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Abstract
This study provides a preliminary overview of the wide range of policy 
concerns relating to surrogacy as a practice at national, European and 
global level. It undertakes an extensive examination of national legal
approaches to surrogacy. It also analyses existing European Union law and
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The study concludes that it is impossible to indicate a particular legal trend 
across the EU, however all Member States appear to agree on the need for 
a child to have clearly defined legal parents and civil status. 
PE 474.403 EN 

  2 
This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs. 
 
 
AUTHORS 
 
Laurence BRUNET (Lead) 
Reader in Private Law 
Université Paris I 
 
Janeen CARRUTHERS 
Professor of Private Law 
University of Glasgow 
 
Konstantina DAVAKI 
Research Fellow, LSE Health 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Derek KING 
Research Fellow, PSSRU 
London School of Economics 
 
Claire MARZO 
British Academy Fellow,  
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
 
Julie MCCANDLESS 
Lecturer in Law 
London School of Economics 
 
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR 
 
Vesna NAGLIC  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
European Parliament 
B-1047 Brussels 
E-mail: vesna.naglic@europarl.europa.eu 
 
 
EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE 
 
Marcia MAGUIRE  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
 
 
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS 
 
Original: EN 
 
 
ABOUT THE EDITOR 
 
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to:  
poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu 
 
European Parliament, manuscript completed in May 2013. 
© European Union, 2013. 
 
This document is available on the Internet at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do 
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. 
 
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the 
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................5 

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................7 

CONTRIBUTORS .......................................................................................8 

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................9 

1. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 17 

1.1. QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION ................................................ 17 

1.2. POLICY MATTERS ........................................................................ 22 

2. LEGAL ANALYSIS – NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW .................. 37 

2.1. 	OVERVIEW ................................................................................. 37 

2.2. 	 PART A: EXPRESS PROVISION FOR SURROGACY AND ASSOCIATED 

CASE LAW .................................................................................. 40 

2.3. 	 PART B: CASE LAW...................................................................... 72 

3. LEGAL ANALYSIS – EUROPEAN UNION LAW ........................................ 137 

3.1. EX-ANTE: THE MANAGEMENT OF SURROGACY PRACTICES .............. 137 

3.2. EX-POST: LEGAL PARENTHOOD FRAMEWORKS .............................. 149 

3.3. CONCLUSION............................................................................ 157 

3.4. INTERNATIONAL LAW ................................................................ 157 

4. LEGAL ANALYSIS –PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ............................... 159 

4.1. SCOPING ................................................................................. 159 

4.2. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF PUTATIVE EU REGIME.............................. 161 

4.3. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION.......................................................... 163 

4.4. 	 ISSUES OF CHOICE OF LAW........................................................ 171 

4.5. 	 ISSUES OF COOPERATION AND BEST PRACTICE ............................ 182 

4.6. 	 ISSUES OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE SURROGACY 

ARRANGEMENT ......................................................................... 186 

4.7. 	CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................. 191 

5. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS......................... 193 

5.1. EMPIRICAL DATA....................................................................... 193 

5.2. POLICY CONCERNS.................................................................... 193 

5.3. LEGAL...................................................................................... 194 

6. COUNTRY REPORTS......................................................................... 200 

6.1. AUSTRALIA............................................................................... 200 

6.2. BELGIUM.................................................................................. 206 

6.3. BULGARIA ................................................................................ 234 

6.4. GERMANY................................................................................. 267 

3
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
6.5. GREECE ................................................................................... 277 

6.6. ITALY ...................................................................................... 294 

6.7. THE NETHERLANDS ................................................................... 302 

6.8. ROMANIA ................................................................................. 324 

6.9. RUSSIA.................................................................................... 333 

6.10. SOUTH AFRICA ......................................................................... 339 

6.11. SPAIN...................................................................................... 351 

REFERENCES ....................................................................................... 368
 
4
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
C.civ 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
1980 HC Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction 
ABGB Allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Austrian Civil Code) 
AHPC Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee (South Africa) 
ART Assisted reproductive technique 
BGN Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) 
Civil Code of Romania 
C. civ. Q Civil Code of Quebec
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
DI Donor insemination 
DCC Dutch Civil Code
EGBGB Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (German
Introductory Law of the Civil Code) 
EC European Community/ Treaty of the European Community
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights 
ESHRE European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology 
EU European Union 
FC Family Code (Russia) 
FLA Family Law Act 1975 (Australia) 
GCC Greek Civil Code 
GBP Great British Pounds 
GSA Gestational Surrogacy Act 2004 (Illinois) 
HFEA 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
HFEA 2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
5
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
ICCS International Commission on Civil Status
ICSI Intracytoplasmic sperm injection
IP Intended parent 
IVF In vitro fertilisation
LTRA Ley sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida (Spanish 
law on the techniques of medically assisted reproduction) 
MP Member of Parliament
MS Member State 
NAMAR National Authority of Medically Assisted Reproduction 
NCTC National Committee for Tripartite Cooperation 
PO Parental Order 
PIL Private International Law
RF Russian Federation 
RT Reproductive technology
SA South Africa 
SAA Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (UK) 
SM Surrogate mother 
StAG Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz (German Citizenship Act) 
TEU Treaty of the European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNCRC  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
US United States 
VARTA Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment Authority 
WHO World Health Organisation 
6
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 :  Summary of definitions ............................................................. 12
 
Table 2 : Overview of the legal approaches of EU Member States .................. 15
 
Table 3 : Summary of the surrogacy questionnaire responses ....................... 18
 
Table 4 : Summary of surrogacy arrangements........................................... 19
 
Table 5 : Member States with ‘express provision’ for surrogacy ..................... 38
 
Table 6 : Non-EU jurisdictions that will be examined.................................... 39
 
Table 7 : Similarities and differences in the Greek and South African legislative 

models .................................................................................... 42
 
Table 8 : The provisions of the Gestational Surrogacy Act 2004 (Illinois) ........ 50
 
Table 9 : Summary Belgium legislative proposals ........................................ 56
 
Table 10: Requirements for the ex-post facto transfer of legal parenthood
 
in UK....................................................................................... 60
 
Table 11: Australian legislative provisions .................................................. 64
 
Table 12: Summary of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology 

guidelines ................................................................................ 68
 
Table 13: Summary table ...................................................................... 156
 
7
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
CONTRIBUTORS 

Core expert team 
Researchers
Country researchers
Laurence BRUNET (Lead)
Reader in Private Law 
Université Paris I 
Derek KING
Research Fellow, PSSRU 
London School of Economics
Julie MCCANDLESS
Lecturer in Law 
London School of Economics 
Elisa NARMINIO 
Project Manager, LSE Consulting 
London School of Economics 
Janeen CARRUTHERS
Professor of Private Law 
University of Glasgow 
Author of section 4
Sarah LIBREGTS
LLM student 
London School of Economics 
Research Assistant section 1 
Virginia AMOROSI 
PhD student 
Università degli Studi di Napoli 
"Federico II" 
Report on: Italy
Olga KHAZOVA
Associate Professor of Law 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
Report on: Russia 
Karène PARIZER 
PhD student 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales
Report on: Austria; Germany 
Marta ROCA I ESCODA
Post-doctoral fellow 
Institute of Law and Technology, 
Barcelona 
Report on: Spain 
Konstantina DAVAKI
Research Fellow, LSE Health 
London School of Economics
Claire MARZO
British Academy Fellow, European
Institute 
London School of Economics
Kiran NANCHAHAL 
Senior Lecturer 
London School of Hygiene & 
Tropical Medicine 
Xavier LABBÉE 
Professor of Private Law 
Université Lille II 
Expert on French legislation
Caroline HENRICOT 
PhD student  
Catholic University of Louvain 
Report on: Belgium; the 
Netherlands
Aikaterina NEOFYTOU
Research Assistant 
London School of Economics 
Report on: Australia; Greece;
Ireland; South Africa; UK; USA 
Carmen PUSCASCU
Law Professor’s Assistant 
Bucarest University 
(from September 2013) 
Report on: Romania 
Elina ZLATANSKA 
Research Assistant 
London School of Economics 
Report on: Bulgaria
8
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
    
 
     
     
     
     
   
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXT 
While surrogacy is not a new reproductive practice, it is commonly accepted that it is an
increasingly prevalent phenomenon. Recent reports have documented a rise in the
practice of surrogacy, to include arrangements that cross national borders.1 Precise 
statistics relating to surrogacy are, however, hard to estimate. This is for a number of
key reasons. First, traditional surrogacy2 does not necessarily require medical 
intervention and can thus be arranged on an informal basis between the parties 
concerned. Second, although gestational surrogacy does require medical intervention, 
officially reported statistics do not necessarily record the surrogacy arrangement but 
often only the IVF procedure.3 Third, in many countries there is simply no legal 
provision, regulation or licensing regime for either fertility treatment and/or surrogacy, 
to include commercial surrogacy in countries where such is not otherwise legally
prohibited. This means that there are no formal reporting mechanisms, which can lead to
a rather ad hoc collection of statistics by individual organisations, if indeed they are
available at all. Finally, in countries where surrogacy is legally prohibited, those involved 
could potentially face criminal prosecution, thus exacerbating the difficulties of collecting
relevant and accurate data. 
Despite these problems, we can still point to a number of factors which signal a rise in
the practice of surrogacy. First, a simple internet search reveals a plethora of agencies 
and clinics that very explicitly seek to facilitate surrogacy arrangements. Sometimes
these are voluntary organisations, which seek to match willing surrogate mothers and 
hopeful parents on a non-commercial basis;4 while others operate on a commercial basis 
either as part of a fertility clinic or in partnership with fertility clinics.5 
Second, there are also increasingly frequent stories in the media about surrogacy
arrangements – whether positive or negative, successful or unsuccessful – as well as 
references to surrogacy in popular culture arenas, such as television shows.6 
Finally, there has been a recent surge in reported case law relating to surrogacy across a 
number of jurisdictions. Interestingly, while some of this case law does involve private
disputes between the parties to the arrangement,7 the primary thematic trend relates to 
difficulties in formal state recognition of the wishes of the parties to the arrangement 
with respect to the legal status and legal parenthood of the children involved. This 
category of case law can emerge in two main ways.  
The first scenario is where a country either prohibits surrogacy, or makes no express
provision for it. When a child is born following a surrogacy arrangement, the general
rules of attributing legal parenthood apply and often a child ends up being cared for by 
someone with whom they have no legal connection.8 This can create a number of 
1 Hague Conference on Private International Law (2012) A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from
 
International Surrogacy Arrangements, pp. 6-8.
 
2 Please see Table 1 below for a summary of the definitions used in this Report.
 
3 E.G. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (2012) Fertility Treatment in 2011: Trends and Figures.
 
Available at: http://www.hfea.gov.uk/104.html.
 
4 E.G. The UK organisation Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy (COTS): http://www.surrogacy.org.uk/.
 
5 E.G. Surrogacy Cyprus: http://www.cyprus-surrogacy.com/index.html.
 
6 E.G. see storylines in the recent US sitcom, ‘The New Normal’: http://www.nbc.com/the-new-normal/; and 

the popular British Soap, ‘Coronation Street’: http://www.itv.com/coronationstreet/news/tinassurrogacy/ h.
 
7 E.G. in the UK see: Matter of TT (A Minor) [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam) and Matter of N (a child) [2007] EWCA Civ 

1053.
 
8 Jackson, E (2006) ‘What is a Parent?’ in Diduck A and K O’Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family
 
Law (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish) pp 59-74 and S. Dermout, H. van de Wiel, P. Heintz, K. Jansen and W.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
difficulties, not least in relation to acquiring and exercising parental responsibility,
maintenance provision and inheritance law. Formal adoption – if permitted in the 
circumstances – must take place, or the courts must rely – if available – on other less
permanent family law measures in order to secure some legal certainly for the child and
the parent(s).9 While the courts in some Member  States have been willing to evoke
adoption or other family law measures subsequent to a surrogacy arrangement,10 others 
have refused to do so, on the basis of public policy.11 
The second, and arguably more complicated scenario, involves formal recognition
following a cross-border surrogacy. Here, the intended parent(s) travel/s to another 
country where surrogacy arrangements are more readily facilitated and/or available at
less expense, either because the fertility treatment (i.e. IVF for a gestational surrogacy) 
is cheaper or because the fee paid to the surrogate mother is lower. While similar
difficulties apply in relation to legal parenthood, the situation can be further exacerbated 
when the rules on legal parenthood in the two countries are mismatched. For example, 
under Ukrainian,12 Russian13 and Californian14 law the intended mother can be
automatically regarded as the legal mother, while for most Member States legal 
motherhood is attributed on the basis of parturition, irrespective of where the birth took 
place.15 Similar difficulties can arise in relation to legal fatherhood, as well as the 
recognition of two parents of the same sex. This can potentially leave a child not only
legally parentless, but also stateless and without citizenship given that their birth
registration documentation is not recognised beyond the country of birth. This scenario is 
particularly problematic when the child needs not just civil status travel documentation
(i.e. a passport), but also a visa to gain entry into the home country of the intended
parent(s). While some Member States have worked towards accommodating the difficult
consequences of such scenarios, whether through judicial deliberations and/or through 
the publication of pre-emptive governmental advice,16 others have refused to do so, 
again on the basis of public policy.17 
While surrogacy has been a legal concern for over three decades,18 there has been a 
recent surge of reports and research in the area of private international law on the
particular legal difficulties associated with cross-border surrogacy arrangements.19 This
Ankum, ‘Non-commercial surrogacy: an account of patient management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF
 
Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004’, Human Reproduction, 2010, vol. 25, n° 2, p. 448.
 
9 E.G. the English courts may grant a non-parent a ‘residence order’ under the Children Act 1989 if they satisfy 

certain requirements. A residence order will automatically confer parental responsibility, but not legal
 
parenthood. In a number of recent cases in Australia, ‘parental responsibility orders’ have been granted to 

intending parents to attribute  them with the ability to make day-to-day decisions concerning the child. 

However, legal parenthood has not been conferred in these cases: Dudley and Chedi [2011] FamCA 502;
 
Hubert and Juntasa [2011] FamCA 504; Findlay and Punyawong [2011] FamCA 503; and Johnson and Anor &
 
Chompunut [2011] FamCA 505. See further Millbank J (2011) “The New surrogacy Parentage Laws in
 
Australia: Cautious Regulation or ’25 brick walls’?”, 35(2) Melbourne University Law Review 1-44.
 
10 E.G. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK.
 
11 E.G. France.
 
12 Family Code of Ukraine, article 123(2).
 
13 Family Code of Russia, articles 51-52.
 
14 Matter of Baby M (1988) 537 A.2d 1227; as reinforced by Johnson v Calvert [1993] 5 Cal 4th 84 and 

Buzzanca v. Buzzanca [1998] 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 280.
 
15 E.G.as per the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s 33(3).
 
16 E.G. Belgium, Ireland and UK.
 
17 E.G. France. However, as this Report indicates, the executive branch of the French Government have 

seemingly been prepared to give ex poste recognition of foreign birth certificates in order to “smooth over” 

some of these difficulties and the precarious position of children born following cross-border surrogacy 

agreements. See section 2, Part B below.
 
18 E.G. the first litigated surrogacy cases in the UK and US where in the early 1980s: Re C (A Minor) (wardship:
 
surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846 and Matter of Baby M (1988) 537 A.2d 1227.
 
19 E.G. Trimmings, K and P Beaumont (2011) ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal
 
regulation at the International Level’ 7 Journal of Private International Law 627-647; Hague Conference of 

Private International Law (2011) Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including 

Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Agreements (Prel. Doc. No 10 of March 2012); Hague Conference
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
work has offered insights into emerging surrogacy practices at a global level by tracking
patterns in cross-border arrangements and cataloguing various national legal regimes.20 
Some of this work has also suggested solutions relating to the possible harmonisation of
private international law principles and/or facilitating cross-border co-operation between 
countries with particular reference to issues such as parental status and the
determination of the nationality and citizenship of the child.21 
This work is clearly of importance for this study and will be used throughout. However,
its private international law focus has meant an inevitable steer towards the resolution of 
cross-border legal disputes and a concentration on managing the legal consequences of 
cross-border surrogacy arrangements, rather than the legal – and policy – management 
of the practice of surrogacy per se. This is not to say that proposed models of legal
regulation for surrogacy at the international level do not seek to encourage acceptable 
international standards for surrogacy, but rather that the existing private international 
law work does not provide a sustained engagement with a number of important policy
considerations that the legal regulation of surrogacy must ultimately be informed by.22 
Although a concern for child welfare is clearly evident in this work, other crucial policy
concerns are less visible; for example, issues of gender equality, reproductive freedom,
exploitation, globalisation, health policy and regulation. While an important function of
the law is to react to particular events that have happened and manage disputes, it is 
also clear  that the role of law in society is much broader. It can be used as a  
preventative, normative or regulatory tool. When controversial issues such as surrogacy 
are addressed by law, it is crucial to reflect on the ultimate purpose of any legal
approach and the broader consequences that may ensue. While it is beyond the auspices
of this study to make concrete policy recommendations, section 1 outlines the key policy
concerns that any legal approach would have to consider before it is taken forward. 
To date, no research has specifically considered the possibility of a European Union (‘EU’)
level response to the legal difficulties raised by surrogacy. One of the main aims of this 
study has been to consider the potential remit of the EU in this area (see below). In 
recent years, various EU directives pertaining to reproductive healthcare provision and 
the management of bio-medical material have been instigated.23 However, when it
comes to the regulation of matters relating to family relations, the role of the EU is much
less visible. This, in part, pertains to the limited competence of the EU legislator in the
domain of family law.24 Therefore, while examples of EU law being used to facilitate
access to reproductive health services across Member States can be identified,25 rarely
do these examples extend to subsequent family status; one of the key legal issues in the
context of surrogacy. This study is therefore the first to investigate the potential remit of 
on Private International Law (2012) A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy
Arrangements (Prel. Doc No 11 of March 2011). 
20 A forthcoming book publication will provide National Reports on a significant number of countries worldwide: 
Trimmings, K and P Beaumont (eds) (forthcoming 2013) International surrogacy Arrangements: Legal
Regulation at the International Level (Oxford, Hart Publishing). 
21 See Trimmings, K and P Beaumont (2011) ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Legal
regulation at the International Level’ 7 Journal of Private International Law 627-647 and Trimmings, K and P 
Beaumont (eds) (forthcoming 2013) International surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the
International Level (Oxford, Hart Publishing), Part 3. 
22 Note, however, the acknowledgment of a range of vulnerabilities relating to surrogacy in: Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (2011) Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children,
Including Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Agreements (Prel. Doc. No 10 of March 2012), pp 1-2,
26-27. The Hague Conference on Private International Law has not yet made any formal proposals in relation
to any international instruments relating to surrogacy. The Permanent Bureau is, however, currently
conducting research in this area and may ultimately provide more of a focus for private international law work 
on the various vulnerabilities that surrogacy presents. 
23 E.G. Tissue and Cells Directive 2004/23/EC. 
24 See Article 81 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (‘TEU’), which permits the Council to 
establish measures addressing the cross-border implications of family law when such implications are the 
subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure. 
25 E.G. R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687, on the release
of posthumously stored sperm for use in Belgium in a procedure that was otherwise illegal in the UK. 
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the EU in relation to surrogacy; a reproductive practice which may or may not involve
medical intervention.
DEFINITIONS 
The following table defines the terminology used by this Report, given the unfamiliar and 
often contested nature of surrogacy-related terminology. While we have adapted the 
terms below, we accept that terms such as “surrogate mother” and “altruistic” continue
to prove problematic in sufficiently capturing the both empirical realties and the
subjectivities of the persons involved in surrogacy arrangements.26 For example, a
woman who bears a child for another person may never perceive of herself as a mother. 
Table 1. Summary of definitions
Term Definition
Surrogacy 
A practice whereby a woman will become pregnant with the intention 
of giving the child to someone else upon birth.  
Surrogate 
mother 
The woman who carries and gives birth to the child.
Intended parent 
The person who intends to raise the child. Sometimes the term 
‘commissioning parent’ is used. However, this study will use only the 
term ‘intended parent’ given that not all surrogacy arrangements are 
commercial, which is what the term ‘commissioning parent’ seems to 
allure to. 
Traditional 
surrogacy 
arrangement 
A surrogacy arrangement where the surrogate mother’s eggs are 
used and she is the genetic mother of the child. The pregnancy 
comes about either through an insemination procedure with the 
sperm of the intended father or donated sperm, or through sexual 
intercourse with the intended father or another man. 
Traditional surrogacy is sometimes also known as ‘partial’ or ‘low­
technology’ surrogacy. 
Gestational
surrogacy 
arrangement 
A surrogacy arrangement in which the surrogate mother’s eggs are 
not used and someone else is the genetic mother of the child. The 
pregnancy comes about through an IVF procedure using either the 
intended mother’s eggs or donated eggs. 
Gestational surrogacy is sometimes also known as ‘full’ ‘IVF’ or ‘high­
technology’ surrogacy. 
Altruistic 
surrogacy 
arrangement 
A surrogacy arrangement where the surrogate mother is paid 
nothing, or only remunerated for her expenses associated with the 
surrogacy. Usually, the intended parent(s) cover such expenses. 
Commercial 
surrogacy 
A surrogacy arrangement where the surrogate mother is 
remunerated beyond expenses associated with the surrogacy. This 
may be termed a ‘fee’ or ‘compensation’ for pain and suffering.
Again, usually the intended parent(s) cover such a payment. 
Cross-border
surrogacy 
A surrogacy arrangement involving a surrogate mother and an 
intended parent or parents from different countries. An intermediary 
26 For an interesting critical discussion of terminology in the context of surrogacy see: Morgan, D (1989)
‘Surrogacy: An Introductory Essay’ in Lee, R and D Morgan (eds) Birth Rights: Law and Ethics at the 
Beginnings of Life (London: Routledge), pp.55-84. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
arrangement may further add to the cross-border dimension. Often, more than
two countries may be involved.
Sometimes the term ‘international surrogacy agreement’ is used. We 
have not used this term in an effort to avoid giving the impression 
that such agreements are attended to by international legal
measures. Moreover, the term ‘cross-border’ emphasises that 
typically the parties involved must cross borders in order for the 
surrogacy to take place, and that typically the intended parent(s)
seeks to cross borders ‘back’ to their home country.  
Legal parenthood 
The attribution of legal status to someone as the parent of a child.
The term legal parenthood is preferred to ‘legal parentage’ given the 
association of the word ‘parentage’ with physical lineage. Legal
parenthood can be attributed on a number of grounds other than bio­
genetic affinity. 
Parentage 
While technically this term can mean the same as parenthood, it is 
also commonly used to refer to a parent-child relationship based on 
bio-genetic affinity. When used in this study, it will mean only the 
latter. 
Reproductive 
technology 
The use of medical or other technology to help a person or persons 
reproduce. 
Fertility
treatment 
The use of some sort of medical intervention and/or reproductive 
technology that enables a person or a couple to have a child. Fertility
treatment interventions range from the use of hormone stimulating 
drugs, to high-technology interventions such as in vitro fertilisation
(IVF) and its variants (e.g. intracytoplasmic sperm injection, ICSI).
While surrogacy per se is not a treatment for infertility (like donor 
insemination and the use of donated gametes more generally, it by­
passes the infertility condition), it may entail the use of one of these 
reproductive techniques. 
Collaborative
reproduction 
Reproduction involving the use of reproductive bodily material and/or 
capacity from a person or persons who do not intend to raise the 
child with his/her intended parent(s). For example, donor 
insemination (DI); the use of donated eggs; and surrogacy. 
Assisted 
reproduction 
Reproduction involving either medical assistance and/or the use of
reproductive bodily material and/or capacity from a person or 
persons who do not intent to raise the child with his/her intended 
parent(s). 
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AIMS OF THE STUDY 
The underlying motivation for this study is to assess whether the EU should, or indeed
could, adopt uniform rules relating to surrogacy. In order to  help make such an  
assessment, the study has the following key aims: 
1.To empirically investigate and analyse trends in the practices and attitudes 
towards surrogacy across the EU Member States through a number of indicative 
case-studies. 
2.To identify and analyse policy issues relating to surrogacy that any process of EU
harmonisation of laws, or indeed any legislative measure aimed at surrogacy,
would need to be informed by. 
3.To investigate and analyse different legislative models and other express
provisions for surrogacy (e.g. professional organisation guidelines), to include
how judges have interpreted these provisions in cases that have come before
the courts. The analytical focus will be comparative and will evaluate both the 
benefits and difficulties that arise with different approaches and subsequent
legal disputes. Given that only a few Member States have any explicit legislation
for surrogacy, the legal regimes and case law in a number of indicative
jurisdictions beyond the EU will also be examined, in order to shed greater light
on the format that legislation might take in this area and the difficulties that
may ensue. 
4.To investigate and analyse the role of the courts in solving the disputes and
problematic legal issues that arise when a legal vacuum exists in relation to
surrogacy, or where all forms of surrogacy are legally prohibited. The analytical
focus will be to suitably categorise the different types of case law that have
arisen across the EU Member States that do not expressly provide for surrogacy, 
or where surrogacy in all forms is legally prohibited, and to evaluate the legal
concepts and techniques that have been used by the judiciary; from e.g. the
‘best interests of the child’, to reference to constitutional and human rights 
provisions, or principles emerging from private international law.
5.To investigate and analyse the private international law issues emerging from 
cross-border surrogacy agreements and to provide an evaluation of what form 
legal regulation in this area could usefully take.
6.To investigate and analyse the potential remit of the EU in the area of surrogacy 
and to provide an evaluation of whether the EU should and/or could adopt
uniform rules in this field.
7.To provide the European Parliament with a significant research report from which
future research studies in the area of surrogacy may emerge. 
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Table 2 Overview of the legal approaches of EU Member States 
Country General 
prohibition 
Prohibition 
on 
commercial 
surrogacy 
*Expressly 
facilitated 
No special law on 
surrogacy 
Austria Prohibition of
egg donation; 
gestational 
surrogacy thus 
prohibited
No specific
prohibition in
relation to
traditional 
surrogacy 
No No special law for
traditional surrogacy
Belgium No Commercial 
surrogacy 
prohibited on
public policy 
grounds 
Some provision in one
fertility clinic, subject
to conditions; there
are currently
legislative proposals
before Parliament 
No special law for altruistic
surrogacy: contracts are 
not enforceable and 
adoption is required to 
transfer legal parenthood 
Bulgaria Yes n/a No: however, draft 
legislation currently 
under consideration 
n/a 
Cyprus No No No Yes 
Czech 
Republic
No No No Yes 
Denmark No Yes No No special law for altruistic
surrogacy; contracts are 
not enforceable and 
adoption is required to 
transfer legal parenthood 
Estonia No No No Yes 
Finland Prohibition on
surrogacy 
arrangements
using fertility 
treatment 
No specific
prohibition in
relation to
traditional 
surrogacy 
No No special law for
traditional surrogacy
France Yes n/a n/a n/a 
Germany Yes n/a n/a n/a 
Greece No Yes Yes: altruistic 
gestational surrogacy
subject to restrictions 
n/a 
Hungary No Yes No Mo special law for altruistic
surrogacy. 
Ireland No Yes No: however, there 
are some formal
guidelines relating to
cross-border 
surrogacy agreements 
No special law for altruistic
surrogacy: contracts are 
not enforceable and 
adoption is required to 
transfer parenthood. 
However, the courts 
recently gave permission 
for genetic intended parents 
to be named as the legal
parents on the birth 
registrar. 
Italy Yes n/a n/a n/a 
Latvia No Yes No No special law for altruistic
15
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surrogacy. 
Lithuania No No No Yes 
Luxembourg No No No Yes 
Malta Yes n/a n/a n/a 
Netherlands No Yes Yes: altruistic 
gestational surrogacy
is required by law to
abide by professional
guidelines
No special law for
parenthood: adoption 
required 
Poland No No No Yes 
Portugal Yes n/a n/a n/a 
Romania No No No Yes 
Slovakia No No No Yes 
Slovenia No No No Yes 
Spain Yes n/a No n/a 
Sweden Illegal for
fertility clinics to
make surrogacy 
arrangements
No No: the Swedish 
Council on Medical 
Ethics recently 
published a report on 
assisted reproduction, 
in which it suggested
that altruistic
surrogacy should be 
permitted in Sweden.
No special law for privately 
arranged surrogacy: 
adoption required to 
transfer parenthood 
UK No Yes Legislation providing 
for the transfer of 
parenthood in certain 
conditions
No special law for altruistic
surrogacy: contracts are 
not enforceable and 
parenthood will only be 
transferred in certain 
circumstances 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
1.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
1.1. QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION 
Detailed data relating to surrogacy in the EU was sought from two sources. Firstly, a 
rapid review of the literature was conducted to locate official data reported in published
studies set in the EU. Secondly the research team designed and conducted a survey of
clinics and associations involved in surrogacy. These two sources of data were 
complimentary as the published data both helped inform the questions asked in survey 
and complemented the data returned to us. 
1.1.1. Surrogacy survey 
As to the empirical data collection, the study team developed a survey to solicit data on 
current arrangements regarding surrogacy in the EU Member States. The data from the 
survey was used to provide an empirical context for the remaining aspects of the study. 
Our survey on the current state of surrogacy legislation has been developed and 
translated into Dutch and Greek. The survey sets out to determine, in each of the 
countries the prevalence of childlessness and use of surrogacy, and shed light on some
of the practical processes by which surrogacy takes place. 
The survey, along with the Letter of Support from the European Parliament and a cover 
letter was initially sent via e-mail to 13 clinics/Organisations across four countries – six
in Greece, three in Belgium, one in the Netherlands and three in the UK. A contact in
France facilitated receipt of data on France also. Contact was made by telephone with a 
number of these clinics to make them aware of the questionnaire before it was sent. In
an attempt to expand our sample we asked respondents to identify other clinics and 
organisations in their country that may have relevant data. It was hoped that this would
allow us to reach a wider sample of respondents. Five clinics/associations were contacted 
by email subsequent to the initial mailout.
We anticipated that responses to the request to complete the Surrogacy Questionnaire 
would be limited due to the timing of when the requests were sent out – around the 
Christmas break. In order to boost the response rate we tried a range of methods to
contact those clinics/organisations that did not return the questionnaire. Each was sent a
reminder e-mail which was then followed-up with telephone calls and/or faxes. Table 2
below details our survey responses and attempts to follow-up in cases where the survey 
was not returned. 
Disappointingly, only six questionnaires were returned, even after follow-up contacts 
were made. We did receive at least one response from each of our representative 
countries. These data were supplemented with data derived from our review of the 
literature. There may be several reasons why the questionnaires were not returned. The
nature of the topic may have generated some apprehension to participate, despite the 
Letter of Support from the European Parliament sent to all potential respondents and our 
assurances of anonymity given to all respondents. Also, more than one respondent 
commented on the complexity of the topic and the ability to provide data on parts of the
surrogacy situation in their country and not on others (e.g. having data pertaining to 
local surrogate mothers only and not having any data or knowledge as to surrogacy 
arrangements involving surrogate mothers from other countries). 
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Table 3 Summary of the surrogacy questionnaire responses 
Country Stakeholder Completed 
questionnaire 
(Y/N) 
Type (number) of 
reminder 
Clinic 1 N email (1); telephone (1); 
fax (1) 
Clinic 2 Y 
Clinic 3 N email (1); telephone (1); 
fax (1) 
Belgium 
Clinic 4 N email (2); telephone (1); 
fax (1) 
France Association 1 Y 
Clinic 1 Y 
Clinic 2 N email (2); telephone (1) 
Clinic 3 N email (2); telephone (2) 
Association 2 N email (2); telephone (1) 
Greece 
Association 3 Y 
The 
Netherlands 
Clinic 1 Y 
Association 1 Y 
Association 2 N email (2); telephone (1); 
fax (1) 
Clinic 1 N email (3); telephone (3); 
fax (1) 
Clinic 2 N email (2); telephone (2) 
Clinic 3 N email (2); telephone (2) 
Association 1 N email (2) 
United 
Kingdom 
Association 2 N email (2); telephone (2) 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
1.1.2. Results 
The data from the survey, supplemented from data reported in the literature, is 
summarised in Table 3. The number of children born to surrogate mothers varies
considerable across Europe. As some respondents were only able to provide data from 
their own clinic, and because in most cases official data is not recorded, the more 
accurate estimate of the national figures are those from the UK as intended parents in
the UK are required to obtain a Parental Order (PO) to give them legal parental 
responsibility. During the period from 1995 to 2007, between 33 and 50 POs were 
granted each year in the UK (Crawshaw 2013). The Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority introduced its Eighth Code of Practice in 2009 which removed the guidance 
that licensed treatment centres only offer surrogacy when a woman seeking surrogacy
was not physically able to get pregnant or if pregnancy was highly undesirable for 
medical reasons (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 2009). This change 
came into force in 2010. Eligibility has also been extended from only married
heterosexual couple to unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex couples. 
The number of POs resulting from surrogacy has risen (Crawshaw 2013). In 2008, 75
were granted; 79 in 2009, and 83 in 2010, and 149 in 2011. This rise is likely to 
continue as clinics target a wider group of potential parents (Crawshaw 2013). For 
example, the British Surrogacy Centre has opened a UK office aimed especially at gay
couples. 
Table 4 : Summary of surrogacy arrangements 
Country Number of 
children born
to surrogate 
mothers per
year 
Countries from 
which 
surrogate 
mothers are
found 
Time from after
birth to child 
handed to 
intended parents 
Costs (average 
or range) 
2 Belgium Child handed over 
immediately 
Not available 
Not available EU; mostly
Greece 
Child handed over 
immediatelyii 
€14000 - 50000 
The 
Netherlandsi 
2 The Netherlands Child handed over 
immediatelyiii 
€7500 
United 
Kingdom 
149iv India, US, 
Ukraineiv 
Child handed over 
immediately 
€11780v 
France 200vi EU: Belgium, UK 
and Greece
Non-EU: US, 
Canada, Ukraine,
India and Russia 
Within 1 day €70000 
Belgiumi 
Greece 
i Data pertains to respondents’ clinic only. 

ii Provided that a relevant permission from the court has been attained and the child 

has been registered (to the National Registry) as the legal child of the intended 

parents.
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iii The intended parents are deemed to be foster parents for the first year and can 

adopt the child after 365 days.
 
iv Crawshaw M, Blyth E, van den Akker O. (2013) The changing profile of surrogacy in
 
the UK – Implications for national and international policy and practice. Journal of
 
Social Welfare and Family Law, DOI:10.1080/09649069.2012.750478.] 

v Median; £10000 converted at exchange rate on 5th April 2013.
 
v iRelates only to cases where surrogate mother resides outside of France. 

There is the potential, however, that even the data from the UK may not be entirely 
accurate. Comparing data from surrogacy agencies with official figures on the number of
POs granted between 1995 and 1998 suggests that only about 50% of Intended Parents
obtained a Parental Order during this period (Crawshaw 2013). Since 2008, however, 
there are now more Parental Orders in the official figures as compared to the number
reported by UK surrogacy agencies. This may reflect births to surrogate mothers who 
reside outside of the UK. The UK General Register Offices for England and Wales
reported that approximately 26% of POs granted in the year to October 2011 involved 
births outside the UK (up from 2% in 2008, 4% in 2009, and 13% in 2010 (Crawshaw 
2013). In Scotland the 2011 figure for POs granted after overseas birth was 13%.  
With regards to the number of parents unwillingly without children, a WHO study from
1991 estimated that 8 to 12% of couples with women of childbearing age are infertile 
(World Health Organization 1991). Note that the definition of fertility may vary
depending on the length of time after a couple having regular unprotected sexual
intercourse and not getting pregnant are deemed infertile. The UK Human Fertilisation
Embryology Authority estimated that 16% of couples in the UK who are trying to get
pregnant will not have done so after one year and 8% will not become pregnant after 
two years of trying (Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority 2011). A study by
Klemetti (2003) in Finland determined that 9% of women were infertile. From our
survey, an estimate from one source was that 15% of couples are infertile. Another
estimate was provided by our French respondent who estimated that 50000 French 
couples are infertile (gestational infertility). These figures, however, do not include same
sex couples. In the UK, 32 POs (approximately 21% of total) were granted to same sex
couples (Crawshaw 2013). This may actually be an underestimate of the frequency of 
same sex couple intended parents as the information on sexuality of intended parents by
the Child and Family Court Advisory and Support Service for England is regarded as
patchy. 
The number of couples who seek assisted reproductive technique (ART) was estimated 
by survey respondents as 139300 in France (in 2010) - up from 122100 in 2007 (a 14% 
increase in 4 years), while 20000 couples in Belgium sought IVF in 2010 - up from 
16700 in 2006 (a 20% increase in 5 years). In the UK, in 2011, a total of 50230 women
received fertility treatment (In Vitro Fertilisation, Intra-Cytoplasmis Sperm Injection or
Donor Insemination) (Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority 2011). The estimate
number of women resident in the UK, between the ages of 20 and 50 years, at the time 
of the 2011 census was 13164000 (Office of National Statistics 2012). Thus it can be 
estimated that 0.4% of women of childbearing age received fertility treatment in the UK
in 2011. Shenfield et al. (2010) cautiously estimated that as of 2009 there were 24000 
to 30000 cycles of cross-border treatment each year involving 11000 to 14000 patients. 
Funding arrangements for ART differs across countries. Sorenson detailed the funding
arrangements for ART in the European Union (Sorenson 2006). 
Data on the number of parents who look into surrogacy as an option and begin the 
process to become surrogate parents comes largely from the literature. In data from 
Belgium collected over a 13 year period at one clinic facilitating surrogacy, 52 of 87 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
(60%) cases where interest was expressed led to a request to be considered for 
surrogacy. Of these 33 (63%) resulted in commencement of clinical procedures for a
surrogate pregnancy (Austin et al. 2011). A study by Dermout et al. (2010) reported
data on all non-commercial surrogacy that took place in the Netherlands between 1997
and 2004. During this period, 500 couples enquired about surrogacy. The French survey 
respondent reported that the number of parents deciding to use surrogacy between 2007 
and 2011 were as follows: 300 in 2007, 300 in 2008, 400 in 2009, 500 in 2010 and 700 
in 2011. 
Good data was received on the country of residence of surrogate mothers in the
surveyed countries (see Table 3). The clinics in Belgium and the Netherlands considered
women resident in the country as potential surrogates. In the case of the Netherlands, 
they were required to be Dutch citizens. India, the US and Ukraine were mentioned as
non-EU countries from which surrogate mothers were sought by intended parents in the
UK and France. Crawshaw et al (2013) reported that in data from the Child and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service for England for 2010-2011, where country of 
residence of the surrogate mother was known, 27% came from non-UK countries 
including 22% from India, US and Ukraine. In France, 200 children were born to 
surrogate mothers who resided outside of the country. There has been a steady increase 
in these cases: 120 in 2007, 125 in 2008, 150 in 2009, and 170 in 2010.  
In the countries surveyed, the child is effectively handed over to the intended parents at
or shortly after birth. In the UK the child is handed over immediately, and the intended 
parents must obtain a Parental Order after the first six weeks of the birth but within the 
first six months (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008). In Greece, the child is
handed over (to the intended parents) immediately after his/her birth, if a relevant
permission from the court has been attained and the child has been registered (to the 
National Registry) as the legal child of the intended parents.
In the Netherlands, intended parents are given the baby directly after delivery but the
child is deemed to be a foster child until they are legally adopted exactly 1 year after 
birth. In France the child is handed over within one day. 
Despite the fact that surrogacy was arranged on a non-commercial bases in each of the 
countries, the costs involved for the intended parents to obtain a surrogate child vary
widely. In part this may be due to differences in clinical costs across countries but this is 
unlikely to explain the degree of variation in the reported estimates of costs. Indeed, 
within Greece, two sources provided estimates of €14000 and €50000. The costs 
reported were highest in France, perhaps reflecting the fact that this estimate related to 
international arrangements only. In the UK the median cost was estimated as €11780. 
This cost estimate was confirmed in the literature (Crawshaw 2013). Cases have been
reported of costs as high as €27,120 (Horsey & Sheldon 2012).  
Costs are intended to cover expenses relating to childbirth including the cost of IVF,
agency fees, transportation, and legal expenses. In Greece, the surrogate mother is also
compensated for lost earnings, while in the UK this can be claimed in some cases. In The 
UK respondents also reported covered costs to include the cost of meetings between the
surrogate mother and the intended parents, food (e.g. if the intended parents ask the 
surrogate mother to eat organic food only before and during pregnancy), support group 
visits, and in some cases the cost of a short holiday for the surrogate mother after the
birth (deemed necessary to allow surrogate mother to adjust after the birth). In each
country the surrogate mother receives standard ante-natal care during pregnancy. In
Belgium, surrogate mothers also receive psychological support.
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As can be seen from our results as well those of others (Crawshaw 2013), it is clear that 
only very limited data are available across the EU and improved systems need to be put
in place to routinely record relevant information across all countries.
1.2. POLICY MATTERS 
1.2.1. Introduction 
The EU landscape is extremely varied when it comes to surrogacy policies and
legislation. Despite general similarities related to whether states adopt prohibiting or
permissive policies, each case is unique and any attempt at generalisation would obscure 
significant aspects of diverse legislative and policy itineraries.
Since ART matters generate heated political debate, politicians are reluctant to take a 
clear stance, as the impact this may have on the electorate is uncertain. Policy design in
different countries is the product of the interplay of various factors on many levels, 
including the influence of institutional arrangements, medical professional communities 
and the claims of women’s movements on the one hand and of pro-life actors on the 
other. Feminist approaches also vary. In the UK and Italy, for instance, women’s 
movements pushed for the liberalisation of abortion through permissive positions on ART
contrary to pro-life views prioritising the human embryo; by contrast, in Germany and
Switzerland they demanded a restrictive policy to protect women from scientific and 
patriarchal abuse (Engeli 2009). 27 
Political parties, institutions, associations of medical professionals, religious groups,
social movements, party systems, private and public interests, all contribute to particular
policy designs and legislation. Varone et al. (2006) refer to five distinguishing variables,
namely policy goals, tools, target groups, final beneficiaries and implementers. The 
constellation of power of all groups involved and the choice of instruments make each
country a separate case and a multi-causal approach seems to be the most pertinent, as
similar outcomes may be the result of different policy paths. Analysing different 
approaches to ART they broadly distinguish between countries that ‘design by non-
decisions’ which results in adoption of substantial policy content, ‘designing by élites’
which leads to intermediate policy design and finally ‘design by mobilisation and 
consultation’ whose outcome are restrictive policies. 
Other important parameters are culture and kinship structures, attitudes toward new 
technologies and ethical dilemmas which in combination with the aforementioned factors 
lead to various state responses. 
The following sections intend to provide the common themes expressed in the literature
regarding ethical issues, health policy, children’s welfare, globalisation, attitudes to
surrogacy and regulation. Finally a section is dedicated to surrogacy as experience,
because any gendered approach takes interest in both the public and the private spheres
and drawing on ethnographic studies narratives of surrogates from different parts of the 
world will reveal differences in status, culture and ways of making sense of the situation,
as well as identification of the regulatory gaps that exist. The list is certainly not
exhaustive and dealing with each one separately could be the topic of numerous studies. 
Given the limited scope for policy analysis in this study, the aforementioned framework 
and the most salient and relevant of the themes that follow will  be discussed with the
purpose of better comprehending the different national approaches and possible 
27 In the case of Germany, in particular, the fascination of the Third Reich with biotechnology and eugenics and 
their appalling consequences for humanity, help explaining the current aversion towards reproductive 
technologies, even by feminists and parties of the Left. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
legislative and policy responses to existing challenges and dilemmas as well as exploring
the possibility of common responses on the EU level.  
1.2.2. The ethical debate: parenthood, commodification, autonomy
On an ethical basis, there are different viewpoints on surrogacy, genetic (traditional) or 
gestational, altruistic or commercial. Most religions and relevant organisations are 
against surrogacy, particularly its commercial aspects, since they see it as immoral,
against the unity of marriage and procreation, or against the dignity or the child to be 
carried by their biological mother; as a result, they call upon the law to maintain
surrogacy as illegal. Liberal approaches, however, emphasise the need for the state and
the law to stay neutral towards competing moral standards, drawing, among else, on
John Stuart Mill’s principle that only harmful practices should be prohibited by law and
that one is ultimately sovereign over one’s body and mind (Hatzis 2003). Legal 
arrangements seem to be struggling to cope with on the one hand these various moral 
views, and on the other a number of ethical issues involved in the idea and the 
procedures of surrogacy, which touch upon family structure and welfare of children, the
nature of motherhood, and opposing views of politicians, feminists and pro-life activists.  
Gestation is usually considered as part of the biological process of reproduction. In 
surrogacy, where it is unclear who the parent is, deciding who will bear legal
responsibility for the child is complex and calls for a broader approach which focuses on
both biological and social parenthood, a normative concept (Ettinger 2011). There are 
common elements in both biological and social parenthood, such as intentions, actions 
and emotional bonds. Biological parenthood presupposes a genetic link between parent
and child and the parent must be causally responsible, whereas social parenting is 
defined and constrained by social norms. IVF has introduced other parties in what used 
to be a bipartite relationship, namely the doctor and, in some cases, the sperm donor 
and finally, in surrogacy, the surrogate mother. The gestational mother’s bond with the 
child is a physical one and cannot be ignored. Some have argued that the law might
account for parental duties and responsibilities, but still this is not enough: a re­
conception of motherhood or mere self-deception is required on the part of the surrogate 
in order to be able to relinquish the child. One must depersonalise the whole process and
treat the surrogate as an object and commodity, or a ‘womb for rent’ in order to make 
the breaking of the biological bond more palatable; but this entails making a surrogate 
susceptible to exploitation and coercion (Tieu 2009). 
This seems to be the case increasingly among legal scholars and surrogacy agencies
through the argument that parenthood should be established on the basis of intentions, 
rather than biology or genetics. In this respect, only the intended parents can be 
considered as parents, since the surrogate does not have the intention to become a 
mother when she conceives the child. In any case, a broad approach to social 
parenthood is essential in our attempt to make sense of new developments.
An important moral objection to commercial surrogacy derives from the commodification
argument which targets the idea of compensation for relinquishing the surrogate’s
parental right to the child she has borne. For Burr (2000), this argument reinforces the 
public/private divide, where private is the feminine sphere, characterised by nurturing 
and loving, while public is the masculine terrain which is defined by commercialisation of
the labour power. By contrast, others view the commodification that emerges when 
families are constructed through the marketplace as disruptive of the dichotomy 
between private and public spheres, or between reproduction and production (Pande
2011). 
Surrogacy has also divided feminists. Since the mid-1980s, with the case of ‘Baby M’, 
liberal feminists took a positive stance, stressing the right of women to determine their 
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reproductive rights and be perfectly capable of entering legal contracts as they please,
whereas socialist and radical feminists were against surrogacy using the commodification
argument. What made feminists uncomfortable with the whole debate was that on the
one hand some of the arguments against surrogacy were overlapping with conservative 
approaches to the ‘unique experience of motherhood’ (e.g. of Catholics and pro-life
activists), while on the other the arguments in favour seemed to be endorsing market 
arrangements (Scott 2009). 
Some feminists view gestational surrogacy as a form of prostitution or slavery and
compare it to organ transplant marketing. They argue that to denounce the commercial 
exploitation of a kidney and accept the exploitation of the womb constitutes a moral 
dichotomy of patriarchal society. The mere fact that a woman rents her body opens the
road to exploitation, particularly since the logic of surrogacy is to fulfil the desire of a
couple at any cost. Kimbrell (1993) draws parallels between surrogacy and slavery, since
slave women were often used as birth mothers without any legal rights. Fears are 
expressed that poor women might be transformed into an army of surrogate labour or a
caste of pregnancy carriers. Berend (2012) considers surrogacy as the extreme form of
alienated labour which is more about generating profits and reproducing sexism, rather 
than about generating life. 
In the words of Anderson, ‘when market norms are applied to the ways we allocate and 
understand parental rights and responsibilities over children, children are reduced from
subjects of love to objects of use. When market norms are applied to the ways we treat
and understand women’s reproductive labour women are reduced from subjects of 
respect and consideration to objects of use’ (Anderson 1993, p.189).  
Moreover, surrogacy raises ethical issues about the dignity of the child as it turns it into
the product of a market relation. A well-known feminist argument condemns ‘baby­
selling’, referring mainly to traditional surrogacy, which involves relinquishing not only
the babies surrogates carry, but also their genetic material (McDermott 2012). This 
negative stance has, however, been mitigated since the 1990s with technological 
developments enabling gestational surrogacy. The lack of genetic link between the 
surrogate and the baby, together with the shift of emphasis to surrogacy as service,
have rendered surrogacy more socially acceptable, but have also paved the way to new 
risks. As commissioning couples are often wealthy and prepared to spend large amounts 
of money their high expectations might include good appearance or specific physical 
attributes (designer babies), raising thus serious bio-ethical issues. Such high 
expectations have also an impact on the autonomy of the surrogate, as they may involve 
asking for detailed and often private information about herself and her family in an
attempt to create as full a profile as possible. They might also generate segmentation in
the surrogate market, with respect to caste, skin colour, appearance etc., with younger, 
higher educated, attract or brighter surrogates being in higher demand (Iowa Institute
2012). 
Others also see payment for reproductive services as problematic, since ova retrieval
and pregnancy are physically invasive and involve significant health risks. Concerns are 
more serious when women in financial need resort to these practices for financial 
compensation, in which cases there is no real autonomy in their decision-making. These 
are enhanced when practices go beyond national borders and into a global market where 
consumers are wealthy people from developed countries and providers are poor women
in the third world (Crozier 2010). 
Globalisation enhances commodification and increases risks of human trafficking and 
sales of women’s reproductive capacity in a global surrogacy marketplace (Iowa Institute
2012). It increases the risk of undue coercion, when the remuneration of the surrogate 
is very high for the salary standards of the destination (Crozier 2010). 
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According to liberal legal views, the parties involved in surrogacy arrangements are the 
best judges of their own welfare; therefore a contract that makes all parties better off
should be enforced, rather than prohibited by law (Hatzis 2003). In the feminist debate 
on women’s reproductive function ‘autonomy’ is a key concept. The ideology of
motherhood constrains both motherhood and maternity. The former as biological 
phenomenon prevents some women from living a fully autonomous life, while the latter
defines the social aspect of being a mother. Real choice would mean that they could
transcend both the social and the physical impediments and opt out of becoming
mothers (Marshall 2008). Choice can be seen as a dynamic navigation through a net of 
social, physical and psychological factors. In this way some women decide to go for 
abortion, to remain childless, or to bear children they will not keep, either because they
will act as surrogates or because they will give them up for adoption.
The concept of informed consent is relevant to better understand the parties’ position in
a surrogacy contract. Informed consent can be used for vitiation of legal responsibility,
which might also include moral responsibility. It is presumed that a woman who decides
to become a surrogate mother is autonomous, but economic pressures in commercial
surrogacy or emotional pressures in altruistic surrogacy should not be underestimated 
(Ber 2000). In such cases, the Western liberal ethical framework emphasising the
individual right to choice, comes up against the risk that this ‘choice’ might be 
emotionally or financially ‘imposed’. Conversely, it is an ethical question whether one 
should be denied the opportunity to act altruistically or alleviate one’s family poverty 
through surrogacy (Deonandan et al. 2012).  
But the issue of informed consent is also problematic due to the fact that long-term 
health outcomes, complexities that might arise in the relationship between the parties
contracting, or social implications cannot be known in advance. The ideal of ‘informed
consent’ in becoming a surrogate is, therefore, compromised by coercion (e.g. by 
family), uncertainty as to the emotional and psychological impact on the surrogate and 
her surroundings, lack of knowledge about pregnancy complications, the complexity of a 
surrogacy contract and the uncertain ethical implications for the wider community (Tieu
2009). 
The autonomy of the surrogate mother can also be compromised throughout the process
by her being forced by the genetic parents and/or physicians to undergo sampling tests,
amniocentesis or vaginal ultra-sound, to receive pressures to change her diet or lifestyle,
or to terminate the pregnancy in case of a defective foetus.  
1.2.3. Cross-border surrogacy  
Cross-border reproductive care is seen as a consequence of a multitude of moral, ethical 
and religious views (a key ingredient of a postmodern society), which produce a mosaic
of legal arrangements in different countries, even those with similar cultures (e.g. in the
EU). It is also the outcome of limited public services for the treatment of infertility, which 
encourage the privatisation of reproductive care (Ferraretti et al. 2010). This is a multi­
million industry. Seeking surrogate mothers in low-income countries, notably India, 
presents ethical challenges hitherto non-dealt with. When clients are from high-income 
countries and the jurisdiction providing maternal surrogacy is a low- or middle-income 
country the opportunity (or risk) for exploitation is great and carries implications for 
female autonomy and reproductive rights (Deonandan et al. 2012). 
Cross-border reproductive care or as some call it ‘reproductive tourism’ has been defined
as ‘the travelling by candidate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction or
country, where treatment is not available to another institution, jurisdiction or country
where they can obtain the kind of medically assisted reproduction they desire (Pennings 
2002, quoted in Inhorn and Patrizio 2009, p.904). Other motives include lower costs, 
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illegal character of the treatment in their own countries, faster procedure, higher success 
rates, higher standards of care or protection of privacy (Pallatiyil et al. 2010). The term 
reproductive tourism portrays as positive an experience which  for some is often  
particularly painful, time-consuming, frustrating, even life-threatening for infertile people
and can feel more like exile in an attempt to find safe, affordable and legal treatment 
(Inhorn and Patrizio 2009).  
One hundred and sixty million European citizens have no full access to donor procedures
in their own country; in terms of demand, 80,000 couples would need treatment 
forbidden by national law but available elsewhere (Ferraretti et al. 2010). Though no 
solid data on a pan-European basis are available, it has been estimated that there could 
be 24-30 thousand cycles of cross-border treatment annually, involving 11-14 thousand
patients in Europe. A steady increase in foreign nationals treated in Belgium between 
2003 and 2007 has also been reported. Within Europe there seems to be a clear trend
for transfer of fewer embryos (Culley et al. 2011). 
The main reasons behind such cross-border movements are evading legislation, access 
to care and quality of care, as well as cost. Other reasons leading people to seek
reproductive care elsewhere are that a treatment may be clinically unavailable because it
is not considered adequately safe, waiting lists may be too long or costs too high.28 
Finally, psychological reasons might be at play, such as the desire to have treatment in a 
relaxing environment away from everyday life stress (Culley et al. 2011). 
Little empirical research has dealt with this topic and it was recently that ESHRE (the 
main European professional and scientific association in infertility) has financed a study 
in six EU countries to collect information on the motives behind couples’ seeking 
treatment abroad (Shenfield et al 2010). The respondents stated a number of reasons, 
such as restricted access due to age or limited number of IVF treatments that had failed,
high cost, vicinity of treatment, legal barriers, donors’ anonymity policies and the fact
that treatments available only to couples (heterosexual or homosexual) and not to single
people. Other studies have indicated similar reasons, such as prohibition for religious or
ethical reasons, unavailability of the service because of lack of technology or personnel,
inadequate safety guarantees, as well as the presence of significant risks, exclusion on 
the basis of sexual orientation, age, or marital status, high demand that cannot be met, 
in addition to privacy issues and high costs (Blyth and Farrand 2005, Pennings et al. 
2008, Deech 2003).  
The most important risks for patients seeking cross-border reproductive care are: money
venture, difficulty in choosing the destination centre (given that there is an abundance of 
alternatives on offer), limited ability to evaluate the quality standard of the centres,
unsatisfactory counselling due to language differences, lack of psychological assistance, 
and limited recourse to local courts in case of malpractice (Ferraretti et al. 2010). 
The internet plays a crucial role in cross-border reproductive care. Apart from providing 
information it makes ART accessible to a broader audience, (homosexual couples, single 
men) and also facilitates medical tourism. This symbiotic relationship between the 
internet and ART has radically changed the field of human reproduction (Swink and Reich 
2011). 
For those managing their own treatment, the Internet has become a key resource of
information and peer-support. Relevant websites include Fertility Friends and IVF World, 
but the websites of overseas clinics are also used, albeit with a bit of scepticism as to the 
28 This seems to apply to the UK, for instance, as local NHS funding bodies apply a range of criteria, such as 
age or number of children, to exclude patients from public fertility treatment, despite the National Institute of
Clinical Excellence guidelines (Culley et al. 2011).
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success rates reported there (Culley et al. 2011); often clinics attempt to deceive 
potential clients (Centre for Social Research 2012).  
Destination countries selected for reproductive treatment permit the operation of 
markets in human bodily resources. They provide little regulation to protect surrogates, 
patients and children, while they lack adequate transparency that would expose 
unprofessional, unethical or illegal practices (Crozier 2010). 
Globalisation and the pervasiveness of information and communication technologies have
enhanced cross-border surrogacy, with fertility clinics in abundance in India and the US 
advertising their services and facilitating the increasing phenomenon of fertility tourism 
(Gamble and Ghevaert 2009).29 Proliferation of agencies, fertility centres and law firms
have increased competition and have eroded the monopoly of old hegemonic 
intermediaries (Berend 2012). At the same time, it has highlighted the profound
inequalities between buyers and sellers of surrogate services (Martin 2009; Pande
2011). 
The motivation for surrogate mothers in low- or middle-income countries has not been 
adequately studied, but it seems to be predominantly of a pecuniary nature; Indian 
surrogates, for instance, can make up to $6000 and they are led to their decision
because of poverty, unemployment, or the need to finance the education of their 
children (Centre for Social Research 2012). Thus, there is tension between individual
rights of both the surrogate and the client to enter a commercial relationship, while it is
the responsibility of policymakers and clinicians to ensure that there is no exploitation. 
Colonial heritage and lack of education make informed consent problematic (e.g. in 
Africa or India); medical informed consent presupposes clarity, quality and adequate 
consent in communication of risks and the avoidance of coercion. Social risks which are 
culture-specific also have to be taken into account (Deonandan 2013). 
The use of reproductive technologies has become an act of consumption in a global 
market. It offers a way out to the privileged who can implement their plans on the global 
stage. Reproductive tourism is a stratified practice, although infertility and its 
psychological effects afflict all social strata equally (Martin 2009). 
An unregulated fertility industry has been compared to sex tourism, since ‘egg donation, 
like prostitution, will be especially attractive in regions of the world where large numbers 
of women with few choices want to improve their economic circumstances by any means 
available (Storrow 2005). 
Legislation in countries like the UK seeks to prevent the creation of a surrogacy market 
for foreigners, e.g. by placing as one surrogacy condition that at least one of the 
commissioning parents resides in the UK (Gamble and Ghevaert 2009).  
1.2.4. Health Policy 
The fact that in most EU countries surrogacy is not allowed and that EU legislation is
conducive to patients’ seeking treatment in other Member States has given rise to flows 
of people with infertility problems seeking cross-border reproductive care. This is a 
serious public health issue which requires attention and is of great concern to policy-
makers. It puts at risk the health of individuals and from the point of view of policy-
makers in the destination country, it affects the provision of local health services. 
29 In India there are over 600 fertility clinics and the reproductive tourism market is valued at more than $500 
million a year. India is a popular destination not only for Western clients, but also for medical tourists from
South East Asia (Centre for Social Research 2012).
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The subjects at the receiving end of health care in the destination country are the 
surrogate mother and the baby. Health issues regarding the surrogate mother are of 
significance, as her preparation and the period after insemination involve injections of
hormones, oestrogen and progesterone, taking pills, as well as adopting a particular 
lifestyle (Hatzis 2003, Centre for Social Research 2012). Other risks related to in vitro 
fertilisation are relevant (de Montgolfier and Mirkovic 2009). Usual pregnancy risks also
apply which often are accentuated by the effects of ART resulting in multiple births or 
need for selective reduction abortion. There have been cases of surrogate mothers dying
because of pregnancy complications, something that accentuates the issue of post­
partum risks. In the case of traditional surrogacy, procedures such as collecting an egg 
carry a certain risk and might involve physical and psychological suffering (Chaves 
2011). 
Neglected psychological dimensions involve the bonding of the surrogate mother with
the child, which might be linked with feelings of guilt when the child is given away and 
which can have impact on the psychological wellbeing or mental health of the surrogate 
(Jadva et al. 2003). It has been well documented that important biological bonds are 
developed during pregnancy. The odour of an infant is attractive to the mother, while
sight and skin to skin contact further promote psychological and physiological bonding as 
important hormones like oxytocin are in operation. Surrogacy interrupts the process of 
bonding that starts during gestation and continues after birth and this is a very
important reason why many surrogates refuse to relinquish the child (Tieu 2009). 
Other issues are related to the impact of surrogacy on the surrogate mother’s family
members (partner, parents or children) whose support is expected during the surrogacy 
arrangements. Understanding of the circumstances by the surrogate’s own children, for
instance, might be quite challenging (de Montgolfier and Mirkovic 2009). Husbands in 
India, for example, often have problems with surrogacy, including managing home 
affairs and children; some might change their behaviour towards their wives (Centre for 
Social Research 2012). In addition, the risks of social stigma and shunning by 
acquaintances and friends will upset family balance and might have psychological
implications (Jadva et al. 2003).  
In cases of commercial surrogacy, available only outside the EU, health and safety issues
are very important. Regulation on EU level is required. Medical advances are faster than 
legal ones and some balance needs to be achieved.  
Conditions of financial need compromise the freedom of surrogate mothers: Indian 
women, for instance, are badly paid and run considerable health risks in a country where
there is a high maternal mortality rate. This is not surprising, taking into consideration
that drugs used are not standardised, procedures are not documented, information
about side effects is not sufficient, while there is often no limit to the number of IVF 
treatments a woman might undergo. Recent research on surrogates has demonstrated 
preoccupations related to leaving their children during their stay in sheltered 
accommodation for nine months, together with exhaustion and considerable pain after 
each IVF treatment (Centre for Social Research 2012). Lack of regulation raises
increasing concerns, not least because surrogates are often destitute and illiterate. They
are kept enclosed in clinics, they do not enjoy counselling or legal services, they are
subjected to decisions taken by the doctors involved and they also undergo tests and 
operations, including often unnecessary caesarean sections for quick delivery (Iowa 
Institute 2012). Other health issues are to do with contingencies often associated with 
pregnancies, namely early termination (before two months into the pregnancy), or early 
abortion and are accentuated by the need to have a contract to account for them.
Research has shown that doctors are uncomfortable with such contingencies, while it is
claimed that delays in signing a contract entails dangers of exploitation by doctors, 
clinics, or intended parents (Centre for Social Research 2012). 
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The aftercare of the surrogates is an important issue, particularly in developing
countries. Long-term harmful effects caused by fertility drugs, surgery-related
complications are frequent and might be more acceptable in a developing country
context. Serious conditions like cancer or sterility can also be related to surrogacy. The
question remains as to who bears the responsibility for treating health problems deriving 
from surrogacy pregnancies? (Iowa Institute 2012).  
The issue of lower cost in less developed countries is one of the main motives behind the
decision of infertile couples to seek cross-border reproductive care. The impact this may
have in the local provision of health services is of increasing importance. Proponents of 
medical tourism argue that private health care services to foreigners keep the highly-
skilled personnel in the country and make the same services available to the local
population at lower rates. The counter-argument is that there is internal migration to the 
urban centres where the private clinics are and the public system does not benefit 
financially (Pallatiyil et al 2010). Medical professionals who would be serving the 
taxpayers whose funds have been invested in those facilities are losing out, what
Deonandan (2013) calls ‘misdirection of medical resources’ (p. 155). Nevertheless, much 
more empirical research is required to allow for estimates of repercussion that private 
arrangements have on the host countries’ health systems and also to ensure that 
surrogate mothers’ health is monitored and safeguarded. 
1.2.5. Welfare of children 
The sudden rupture of the (surrogate) mother-child bond at a very early stage is in itself
a consideration for the welfare of the children. As surrogacy involves both in vitro
fertilisation and relinquishing a child in a similar manner like in adoption, long-term 
consequences for the children can be inferred from these (Iowa Institute 2012). 
In case the intended parents need to legally adopt the child, the matter becomes more 
complex. The fact that custody disputes might arise is also something that cannot be 
prevented by legal arrangements and can have impact on children’s wellbeing, as they
are involved in unusual circumstances (more than one family group).
One might argue that such conditions are also encountered in the case of adopted 
children. However, the difference lies in the fact that, unlike adoption, which is a
conscious decision to serve the best interests of the child, surrogacy is about a mutual 
decision between the surrogate and the commissioning parents taken before the birth of 
the child and having as primary objective not the welfare of the child, but the utility
(fulfilment) of an infertile couple (Tieu 2009).  
The significant matter of whom the legal system acknowledges as mother of the born
child varies in different national contexts and with respect to different family
arrangements. In Portugal, for instance, in the case of single gay men, the surrogate 
mother (genetic surrogate) is legally recognised as the mother of the infant. This raises
issues that can potentially affect the welfare of the child, particularly if it imposes
responsibility on the surrogate (Chaves 2011). 
There are a number of circumstances and contingencies that might create friction in the 
contractual agreement between the parties and might impact on the future welfare of
children. The risk of opportunistic behaviour by either the parents or the surrogate is
quite relevant. This is often related to asymmetric information, with one of the parties
having access to more or withholding information from the other (Galbraith et al. 2005). 
A further problem is that the contractual parties do not always know what their best
interests are. Information uncertainty might contribute to this and can lead to wrong
decisions. As in any contractual arrangement, also, it is more than conceivable that one’s
circumstances might change in the course of surrogacy. If, for example, the child suffers 
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from some disability or other condition, in which case serious problems with the 
surrogacy arrangement might arise: options such as abortion can be considered but 
might also lead to deadlocks due to different perspectives on abortion, the surrogate
mother might want to act contrary to the wishes of the intended parents and so on (Tieu 
2009). 
As ART is involved in surrogacy, the higher risk of multiple births and prematurity, with
increased chance of death of a child, is a significant health issue for the children and
might also create complications, as the intention of the commissioning parents is often 
to have only one child.
1.2.6. Attitudes to surrogacy by the public and the parties involved 
Surrogacy remains a very controversial topic and the role of the media contributes to its 
negative image, as they only highlight the cases where things have gone wrong. It is  
only very recently that surrogacy became a method chosen by both gay and straight
celebrities and has thus received positive media coverage. Yet most intended parents 
initially got the idea through television documentaries or magazines (MacCallum et al.
2003). Their overall experience is positive and would recommend surrogacy to friends 
with infertility problems.
Not much empirical research has been done in the field of public attitudes towards 
surrogacy, but the few studies that have been conducted show that most people are not 
in favour for different social and cultural reasons. Religion plays an important role in
shaping negative attitudes. Poote and van den Akker (2009) have found that a very
small proportion of the women who took part in their study showed willingness to act as
surrogate mothers and they did not differentiate between genetic and gestational 
surrogacy. They scored high in parenthood scale and upheld traditional values. In many
cases negative attitude or scepticism towards surrogacy seems to be following distrust in 
reproductive technologies. 
Surrogacy is of particular importance to gay couples in civil unions or marriage, as it
allows them to become parents with a genetic link to their offspring. Significantly, for
gay and lesbian couples parentage is, generally speaking, a conscious decision (Chaves
2011). Studies regarding children born to gay parents (Golombok et al. 2006) and their
development compared to children in traditional families have shown that the quality of
parenting is higher and gay parents enjoy their role more and they are more emotionally
involved. Empirical evidence of this sort might contribute to a shift of attitudes towards 
surrogacy, as non-traditional households seem to be increasingly part of the social 
picture. 
Growing evidence of successful parenting by gay parents will eventually influence public 
opinion. Recent research in the US (Bergman et al. 2010) has also shown that gay 
couples opting for surrogacy are usually of a particular demographic profile, namely of
very high socio-economic status which can be explained by the high cost of surrogacy. 
Nevertheless, they give up their job totally or partially to fulfil their roles as parents, 
which has considerable financial implications that worse-off people could not afford.
Their new identity as parents has improved their relationship with their own parents and 
family. Another conclusion is that having children through surrogacy is still a matter of 
socio-economic status among gay people. 
Surrogate mothers’ attitudes remain under-researched. As most countries prohibit
surrogacy, it is very important to conduct research on the views of the experience by 
surrogate mothers, especially because they are the most vulnerable parties in terms of
psychological strain.
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1.2.7. Regulation
To evaluate state responses to surrogacy, one should not conflate lack of regulation with
freedom and choice, while viewing regulation as a restricting factor. As Martin (2009)
says the ‘choice’ framework is problematic for reproductive technologies and so is the 
human rights one, as definitions of choice and rights tend to vary from state to state. 
Whatever the national context, there is a growing market in countries with more  
permissive regimes to serve a specific clientele.
Surrogacy is becoming an ever more frequent alternative to adoption. Yet despite its 
enormous complexity and its involving up to five different parties (intended parents,
biological mother, biological father, surrogate mother, sperm/egg donors), very little has
been done to regulate it and safeguard their interests.  
In the UK surrogacy arrangements are lawful, although they cannot be commercial,
brokered or advertised for commercial exploitation. Surrogacy is facilitated by a number 
of non-profit agencies which have sprung and which help establishing contact between
the parties involved. The 2008 Act has permitted advertising by such organisations. It 
has also promoted equality between heterosexual and same sex couples regarding
surrogacy, but not for single parents (Fenton et al. 2010). However, the arrangements 
involve complex rules on legal parenthood and presuppose the consent of the surrogate
mother and her husband. English law supports surrogacy but seeks to control the form 
that it takes (altruistic, consenting, privately-arranged). The underlying logic is one of
preventing women from entering commercial contractual agreements which they might 
not be able to fulfil later on and which might thus lead to their exploitation. However, the
counter-argument is that by not allowing enforceable contracts and commercial agencies
surrogacy arrangements are made risky unless of course there is already trust between
the parties involved (Galbraith et al. 2005). 
Consequently, looking for surrogacy abroad is much more attractive for British fertility
treatment seekers, as the process is better organised, faster, involving a foreign clinic or
agency and providing an enforceable contract. However, the limitations of the UK law are 
bound to affect such parents upon their return (Gamble and Ghevaert 2009).  
Those seeking help abroad are faced with challenges such as lack of accurate
information and advice on what is involved, language barriers in the host country and
legal impediments at home after the birth of a child, such as rigid interpretation of 
domestic law and parental order procedures, as in the case of the UK, which could affect 
the welfare of children and of surrogates and intended parents (Bednall 2011).  
Cost is another significant factor in commercial surrogate arrangements. Data are scarce 
and rates are different in the different countries which are popular surrogacy 
destinations. In the US, for instance, the compensation to the surrogate mother can 
range from $15,000 to $25,000, depending on her experience, but the overall cost to the 
parents, taking into account that more than one IVF attempts might be needed, might 
be as high as $120,000 (Hatzis 2003). 
A consequence in the asymmetry of power present in commercial surrogacy 
arrangements is that it often induces surrogates to enter into agreements, whose risks 
they are not fully aware of. Galbraith et al. (2005) have studied a random sample of
commercial Californian surrogate agencies and they have found that 90% regulate
disbursement of fees to the surrogate mother so as to avoid risks of renegotiation after 
the surrogate has become pregnant. Further, they conduct extensive screening to 
minimise potential surrogate mothers and commissioning parents with undesirable 
behaviour patterns. To reduce the chance that surrogates renege on the contract or are
forced into these arrangements due to poverty pressures, 80% of these agencies make 
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sure that surrogates have already a child and they do not receive any kind of financial 
support. Moreover, all agency websites contain message boards for sharing lessons
learned by the experience of others. They also organise health and life insurance for the
surrogate mothers, which are necessary conditions of the agreement.  
Research on Indian surrogates, however, indicates that their remuneration is not fixed 
and is usually determined by the clinic, while it can be delayed for months. Very often it
is not sufficient to make a substantial difference in their lives; it might provide for more 
meals for their children, or for their entry level fees in higher education, or enable some
repairs in their home, but not much more. 
The need to safeguard their payment, which can be also appropriated by husbands for 
drinking or for some unsuccessful enterprise endeavour is imminent, particularly because 
of the patriarchal structure of Indian society. Payments to surrogate mothers need to be 
harmonised on a global scale in order to prevent exploitation of women in more 
disadvantaged positions than that of intended parents, especially in cases of cross-
border arrangements, which can easily lead to benefiting wealthy Westerners at the 
expense of destitute women in developing countries (Welstead, 2010; Smolar 2013). 
Likewise, surrogates need to be protected from appropriation of their fees by agencies or
doctors (Centre for Social Research 2012). There is a constantly expanding market and 
companies operating in developing countries need to be regulated in terms of level of
compensation offered (McEwen, 1999). 
Furthermore, increasing commercialisation calls for quality control. It is important that 
an international system of clinic accreditation be established so that patients know that
the clinics they use abide by good clinical practice principles. Monitoring the travelling of
patients, highlighting the problems and engaging in public discussion are necessary 
actions to enhance the benefit of patients. It is very hard to estimate how many babies
are born to surrogate mothers per year, as quite a lot of data are inaccessible. It seems
that about 750 live births occur per year in the USA alone, out of double number of 
surrogate pregnancies (McDermott 2012). Half of live births worldwide occur in the two 
countries with permissive regulation and the possibility for compensation of the 
surrogate mother, namely India and the USA (Ferraretti et al. 2010). 
Other issues to be examined include questions such as who bears the financial burden in
cases of failed pregnancies when surrogate mothers’ health is affected? How can the 
health of surrogates be monitored when they live in India or in the Ukraine?30 Issues of 
health of the surrogate are taken into account by clinics only as far as the health of the 
baby is concerned; the commercial logic seldom allocates to the surrogate resources
beyond what is necessary for the production of a healthy child (Deonandan et al. 2012). 
Another unsolved problem is that of ‘imperfect’ children; if they are the product of a 
commercial relationship what is their fate and to whom responsibility are they placed 
under? (Ber 2000). 
Evidence from the US (McEwen 1999; Spar 2012) shows that commercialisation 
eventually leads to exploitation of surrogates on low income, while some nations risk
becoming breeding grounds. Race is irrelevant in gestational surrogacy which means 
that increasing numbers of women of colour will be offering their services to well-off
white couples. The social divide created due to socio-economic status cleavage between 
the contracting parties needs to be addressed by policy-makers and legislators as social 
inequalities are not of interest to market forces. As Spar (2012) claims ‘babies are a
good with a totally inelastic demand’ (p. 300) and restricted supply. 
30 These two countries are the most popular destinations of EU couples seeking surrogacy abroad 
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Commodification arguments about using women’s bodies as rented wombs are valid but 
banning a practice in a particular state on ethical grounds, when parties are prepared to
sign contracts elsewhere and evade strict legislation, leaves the road open to
exploitation of vulnerable social groups who are at the mercy of market interests and 
lack protection. 
Wherever commercial surrogacy is allowed, regulating a fee corresponding to a 9 month 
24-hour job could offer a minimum protection for surrogate mothers. Non-negligible 
sums would make intended parents more responsible and would provide some safety to
third-world women, whose ‘freedom of choice’ to enter such agreements is highly
debatable. At the same time the pitfall is that the level of payment could act as a factor
boosting supply. 
1.2.8. Surrogacy as experience 
The aim of this section is to shed light to the personal experience of women involved in
surrogacy arrangements and the way they perceive them. The reason is that there have
only been a limited number of studies addressing the experience of surrogacy which 
show that it is conditioned by a host of factors: geographical proximity of intended
parents and surrogates, level of contact or bonding. Nevertheless, the three countries we
have such evidence from, namely the US, the UK and India show remarkable differences. 
Surrogates are not a uniform category. Those of the developed world are well-informed, 
professionals, parts of networks, and often perfectly capable of negotiating the terms of
contracts. By contrast, their counterparts in developing countries are much more prone 
to exploitation, usually very poor and of low educational background.
The psychological impact that relinquishing the child has on the surrogate mother has 
been a popular topic of empirical research. What such studies show is how surrogates 
deal with it and the ways in which they ‘re-invent’ themselves to cope. It has been
suggested that surrogates deploy ‘cognitive dissonance reduction strategies’ to mitigate 
this effect (Tieu 2009). One of the most significant studies has identified that the 
perception of the surrogate that the child is not hers is crucial when support services are 
removed after birth and surrogates have to give the child away. They experience feelings 
of despair, loss and pain (Ragoné 1994). Other studies have indicated that the 
experience of relinquishing the child was an unhappy one in the short term, but a good 
relationship with the commissioning parents alleviated this feeling, though in one or two 
cases the impact was more significant and even led to post-natal depression and feelings 
of guilt (Baslington 2002, Palattiyil et al. 2010). Most of the above focus on a European
or US context (e.g. Ragoné 1994), with the exception of a recent study conducted in 
Israel (Teman 2010), where surrogacy is tightly controlled by the state and restricted to 
Jewish citizens. In this study Israeli gestational surrogates use metaphors of love to
speak of their relationship with the commissioning mother, though they recognise that 
they need the fee involved.  
An investigation using semi-structured interviews found that surrogacy was a positive 
experience, contradicting the potentially negative impact on surrogates. Psychological 
consequences were not significant, though some surrogates experienced some problems
immediately after the handover. Genetic surrogates did not seem to feel a special bond 
towards the child vis-à-vis gestational ones. The majority of the mothers did not
experience major problems with the intended parents during the process and the quality
of the relationship was not dependent on whether they were previously known to the
commissioning parents. However, the possibility of bias from socially desirable answers
or non-representativeness was pointed out as a limitation of the study (Jadva et al.
2003). 
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As surrogacy is a very personal, intimate and invasive relationship, it is only natural that
it involves altruistic motives. Ragoné (1994) found about US surrogates she studied that
payment was not important as motivation and women identified altruistic reasons. A
theme that emerges is that women involved in surrogacy (surrogates and clients) use
notions such as ‘gift-giving’ or ‘sisterhood’ to counterbalance the commercial nature of 
the relationship with each other. This discourse focuses either on the child as a gift, or as 
motherhood as something that one woman offers to another through developing a strong
bond (Pande 2011). Indeed for many surrogates the relationship with the intended
parents is stronger than with the baby (Berend 2012).  
Contract surrogacy is part of a whole culture of commoditisation; however, surrogates 
do not see receiving compensation as contradictory to the creation of a personal bond 
with intended mothers. If anything, remuneration is seen as a measurement of worth.
They see the relationship with the intended parents as one of mutual benefit, in contrast
to the liberal legal scholars’ approach of viewing it as something giving a net surplus 
value for both parties (Berend 2012). 
Indian surrogates have different experiences. Surrogacy in India is not regulated by the 
state and is supported by the government’s championing of ‘medical tourism’. 
Commercial surrogacy was legalised in 2002 but there is no regulation of clinics as yet 
(Pande 2011).31 Ethnographic studies are thus of importance also because they expose
the conditions of surrogates in certain clinics: ‘All the surrogates live together, in a room 
lined with iron beds and nothing else. Husbands and family members are allowed to visit 
but not stay overnight. The women have nothing to do except walk around the hostel 
and share their woes, experiences and gossip with the other surrogates while they wait
for the next injection’ (Pande 2011, p.620). 
In contrast to their US counterparts, Indian surrogates claimed kinship with the baby
while recognising the right of biological father over the child. There is again deployment
of the gift metaphor but this time by the surrogacy clinic counsellors who indoctrinate
the surrogates into seeing their status as God’s gift which enables them to generate
some income for their families, without becoming too greedy. The perceptions of the 
surrogates demonstrated their altruistic nature towards their own children, rather than 
towards those of their clients. They also seemed to resist the commercial nature of 
surrogacy by establishing relationships with the commissioning mothers, whom they 
perceived as hope for a better future out of poverty. Remarkably, the narratives used by
the intended mothers were informed by the rhetoric of ‘mission’; while they accepted
that issues like relaxed laws and control over surrogates were incentives for choosing 
India as destination, they emphasised their wish to help a family out of poverty as being
their main motive (Pande 2011). Both interpretations are demonstrative of unequal 
power dynamics and status. What is obvious is that all parties try to redefine the
relationship on non-commercial grounds, attributing more a more noble character to a 
relationship which starts and usually ends as a transaction.
Other interesting themes emerge from the narratives of all surrogates. The importance 
of support from their husbands/partners which is essential for family life at home cuts
across cultures and boundaries. American surrogates appear strong-willed and well-
informed, independent and indifferent to attitudes of others (Ragoné 1994), whereas
their Indian counterparts felt that the surrogacy arrangement had alienated them from 
their families and friends. They had been confronted by enmity due to the social stigma
attached to surrogacy in rural India, while clinics did not take any responsibility of their
well-being and re-integration in their community (Centre for Social Research 2012). 
31 The finalized version of draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill – 2010 has now been 
revised by the Ministry of Law & Justice as Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 2013. 
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The Internet has democratised information access for surrogates in the US, who are less
dependent on agencies and can organise support online by sharing information through 
joining virtual communities. Using message boards, for instance, women offer each other 
advice, share their stories and portray themselves as strong and well-informed, but also 
as loving and warm (Berend 2012). Interpretation of their online message boards and
their narratives show that they negotiate meaning in the process. The language of
surrogacy as a ‘labour of love’ and the emphasis on the closeness of the relationship with 
the intended parents seem to be dominant and runs against commodification. Indeed, 
payment seems to be a sensitive issue and there is awareness that it might be
contradictory with the emotional dimensions involved. Many sad stories have also been
reported about intended parents disappearing or excluding surrogates, emphasising the 
commercial side of the relationship and generating obvious feelings of disappointment.
Such experiences are counteracted by collective lessons learned about the purposes of 
surrogacy, namely to create a family, rather than build friendships. Sharing meanings by
the communities of surrogates, notably in the online world, enables them to retain a 
moral code and feminine values, such as empathy, generosity, autonomy, intelligence
and self-control (Berend 2012).  
Evidence from the UK (Jadva et al. 2012), where commercial surrogacy is banned, shows 
that often contact between the surrogate and the parents continues after the birth but it
becomes less frequent as time passes, unless the parents had known the surrogate 
before. Though such studies suggested a positive relationship between surrogate and
intended parents, this is far from straightforward and might involve prolonged
psychological burden on the surrogate, fear of the parents that the surrogate will 
interfere with upbringing, or tensions regarding the frequency of contact (Iowa Institute
2012). 
Moreover, children’s views on surrogacy remain an unexplored area. Research from the 
UK involving intended parents who had disclosed to their children aged 7-10 that they
had been born by surrogate mothers, whom they already knew, shows that most of 
them were either indifferent or positive to surrogacy (Jadva et al. 2012). They saw 
surrogates as women who helped their mothers have them and praised their altruism.
This attitude may change when they are teenagers and will be in a position to fully
understand what surrogacy means. The same study showed that parents had no problem 
to reveal the link with the surrogate mother when it was a case of gestational surrogacy.
It was not the same when it came to traditional surrogacy; almost half of the parents did
not disclose the information. 
1.2.9. Concluding remarks
Despite prohibition and often negative attitudes and moral reservations, surrogacy
practices persist. The desire for perpetuating their genes will make infertile people cross
boundaries in search of ways to fulfil their procreation aspirations (Gamble and Ghevaert 
2009). Countries have ethical obligations to consider the effects of their own restrictive 
reproductive policies. Prohibiting surrogate practices in the West leads to the expansion 
of a foreign market for such practices and opens up exploitation dynamics (Crozier 
2010). 
Regulating the surrogate practice towards mutually beneficial ends is a key direction
(Deonandan 2013). Lack of adequate regulation will contribute to the maintenance of a
global black market of surrogacy services, with considerable risks and exposure of 
women to trafficking, exploitation, coercion. Legal contracts need to evolve as to
safeguard the interests of surrogate mothers, taking into consideration the inescapable
fact that surrogacy decisions are taken under certain personal circumstances, which 
might change over time. Surrogacy contracts should include clauses on medical 
insurance and emergency needs of the surrogate mother. Provisions as to coverage of 
35
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
her medical needs in case of failed pregnancy and compensation for her family and 
children in case she dies during pregnancy or labour must also be included (Palattiyil 
2010). Entitlement to counselling services are often under-estimated, as many cases for 
post-surrogacy disputes demonstrate the lack of psychological preparation of the parties
involved for what surrogacy entails (McDermott 2012). In any case, the legality of 
contracts should not be compromised by the involvement of agents with profit and other 
non-altruistic motives, whose only interest is to serve their clients and provide them with
children, disregarding the need for emotional fulfilment and alleviation of the often harsh 
circumstances dominating the life of surrogate mothers (Centre for Social Research 
2012). 
Various feminist arguments for and against surrogacy might shift as surrogacy
arrangements change. Liberal approaches will continue to emphasise autonomy and free
will as pivotal in one’s decision to resort in surrogacy. For these reasons, regulatory 
steps need to be taken, so as to leave  room for autonomy and self-determination, 
necessary ingredients of a democratic society. Exploitation and coercion, hitherto 
unpleasant realities for surrogate mothers, notably in the developing world, will need to 
be prevented through relevant policies.  
Globalisation, the main driving force behind the growing surrogacy market ought to be 
coupled with the aspiration of globalising norms determining surrogacy arrangements so 
that a global regime of surrogacy emerges, in which negative dimensions are mitigated 
and the North/South divide as to income, education and power is not mirrored in the 
surrogacy arena. Cross-border reproductive care needs to combine business ethics with
medical ethics: ‘to find a comfortable space between medicine and commerce, utilising a
hybrid ethical framework that refuses to compromise the essential role of a clinician,
which is to always act in the best interests of the person under care, with respect to her 
health’ (Deonandan 2013, p.170). 
What is seen as law evasion in certain national contexts which leads people to cross
borders, may be a deliberate safety valve to national policy-makers and legislators which 
reduces pressure for domestic law reforms. This makes the need for regulation on EU
level imperative to safeguard health and safety. Issues such as lack of reimbursement  
for treatments received in other countries, differences in procedure such as psychological 
screening of all parties involved, are matters that need to be looked into. Legalising non­
commercial gestational surrogacy in a strict regulatory framework is seen by some 
(Dermout et al. 2010, McDermott 2012) as the pragmatic way forward. 
As very little empirical research has been done in the area of surrogacy, there is a
growing need for studies which will focus on surrogates, their concerns, experience and 
attitudes. Such findings will shed light on a world hitherto unfamiliar to policy-makers
and medical tourists and will hopefully lead to more ethical and fair future policies.
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2. LEGAL ANALYSIS – NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND 
CASE LAW 
2.1. OVERVIEW
This section presents an analysis of national legal regimes pertaining to surrogacy. This
legal focus of the study will be divided into two parts:
Part A
i) Legislation, draft legislation and other formal provisions (e.g. professional 
organisations and foreign office guidelines) in EU Member States and an
indicative number of non-EU jurisdictions, which operate to facilitate 
surrogacy agreements, whether fully or partially. 
ii) Case law interpreting the above provisions and/or dealing with subsequent legal
disputes that have appeared before the courts. 
Given the time and budgetary confines of this study, we have not attempted to provide a 
complete catalogue of all national legislative approaches to surrogacy agreements.32 
Instead, we have confined the parameters of this study to a detailed analysis of all 
relevant legislation and draft legislation in EU Member States and an indicative number 
of legislative case studies from non-EU jurisdictions, which provide useful comparisons.
In relation  to EU Member States, we have  also included reference to non-legal, but 
otherwise formal guidelines that concern surrogacy agreements. The selection of our 
legislative case studies is explained below and the analysis is organised according to the 
different legislative approaches that we have identified. 
Part B
iii) Case law in EU Member States where there is a legal vacuum in relation to
surrogacy. 
iv) Case law in EU Member States where surrogacy in all forms is legally prohibited.
The purpose of this part is to investigate the role of the courts in EU Member States
where there is either no express legal provision for surrogacy, or where surrogacy in all 
forms is legally prohibited. In the preliminary work for this study, all relevant case law
was identified and organised according to the legal issues being addressed. This 
schematic organisation of the case law has been refined and developed for presentation
in the Final Report.
Before moving to a fuller consideration of the substantive legal issues addressed by this
section we first provide a justification for our selected case studies. 
2.1.1. Selection of case studies 
In the preparatory work for this study, we investigated whether any EU Member States 
had a legislative framework that operated to regulate, facilitate and enforce surrogacy
arrangements. It soon became apparent that Greece was the only Member State to have
such a legislative regime in place. As a consequence, we took the decision to give the 
term ‘express provision’ a wide interpretation, in order to further capture: 
32 This is being attempted elsewhere, at least in relation to the domestic legal approach of different countries to 
cross-border surrogacy agreements: Katarina Trimmings and Paul Beaumont (eds) International Surrogacy
Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level (Hart Publishing: forthcoming May 2013). 
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 partial legislative frameworks relating to the transfer of legal parenthood after 
birth to the intended parent(s);
 draft legislation; 
 professional or regulatory guidelines relating to the facilitation of surrogacy by a 
fertility clinic; and 
 formal guidelines on citizenship acquisition following a cross-border surrogacy 
arrangement. 
On this interpretation, seven Member States were indicated in the Inception Report for 
further investigation (Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Romania, UK).
Further country specific research confirmed the suitability of all-but-one of these Member
States for this component of the study (the draft legislation proposals in Romania were 
not taken forward - see country report on Romania, Annex). The justifications for 
including each Member State in this component of the research are presented in the 
following table.
Table 5 : Member States with ‘express provision’ for surrogacy
Member 
State 
Reason
Belgium There is no express provision in Belgian law for surrogacy. However, four
legislative proposals have been tabled for discussion at parliamentary 
assemblies. 
Bulgaria There is a general legal prohibition against surrogacy in Bulgaria.
However, draft legislation has recently been considered by parliament.33 
Greece Greece has a legislative framework for altruistic gestational surrogacy 
involving judicial pre-approval of the surrogacy agreement, which is then 
enforceable. While a number of restrictions apply, the aim of the Greek
legislation was to provide a comprehensive and facilitative framework for 
altruistic gestational surrogacy. 
Ireland There is no express provision in Irish law for surrogacy. However, formal
guidelines relating to citizenship and cross-border surrogacy
arrangements have recently been published by the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Defence. 
Netherlands There is no express provision in Dutch law for surrogacy. However,
fertility clinics that provide IVF for surrogacy arrangements have, since 
1998, been legally required to abide by the professional regulations of the
Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology. 
UK The UK has two pieces of legislation on surrogacy. The Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985 makes it clear that surrogacy contracts are not 
enforceable and criminalises certain activities relating to commercial
surrogacy. The ‘Parental Order’ provisions in the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 allow for the transfer of legal parenthood from the
surrogate mother (and father) to the intended parents. Finally, the Home 
Office has published guidelines on immigration and cross-border 
surrogacy. 
33 Note that during the life-time of this study, many key personnel in the Bulgarian government resigned, 
resulting in parliament initiating a ‘state of emergency’, whereby only essential issues and measures are 
currently being addressed. This has meant a significant delay with the progress of the draft legislation relating 
to surrogacy. 
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Given that one of the key aims of the study is to analyse different legislative approaches 
to surrogacy, it would be limiting to have restricted this component of the research to 
Member State case studies. We have therefore included a small number of indicative 
case studies from non-EU jurisdictions, to allow for a more thorough consideration of the 
models of legislation that are possible. 
The justifications for including each case study in this component of the research are 
presented in the following table. 
Table 6 : Non-EU jurisdictions that will be examined 
Country Reason
Australia Surrogacy is legally regulated at the state rather than federal level in
Australia. Most states have recently enacted legislation which places
restrictions on the practice of surrogacy and facilitates the post-birth transfer 
of legal parenthood to the intended parent(s), subject to certain conditions. 
Despite such explicit legal regimes, difficulties persist, particularly in relation
to intra-state surrogacy arrangements across Australia and cross-border 
surrogacy arrangements. In addition, the Family Law Council has
commenced work on a Research Reference from the Attorney-General’s office 
into family formation and the law, to include an inquiry into legal issues
associated with surrogacy, such as cross-border and civil status issues.  
Russia Russia is regarded as having one of the most permissive surrogacy regimes. 
This is due to the eligibility requirements being fairly relaxed (the main 
restriction being that the intended mother has to have some sort of medical 
condition which prevents her from carrying a pregnancy to term) and the fact 
that the intended parent(s) can be registered as the child’s legal parents 
from birth. Also, both altruistic and commercial surrogacies are permitted
under the Family Code of Russia (articles 51-54). However, there are two 
other important restrictions in the Russian legal framework: the surrogate 
mother must not also be the genetic mother of the child (i.e. only gestational
surrogacy agreements fall under the legal framework) and she must give her 
consent to the registration of the intended parent(s) as the legal parent(s) of
the child. It will be useful for the study to detail the specifics of the Russian 
legal framework, given that it is so commonly perceived as particularly
permissive. 
South 
Africa 
South Africa has recently instigated a court approval procedure for surrogacy 
agreements. As such, it is similar to the legal framework in Greece and will 
act as a useful comparator regime. There are various restrictions (e.g. 
arrangements should be altruistic rather than commercial, domicile
requirements, eligibility criteria for the surrogate mother, and sometimes a 
genetic connection is required between the intended parent(s) and the child)
but in some circumstances the intended parent(s) can be recognised as the 
child’s legal parent(s) from the moment of birth and single persons and
same-sex couples are not excluded. The High Court has also issued guidance 
on when surrogacy agreements will be validated. In this guidance, the court 
was particularly concerned with the socio-economic context in which 
surrogacy operates. It will therefore be extremely useful for the study to
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analyse the legal framework and court guidance in order to better assess 
how certain social justice issues may be countenanced by law. 
US Several states in the US expressly regulate surrogacy, to include permitting 
commercial surrogacy and providing for the intended parent(s) to be the 
legal parent(s) from the moment of birth. Rather than provide an overview of 
the different legislative approach in these states, we have provided a detailed
case study of a state with an established legislative framework.
Illinois: has legislation which sets out the terms of legally valid gestational 
surrogacy agreements. Under the Illinois legislation, legal parenthood can be 
framed prior to the child’s birth, so that the intended parent(s) are the legal 
parents upon the child’s birth. This makes the Illinois legislation similar to the 
legal frameworks in Greece and South Africa. However, unlike Greece and 
South Africa, the court does not have a pre-approval role; instead, lawyers 
are charged with ensuring that all the terms of legislation are satisfied in the 
particular surrogacy agreement. Illinois therefore provides a further 
comparative dimension to the legislative case studies.  
2.2. PART A: EXPRESS PROVISION FOR SURROGACY AND ASSOCIATED
CASE LAW 
2.2.1. Legislation and draft legislation 
The following sections examine models of legislation and draft legislation relating to the 
facilitation, or sometimes partial facilitation, of surrogacy agreements. The analysis is
organised by categories of legislative model, beginning with legislative examples which 
provide an ex-ante facilitation of the surrogacy agreement, its formal approval and the 
automatic attribution of legal parenthood to the intended parent(s) upon the birth of the 
child. Legislative examples which provide for the ex-post facto transfer of legal 
parenthood to the intended parent(s) following the birth of the child are then considered,
followed by some examples of non-legal, but otherwise formal guidance relating to
surrogacy. Finally, some concluding analysis of the different legislative models is offered.  
2.2.1.1. Ex-ante: judicial supervision of the surrogacy agreement 
This section focuses on the legal frameworks for surrogacy in Greece and South Africa. 
Both countries have introduced comprehensive legislation for the ex-ante facilitation of 
altruistic surrogacy arrangements. A key requirement of the legislation in both countries 
is that a judge must pre-approve the surrogacy agreement before the surrogate mother 
is impregnated in order for it to be legally valid and enforceable. In the case of legally
valid surrogacy agreements, legal parenthood for the intended parent(s) can be framed 
prior to the child’s birth. This means that it is not necessary for legal parenthood to be
transferred from the surrogate mother (and her partner) to the intended parent(s) 
following the child’s birth.
It is important to note that the legislation in both countries places restrictions on the 
types of surrogacy agreements that will be facilitated. For example, only altruistic
surrogacy agreements involving the medically assisted impregnation of the surrogate 
mother are countenanced. The legislation also imposes requirements that must be met 
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before a judge can authorize an agreement. For example, medical infertility must be the 
reason for the surrogacy arrangement and all the parties involved must give informed 
consent to the terms of the agreement. In addition, although many aspects of the Greek
and South African legislation are strikingly similar, very significant differences do exist.
For example, the Greek legislation is limited to gestational surrogacy and heterosexual
couples and single women only, while the South African legislation countenances also 
traditional surrogacy (when it involves a medically assisted impregnation) and same-sex 
couples and single men. The precise task of the judge is also subtly different: in Greece,
the judicial role is primarily administrative, in sense that they are restricted to formally
approving that the legal requirements have been met; while in South Africa, the judicial
role is more investigative and discretionary, in the sense that the judge must question
the motivations behind the surrogacy agreement in addition to ensuring that the legal 
requirements and restrictions have been met.  
Detailed country reports on the Greek and South African legal frameworks are provided 
in the Annex of this Report. These reports provide background detail to the introduction
of the legislation, a detailed overview of its provisions, as well as an analysis of case law
to have emerged since the enactment of the legislation. What we provide below is a brief
outline of how the law in each country was changed and then a table detailing the points 
of similarity and difference between the two legal frameworks. This summary is followed
by a concluding analysis of this model of legislation.
Details of the legislation 
In 2002 the Greek legislature introduced Law 3089/2002 for the regulation of medically
assisted human reproduction. Law 3089/2002 provided for a radical reform of the Greek
Civil Code (GCC), particularly in relation to the family law provisions. In legislating for
advances in fertility treatment and reproductive technology, provisions for the 
permissibility and ex-ante facilitation of surrogacy were also included.34 In 2005, Law 
3305/2005 provided further detail on the permissibility of surrogacy, by stipulating the 
concept and meaning of ‘reasonable expenses’ that may be paid to a surrogate mother 
and introducing criminal and civil sanctions for violations of the legislation. In the
summary table which follows, references are made to either Law 3089/2002 or
3305/2005, or the GCC as appropriate. 
In South Africa, the National Health Act 2003 introduced a legal framework for advances 
in fertility treatment and reproductive technology. Although surrogacy was not expressly 
regulated by this legislation, it would appear that surrogacy (or more precisely, 
surrogacy involving a medicalised fertility treatment) was thought to be legally
permissible under sections 12(2) (a)-(b) of the South African Constitution, which provide 
for the right of self-determination and the right to make decisions concerning 
reproduction. In 2005, the legislature passed the Children’s Act [No. 38 of 2005], where 
it was declared that surrogacy was to be seen as a form of fertility treatment. However, 
it was not until 2010 that a legal framework for the permissibility of surrogacy was 
enacted. This came in the form of an amendment to chapter 19 of the Children’s Act. In 
34 This is in contrast to e.g. the Human Fertilisation and Embryology legislation in the UK. This legislation was 
originally enacted in 1990, with a major reform process leading to the enactment of amending legislation in
2008. As is detailed later in this Report, the UK legislation does not include ex-ante provisions for surrogacy,
but only for the ex-post facto transfer of legal parenthood when certain conditions are met. 
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the summary table which follows, references are made to the Children’s Act and the 
South African Constitution as appropriate. 
Table 7 : Similarities and differences in the Greek and South African 
legislative models 
Similarities
 The legislations of both countries facilitate surrogacy and regulate its practice
under strict provisions. 
 The facilitation of surrogacy is based on the constitutional recognition of
a right to have a child: art. 5 para. 1 of the Greek Constitution; s.12 (2) 
(a) of the SA Constitution.
 In both countries this includes cases where conception can only be accomplished 
with the help of fertility treatment and/or the collaborative involvement of the 
reproductive bodily material and/or capacity of persons other than the intended
parent(s). 
 Surrogacy contracts are valid and enforceable: art. 1458 GCC; s. 292 Ch. 
19 of the SA Children’s Act.  
 Both the Greek and SA legislation allow for the drafting of a surrogacy agreement
between the individuals involved (intending parent(s), surrogate mother and her 
husband/wife/partner, in case she has one).  
 The agreement must be in writing, and must be made at a time before the
impregnation of the surrogate mother.  
 Furthermore, in order for the terms of the agreement to be enforced three other
prerequisites must be fulfilled: i) the provision of (informed) consent by all those
involved in the arrangement; ii) the pre-conception authorisation of the surrogacy
agreement by the court; and iii) the altruistic nature of the surrogacy agreement
and evident (by the specific clauses of the contract) lack of financial gain. These 
prerequisites are discussed in turn below. 
 Consent to the surrogacy agreement: art. 1456 GCC and art. 5 of Law 
3305/2005; s. 293 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act. 
 The surrogacy agreement must be created by consensual individuals, who were 
not coerced into participating in the surrogacy,
 The individuals must understand and accept the legal consequences of the
arrangement, as well as their rights and obligations related to the nature of the 
arrangement, for example: the costs of the medical and legal procedures; the 
lack of payments; the right of the surrogate mother to a legal abortion; the 
obligation to hand over the child after his/her birth; the terms and conditions of 
the right to parent and contact the child etc. The Greek law also states that the
parties must assert that they have been informed about the risks of the fertility
treatment, as well as the dangers associated with the pregnancy and childbirth. 
 The parties should also consider the psychological impact that the relinquishment 
of a child may have on the surrogate mother’s life (art. 5 of Law 3305/2005, and 
s. 11 (b) of the SA National Health Act 2006, as amended in 2 March, 2012). 
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	 The pre-conception confirmation of the surrogacy agreement by the
court: art. 1458 GCC and art. 6 of Law 3089/2002; s. 295 Ch. 19 of the 
SA Children’s Act.  
	 The upper guardian of the rights of the contracting parties and of the interests of
the child, as well as the upper authority to deem the agreement valid is the
Court.
	 The judges in both countries must examine the contract and decide whether the 
provisions of the law have been followed, and more specifically whether the
parties have entered into the agreement in good faith and only for altruistic
reasons, whether payments have been made to any existent intermediaries,
whether there is a medical necessity on behalf of the individual who wants the 
child to proceed to the practice of surrogacy in order to have his/her desire for
parenthood fulfilled, whether the intending parent(s) and the surrogate mother
have been assessed as suitable to execute the terms of the agreement, among 
other issues.  
	 The confirmation of the surrogacy arrangement must take place before the 
surrogate’s impregnation. However, due to the significance of the child’s best
interests, it seems likely that a judge would authorise a surrogacy arrangement in 
retrospect, if the parties failed to ask for the court’s permission before the 
surrogate’s impregnation, particularly if all parties are in agreement about the
surrogacy arrangement.35 
 Altruistic nature of the surrogacy arrangement: art. 1458 GCC; s. 295 (c) 
and (v) and s. 301 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act. 
 Any payments in relation to surrogacy are prohibited in both countries, including
payments towards the donor, the clinic, any surrogacy agencies that brought the
intending parent(s) into contact with the surrogate mother, or any third parties 
involved.
 The woman who offers her gestational services must not aim to benefit financially
from the surrogacy arrangement. 
 An exception to the prohibition against payments in both countries is the
coverage of ‘reasonable expenses’, namely any costs directly linked to the 
impregnation of the surrogate, the pregnancy, and childbirth costs (art. 13 para. 
4 of Law 3305/2005; s.301 (2) Children’s Act).  
 More specifically, the intending parent(s) should provide for the medical care of
the surrogate, her clothing, her transportation to and from the medical clinic, the
costs of the childbirth and after-birth treatment, the legal costs for the application
for the approval of the surrogacy agreement by the court, the medical and 
psychological assessment of the surrogate mother, as well as the loss of wages
due to her inability to present herself to work during the last months of the 
pregnancy.
 The SA law goes a step further and accepts additional payments for the insurance 
coverage of the surrogate (death and disability insurance). Also, the SA law
requires agreements to be managed by specialised lawyers and the costs for their 
services are covered by the intending parent(s) (s. 301 (3) Children’s Act no. 38 
of 2005). 
35 In Greece, there is a legal precedent for the retrospective court approval of a surrogacy agreement after the 
surrogate mother was impregnated (One Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki (case no. 
27035/2003). See the country report on Greece in the Annex for further details. 
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	 Both in SA and in Greece the court must be satisfied – based on affidavits that
must be submitted to the court – that no payments other than for reasonable
expenses have been made to the surrogate or any agencies involved. 
 The best interests of the child are a fundamental consideration in the
decision relating to the approval of the surrogacy agreement and in
dealing with any issues arising from the arrangement: art. 1 para. 2 of Law
3305/2005, art. 21 para. 1 of the Greek Constitution (protection of the family); s.
295 (e) and 296 (1) (a) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act. 
 The rule of medical necessity: art. 1458 and 1455 of GCC; s.295 (a) Ch. 
19 of the SA Children’s Act.
 Surrogate motherhood in both countries is only available to persons who are 
unable to have a child for medical reasons.  
 The SA law considers homosexuality as a biological inability to procreate, and,
hence, same-sex couples may use a surrogate in order to have a child. A
provision similar to this one is non-existent in the Greek law.
 Single parenting is acceptable: art. 1458 GCC;s.292 (1) (c) Ch. 19 of the 
SA Children’s Act.
 The marital and/or relationship status of the person who wants to have a child 
through surrogacy is irrelevant. 
 On the face of the Greek legislation, it would appear that a single man’s
application to the court requesting the authorisation of a surrogacy agreement 
would not be accepted. This is because the legislation requires for the judicial
approval process to be instigated by the intended mother. However, two recent 
legal cases defined this provision as unconstitutional and discriminatory towards 
single men (cf: arts. 5(1) and 4(1) of the Constitution) and the judge did 
authorise the surrogacy agreement.36 It is important to note that under the Greek 
legal system, First Instance cases are not necessarily binding for future First 
Instance cases in other courts. However, if a similar application was presented by
a single man in the future, the judicial reasoning would have to make clear why 
the application did not similarly relate to the man’s constitutional rights.
 Domicile requirement: art. 8 of Law 3089/2002;s. 292 (c) and (d) Ch. 19
of the SA Children’s Act.
 Both the intending parent(s) and the surrogate mother must be domiciled in the
country.  
 However, there is a provision in the SA law which states that the court is entitled
to allow – on good cause shown – for a woman to become a surrogate even if she 
is not domiciled in SA (s. 292 (2) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act). Such flexibility
to the court’s powers is not recognised by the Greek Law. 
 Requirement for the psychological assessment of the surrogate: art. 13 
para. 2 of Law 3305/2005; s. 7 (j) (ii) of the National Health Act of 2003
36 See: the One Member Court of First Instance of Athens no. 2827/2008 and the One Member Court of First
Instance of Thessaloniki no. 13707/2009. Further details are provided in the Greek country report in the
Annex. 
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(as amended in 2012) and WH and Others (29935/11) [2011], para. 67.
	 Before applying to the court for its authorisation of a surrogacy agreement, the
intending parent(s) should make sure that the good emotional state of the 
surrogate and her intention to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
surrogacy arrangement and the law have been evaluated by an experienced
psychologist and have been deemed satisfactory. 
 No right to terminate the agreement after the fertilisation of the
surrogate mother: art. 1456 para.2 GCC; s. 297 (1) (e) Ch. 19 of the SA
Children’s Act.
 The fully medicalised fertilisation procedure: art. 16 of Law 3305/2005; 
s. 9 (1) National Health Act of 2003.
 The fertilisation of the woman who acts as a surrogate on behalf of the intending
parent(s) must be performed in medical institutions which are authorised to
provide fertility treatments and IVF and by medical practitioners/gynaecologists 
specialised in human reproduction and reproductive technology. 
 Anonymity of the donor, if donated gametes are used: art. 1460 GCC; s. 8
(2) (d) of National Health Act 2003 and WH and Others (29935/11) 
[2011], para. 68.
 In cases where the gametes of another person are used, the identity of the donor 
will remain undisclosed. Only access to the donor’s medical files is allowed by law.
 Surrogate mother’s right to terminate the pregnancy: art. 179 and 181 of 
the GCC (legal principal of fairness) and art. 304 of the Greek Criminal 
Code (right to a legal abortion); s.300 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act.  
 Automatic transfer of the legal parenthood to the intending parent(s): 
art. 1458 and 1464 GCC; s. 297 (1) (a) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act.
 The child that is born after the drafting and the confirmation by the court of a 
surrogacy arrangement is considered as the child of the intending parent(s) from
his/her birth. No adoption, or court proceedings (such as those of the ‘parental 
order’ in the UK37) is needed. The surrogate and her husband/wife/partner have
absolutely no parental rights towards the child. Moreover, the SA law includes an
express provision for the lack of a right of the surrogate, and her 
husband/wife/partner, as well as their relatives, to contact with the child born
through surrogacy, unless there is a different agreement between the parties
found in the surrogacy agreement. Such a rule does not exist in the Greek Law. 
37 As provided for by section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. See further details below. 
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Differences 
 Genetic link with intended parent(s): 
 The SA law requires for the child to have a genetic relationship with his/her 
parent(s) (s.294 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005).,  
 In contrast, the Greek law does not require a genetic relationships between the 
child and the intended parent(s), permitting the framing of social legal
parenthood in the context of surrogacy (cf: art. 1458 GCC).  
 Type of surrogacy: 
 Both gestational (s. 294 of the Children’s Act) and traditional surrogacy is
recognised in SA (stemming from s. 294 in conjunction with s. 298 (1) of the 
Children’s Act).
 In Greece only the case of gestational surrogacy is allowed, since the law requires
for the egg not to belong to the surrogate mother (art. 1458 GCC). Hence, the 
fertilised egg will either come from the intending mother, if she is able to produce
one, or a third donor.  
 Same-sex parenthood:
 The SA law makes surrogacy available to same-sex parents (S. 295 (a) of Ch. 19, 
Children’s Act 2005).  
 A legally authorised surrogacy agreement is currently not available to Greek 
same-sex couples.  
 However, as with the aforementioned cases involving single men, it is possible 
that a judge may authorise a future surrogacy arrangement presented by a 
same-sex couple, on the basis of the general constitutional principle of equality
and non-discrimination (art.4 of the Greek Constitution). However, same-sex 
relationship recognitions remains a controversial issue in Greece, so the same
willingness to approve a surrogacy agreement presented by a same-sex couple 
may not transpire. 
 Making the application to the court:
 According to the SA law, the application to the court for the authorisation of the 
surrogacy agreement may be made by either of the intending parents, whereas in
Greece this right is only appointed to the intending mother (art. 1458 GCC).  
 Age limits:
 The Greek law sets an upper limit to the age of the intending mother, which is the
age of fifty (from the combination of the art. 1455 of the GCC and art. 4
paragraph 1 of Law 3305/2005), although no requirement is in existence with 
regards to the age of the surrogate mother.  
 Recent case law38, however, indicates that the most significant criterion for a 
woman to be allowed to act as a surrogate mother in Greece is not her biological
age, but her general good health and her ability to endure the difficulties of
pregnancy and childbirth.  
38 In 2006 a woman aged 52 was allowed to bear the child of her daughter and her husband (One Member
Court of First Instance of Korinthos no. 224/2006). See further the Greek report in the Annex. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
 A similar rule is not to be found in the SA legal framework.
 The need for a surrogate to have had a previous pregnancy:
 The surrogate mother in SA must have already had a viable pregnancy and
delivery and a child of her own: s. 295 (c) (vi) and (vii) of the Children’s Act of
2005, respectively.  
 The Greek law does not require the woman who acts as a surrogate to have had
the experience of pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood before she agrees to
enter into a surrogacy contract. 
 Death and disability insurance:
 In SA the payment of a death and disability insurance to the surrogate mother is 
included in the “reasonable expenses” of a surrogacy arrangement (s. 301 (2) (c) 
of the Children’s Act of 2005).  
 No such rule is adopted by the Greek law. 
 Consent of the surrogate’s partner:
 In SA the impregnation of the surrogate mother may take place, if the judge
deems it necessary, even when the husband/wife/partner of the woman who 
wants to act as a surrogate does not consent to it (s. 293 (3) of the Children’s 
Act). The court will decide whether the person withholds his/her consent for no
apparent and justifiable reason, and if it finds it correct and fair to do so, it will
order the performance of the impregnation of the surrogate without worrying 
about the lack of consent from all parties involved.
 Such an action is prohibited by the Greek law, where there is a legal prohibition
against the indirect attainment of legal parenthood through the legal recognition
of the man’s wife/civil partner as a parent (art. 1456 GCC, art. 5 of Law 
3305/2005, arts. 1464 and 1475 GCC).  
 Time period for fertilisation:
 The SA law states that the fertilisation of the surrogate must take place before 
the lapse of a period of time of 18 months after the court’s permission to proceed 
with the surrogacy (s. 296 (1) (b) of the Children’s Act).
 The reason for this is the fear that the consent of the parties will not be valid 
after the time specified by the law, which could render the agreement unethical 
and coerced.
 The Greek law pertaining to surrogacy includes no similar rule.
 “Cooling-off period”:
 The SA law allows, in certain circumstances, for a “cooling-off period” and the 
right of the surrogate mother to change her mind. 
 In Greece this is only possible before the attainment of pregnancy. After this
point the surrogate mother must adhere to the regulations of the surrogacy 
arrangement and relinquish her parental rights along with the child after his/her 
birth. 
 In SA, s. 298 (1) of the Children’s Act stipulates that the surrogate mother
who is also the genetic mother can terminate the agreement at any time, as
long as this is done before the lapse of a period of 60 days after the birth of the 
child.
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	 The process is simple: she just has to file a written notice to the court informing
the judge about it. She may then be considered as the exclusive legal mother of
the child and not be forced to hand it over to the intended parent(s). 
	 However, the law states that she may have to compensate the intended parent(s)
for any payments for reasonable expenses that have been made up to that point
as a penalty for a breach of contractual obligations.
	 Such a right for a change of heart is not available to the gestational surrogate 
mother according to the SA law. Her position as an altruistically motivated 
‘service provider’ is not deemed strong enough for her to be given the right to 
seek the recognition of legal motherhood. Any attempt to keep the baby for 
herself would be against the law (s. 297 (1) (b) of the Children’s Act), as it is also
in Greece.
 The role of the court:
 In practical terms, the role of the judge in approving surrogacy agreement 
applications in Greece is limited. There is little or no discretional power, and the 
court procedure of the authorisation is more of a formal bureaucratic procedure 
than a discretionary assessment of the motivations behind the surrogacy 
agreement. 
 The case is different in SA. The court is more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for the  
endorsement of the individual’s desire to have a child through surrogacy. The 
judge is the protector of the law and of the interests and rights of all the parties 
involved in the surrogacy arrangement. He/she will investigate and confirm the
lack of financial gain, the respect of all the legal prerequisites, and the suitability 
of the intended parent(s) and the surrogate mother to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the contract. The judge will ask about the true reasons for choosing 
the method of surrogacy in order to have a child, and search for a close 
relationship of mutual respect and appreciation among the parties.
 In theory, these are also the responsibilities of the Greek judge, but the research 
conducted for this study on the recent case-law indicated that the courts in 
Greece merely check if the paperwork submitted to the court is sufficient to 
declare the specific agreement as valid and in accordance with the national laws 
and the Constitution.
 In a recent High Court case in SA, which offered important guidance to the 
judiciary for the approval of surrogacy agreement, it was made clear that an 
aspect of the role of the judge was to investigate the motivation of the parties 
involved (WH and Others (29935/11) [2011]).
 Criminal sanctions:
 No criminal sanctions are threatened against the violators of the SA law on
surrogacy, as is done by article 26 paragraph 8 of Law 3305/2005 in Greece. The 
penalties stipulated are harsh: personal imprisonment of all the actors to the
crime for two years at least, and a payment of damages of at least 1,500 Euros.
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
2.2.1.2. Ex-ante: lawyer supervision of the surrogacy agreement
Illinois is often described as one of the most ‘surrogacy-friendly’ states in the US, along
with California.39 In 2004, Illinois enacted the Gestational Surrogacy Act (‘GSA’), which
came into force in 2005. As the name suggests, the GSA pertains to gestational 
surrogacy agreements only, with traditional surrogacy agreements falling outside the 
auspices of the legal framework. The primary motivation for introducing this legislation
appears to have been to provide legal certainty about parenthood for children born 
through gestational surrogacy arrangements.40 
While the GSA has much in common with the Greek and South African surrogacy 
legislation, in that they all operate to provide an ex-ante facilitation of surrogacy
agreements and framing of legal parenthood, there are important differences. Most 
significantly, the GSA does not provide for a judicial pre-conception approval process, 
with lawyers and legal advice playing the key role in ensuring that the terms of the 
legislation are satisfied.41 Indeed, in Illinois, independent legal advice and lawyers play a 
key role in “sealing” the terms and obligations of the surrogacy agreement, and in
ensuring that all parties give formal consent. It would be very interesting to have an  
empirical study investigating the effectiveness of legal advice in this context and whether 
it is a sufficient means of protecting the interests of all the parties involved.42 This ex-
ante supervisory role for lawyers is not as evident in other ex-ante legal models that are 
detailed below. 
When the stipulations of the GSA are satisfied, the surrogacy agreement is presumed to 
be enforceable and it is possible for the intended parent(s) to be attributed with legal 
parenthood from the child’s birth.  
The other key difference with the Greek and South African legal frameworks is that the 
GSA does not prohibit payments other than ‘reasonable expenses’. In addition to 
‘reasonable expenses’ the surrogate mother can also be paid ‘reasonable compensation’, 
where compensation is defined in section of the GSA as: “payment of any valuable 
consideration for services in excess of reasonable medical and ancillary costs”. Illinois
39 Note that the law in California has been developed through case law interpretations of the Uniform Parentage 
Act, in order to give legal force to the role of intent in the attribution of legal parenthood following a surrogacy 
agreement: see the landmark case of Johnson v Calvert [1993] 5 Cal.4th 84, 851 P.2d 776. This use of this
principle has not been restricted to the heterosexual family form, or indeed to couples. California recently
codified this approach with the signing in of California Assembly Bill 1217, which alters the definition of who a 
legal parent is in the California Family Code. Section 7690 of the Code now provides that an intended parent is
“an individual, married or unmarried, who manifests the intent to be legally bound as the parent of a child 
resulting from assisted reproduction”. While this seems like a fairly benign phrase, it is highly significant in
providing a legislative statement of parenthood that is both gender and relationship neutral. While many
commentators have argued for parenthood in the context of assisted reproduction to be framed around intent, 
most legislative statements include other criteria, with a person’s intent forming only part of the schema. For 
academic discussions of the possible role of intent, see for example: Horsey K. (2010) ‘Challenging 
presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements.’ 22(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly pp 449­
474 and Shultz, M (1990) ‘Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality’ Wis. L.Rev. 297. 
40 Richey, J (2005) ‘The troublesome good idea: An analysis of the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act’ 30 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 169-194, pp 178-9. 
41 An example of a US state which does provide for judicial involvement in the approval of the surrogacy 
agreement is Virginia. However, the procedure in Virginia appears to be much more invasive than either 
Greece or South Africa as the court is required, for example, to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child once 
the agreement has been filed with the court and to order a social services study of the home of the intended 
parent(s). Such requirements are clearly modelled on adoption laws. See further H. Joseph Gitlin (2010)
‘Illinois becomes surrogacy friendly’, comment paper published on the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers website (http://www.aaml.org). 
42 We did not come across any such studies in the course of this research. However, studies investigating the 
role of independent legal advice in the context of pre-martial agreements have questioned the efficacy of 
independent legal advice in such emotionally charged contexts. See for example: Sharon Thompson (2011)
‘Levelling the prenuptial playing field: Is independent legal advice the answer?’ 4 International Family Law 327­
331. 
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therefore permits commercial surrogacy agreements, while Greece and South Africa 
permit only altruistic surrogacy agreements.
The table below details the various requirements and restrictions in the GSA.  
Table 8 : The provisions of the Gestational Surrogacy Act 2004 (Illinois) 
Gestational Surrogacy Act 2005
Eligibility requirements for the surrogate mother (section 5):
 The surrogate mother must be at least 21 years of age and have already given 
birth to at least one child; there is no upper age limit or no requirement for the 
child to still be alive, or for the surrogate mother to consider her family to be 
‘complete’. 
 She must complete a medical and mental health evaluation and have obtained a 
health insurance policy that extends to at least eight weeks after the birth of the 
child. The intended parent(s) may procure this health policy for the surrogate in
advance of the surrogacy agreement.
 She must have had independent legal advice about the agreement and the
potential legal consequences of the agreement.
Eligibility requirements for the intended parent(s) (section 5):
 They must contribute their gametes to the in vitro embryo that will be implanted 
in the surrogate mother. In the case of a couple, it is permissible for there to be a 
partial genetic connection to the child i.e. only one intended parent needs to
contribute a gamete.
 The intended parent(s) must have a medical need for gestational surrogacy and 
this must be evidenced by a signed affidavit from a qualified medical professional.
This affidavit must be attached to the surrogacy agreement. It has not yet been 
clarified in Illinois whether a single man or same-sex couple would satisfy this 
requirement. However, there is nothing on the face of the legislation which makes
them ineligible.
 Must complete a mental health evaluation.
 Must have had independent legal advice about the agreement and the potential 
legal consequences of the agreement.
 There is no requirement for intended parents to be in a martial relationship.
Requirements for the surrogacy contract in order for it to be presumed 
enforceable (section 6): 
 Must be in writing and must be executed prior to the impregnation of the
surrogate mother. It must also be signed by two competent adult witnesses. 
 If the surrogate mother has a husband, he must also be party to the agreement,
as must any spouse of an intended parent. 
 The surrogate mother (and her husband) and the intended parent(s) must have 
separate legal advice and sign a written acknowledgement that they have 
received such advice. 
 If the surrogacy agreement provides for compensation to the surrogate mother, 
this compensation must be placed with an escrow agent prior to the surrogate
mother’s impregnation. 
 The contract must include the express written agreement of the surrogate mother
to: undergo the necessary fertility treatment and to attempt any resulting
pregnancy and give birth to the child; to surrender the child to the intended
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
parent(s) upon birth. Her husband must also provide his express written
agreement for her to undertake these obligations. 
 The express written agreement of the intended parent(s) to accept custody43 of 
the child and assume responsibility for child support must also be included. 
Control of the pregnancy (section 6): 
 Under the terms of the surrogacy agreement, the surrogate mother must have 
the right to utilise the services of a medical professional of her choosing.
 It is permissible for the surrogacy agreement to contain provisions relating to the 
surrogate mother’s agreement to undergo particular medical examinations and 
foetal monitoring procedures, as well as her abstention from activities that the 
intended parent(s) and/or the physician reasonably believe to be harmful to the 
pregnancy and future health of the child.
 The surrogate does not have to agree to such conditions for an agreement to be
deemed valid and enforceable. However, if she does agree to such terms, she 
may be considered to be in breach of  contract (section 11) with the intended
parent(s) entitled to available legal remedies (section 12). The legislation makes
clear that a specific performance remedy of impregnation is not available (section
11).
 There is no specific mention as to whether the surrogate mother maintains her
right to a legal termination of the pregnancy.
Payments to the surrogate (section2 and section 6):
 It is permissible for the surrogacy agreement to make provision for the surrogate
mother to be paid reasonable compensation. Compensation is defined as: 
“payment of any valuable consideration for services in excess of reasonable 
medical and ancillary costs”. This indicates that commercial surrogacy 
agreements will be considered valid and enforceable in Illinois. 
 It is also permissible for the surrogacy agreement to make provision for the 
intended parent(s) to pay for or reimburse the surrogate for reasonable expenses
such as medical, legal, insurance or other professional expenses relating to the 
agreement and the pregnancy. 
 Unlike the legislation in Greece and South Africa, which are more proscriptive in 
detailing what costs must be met by the intended parent(s) in relation to health 
insurance, fertility treatment etc, it would appear that the Illinois legislation 
permits much more of a negotiation between the parties involved, relying on legal
advice and the role of the ‘reasonable physician’ to supervise the negotiations.
The role of the court when the formal requirements of the GSA are not met 
(section 6(e)): 
 If the requirements of section 6 of the GSA are not met and the surrogacy 
agreement not considered enforceable, the court is instructed to determine legal 
parenthood based on evidence of the intent of the parties’ to the agreement.
 Rather than advocating a major role for the court, this provision seems to have 
been inserted as a way of safe-guarding the intent of the parties’ involved when 
the formalities of the GSA have not been satisfied.
Legal parenthood (section 4, 8 and 17): 
 The GSA makes it possible to frame legal parenthood prior to the birth of the 
child.
43 While the term ‘custody’ is no longer used by many legal jurisdictions, it is still common in the US. 
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 The effect of the legislation is to disrupt the presumption of legal motherhood to
the birth mother in gestational surrogacy agreements which accord with the
requirements in the GSA. 
 Instead, when a gestational surrogacy agreement satisfies the terms of the GSA,
the intended parent(s) shall be regarded as the legal parent(s) of the child at
birth and have sole custody of the child. 
 It is the lawyers involved who must certify that the formal requirements of
section 6 of the GSA have been satisfied. The certification process is through the
filing of prescribed documentation with the Illinois Department of Public Health.
 A medical practitioner licensed in Illinois must also certify that the child is not the 
‘biological’ (meaning ‘genetic’) child of the surrogate mother (and her husband). 
 Legal parenthood is acknowledged through the signing of the birth register; there 
is no need to make any further applications to the court.
 Section 4(6)(d) also stipulates that even if the wrong embryo is implanted during
the fertility treatment, resulting in the child not being genetically related to the 
intended parent (or either intended parent in the case of a couple), the intended 
parent(s) will still be the legal parents of the child unless a court determines
otherwise. With this provision we see the determined focus of the GSA to provide 
legal certainly about the parenthood of the child in favour of the intended 
parent(s), even in exceptional circumstances.  
 No challenges to legal parenthood or the validity of the surrogacy agreement can 
be filed once the period of one year after the child’s birth has passed (section
15). 
Child support obligations (section 7): 
 The legal parent(s) will be responsible for child support obligations.
 The legislation makes it clear that any breach of the surrogacy agreement by the 
intended parent(s) does not relieve them of child support obligations.
 Where a donated gamete is used, the legislation makes clear that they are only
responsible for child support obligations when he or she fails to enter into a legal
agreement with the intended parent(s) in which he or she relinquishes all their
parental rights and entitlements. 
Birth must take place in Illinois: 
 Although there are no residence or domicile requirements in relation to either the
surrogate mother or the intended parent(s), the birth must take place in Illinois
for the legislation to have effect. 
Role of the Department of Public Health (section 13): 
 The Department of Health is empowered by the GSA to adopt rules pertaining to 
the medical and mental health evaluations required for a surrogacy agreement
under the legislation.
2.2.1.3. Ex-ante: legal management of surrogacy agreements
This section details a number of ex-ante legal models which aim to facilitate certain
surrogacy agreements and either the pre-birth framing of legal parenthood, or the
framing of legal parenthood at the formal registration of the child’s birth. Unlike Greece,
South Africa and Illinois, these models do not stipulate either judicial or lawyer
supervision and/or approval of the surrogacy agreement. This is not to say that legal
professionals may not be involved in giving advice to persons who may wish to enter into
a surrogacy agreement; indeed, this may often be the case. Rather, what it means is 
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that they have no formally mandated legal role in the approval of the surrogacy
agreement. While certain pieces of medical evidence or documentation may have to be 
provided before the registration of the child’s birth can occur, the legal models turn more 
on administrative procedures than either judicial or lawyer supervision.
i. Commercial 
RUSSIA
Russia is commonly described as having a permissive legal framework for surrogacy. 
This is due to a combination of three main factors. First, the eligibility criteria is quite 
relaxed in the sense that other than the indication of a medical need for surrogacy, most 
adults are entitled to avail of the legal provisions: a genetic connection to the child is not
necessary; intended parents need not be married; nor do they need to satisfy residence,
domicile or citizenship requirements. For a woman to act as a surrogate mother in Russia 
she must be between 20 and 35 years old, have at least one healthy child and have a
medical certificate which indicates her to be in a satisfactory state of health. Second, the 
legal framework does not place limitations on the compensation that may be paid to the 
surrogate mother: commercial surrogacy is therefore not legally prohibited. Third, it is
possible for the intended parent(s) to be named as the child’s legal parent(s) on the 
birth certificate and the surrogate mother does not have to be registered as the child’s
legal mother. Also, there are no formal stipulations for presumptively valid surrogacy 
agreements. 
However, despite these arguably permissive factors, it is also important to be aware of
the restrictions and limitations that the Russian legal framework presents. Crucially, not 
all types of surrogacy are countenanced by the legal framework. It is only in the context
of gestational surrogacy agreements, where the surrogate mother is not the genetic 
mother of the child, that the provisions permitting the intended parent(s) to register as 
the legal parent(s) of the child are relevant. If the surrogate mother is the genetic 
mother, the usual rules of legal parenthood are applied and she will be regarded as the 
legal mother. Second, the registration of the intended parent(s) as the child’s legal 
parent(s) is contingent upon the consent of the surrogate mother. In other words, under
the Russian legal framework, a surrogate mother maintains the right to change her mind
about giving the child to the intended parent(s). The constitutionality of this provision 
was recently challenged in an application to the Russian Federation Constitutional Court
by the intended parents in a surrogacy agreement where the surrogate mother
registered herself as the child’s legal parent.44 The challenge was not successful and the 
surrogate mother’s status as the child’s legal mother was maintained and the 
constitutionality of the provision confirmed. 
As was indicated above, the South African legal framework provides for a “cooling off”
period in the context of traditional surrogacy agreements, whereby the surrogate mother
is also the genetic mother of the child. However, this “cooling off” period is not available
in the context of gestational surrogacy in South Africa.  
That the surrogate mother maintains the right to register herself as the legal parent of
the child and deny the intended parent(s) the opportunity to do so, makes the Russian 
legal framework more analogous to jurisdictions where surrogacy arrangements are only
facilitated ex-post facto, in the sense that legal parenthood can potentially be transferred
at some stage after the child’s birth from the surrogate mother (and her partner) to the 
intended parent(s) (see below). That the consent of the gestational surrogate mother is
needed before the intended parent(s) can be attributed with legal parenthood makes the
Russian ex-ante legal framework somewhat unique. It could be argued that the Russian
44 Constitutional Court ruling of 15.05.2012 No. 88-O). 
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legal framework provides an important protection for the surrogate mother, without 
requiring her to be the legally recognised mother upon the child’s birth (as is common in
ex-post facto models). In other words, if she is happy to continue with the surrogacy
arrangement once she has given birth to the child, the intended parent(s) can
automatically be registered as the child’s legal parent(s) through a straightforward 
administrative procedure, without the surrogate mother (and her husband) being initially
registered as the child’s legal parent(s).
On the other hand, of course, it can be argued that the Russian legal framework puts
intended parents in a very precarious position, to include surrogacy arrangements where 
they may well be the genetic parents.
The country report on Russia in the Annex provides full details of the legal sources that 
govern surrogacy in Russia, as well as an elaboration of all the relevant provisions.
ii. Non-commercial 
BULGARIA
There is currently a general legal prohibition against all forms of surrogacy in Bulgaria.
However, in 2009, plans to instigate legislation that would provide for the ex-ante
facilitation of altruistic gestational surrogacy agreements for heterosexual married
couples were introduced. This led to the introduction of a number of Draft Bills before
the legislative assembly, with the aim of amending and supplementing existing Bulgarian
legislation, namely: the Family code; the Social Security Act; the Employment Code; and 
the Health Act.45 These Draft Bills have been considered by preliminary committees and 
have been debated in the Bulgarian National Assembly. In advance of the second plenary 
debate in the National Assembly, further recommendation on the Draft Bills were made 
by a lawyer specialised in medical and family law. While it appeared likely that these 
Draft Bills would soon be passed in the Bulgarian National Assembly, many key 
personnel in the Bulgarian government resigned at the end of 2012. This resulted in the
National Assembly initiating a ‘state of emergency’, whereby only essential matters of 
legislation are currently being considered. The Draft Bills have therefore not yet been
passed, nor did the second reading in the National Assembly take place, which would 
have allowed us to report on what aspects  of the scrutiny of the draft legislation were 
incorporated by the sponsors of the Draft Bills.
However, the country report on Bulgaria in the Annex provides a detailed account of the
background to the introduction of the draft legislation and full details of the original 
content of the various Bills. It also includes detailed reportage on the main points raised
in the committee-stage, National Assembly and specialised legal scrutiny of the 
legislation. Finally, some of the main arguments for and against surrogacy, as made by 
various Bulgarian special interest groups are outlined.
The Bulgarian proposals and debates represent the most recent attempt by any Member 
State to initiate an ex-ante legal framework for surrogacy. They also represent a very 
thorough attempt at doing so, with not only family and health law provisions being 
considered, but also employment and social security. Beyond the specifics of the
proposed legal framework, a number of particularly interesting points of discussion
emerged in the legislative process: 
i) The need to legalise surrogacy was contextualised within the demographic crisis 
in Bulgaria and the decreasing number of Bulgarian citizens, particularly young
Bulgarian citizens given the increasing immigration of young people and the 
45 A Draft Bill relating to the Citizen Registration Act was also introduced, but subsequently withdrawn. 
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increasing numbers of people with fertility problems. While this proposition did 
not go unchallenged – on the basis that surrogacy would only be an option for a 
small number of people and was therefore hardly an adequate response to much 
larger-scale demographic problems – it is interesting to see a controversial
reproductive technique framed in this way.
ii) There was a perception that Bulgarian law was lagging behind Western
European countries and that reform was needed to keep Bulgaria ‘in sync’ with
Western Europe. Interestingly, Greece was not explicitly referred to in the public
documentation that we were able to access, despite it being the only country with 
a comprehensive ex-ante legal framework for surrogacy. Instead, Western 
European countries with an ex-post facto facilitation of legal parenthood to the
intended parent(s), or where adoption procedures have been used to achieve the
same, were cited as examples (e.g. UK, Netherlands and Denmark). This is an
interesting finding, in light of the fact that the legal framework proposed in
Bulgaria is much more comprehensive than any of these Western European 
countries and aims to frame legal parenthood in favour of the intended parents 
prior to the birth of the child. Of course, not everyone agreed with this perceived 
need to ‘sync’ with Western European countries, with some commentators 
referring to the legal position in other Balkan countries and the need for Bulgaria
to keep in tandem with their more prohibitive legal stance towards surrogacy.
iii) The support for any legal framework was overwhelmingly limited to altruistic
surrogacy. While the ex-ante facilitation of surrogacy agreements in the draft 
legislation has many aspects in common with e.g. the Russian legal framework,
the draft legislation was repeatedly distinguished from the legal framework of
Russia, and also Ukraine, on the basis that the Bulgarian legal framework would
continue to prohibit commercial surrogacy
iv)There appeared to be strong support from the medical professional 
associations and the medical profession generally for the draft legislation, as well 
as a strong public sympathy for infertile heterosexual (married) couples. Given 
that the draft legislation relates only to gestational surrogacy agreements, it very
much prioritises the medical model of surrogacy, whereby surrogacy is seen as an 
extension of fertility treatment involving high-tech reproductive technology. The
limitation of the legal framework to married couples also means that surrogacy
will be used more as a means of replicating the traditional family, not least
because the intended parents must have at least a partial genetic link to the child
in order to be attributed with legal parenthood. 
v) There were some interesting discussions around terminology in the context of
surrogacy. The draft legislation refers to the intended mother as the ‘biological
mother’ and the surrogate mother as the ‘substitute mother’. As detailed in the 
country report, the word ‘surrogate’ has negative connotations in the Bulgarian
language, so ‘substitute’ was deemed preferable. The use of ‘biological’ for the
intended mother is problematic, not least because a donated ovum can be used
to create the embryo that is implanted into the surrogate mother. Moreover, as 
was questioned by the specialised lawyer who scrutinised the draft legislation,
there is also a biological relationship between the surrogate mother and the child,
given the highly biological process of bearing and giving birth to a child. It is
refreshing to see such a discussion of terminology take place, particularly in
relation to the increasingly exclusive implication of genetics with ‘biology’ in the 
context of reproduction. 
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BELGIUM 
There is currently no express legislative provision for surrogacy in Belgium. In light of
this legislative gap, legislative proposals have been tabled at the parliamentary 
assemblies with the objective of either expressly forbidding for-profit surrogacy 
agreements, or for legally permitting surrogacy agreements under certain conditions.
The table below presents the core ideas of the four proposals which aim to legally frame 
and permit certain types of surrogacy under certain conditions. The country report on 
Belgium in the Annex provides a detailed consideration of these legislative proposals,
followed by an analysis of surrogacy case-law in Belgium. 
As can be seen in the table below, there are differences in the types of surrogacy that 
are permitted under the four proposals, as well as different eligibility requirements for 
the intended parent(s) and the surrogate mother; different framings of legal parenthood
upon the birth of the child (two of which provide that this surrogate mother is the legal
parent at birth, two of which attribute the intended parent(s) with legal parenthood at 
birth); different formalities for the execution of a surrogacy agreement; and different 
roles for the judiciary. However, a number of common features to all the Belgium
proposals which seek to legally frame surrogacy can be identified: the surrogacy
agreement must be altruistic; there must be a medical need that indicates the use of
surrogacy; and there must be a genetic link between the child and the intended parent,
or at least a partial genetic link to intended parents who are a couple. In light of this
wide range of legislative proposals in Belgium, it will be interesting to monitor
development in the country over the next few years. 
Table 9 : Summary Belgium legislative proposals 
DRAFT LAW
submitted by
Mr B.
TOMMELEIN and
associates
(Open
VLD)
DRAFT LAW
submitted by Mrs
C. DEFRAIGNE
(MR)
DRAFT LAW
submitted by
Mr P.
MAHOUX 
(PS)
DRAFT LAW
submitted by
Mrs M.
TEMMERMAN
and
Mr G.
SWENNEN 
(SPA)
TYPE OF 
SURROGACY
Altruistic,
traditional or
gestational
surrogacy
arrangement 
Altruistic, traditional
or gestational
surrogacy
arrangement
Altruistic, traditional
or gestational
surrogacy
arrangement 
Altruistic and
gestational
surrogacy
arrangement
ACCESS
Intended
parent(s)
(IP)
Medical indications
(precis.)
Heterosexual
couple, married or
not, and single w
omen
+ able to provide at
least half of the
genetic makeup of
the child (possibly
SM) 
+ age requirement 
+Belgian
nationality or
stable residence in
Belgium
Medical indications
Heterosexual
couple, married or
not
+ able to provide
full genetic makeup
, but ambiguity
+ evaluation by doctor
No condition of
nationality
and/or residency
Medical indications
No restriction 
+ able to provide at
least half of the
genetic makeup of the
child (possibly SM)
+ age requirement 
+ 2 year residency
Medical indications
“Stable” couple,
hetero-or
homosexual, married
or not, but ambiguity
+ able to provide at
least half of the
genetic makeup of the 
child (not SM or SM
partner)
+ age requirement 
+ Belgian nationality
(both) and 2 year
residency in Belgium
(at least 1 of the 2)
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Surrogate
mother (SM)
Possibly in a
relationship
+ implicitly
contemplates
family
connections
+ must already have
been through
pregnancy
+ age requirement 
+ Belgian 
nationality or
stable residence in
Belgium
Single,  widow
or divorced
+ no family
connections
(but exceptions)
No requirement of
a previous
pregnancy
+ age requirement 
No condition of
nationality
and/or residency
Possibly in a
relationship
+ no indication
regarding possibility
of family ties
+ must have given 
birth to a living child
+ age requirement 
No condition of
nationality and/or
residency
Possibly in a
relationship
+ implicitly
contemplates
family connections
+ must have given 
birth to a living child
+ age requirement 
+ Belgian nationality
Validity Null in principle,
but conditional
derogation
Null in principle, but
conditional
derogation
Formalisation Authentic certificate Authentic certificate Private agreement 2 private
agreements (with
and without centre)
RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES
Content
Legal indications:
Financial aspects
Medical and
psychological
aspects. Prenatal
diagnosis, IVF
Legal indications:
Aspects relative to
costs
Legal indications:
Financial aspects
Medical and
psychological
aspects. Prenatal
diagnosis, IVF
Model convention
(see legal document
n. 5­
929/1):
Financial aspects
Medical and 
psychological
aspects. Prenatal
diagnosis, IVF
Behavioural,
informational
relational aspects
Execution PI and MP:
compensation in
case of non­
fulfillment
PI and MP:
compensation in case
of non-fulfillment
PI: nothing / MP: right 
to withdraw , even
after birth
PI / MP: unilat.
before pregnancy;
and MP: right to
withdraw (90 after
implant)
Surrogate
mother
Filiation with the child 
(of whom she is the 
parent)
No filiation with the
child
(of whom she a priori
never is the parent,
but ambiguity of the
proposition)
Filiation with the child
(of whom she is the 
parent)
Never filiation with
the child (of whom
she
never is the parent)
FILIATION
Filiation established
through adoption
(with
modifications).
The agreement
applied as “prior
declaration of
adoption” ( ?)
Downstream judicial
control, via the
adoption procedure
Maternal and 
paternal filiation
found as a matter of
law subsequent to
the
naming, in the birth
certificate, of the
parents mentioned
in the agreement
No judicial control
Filiation established
through adoption
(without modification
– consent two months
after the birth)
Downstream judicial
control, via the
adoption procedure
Filiation as a matter
of law subsequent to
the mentioning of the
“requesting parent”
referred to in the
agreement
(ambiguity)
No judicial control
Intended
parent(s)
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2.2.1.4.  Ex- post facto: transfer of legal parenthood  
UK 
While the UK is widely cited as having a comprehensive legal regime for the facilitation
of surrogacy agreements, it in fact only provides for the post-birth transfer of legal
parenthood in certain circumstances and when certain conditions have been met. The 
perception that the UK fully legalises surrogacy may be due, in part, to the fact that 
since the mid-1980s, the UK has had a piece of legislation specific to surrogacy: the
Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SAA 1985). However, the primary purpose of the 
SAA 1985 was to prohibit and criminalise certain commercial activities in relation to 
surrogacy agreements, such as advertising, brokering and profit-making by third party
intermediates to a surrogacy agreement. The SAA 1985 did not prohibit surrogacy
outright, with section 2(2) making it clear that it is not a criminal offence for a woman to
enter into an agreement with a view to being a surrogate mother, or for someone else to
enter into an agreement with a view to a woman having a child for them. Nor did it
provide for any ex-ante framework for surrogacy arrangements or legal parenthood. 
The motivation for the legislation came from two main sources. The first was the 
response to a high profile surrogacy case known as ‘the Baby Cotton case’, whereby a
woman called Kim Cotton agreed to be a surrogate mother for a married couple in return 
for the payment of a fee.46 This was around the same time as the publication of the 
Warnock Committee’s Report into the regulation of human fertilisation and embryology.47 
Although the Warnock Report was generally supportive of emerging treatments for 
infertility involving emerging reproductive technology (e.g. donor insemination, IVF,
donation and storage of gametes), surrogacy as a reproductive technique found
disapproval. Although the Warnock Report did not recommend the prohibition of 
surrogacy, it did recommend that regulation should discourage people from entering into
surrogacy agreements. The legislative framework that emerged from the Warnock 
Report, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990), inserted section
1B into the SRA 1985. This provision codified the unenforceability of surrogacy
agreements in UK law. This was the only provision relating to surrogacy that the original
version of the HFEA 1990 contained. 
However, in 1992, the ‘Parental Order’ provisions, providing for the post-birth transfer of 
legal parenthood when certain conditions have been met, were inserted following a
campaign by an  MP on behalf of married couple in his constituency  who were in the  
position of having to adopt their genetic children following a surrogacy agreement in
order to establish legal parenthood. A Parental Order is effectively a type of fast-track
adoption procedure, providing for the ex-post facto transfer of legal parenthood to the
intended parents of a child born following surrogacy agreements. A formal application
must be made to the court and the judge will consider whether all the criteria have been
met. Until a Parental Order has been applied for and approved, the surrogate mother will
be the legal mother,48 and her partner, if she has one, may well be the second legal
46 The question of wardship in relation to this case was addressed by the court in: Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. 
47 Department of Health and Social Security (1984) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation
and Embryology (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 9314). Available at: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Warnock_Report_of_the_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_Fertilisation_and_ 
Embryology_1984.pdf 
48 As per either section 33 of the HFEA 2008, or the common law presumption, depending on the type of 
surrogacy arrangement, how the baby was conceived and the relationship status of the legal mother. For a 
more detailed elaboration of legal parenthood in the UK in the context of assisted reproduction and surrogacy 
respectively see: McCandless J and S Sheldon (2010) ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and the
Tenacity of the Sexual Family’ 73(2) Modern Law Review 175-207 and Horsey K. (2010) ‘Challenging 
presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements.’ 22(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly pp 449­
474. 
58
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
   
 
 
 
 
   
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
parent. The consent of the birth parent(s) is needed before a Parental Order can be 
approved. 
Despite the UK government commissioning a specific report in 1998 to examine the 
regulation of surrogacy,49 no further changes were made to the UK legal framework until 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 2008) amended the eligibility
criteria for applying for a Parental Order. Under the HFEA 1990, the ability to apply for a
Parental Order was limited to married couples (section 30). The HFEA 2008 relaxed the 
eligibility criteria relating to intended parents (section 54), so that unmarried and same 
sex couples could apply for a parental order following certain surrogacy arrangements. 
Single persons are still not eligible to apply for a Parental Order, and can only acquire
legal parenthood through formal adoption procedures.50 
As Section 1 of this Report makes clear, there has been a steady rise in the number of 
Parental Order applications to the courts in the UK, a significant proportion of which 
relate to cross-border surrogacy agreements. There may of course also be surrogacy
arrangements whereby the intended parent(s) do not/cannot apply for a parental order 
(either because they don’t appreciate the need to do so, or because they don’t meet the 
eligibility criteria), or where formal adoption takes place in order to affect the ex-post
facto transfer of legal parenthood. In relation to Parental Order applications that do 
come to the attention of a judge, it is interesting to note that since 2007 the High Court 
in England has been publishing significant rulings relating to the criteria of section 54. 
Two cases involving residence applications under the Children Act 1989 following 
surrogacy arrangements whereby the surrogate mother refused to hand over the child to
the intended parents have also been published by the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal. How these cases interpret and clarify the legislative framework in the UK is 
detailed below in the exposition of the eligibility criteria for Parental Order applications.
However, what is also interesting to note from these cases is the very clear appeal from 
the judiciary for better ex-ante regulation of surrogacy in the UK.51 
The table below details the criteria that must be met so that two persons can apply to 
the court for a Parent Order under section 54 of the HFEA 2008, in order to be attributed
with legal parenthood.
49 Margaret Brazier, Alastair Campbell and Susan Golombok (1998) Surrogacy: Review for health ministers of 
current arrangements for payments and regulation (London: HMSO, Cmnd. 4068). 
50 A recent case, involving the death of the intended father after the application for the Parental Order was 
submitted, but before it was granted, could be regarded as paving the way for an application from a single
intended parent. However, the case makes clear that the Parental Order was granted in order to ensure that 
parental status was conferred to both the intended mother and the now deceased intended father. It was 
reasoned that to do so did not frustrate the intention behind section 54 and that as no other legal order could 
declare the intended father as the legal father of the child, to not grant the order would be a disproportionate 
interference with the Article 8 rights of the parties involved. See: A v P [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam). 
51 Similar calls have been made by academic commentators: Horsey, K and Sheldon, S (2012) ‘Still Hazy After 
All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’ 20(1) Medical Law Review pp 67-89. 
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Table 10 : Requirements for the ex-post facto transfer of legal 
parenthood in UK 
Parental Order requirements
Must be two applicants: 
 Applicants can be married, in a civil partnership or be two persons who are living together
in an “enduring family relationship”; so long as they are not within prohibited degrees of 
relationship.
 Single persons are not entitled to apply for a Parental Order.
Mode of conception: 
 The surrogate mother’s pregnancy must have been brought about through means other 
than sexual intercourse. 
 Part 2 of the HFEA 2008 provides for a statutory schema for the attribution of parenthood
for a child born through licensed fertility treatment, including the use of donated gametes. 
The schema extends to unlicensed ‘artificial insemination’ when the woman who is
inseminated is married or in a civil partnership. 
 Under these provisions, the woman who gives birth is regarded as the legal mother,
irrespective of whether she is the genetic mother.
 The second legal parent may be her husband/civil partner or a person who meets the 
‘agreed parenthood provisions’ in the legislation.
 This legislative schema was not designed to countenance surrogacy agreements and in
most arrangements, the intended parents will not be considered as the child’s legal parent 
at the moment of birth.
 There is some scope for either the intended mother, or more commonly, the intended
father (especially if he is the genetic father and the surrogate mother is single) to be 
considered as the child’s second legal parent from birth. However, this status will be
shared with the surrogate mother. 
 If these provisions do not apply, or the child was conceived through sexual intercourse, the
common law rules attributing legal parenthood will apply. Again, the surrogate mother. If
she has a husband, he is the presumed legal father; but this presumption can be rebutted
by evidence from the genetic father.
 It is interesting that the specific mode of conception is more significant than the 
distinctions between traditional/gestational surrogacy.52 
The intended parents must have at least a partial genetic connection to the child:
 This genetic connection can of course be with both of the intended parents, but at least
one must contribute genetic material to the pregnancy.
 There is nothing on the face of the legislation which requires the intended mother to be
medically incapable of a successful pregnancy and childbirth. However, it is possible that in 
the context of licensed medical fertility treatment, a medical professional may require this
before agreeing to provide the surrogate mother with fertility treatment. 
 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority does not regulate surrogacy, so no
guidance on this issue is provided in their Code of Practice guidance for medical
professionals.
The intended parents must apply for the order within six months of the child’s birth: 
 Importantly, the child’s home must be with the applicants at the time of the application.
 This means that a child is legally required to live with persons who are not his/her legal
parents. Indeed, they may have no legal relationship with the child at all, given the
practicalities of a non-legal parents obtaining e.g. a parental responsibility order or a
residence order53 
52 Note, however, that when it comes to nationality purposes, section 50(9) of the British Nationality Act 1981 

does not distinguish between different modes of conception. This means that if a surrogate mother is married, 

her husband will be the presumed legal father irrespective of the details of conception.
 
53 These orders are provided for under the Children Act 1989, which is applicable in England, Wales and 

Northern Ireland. Scotland has a separate statute governing child law. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology
 
legislation applies to all of the UK.
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Domicile: 
 At the time of the application at least one of the intended parents must be domiciled in the
UK.
 Domicile means more than simply residing in the UK at the time of the application, or
indeed, for a substantive time prior to the application.
 In 2007, a Turkish couple entered into a surrogacy arrangement with a UK surrogate. They
moved to the UK towards the end of the pregnancy and the child was living with them at
the time of the application to the court. It was, however, their desire to return to Turkey, 
where they considered their permanent home to be. The court made clear that this did not 
satisfy the requirement of domicile, and thus the court had no jurisdiction in relation to
Parental Orders. Measures other than a Parental Order had to be used in order to facilitate 
the ability of the Turkish couple to take the child out of the UK and return to Turkey.54 
 The mandatory requirement of domicile has been addressed by two further High Court 
cases.55 Both cases involved male same-sex couples who had moved to the UK from other
countries (US/Poland and Israel) in 2008 and who engaged in a gestational surrogacy
agreement in India using the gametes of one of the men.
 Upon return to the UK, timely applications for Parental Orders were made, with the High
Court confirming in both cases that the burden of proof in establishing the domicile 
requirement rested with the applicants.
 What had to be established was that at least one of the applicants had abandoned their
domicile of origin, along with the acquisition of their domicile of choice in the UK. Part of
establishing this would be to show that they had a fixed intention to remain in the UK 
indefinitely.
Age:
 Both intended parents must be over 18 at the time of the application.
 There is no upper age limit mentioned in the legislation.
As surrogacy is not regulated ex-ante, there are no legal age limits with respect to the
surrogate mother. However, age limits with respect to licensed fertility treatment may be
otherwise applicable, as per guidance from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority.
Consent of the surrogate mother and other legal parent: 
 The surrogate mother must consent to the transfer of legal parenthood.  
 She cannot provide this consent any earlier than six weeks after the child’s birth. This is 
similar to adoption law in the UK. 
 If there is a second legal parent at the time of the child’s birth, their consent is also 
required. 
 If the surrogate mother and/or the second legal parent cannot be found, or are deemed
incapable of giving consent, their consent will not be required.
 The courts have made clear that this consent is required to be documented even if the
surrogacy arrangement took place in a country where there is an ex-ante framing of legal
parenthood in favour of the intended parent(s).56 
 In a recent case involving a surrogacy arrangement in India, the surrogate mother
disappeared shortly after the birth of the child.57 The appropriate consent six weeks after
the birth could therefore not be provided. However, the court proceeded to grant the 
Parental Order application as they were satisfied that all had been done to find the 
surrogate mother and acquire her consent. In other words, this was a genuine case of
where the surrogate mother could not be found. In light of this, it was deemed to be in the
children’s best interest to grant the Parental Order application (see below on the 
paramountcy principle).
 However, the court warned against utilising this provision as a means of avoiding the need 
to take all reasonable steps to obtain the surrogate mother’s consent.
54 Re G (Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam). The solution of the court was to use section 84 of the
Adoption and Children Act 2002 to terminate the parental responsibility of the surrogate mother and her 
husband and attribute the intended parents with parental responsibility. Note, however, that parental 
responsibility does not establish parental status and legal parenthood. What this court solution facilitated was 
the ability of the intended parents to return to Turkey with the child, with a view to initiating adoptions 
proceedings in Turkey. 
55 Z v C [2011] EWHC 3181 (Fam); Re A and B (surrogacy: domicile) [2013] EWHC 426 (Fam). 
56 Re X and Y (foreign surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam); Re IJ (a child) [2011] EWHC 921 (Fam); Z v C 
[2011] EWHC 3181 (Fam); Re A and B (surrogacy: domicile) [2013] EWHC 426 (Fam). 
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Payments: 
 The court must be satisfied that no money or benefit, other than for “reasonable 
expenses”, has been exchanged in relation to the surrogacy agreement.
 The court assesses the reasonableness of these expenses retrospectively and has 
expressed its discomfort as doing so, not least because often the surrogacy arrangement is
a fait accompli once the Parental Order application has been made.58 This puts the court in
the difficult position of refusing an order that might otherwise be deemed to be in the 
child’s best interests, on the basis of a payment that has already taken place.
 To date, no Parental Order application has been refused on the basis of unreasonable 
costs, to include arrangements which might otherwise be classed as ‘commercial’. In 2008,
the High Court retrospectively approved payments to a Ukrainian surrogate mother of 
€27,000. However, it was clear that the court felt under considerable pressure to approve
the payment, as otherwise the children would be left ‘stateless and parentless’.
 In 2010, the High Court considered an application for a Parental Order following a
surrogacy arrangement in Illinois, where compensation beyond ‘reasonable expenses’ had
been paid to the surrogate mother (the precise amount was not disclosed in the case
report).59 In this case, the judge made clear that it would only  be in the more extreme 
cases of an abuse of public policy that the refusal of an application for a Parental Order 
would be justified if the child welfare considerations indicated that the application should
otherwise be granted. The fact that the surrogacy agreement was legally permissible in
Illinois also steered towards approving the payment, which was regarding as being made
in ‘good faith’.
 Similar sentiments have been repeated in subsequent cases: “Where the Applicants for a 
Parental Order are acting in good faith, with no attempt to defraud the authorities, and the 
payments are not so disproportionate that the granting of Parental Orders would be an
affront to public policy, it will ordinarily be appropriate to give retrospective authorisation, 
having paramount regard to the children’s welfare.”60 
The child’s welfare is paramount: 
 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Order) Regulations 2010 indicate the 
child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. Previously it has been the primary, as
opposed to the paramount, consideration.
 Subsequent case law has emphasised this change in the regulations.
As can be seen, section 54 of the HFEA 2008 stipulates a mandatory gateway to the 
court’s jurisdiction in relation to Parental Orders, with various requirements relating to 
age; domicile; living arrangements; relationship status of the intended parents; and the
consent of the birth parent(s). However, once this jurisdiction is unlocked, the court’s 
paramount consideration is the child’s welfare.
What can also be seen is that the UK legal framework is deemed to apply, even when 
the surrogacy agreement has taken place elsewhere. In other words, foreign birth
certificates and court orders will not be recognised and the intended parents will have to 
apply for a Parental Order in order to establish legal parenthood. If the jurisdiction of the
court is not ‘unlocked’, full adoption must take place, which may be far from 
straightforward particularly if payments have been involved, or in the context of cross-
border surrogacy arrangements. Although the UK government has published some 
guidelines relating to immigration following cross-border surrogacy agreements (see 
below), these do not relate to parental legal status, which will still need to be established
upon return of a child to the UK. 
57 Re D and L (minors) (surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631.
 
58 See: Re X and Y (foreign surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam).
 
59 Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam).
 
60 Re D and L (minors) (surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631.
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AUSTRALIA
Although there are no legal provisions relating to the practice of surrogacy on a federal 
level, the vast majority of the Australian states have recently introduced legislation that 
allows for and expressly regulates surrogacy. 
The individual state legislatures are free to impose their own specific conditions that set 
limits, ban, or impose (sometimes severe) hurdles to the legal acknowledgement of the
family relationships stemming from a surrogacy contract. Commercial surrogacy is
prohibited in all states, and a criminal conviction is more than a mere possibility.
Surrogacy services for the provision of which no money exchange is arranged, namely
the form of altruistic surrogacy, is allowed by all state legislations, with the exception of
the Tasmanian Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993, which unequivocally renders all surrogacy
arrangements void and unenforceable as contrary to the social ethos and policy 
(paragraph 7).61 
A series of major reforms in 2008 to the federal-level Family Law Act 1975 (FLA) brought 
the issue of surrogacy and legal parenthood to the fore of public debate. In its previous
form, the FLA did not deal with the matter of legal parenthood in cases of collaborative
reproduction involving same-sex lesbian couples or surrogacy.
Under the 2008 amendments of subsection 60HB of the FLA, the definitions of “parent”
and “child” in federal law have been extended to include lesbian parents who have a child 
through collaborative reproduction and/or fertility treatment, and to some parents who 
have children through surrogacy arrangements. The effect of subsection 60HB FLA is to 
clarify that any transfer of legal parenthood by state and territory courts for surrogacy 
families alters legal parental status under the FLA. 
Up until 2010, surrogacy laws in Australia varied significantly from state to state. 
However, some uniformity was accomplished when all states – except Tasmania – 
adopted laws that prohibited commercial surrogacy and accepted the occurrence of
(gestational) surrogacy in limited circumstances.  
The legal regimes in most states now currently present the option of a court-based 
issuance of a ‘parentage order’ that leads to the transfer of legal parenthood to the 
commissioning couple. This possibility is generally available to all opposite and same-sex
couples in legal or ‘de facto’ relationships. The above mentioned legal process was
deemed to be in accordance with the ‘best interests of the child’ because it ensures that 
the child will not be left stateless or parentless, as well as protecting the surrogate
mother from a coerced consent when offering her gestational services. 
The following table illustrates the different pieces of legislation that cover the issue of 
surrogacy in each Australian state and briefly explains the basic content of the legal 
provisions.
61 However, note that more facilitative legislative proposals have been introduced in Tasmania. See table below 
for details of the Bill. 
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Table 11 : Australian legislative provisions
State Legal response Content of legal provisions 
Australia No express federal legal response to
surrogacy other than the Family Law 
Act 1975, 60HB, which allows for
federal-level recognition of any 
transfer of legal parenthood in the 
context of surrogacy by state or
territory courts.  
Most states have express legislation
permitting some form of surrogacy.  
Summary of generally applicable legal provisions:
 Commercial type of surrogacy is a criminal offence. 
 The rule of medical necessity exists. The commissioning couple should provide sufficient
evidence of their inability to produce a child or carry a pregnancy to term.
 The surrogate mother must be over 25 years old, able to carry a pregnancy, and have a history
of a previous live childbirth.
 Only gestational surrogacy arrangements are accepted. The eggs should not come from the 
surrogate. 
 Criminal records check to all participants in the arrangement.
 The parties must undergo counselling. 
 Informed consent free from coercion is a prerequisite in some states.
 Legal advice prior to the drafting of a surrogacy contract should be sought.  
 If state laws do not provide otherwise, it is accepted that the person(s) who have parental
responsibilities towards the child is/are the intended parent(s). Parentage is acquired through
adoption. 
 Surrogacy contracts are unenforceable. 
 The best interests of the child are paramount. 
Parentage Act 2004 	 This legislation was closely based upon s. 30 of the UK HFEA 199062, but its scope is arguably 
more limited. Only altruistic gestational surrogacy is acceptable, and the courts have no power 
on the authorisation of any payments made or to be made. 
 Commercial surrogacy is prohibited (para. 41). 
 Parental recognition under strict requirements (par. 24-25):  
a) the child should be conceived via IVF performed in a fertility clinic based in the Australian
Central Territory;  
b) the surrogate mother and/or her potential partner should not have offered their genetic 
material; 

c) the parties have come to an agreement for substitute parenthood;  

d) the child is the product of the genetic material of at least one of the intended parents;  

e) intended parents’ residence in the Australian Central Territory. 

62 Read further Millbank, J., ‘De facto Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents: Exploring the Scope and Effects of the 2008 Federal Relationship Reforms’, (2009) 
23(3) Australian Journal of Family Law 160. 
64
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
New  
South 
Wales 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
                                                            
   
     
    
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
- Surrogacy Act 2010 No 102
- Assisted  Reproductive 
Technology Act 2007 
- Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Regulations 2009 
- Status of Children Act 1996 
- Births, Deaths and Marriage 
Registration Act 2010 
(See also New South Wales Legislative
Council Standing Committee on Law 
and Justice, ‘Legislation on Altruistic
Surrogacy in
New South Wales’, May 2009).
 Altruistic surrogacy allowed.
 Presumption of motherhood for the birth mother. It is difficult for the intended mother to gain legal 
rights to parenthood. 
 Any surrogacy agreements must be drafted prior to the pregnancy, but they are unenforceable. 
 Transfer of legal parentage through parental orders. 
 Single and same-sex parenting is acceptable.
 Age limit for the surrogate (she must be over 25) and the intended parent(s) (he/she/they must be 
over 18) 
 Payment of reasonable expenses is allowed.
 This state’s laws regarding surrogacy have been criticised as harsh. Under the previous regime
(Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988) all forms of surrogacy were prohibited and criminal sanctions
were in force. The maximum penalty was 100 penalty units63 or three years of imprisonment for
entering into or offering to enter into a surrogacy arrangement.  
 The change came in 2008, after the Queensland’s Parliamentary Select Committee’s
recommendation for the legalisation of altruistic surrogacy (see also Queensland Parliament, 
‘Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy’, Report 2008). Queensland’s law is said to be the most 
controversial one, as it allows for state intervention in matters relating to private contracting and 
intimate personal relationships.
 Altruistic surrogacy. 
 No requirement of a genetic link between the intended parents and the child. 
 Conception can be accomplished by any means, not necessarily through the use of ARTs. 
 Same-sex and single parenting acceptable.
 No residence requirements: the court has discretion to grant parenthood orders even in cases where
the intended parents do not live in Queensland (Surrogacy Act 2010, s. 23 (2)).
 Payment for reasonable expenses allowed.
ring the lifetime of this study, restrictive reform to the Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010, relating
to access to the legislation by single and same-sex couples was proposed.64 This proposal has 
now been dropped.
Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010 
63 The value of a penalty unit differs from state to state in Australia, and may be regularly reviewed by the state authorities. In Queensland, a penalty unit is currently 

110 Australian Dollars. 100 penalty units would therefore be 1,100 Australian Dollars, which is approximately 847 EURO (calculated on 13th May 2013).
 
64 See Smith, Malcolm K., Willmott, Lindy, Trowse, Pip, & White, Benjamin P. ‘Back to the future: prohibiting surrogacy for singles, same-sex and shorter-term
 
heterosexual couples in Queensland’, (2013) 20(3) Journal of Law and Medicine 638-654.
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Tasmania Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993 
See also Department of Justice 
‘Proposed Tasmanian Surrogacy Bill:
Exposure Bill’, 1 (2011).
 ALL types of surrogacy are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
 Surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable (par. 7) 
 Third-party intervention in a surrogacy agreement is a criminal offence (par. 5-6).
Western 
Australia 
- Surrogacy Act 2008 
- Human Reproductive Technology Act 
1991 
 The Surrogacy Act came into force in 2009.
 Surrogacy for commercial reasons is prohibited (par. 8-9).  
 Payments for reasonable expenses related to the pregnancy and insurance claims are allowed
(par. 6 (3)). 
 A court authorisation process for parental orders and transfer of legal parentage to the intended 
parents is provided by law, and the child’s best interests are paramount to this decision.
 The intended parents must persuade the court for their fitness to parent the child (par. 13 (2)). 
 A plan of communication and contact between the parties must be submitted to the court.  
 The surrogate mother must be at least 25 years old and have a child of her own. 
 The progressiveness and innovation of this piece of legislation can be found in the availability of
surrogacy also to a single man or a male couple. 
 At the same time, however, there are limitations which point to the requirement for the residence 
of the intended parent/couple within the state’s jurisdiction; the requirement of a pre-conceptual 
written surrogacy agreement; as well as that of a “cooling-off” period of 3 months for the 
surrogate mother to decide whether she would like to relinquish the child or not.  
 The request for a parental order can be reviewed by a government appointed Tribunal court.  
Victoria Assisted Reproductive  
Treatment Act 2008, no. 76.
(see also the Assisted  
Reproduction Regulations of 2009) 
Status of Children Act 1974  
(for those cases where conception was 
not accomplished through fertility 
 The state of Victoria was the first to adopt a law on surrogacy.  
 In 1995 the legislature introduced the Infertility Treatment Act, which classified commercial
surrogacy as a criminal offence. Altruistic surrogacy was passively accepted, but in some cases it
was practically impossible for intended parents to be allowed to perform fertilisation with the
purpose of surrogacy, as under the Act the woman who would be treated (i.e. the surrogate
mother) must have been infertile (para 20).
 In 2008, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act was passed (it came into force on 1 January
2010), and rendered surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable (par. 44).
South Family Relationships Act 1975, as 
Australia amended.
 Altruistic surrogacy. 
 Criminal penalties for intermediaries. 
 Automatic transfer of legal parentage (s. 10 (c)). The intended mother’s husband is considered to
be the legal father of the child (s. 10 (d)).
 Surrogacy is only available to heterosexual married couples or couples in a de facto relationship for
a period of 3 years or more. 
The intending couple must reside within the state’s jurisdiction. 
Pregnancy must be accomplished through the use of fertility treatment, which will take place in a
licensed fertility clinic based in South Australia. 
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 However, the practice of surrogacy was not illegal if the IVF treatment of the surrogate occurred 
within the Victorian jurisdiction.  
 The law states an age limit for the surrogate (she must be over 25), as well as the precondition 
of a previous live birth and experience of motherhood, and requires prior consultation of all the
participants with a legal professional, as well as counselling (dictated by the Assisted 
Reproduction Regulations of 2009).
 With regards to the intending mother, she must be infertile, and she and her partner must
undergo and succeed in a criminal record and child protection check. 
 Moreover, a number of organisations, such as the Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment
Authority (VARTA) function in this state.  
 More specifically, VARTA is responsible for the administrative matters of the ART Act 2008 and 
ensures that the participants have complied with the state law requirements.
 The Act refers to a Parent Review Panel, before which the parties of the surrogacy arrangement 
must present their case and provide evidence for their altruistic motives, their need for
surrogacy in order to procreate, and their suitability to become parents. The decisions of this
Panel are reviewable by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. 
 The Victorian Supreme Court holds the ultimate decisive power for the authorisation of individual
requests for the acknowledgement of any substitute parental orders, which will then lead to the 
transfer of legal parentage.
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2.2.2. Non-legal guidelines
2.2.2.1. Fertility clinic and professional organisation guidelines  
NETHERLANDS
Commercial surrogacy is prohibited by the Criminal Code and although there is no
specific legal regulation of non-commercial surrogacy, legislation was adopted in 1998
that requires institutions providing IVF services in the context of surrogacy agreements
to comply with a number of criteria, including the guidelines established by the Society
for Obstetrics and Gynaecology. Institutions must also ensure that the intended parents 
provide all the necessary genetic material for the pregnancy, thus limiting the provision
of gestational surrogacy to heterosexual couples with functioning gametes. The country
report on the Netherlands in the Annex provides a detailed consideration of the general 
legal regime in the Netherlands. A summary of the relevant provisions for this 
component of the research is presented in the table below. 
Table 12 : Summary of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology
guidelines
Age of the surrogate 
mother
The surrogate mother should be no older than 44 (aligned 
to the age limit for an IVF with egg donation). 
Surrogate mother’s 
previous fertility
The surrogate mother should already have given birth to 
a healthy child and should consider that her family is
complete. 
Informed consent All parties involved – that is the intended parents, the 
surrogate mother as well as her partner, if appropriate –
must be informed orally and in writing of all the potential 
consequences of this undertaking, be it on the medical,
psychological or judicial fronts, which should allow for a
verification of the free and informed consent of the 
surrogate mother. 
Medical and 
psychological 
examination and support
The parties involved should benefit from psychological
support during and after the procedure. Moreover, on a 
medical level, the guidelines stipulate that the number of 
embryos implanted into the surrogate mother should be 
limited to two in order to avoid the risks of multiple
pregnancy.
Age of the intended 
parents 
The intended mother should be no older than 40. This age
limit is based on the expected results of the ovarian 
stimulation and the small chance of success of a
pregnancy through IVF for women aged over 40, due to 
the aging of their ovula.
Withdrawal of the 
intended parents’ 
consent
There does not seem to be any specific provision to make
sure that the parents do not withdraw their consent.
However, the procedure to be followed by the intended
parents and the conditions imposed on them seem to be
so strict that it seems very unlikely that intended parents
would withdraw their consent;
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Conditions linked to the 
place of residence, home
and/or nationality of the 
intended parents and/or 
of the surrogate mother
Counselling requirement The guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and
Gynaecology dedicate a paragraph to the requirement of 
counselling. It provides that all parties, that is both the 
intended parents and the surrogate mother and her 
partner, should be informed in writing and orally of all
aspects, risks and disadvantages of the treatment, be on
the medical, psychological or legal levels. The counselling 
is carried out by a psycho-medical team who tries to
bring out an informed consent, which will be recorded in
an agreement bringing together all parties involved, but 
also separately consulting with, on the one hand, the 
intended parents, and on the other hand, the surrogate
mother and her partner. The agreement among others 
stipulates the number of IVF attempts accepted by the 
surrogate mother as well as the moment and manner in 
which the child will be handed over to the intended 
parents. 
The guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and
Gynaecology don’t formulate any requirements in terms 
of place of residence, home or nationality. However, 
certain surrogacy centres lay down additional 
requirements to those stipulated in the guidelines and
require for example that the parties hold Dutch
nationality and residency in the Netherlands. 
2.2.2.2. Government guidelines for cross-border surrogacy agreements 
Both the UK and Irish governments have published formal guidance in relation to cross-
border surrogacy agreements and immigrations and citizenship rules.65 It is important to
realise that these guidelines do not provide a schema for the attribution of legal 
parenthood in cases of cross-border surrogacy; they merely provide guidance as to the 
principles which will be considered in the approval of applications for travel
documentation and immigration status. In relation to parental legal status, both 
documents make clear that national law is applicable to the parties concerned, and that
foreign birth certificates and/or court orders are not binding on the national authorities.  
The rules pertaining to immigration and citizenship in both jurisdictions are complex, and 
it is beyond the scope of this section to analyse these documents in full. However, a
number of observations can be made. 
First, the process of returning with a child is likely to be more straightforward if:
1) the intended father is the genetic father of the child; and 
2) the surrogate mother is single/not married. 
If the intended father’s genetic connection can be evidenced by an independent third
party, this provides scope for him to be regarded as the child’s legal parent or guardian, 
and thus eligible to apply for the necessary travel documentation. However, much
65 Irish Department of Justice and Equality (2012) ‘Citizenship, parentage, guardianship and travel document
issues in relation to children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements entered into outside the state’
(available at: http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR12000035); Home Office, UK Border Agency (2009) 
‘Inter-country surrogacy and the immigration rules’ (available at: 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/residency/Intercountry-surrogacy-leaflet). 
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depends on the surrogate mother’s marital status as both UK and Irish law will initially
regard her husband as the legal father.66 It may be possible in Irish law to rebut this 
presumption through a declaration of parentage under the Children Act 1987.67 Under 
UK law, the situation is complex due to somewhat conflicting terms of the HFEA 2008 
and the British Nationality Act 1981 as to when the marital presumption of paternity can 
be rebutted. In light of this, intended parents are advised: 
that they must not rely on any future rebuttal of the surrogate mothers’ husband 
being the child’s father as a means of establishing that the child has British
citizenship, and should expect to have to apply for an Entry Clearance in order to
bring the child into the United Kingdom under the Immigration Rules, not by way 
of the child automatically acquiring British citizenship and coming in on a British
passport (section 27). 
In the UK, male same-sex couples can apply for a Parental Order (see above). So long 
as one of the men have a genetic connection to the child, their position would be 
regarded as the same as a genetic father in a heterosexual relationship. Given the
framing of the rules around the male genetic link, a female same-sex couple would not
be similarly positioned, even if one of the women was genetically related to the child. A 
single man would be in a similar position with respect to the immigration rules, but he 
would not be eligible to apply for a Parental Order upon returning to the UK. Full
adoption would be needed to ensure that the man acquired full parental responsibility for 
the child and to extinguish the parental legal status, rights and entitlements of the 
surrogate mother. 
A significant difference between the Irish and UK guidance is that no reference is made
in the Irish guidance to surrogacy agreements whereby the intended father is not also 
the genetic father. In other words, there is no mechanism to facilitate the bringing of a 
child to Ireland following a cross-border surrogacy agreement when donor sperm has
been used: the intended father must be the genetic father. In the UK guidance, intended
parents are directed to apply for an Entry Clearance in order to bring the child to the UK 
under the immigration rules. This application will of course have to be successful before 
the child can travel to the UK. 
Second, as both jurisdictions have hitherto regarded the surrogate mother as the legal 
mother, there is little scope for the intended mother to establish herself as a parent or 
guardian for the purpose of applying for travel documentation after the child’s birth.
Even if the surrogate mother relinquishes her status as the legal mother, this will only be
relevant for the later purpose of transferring legal parenthood according to the national
legislation. This means that even if the intended mother is the genetic mother, she has 
no official standing with respect to applying for the child’s travel documentation, or
establishing their citizenship status. 
A recent Irish case, however, may make this aspect of the guidance in Ireland
untenable. The current guidance currently states that: 
Under Irish law the woman who gives birth to the child – in this case, the
surrogate mother – is the legal mother of the child, even if the ovum from which 
the child was produced was provided by one of the commissioning adults, or by a 
donor. 
66 See sections 33 and 35 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and section 50(9) of the British 
Nationality Act 1981; and section 46 of the Status of Children Act 1987. 
67 Note, however, that the intended father will also have to apply for a guardianship order to be considered as 
the child’s legal guardian. This is because under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 the mother of a child 
born outside of marriage is considered to be the child’s sole legal guardian.  
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In March 2013, the Irish High Court ruled that the intended mother in a domestic
surrogacy agreement should be named as the legal mother of the children born
subsequent to the surrogacy agreement and that the birth register should be amended
accordingly.68 The original entry in the birth register recorded the surrogate mother and 
the intended genetic father as the legal parents. When the intended parents 
subsequently asked for the entry to be amended to name the intended mother, the Chief
Registrar refused to do so on the basis of the mater semper certa est principle. The 
intended parents then applied for a declaration of parentage under the Children Act 
1987, presenting evidence of the intended mother’s genetic relationship with the child.
The application was supported by the surrogate mother and ultimately by the High
Court.
The court concluded that there was nothing in Irish law affirming the principle that the 
birth mother is the legal mother. The court also dismissed the respondent’s arguments
relating to the significance of pregnancy and gestation for maternity in light of
developments in epigenetics. The respondents argued that these factors distinguished
maternity from paternity, which was based on genetics and nuclear DNA alone. The
purpose of this argument was to unsettle claims of symmetry in relation to the
significance of DNA evidence for a declaration of parentage under the Children Act 1987.
However, the court found that the significance of epigenetics did not trump the
significance attached to nuclear DNA, from which characteristics are deemed to be
inherited. This, the court argued, was supported by the focus on the ‘blood tie’ in Irish
case law. 
This important case certainly paves the way in Ireland for intended parents with a 
genetic link to a child to be regarded as their legal parent. However, given the focus of 
the High Court’s reasoning on the genetic link, this case is unlikely to have any broader 
application to surrogacy agreements where the intended parents are not also the genetic
parents of the child. Although the intent of the intended mother was acknowledged by 
the court, this was very much a secondary consideration to the main focus on genetics in
the case. 
The Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence in Ireland, Alan Shatter TD, has 
announced his intention to introduce legislation relating to surrogacy and assisted 
reproduction. The Family Relationships and Children Bill is scheduled to be published 
later in 2013. In 2004, a report on assisted human reproduction was commissioned by
the Irish government, with the Committee publishing their report in 2005.69 In this 
Report, the majority of the Commission recommended that the intended parents should
be the presumed legal parents. The presumption could be rebutted if there was evidence 
of a fundamental change in circumstances under which the surrogate mother agreed to
the arrangement. It is interesting to note that this recommendation was not limited to
cases whereby the intended parents had a genetic link to the child,70 suggesting that the
intent behind the arrangement may have been considered as more crucial. Legislative
developments in Ireland may therefore prove very interesting, and possibly in significant
contrast to the ex-post facto position in the UK, at least in relation to legal parenthood.
Whether full ex-ante regulation is proposed remains to be seen. 
Third, while Ireland and the UK have both published guidelines relating to travel
documentation, immigration and citizenship after cross-border surrogacy, it must be
remembered that these are merely guidelines on the existing law: no special legal
measures have been put in place and parties who plan to engage in a cross-border 
surrogacy agreement are still strongly advised to obtain legal advice relating to their
68 MR & Anor v An tArd Chlaraitheoir & Ors [2013] IEHC 91.
 
69 Department of Health (2005) Report of the Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction (available at: 

http://www.dohc.ie/publications/cahr.html).
 
70 Note that some members of the commission thought that if the surrogate mother was also the genetic
 
mother, she should be the presumed legal mother.
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specific circumstances. However, the rules continue to be complex and incredibly difficult
to navigate, with the English High Court observing incorrect advice in some of their  
published cases.71 In other words, despite the attempt by national governments to raise 
awareness of the relevant legal issues, cross-border surrogacy remains a difficult
practice to navigate in light of national legislative frameworks that were not designed to 
countenance their existence.  
2.3. PART B: CASE LAW 
2.3.1. MEMBER STATES WITH NO EXPRESS PROVISION FOR SURROGACY 
2.3.1.1. Protection of the child  
Placement of the child 
BELGIUM
- Ghent (15th ch.), 18th of May 2009, reforming Youth court. Ghent (27th ch.),
31st of March 2009: after an agreement concluded between the biological parents and 
the intended mother before childbirth, the child was given to the intended mother so 
that she could adopt him/her (traditional surrogacy). The circumstances of the case did
not suggest a for-profit surrogacy. In first instance, the Youth court considered that it 
was not necessary to pronounce an enforceable pedagogical measure with regards to the
child. The Court of Appeal reformed this decision and granted the child to an adoption
family for a period of six months, considering it necessary to take an urgent enforceable 
pedagogical measure applying article 37, 2° of the decree on the special assistance to
the youth. The child was then placed in a centre for child care and family assistance. 
While this placement was first extended by request of the public prosecutor (Youth court. 
Ghent (27th ch.), 4th of November 2009, inedited), the Youth court settled in favour of
the request of the social services, requesting the attribution of the child to the intended
mother, in whose household the child currently lives (Youth court. Ghent (27th ch.), 4th of 
November 2009, unpublished). 
THE NETHERLANDS
Rechtbank Groningen, 20 July 2004, Rechtbank Utrecht, 26 October 2005,
Rechtbank Utrecht, 24 October 2007, Rechtbank Utrecht, 7 May 2008, 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 25 November 2008, Rechtbank Utrecht, 10 June 2009, 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, February 2, 2010: case Donna: surrogacy was carried out 
in Belgium between a Belgian surrogate mother and a Belgian couple of intent. The 
surrogate mother was inseminated with sperm from the father of intent (traditional
surrogacy). As a result of the deterioration of the relationship between the surrogate 
mother and the couple, the surrogate mother pretended that she had a miscarriage.
After the birth, the surrogate mother entrusted baby Donna to a Dutch couple, in return 
of payment. The Dutch couple informed the Dutch authorities that a new-born would 
soon arrive in their family and that they would like to adopt it, without specifying that
the child is coming from abroad. The case was referred to the Court of Utrecht, which
has had to decide whether the child could stay with the Dutch couple despite the fact 
that they had not honoured the rules applicable to the adoption procedure when the
child to be adopted is foreign. Noting that there was a "family life" between the child and
the couple insofar as Donna had been living in the home of the Dutch couple since her 
birth, the Court allowed the couple to keep Donna. Meanwhile, the Belgian parents of
intent had realised that the surrogate mother had lied to them and had given birth to 
'their' child. More than two years after the birth of the child, a DNA test showed that the 
71 E.G Re X and Y (foreign surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam)Re A and B (surrogacy: domicile) [2013] EWHC 
426 (Fam). 
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Belgian father of intent was the biological father of the child. Following this test, the 
Belgian father of intent started various procedures before the Dutch courts to get the 
child back and to be granted visitation rights. The courts however felt that it was not in
Donna’s interest to leave the home in which she had been growing up since birth, nor to 
grant her biological father a right of access (see below for the procedure in Belgium). 
Criminal law
BELGIUM
- Ghent, 5th of September 2005: case Donna: the surrogacy took place in Belgium
with a Belgian surrogate mother and Belgian intended parents. Following the 
deterioration of the relations between the surrogate mother and the Belgian couple of
intended parents, the surrogate mother pretended a stillbirth and sold Donna to a Dutch 
couple. At first instance, the youth court of Oudenaarde placed Donna under the 
provisional tutelage of the social service of the Flemish Community after requesting the 
youth court of Utrecht (Netherlands) to transfer the case to it. In appeal, the Court of 
Ghent nullified the decision of the youth court of Oudenaarde on the basis of the 
territorial incompetence of the Belgian courts. Indeed, the transfer of the Dutch courts to
the Belgian courts was not in conformity with the article 15, § 2 of the regulation
Brussels n° 2201/2003 of the Council of the 27th of November on the competence, the
recognition and the execution of decisions in matters of wedlock and in matters of
parentage, abrogating regulation (CE) n° 1347/2000, so-called Regulation Brussels II
bis. The case was transferred to the tribunal of Utrecht (see above).
However, on 12 October 2012, the criminal court of Oudenaarde sentenced the 
surrogate mother and her husband to a year of deferred imprisonment and a fine of 
1,650 EUR for having inflicted “inhumane and degrading treatment” to the little Donna.
The Dutch couple who bought the child was also sentenced to a 1,650 EUR fine, whilst
the Belgian couple of intent benefitted of a suspended sentence.  
- Civ. Ghent, 24th of December 2009: case J: the surrogacy took place in Belgium
with a Belgian surrogate mother and Dutch intended parents to whom the child was sold
beforehand via Internet. The surrogate mother and her spouse are the genetic parents
of the child. At the moment of birth, the Belgian surrogate mother pretends to be the 
Dutch intended mother and, for this reason, the identity of the Dutch intended mother is
registered on the birth certificate instead of the identity of the Belgian surrogate mother. 
Parentage in relation to the child of the intended father is established by presumption of 
paternity, him being married to the intended mother. When the fraud is revealed, a
penal enquiry takes place in Belgium and the Netherlands and, as a result, the child is
withdrawn from the Dutch intended parents and placed with a host family in Belgium.
The results of the penal enquiry clearly demonstrate that the Belgian woman gave birth
to the child. The action undertook by the Belgian surrogate mother before the tribunal of
first instance of Ghent contests the parentage of the Dutch intended parents. The
Belgian courts are competent as the child has habitual residence on the Belgian territory
(article 61 of the Code of international private law, on the rules of international
competence in matters of parentage). The applicable law in the case of the contestation 
of paternity and maternity is the Dutch law as designed by the rule of conflict of laws in
matters of parentage (article 62 of the Code of Private international law). Indeed, it is
the law of the State from which the intended parents – whose parentage is contested–
are citizens of. According to article 209 of the Dutch Civil code, parentage as established 
in a birth certificate cannot be contested if there is a de facto parent-child relation
between the child and the person mentioned in the birth certificate. The tribunal 
considered that in the current case this was not the case for the Dutch parents to the 
extent that the child had not lived but only a few months with the Dutch family and was 
soon placed in a Belgian host family. In the absence of a de facto parent-child relation
between the child and the parents mentioned in the birth certificate, the action of 
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contestation is open to a third party. In conformity with the article 209 of the Dutch Civil 
code, the surrogate mother was, thus, capable of undertaking an action contesting the 
parentage as there was no de facto parent-child relation between the child and the 
Dutch parents. The maternal parentage of the intended mother was, then, easily 
revoked by proving that she did not give birth do the child and the parentage of the 
husband was revoked by domino effect, as the parentage of his wife was revoked. The 
parentage of the surrogate mother was, thus, re-established. 
Before the Dutch courts, the case produced a penal conviction of the Dutch parents for 
forgery and illegal adoption (Rechtbank Zwolle, 14th of July 2011, LJN: BR1608 
(sentence condemning the woman) et LJN: BR1615 (sentence condemning the man) 
(See report on the Netherlands). The surrogate mother and her partner (biological 
parents) were also the subject of penal conviction before Belgian courts of degrading 
treatment of a child (art. 417 bis, 3° Penal code), declaring themselves guilty of
substitution of a child through a commercial exchange, a situation that the tribunal
analysed as the sale of a child as well as a for-profit surrogacy, both contrary to the 
human dignity of the child. The correctional court of Ghent condemned them to a year of 
suspended imprisonment, imposed them a fine of 550 EUR and an amount of 7.500 EUR
to be paid to the child for damages (Corr. Ghent, 14th of May 2012, inedited. An account 
of the facts can be found in this site: www.jeugdenkinderrechten.be). 
2.3.1.2. Ex-post facto: legal parenthood framework  
Internal case law 
BELGIUM
1) Applicable rules 
Establishing the maternal bond 
As there is no legislation enacted on matters on surrogacy, the rules determining the
establishment of maternal parentage follow the traditional adage mater semper certa est
by establishing that the legal mother is the mother giving birth72. In other words, the 
surrogate mother is the legal mother of the child, even if she has no genetic relation to
the child, while the intended mother has no legal relation to the child, even if she is the
genetic mother. In order to establish a parentage relationship with the child, the
intended mother has to engage an adoption procedure either through a joint adoption 
with her spouse/cohabitant, if he could recognise the child, or adopting the child on her 
own if she is single. Belgium authorises the adoption by a single parent as well as by 
same-sex persons. Moreover, the law does not require that the candidates seeking to 
adopt are married. It is sufficient to be “cohabitants”, for example, having made a
declaration of legal cohabitation or of permanent and affective life together for at least
the last three years when the adoption request takes place (art. 343, Civil code).
Establishing the paternal bond 
In the absence of modifications to the rules related to paternal parentage, the husband
of the surrogate mother is considered as the legal father of the child, in compliance to
the rule relating to the presumption of paternity73. The intended father will have to either 
engage an adoption procedure to establish parentage to the child or contest the paternal 
parentage of the husband of the surrogate mother to establish his own paternity. If the 
surrogate mother is not married, the intended father can acknowledge the child with the 
72 Art. 312 Civil code: “The child’s mother is the person designated as such on its birth certificate” (editor’s
 
translation).
 
73 Art. 315 Civil code: “The child born in wedlock or within the 300 days following the marriage’s dissolution or 

annulment, has the husband as a father” (editor’s translation).
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consent of the surrogate mother74, which allows him to establish parentage without
engaging an adoption procedure. If there is no consent from the surrogate mother, a 
court tries to conciliate the parties and can reject the claim by the intended father in
case an agreement is not attained and with the condition that it is proven that the 
intended father is not the biological father of the child. Moreover, the court can reject
the acknowledgment if the child is a year or older and the acknowledgement is obviously
against the child’s best interests. 
Adoption 
If the intended parents engage an adoption procedure aiming at establishing parentage 
to the child, it will be organised according to the classic rules governing adoptions aiming
at establishing parentage in Belgium. As a result, no genetic relation is required between
the child and the intended parents for these to be eligible for the adoption procedure.
2) Analysis of the decisions 
In the domestic cases of surrogacy, the legal action is almost systematically undertaken 
by the intended parents seeking to establish parentage in relation to the child, either 
through a procedure of adoption, undertaken by the intended mother75 or by both of the
intended parents76, or by a procedure of approval of the acknowledgement of paternity 
by the intended father77. One of the published cases concerns, however, a different
hypothesis; that of the contestation of paternity, introduced by the husband of the 
surrogate mother, on the basis of the absence of his consent to the insemination of his 
wife by the sperm of the intended father78. As, by definition, the surrogacy contract is 
illegal, no action has been undertaken, until today, with the purpose of requesting the
enforcement of an eventual contract concluded between the parties. 
Of the eleven decisions taken into account, relating to cases of domestic surrogacy, 
seven concern the approval of adoption procedures; five decisions concede it and two 
refuse to sentence on it. Only one decision has been taken on the subject of the
protection of childhood. 
Let’s start with the decisions granting the adoption:
- Antwerp (16th ch. bis), 14th of January 2008, reforming Youth court Antwerp 
(7th ch.), 11th of October 2007: the surrogacy took place with the gametes of the 
intended parents implanted through IVF, the woman being the mother of the intended 
mother (gestational surrogacy). The intended father’s parentage is established by the 
acknowledgment of paternity, the surrogate (grand-)mother not being married79. The 
action introduced before the Youth court of Antwerp seeks the approval of the adoption 
74 Art. 319 and 329bis Civil code: “When the paternity is not established in relation to articles 315 or 317, the
father can recognise the child within the conditions fixed in article 329bis”. 
75 Youth court Brussels, 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1182 ; Antwerp 
(16th ch. bis), 14th of January 2008, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1774, note F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie 
na draagmoederschap revisited » ; Youth court Brussels, 6th of May 2009, J.L.M.B., 2009, p. 1083 ; Ghent (15th 
ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L. PLUYM reforming Youth 
court Bruges, 19th of January 2012 and Youth court Ghent, 13th of June 2012, 590.B.2011/57, unpublished. 
76 Ghent (15th ch.), 16th of January 1989, T.G.R., 1989, p. 52 ; Youth court Turnhout, 4th of October 2000,
RechtskundigWeekblad, 2001-2002, p. 206, note F. SWENNEN, « Volle adoptie na draagmoederschap: nihil 
obstat ? ». 
77 Brussels (3rd ch.), 1st of March 2007, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2007, p. 754 et Civ. Hasselt (1st 
ch.), 27th of March 2001, Limb. Rechtsl., 2001, p. 323. 
78 Civ. Ghent (3rd ch.), 31st of May 2001, Revue générale de droit civil, 2002, p. 27, note G. VERSCHELDEN. 
79 At first instance, the acknowledgement of paternity by the intended father in relation to the child born from 
his mother-in-law was problematic in view of the article 321 of the Civil code that forbids the acknowledgement
of paternity when it crates between the mother and the father an absolute obstacle to marriage. Following a 
reform of the law on parentage, the intended father could acknowledge his child, the obstacle becoming
relative and not absolute anymore. See F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie na draagmoederschap revisited », note on 
Antwerp (16tth ch. bis), 14th of January 2008, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1775, 
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requested by the intended mother. In first instance, the Youth court refuses to concede 
the adoption on the basis that a surrogacy convention is illegal and that it cannot be 
used as a fair basis framing the adoption unless it is accepted and framed by the law. 
The tribunal considers, thus, that the full adoption resulting from an intra-familial
surrogacy is not in conformity with the best interests of the child or his/her fundamental 
rights. The Court of Appeal of Antwerp reforms the sentence pronounced by the Youth 
court and concedes the adoption underscoring the fact that an altruistic surrogacy by a 
surrogate mother, whose only objective is to satisfy the desire to have a child by her
daughter, is not contrary to the public order. 
- Youth court. Brussels, 4th of June 1996: the surrogacy took place with the gametes 
of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother being the sister of 
the intended mother (gestational surrogacy). The parental parentage is established by
acknowledgement of paternity. The action undertaken before the tribunal of first 
instance of Brussels aims to obtain an approval of the adoption requested by the 
intended mother. The tribunal settles in favour of her request highlighting that it is in the
best interests of the child that his/her legal situation corresponds to the social reality, 
the child being reared in the household by the intended mother. 
- Youth court. Turnhout, 4th of October 2000: surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother being the
sister of the intended mother (gestational surrogacy). The action undertaken aims to
obtain the approval of the adoption requested by both intended parents, the surrogate
mother being married. The tribunal settles in favour of their request after observing that 
the surrogate mother and her spouse (legal parents) consent to the adoption and on the 
basis that a surrogacy not for profit is not against public order.
- Youth court. Brussels, 6th of May 2009: the surrogacy took place with the gametes 
of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother not being related 
to the intended parents (gestational surrogacy). The parentage of the intended father is
established by acknowledgement of paternity. The action undertaken aims to obtain the 
approval of the adoption requested by the intended mother. The tribunal settles in
favour of her request on the basis that the request is substantiated on a fair basis and
that it responds to the best interests of the child as it allows to match the law with the
facts as the intended mother is the genetic mother of the child and considered by 
everyone as the child’s mother. 
- Youth court. Ghent, 13th of June 2012: the surrogacy took place with the gametes 
of the intended parents implanted through IVF (gestational surrogacy). The parentage of 
the intended father is established by acknowledgement of paternity. The action
undertaken aims to obtain the approval of the adoption requested by the intended 
mother. The tribunal settles in favour of her request, considering that the adoption is
based on a fair basis as the twins are, from the moment that they were born, a part of 
the household of the intended parents. 
The two decisions that refuse adoption are the following: 
- Ghent (15th ch.), 16th of January 1989: the surrogate mother was inseminated with 
the sperm of the intended father. Thus, it was a case of “traditional” surrogacy, the 
surrogate mother being also the genetic mother of the child. The legal action undertaken 
by the intended parents seeks to approve a full adoption with regards to the child
conceived by the surrogate mother. The Court of appeal refuses to settle the case,
considering that it was not the intention of the legislator that a couple could request a 
child from a surrogate mother to integrate the child into their household after childbirth
through an adoption procedure. 
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- Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, reforming Youth court. Bruges, 19th of 
January 2012: the surrogate mother was inseminated with the sperm of the intended
father. It is, thus, a “traditional” surrogacy, the surrogate mother being also the genetic
mother of the child. In addition to the costs linked to the pregnancy, the intended
parents paid an amount of 1.600 euros per month to the surrogate. The action
undertaken seeks to obtain the approval of the adoption requested by the intended
mother. In first instance, the Youth court settles in favour of her request, considering
that it is not within the responsibility of the tribunal to carry out, within the framework of
an adoption procedure, an exam of the content, the scope and the legal (in)validity of a 
surrogacy contract concluded between the surrogate mother and the adopting mother. 
The tribunal considers that only the basis of the adoption requires analysis without
taking into consideration the illegality of the surrogacy contract. In appeal, the Court of
Ghent reforms the sentence pronounced and refuses the full adoption requested by the 
intended mother on the basis that the dissimulation, through an adoption, of buying-
selling a child is an illegal basis that makes the adoption illegal. The Court affirms that
the human individual cannot be lowered to the level of a monetarily quantifiable object,
which makes a for-profit surrogacy contrary to human dignity. To verify if the adoption
was based on a fair basis, the Court has to analyse the information preceding the 
procedure of adoption, based on article 351 of the Civil code, according to which the sale 
of a child can lead to a revision of the adoption sentence. This analysis cannot be 
thwarted by the circumstance that there is a de facto parent-child relation between the 
child and the adoption candidate and that, in social relations, the child is considered the 
child of the adoption candidate. 
In yet other two decisions published, the tribunals settle in favour of the 
approval of the acknowledgement of paternity of the intended father80:
- Brussels (3rd ch.), 1st of March 2007: the surrogacy took place with the gametes of
the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother not being related to
the intended parents (gestational surrogacy). The action undertook aims at obtaining the
approval of the act of acknowledgement made by the intended father in relation to the 
child to be born of the surrogate mother. This action is founded on the old article 319bis
of the Civil code, according to which “if the father is married and acknowledges a child
conceived by a woman who is not his spouse, the act of acknowledgement has to be
presented through a request of approval before the tribunal of first instance where the 
child is domiciled”. In this case, the Court tried to determine if by use the terms “child
conceived by a woman who is not his spouse”, the legislator had aimed at distinguishing
between the different modes of conception, responding in different ways to requests of
acknowledgement on the basis of whether the child born and given birth to by a woman 
who is not a spouse was conceived with the gametes of the spouse or not. The Court 
responded negatively considering that the surrogate mother could equally “conceive” a
child even if she was not the genetic mother. The Court of Appeal of Brussels settles in
favour of the applicant and approves the acknowledgement made by the biological father
with regards to the child who was given birth to by the surrogate mother. 
A procedure of approval of full adoption was then introduced by the intended mother, 
equally the genetic mother, before the Youth court, which settled in favour of her 
request. 
- Civ. Hasselt (1st ch.), 27th of March 2001: the surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother being 
anonymous (gestational surrogacy). The child was born through anonymous childbirth in 
80 Ever since a reform on the laws of parentage came into force on the 1st of July 2007, a married man who 
acknowledges a child conceived by a woman who is not his spouse does not have to request an approval of the 
act of acknowledgement from the tribunal of first instance. See Law of the 1st of July 2006 modifying the
dispositions of the Civil code on the establishment of parentage and the effects of it, M.B., 29th of December 
2006. 
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France (‘accouchement sous x’). The action undertook aims at obtaining the approval of
the act of acknowledgement made by the intended father in relation to the child to be 
born of the surrogate mother. The tribunal settles in favour of the request of the 
intended father after verifying that the conditions of the old article 319bis of the Civil 
code, on the acknowledgement of paternity of a child conceived by a woman who is not 
his spouse, were fulfilled. The tribunal considers that this disposition applies equally to a 
situation in which the woman, other than the spouse, gives birth to a child even if she is 
not genetically related to the child.  
A procedure of approval of full adoption was then introduced by the intended mother, 
equally the genetic mother, before the Youth court, which settled in favour of her 
request. 
Finally, the last decision concerns an action to contest paternity, introduced by 
the husband of the surrogate mother, claiming not consenting the insemination 
of his wife: 
- Civ. Ghent (3rd ch.), 31st of May 2001: the surrogate mother was inseminated with
the sperm of the intended father. This is, thus, a “traditional surrogacy”, the surrogate 
mother being also the genetic mother of the child. Paternal parentage was established in
relation to her husband, in accordance with the presumption of paternity. The action
undertaken by the husband of the surrogate mother before the tribunal of first instance 
of Ghent aims at contesting his paternity on the basis that he had not consented to the 
artificial insemination of his wife. The tribunal declares the action admissible and well-
founded, after ascertaining the absence of consent from the husband to the artificial
insemination of his wife as well as the absence of genetic relation between the husband 
and the child given birth to by his wife. 
This decision is situated at the start of the procedure that could lead to link the child to
his father – and thereafter potentially mother – of intent, after having removed the child
from the surrogate’s husband. But nothing can be concluded. 
The eight other decisions go beyond this and result in the establishment of the
parentage of the child with his father of intent as well as with his mother of intent.
Two decisions have on the contrary refused the adoption (either by the mother of intent 
of by both intended parents). What is the impact of these decisions? Do they invalidate
the favourable case law tendency to establish the parentage of child with his parents of
intent? 
Two features differentiate these decisions from the case law trend that favours the 
integration of the child into the family of intent:
- in the two decisions that refused to deliver the adoption of the child by the intended 
mother, the surrogate mother was the genetic mother of the child (traditional 
surrogacy). It seems that the genetic reality strongly influences the outcome of the 
dispute and that the judges consider that it is in the child’s interest to have his
parentage confirmed with the surrogate if she is his genetic mother; 
- besides, the surrogacy concerned by the decision of the Appeal Court of Ghent (30 
April 2012) was of commercial character. The Court refused to grant the adoption after
recording that the parents of intent monthly paid the amount of 1,600 EUR to the 
surrogate, on the grounds that an adoption based on a commercial surrogacy could not 
be based on the right motivations, no matter what the de facto link was between the 
child and the mother of intent. The Court considers that a commercial surrogacy 
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agreement is contrary to human dignity and that an adoption trying to hide the 
buying/selling of a child is illegal81. 
It looks like we can conclude that the Belgian jurisprudence shows benevolence in the 
event of an altruistic surrogacy by recognising the double parentage of the couple of
intended parents. 
The concept of superior interest of the child tends to occupy a major space in the 
motivation of the judges. In Youth court Brussels, 4th of June 1996, the interest of the
child was hence put forward by the magistrate to justify the ratification of the adoption 
request by the mother of intent with the aim of having the judicial reality match the
social reality, since the child was being brought up by the mother of intent and not by
the surrogate82. But in more general terms, the control of the superior interest of the
child is used as the basis of the judicial decision granting the adoption, insofar as the
tribunal seized of the request must check whether the adoption is based on “just 
motives”, which include the best interest of the child83.
THE NETHERLANDS
1) Applicable rules  
In the absence of regulation governing the civil aspects of surrogacy, common law rules 
apply. 
Establishing the maternal bond 
Maternal filiation is therefore established for the surrogate mother, as she is the woman
who gave birth to the child, no matter whether she is genetically related to the child or 
not (art. 1:198 DCC) while the paternal filiation is established if she is married.  
Establishing the paternal bond 
If the surrogate mother is married, the paternal filiation is established with respect to
her husband (art. 1:199(a) DCC). If the surrogate mother is not married, the father of
intent can recognize the child with the consent of the surrogate mother and provided
that there is a close personal relationship between the child and the father of intent (art.
1:204(1)(e) DCC). 
Adoption
To establish parenthood of the child, the intended parents must turn to the adoption
procedure after the “surrogate parents” have been deprived of parental authority over
the child. In practice, the intended parents must report the situation to their 
municipality, which then refers the case to the Child Protection Council (Raad voor
Kinderbescherming; authority from whom permission to adopt must be requested) so
that a social investigation can be performed. If the Council validates the parents’ 
request, the latter can initiate an adoption procedure under the condition that they have 
been living together for 3 years and that they have been raising and taking care of the
81 Ghent (15ième ch.), 30 avril 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L.
 
PLUYM ; Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 372, note G. VERSCHELDEN.
 
82 Civ. Bruxelles (jeun.), 4 juin 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles, 1996, p. 1182 :
 
« Génétiquement, Ivo est le fils de la requérante et il est considéré comme tel dans la vie sociale. Il paraît dès 

lors de son intérêt que le droit rejoigne ici le fait. La rupture du lien de filiation avec la mère porteuse constitue 

un élément de sécurité juridique, en particulier pour le cas où la mère porteuse souhaiterait un jour faire valoir
 
des droits à l’égard de l’enfant ».
 
83 Art. 344.1 C. civ. : « Toute adoption doit se fonder sur de justes motifs et, si elle porte sur un enfant, ne
 
peut avoir lieu que dans son intérêt supérieur et dans le respect des droits fondamentaux qui lui sont reconnus 

en droit international ».
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
child for at least one year, period during which they exercise joint guardianship
(gezamenlijke voogdij) with respect to the child (art. 1:228 DCC). No genetic link is
required between the child and the parents who want to adopt it. Moreover, a single
person can also adopt a child. 
In concrete terms, in situations involving surrogacy, the Child Protection Council refers
to the competent courts to seek the forfeiture of parental authority of legal parents 
(‘surrogate parents’) and the designation of the parents of intent as tutors. The request
for revocation of the parental authority of the ‘surrogate parents’ can only be introduced 
by the Child Protection Council and not by the parents of intent (art. 1:267 DCC). Most 
courts revoke the parental authority of 'surrogate parents' because of their inability to
care for the child as they did not intend to have it for themselves84. After caring for the
child for a year, the parents of intent can then introduce an adoption procedure85. 
According to a study, this period is inappropriate as it subjects parents of intent and
surrogate mother alike to uncertainty for a year. This study therefore recommends the 
abolishment of this period to allow the parents of intent to adopt the child at birth86. 
2) Analysis of the decisions 
In some of the internal cases of surrogacy, the father of intent files a paternity claim in
which he seeks to establish parentage through proof of a close personal relationship with 
the child.
- Rechtbank Almelo, 24 October 2000, FJR, 2001 (3) 91, cited by M.J. Vonk87: 
acknowledgment of paternity of a child born to a surrogate mother by a married father
of intent. The tribunal granted demand as soon as it appeared that there was a close 
personal relationship between the father of intent and the child established by the fact 
that the child was living in the home of the parents of intent since birth.
- Rechtbank Assen, 15 June 2006, LJN AY7247 cited by M.J. Vonk88: filing of a 
prenatal recognition of paternity of a child carried by a surrogate mother (sister of the 
mother of intent) by a married father of intent (biological father). The tribunal refused to
grant his application on the ground that there can be no close personal relationship 
between a man and an unborn child. 
In other situations, the Dutch courts were seized of cases designed to challenge 
paternity of the husband of the surrogate mother to establish filiation from the father of 
intent.
- Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 21 June 2010, LJN: BN1309: surrogacy was carried out 
in the Netherlands between parents of intent of Dutch nationality and a surrogate 
mother of Dutch nationality who is related to the parents of intent (sister of the mother 
84 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double Dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 212.
 
85 M. ANDRE, A. MILON, H. DE RICHEMONT, Contribution à la réflexion sur la maternité pour autrui, Information 

Report n° 421, 25 June 2008, French Senate, p. 27, available online: www.senat.fr/rap/r07-421/r07-4211.pdf.
 
86 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, « Non-commercial surrogacy : an account of 

patient management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004 », Human Reproduction,
 
2010, vol. 25, n° 2, p. 448.
 
87 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 210.
 
88 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 210.
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
of intent). The surrogate mother was inseminated with sperm from the father of intent.
She is therefore the genetic mother of the child (traditional or low-technology
surrogacy). The filiation of the child is established with the surrogate mother and her 
husband. The case initiated on behalf of the child (by a guardian or bijzonder curator) 
aims to challenge the paternal filiation of the husband of the surrogate mother and to 
establish the paternity of the child's father of intent. In accordance with the rule of
conflict of laws on filiation (art. 2, al. 1 and art. 1 WCA), the action in contestation of
paternity is governed by Dutch law as soon as it comes to the common nationality of the
legal parents (i.e. the surrogate mother and her husband). Dutch law is also applicable
to the issue of the establishment of paternal filiation of the biological father whenever it
comes to the law of the common nationality of the mother and biological father having 
validly challenged the legal father’s filiation (art. 6 WCA). As a consequence, the Court
refers to article 1:207, al. 1 of the Dutch Civil Code according to which the father of a 
child is the one that has "created it". Having established that a "sperm donor" cannot be 
described as "progenitor" within the remit of the Dutch law, the tribunal refers to the
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to article 8 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and notes that the 
European Court ignores the distinction made by the Dutch legislator between a 
"progenitor father" and a "sperm donor father”. What matters is the combination of
blood ties and the concrete circumstances of a family life. Therefore, the Court accepts
the relationship of filiation of the biological father on the grounds that, under the
circumstances of the case, the latter maintains a "family life" with the child. This is the 
reason why he is entitled to the protection afforded by article 8 of the ECHR. The tribunal 
grants the request and establishes the filiation of the biological father to the child.
As explained above, to establish their parentage with respect to the child, the parents of 
intent will have to wait until the legal parents or 'surrogate parents' to be deprived of
parental authority over the child, and until they are themselves appointed as guardians. 
Providing they have lived together for at least three years, the parents of intent will be
able to introduce a procedure for adoption after having raised and cared for the child for
a year. The Child Protection Council will initiate the case for the revocation of the legal 
parents’ parental authority.  
- Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 18 August 2011, LJN: 5334 BR: surrogacy was 
carried out in the Netherlands between a surrogate mother and a married same-sex
couple. A friend of one of the fathers of intent gave the egg that was fertilized by the
sperm of the other father of intent to then be implanted in a surrogate mother 
(gestational surrogacy with egg donation). The action is brought by the Child Protection
Council in order to withdraw parental authority from the surrogate mother and her 
husband (legal parents) and to place the children under the joint custody of the parents 
of intent (homosexual couple). The Court granted the application and nominated the 
parents of intent guardians with regard to different elements: the interest of the 
children, the absence of financial stakes, the excellent relationship between the parents
of intent and the “surrogate parents”, the emotional bonding between the parents of 
intent and the children, the biological link between the children and one of the two
fathers of intent, the parents of intent’s desire for a child and the absence of pressure on 
the surrogate mother. 
Some decisions classified under the heading of International Affairs (because the 
surrogacy was carried out abroad) actually concern questions of internal law as the 
action does concern the recognition of a foreign birth certificate but the revocation of the 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
legal parents’ parental authority to entrust the guardianship of the children to the 
parents of intent89. 
- Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October 2008 LJN: BG8903: surrogacy was carried out in
Belgium with the gametes of intended parents implanted via IVF in the surrogate, who is 
the sister-in-law (brother’s wife) of the mother of intent (gestational surrogacy).
Surrogacy has been carried out in Belgium and not in the Netherlands because of the 
age limit that the Dutch legislation subjects the mother of intent to. The proceedings are 
instituted by the Child Protection Council in order to remove parental authority of the 
surrogate mother and her husband (legal parents) and to place the child under the joint 
custody of the parents of intent so that they can adopt the children in one year’s time, in
accordance with Dutch law. The Court granted the application on the ground that it is in
the interest of the children that the parents of intent be appointed as their guardians. 
- Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19
May 2009, LJN: BI5039: surrogacy was carried out in Russia with the gametes of the
intended parents implanted via IVF into the surrogate, who is the mother of the mother
of intent (gestational surrogacy). The proceedings are instituted by the Child Protection 
Council in order to remove parental authority of the surrogate mother and her husband 
(legal parents) and to place the child under the joint custody of the parents of intent.
The Court granted the application on the ground that it is in the interest of the children
that the parents of intent be appointed as their guardians. In accordance with Dutch law, 
the genetic parents filed an application to adopt the children one year after having been
designated as guardians. The Court granted their request and orders the adoption of the
children by the parents of intent, on the grounds that it is in the best interest of the 
children to have their filiation established with their genetic parents. During the adoption 
procedure, the (unmarried) parents of intent agreed to give the children the surname of 
their father of intent.
It is hence clear that the absence of specific legislation governing the civil aspects of
surrogacy in domestic law has led judges to “tinker” legal solutions from laws that were 
not quite suitable for surrogacy. Thus, the procedure for revocation of parental authority 
is used to remove parental authority from the “surrogate parents” in order to be able to
vest the parents of intent with the guardianship of a child born out of surrogacy, which is 
a necessary step before starting an adoption procedure. Like the Belgian judges, the
Dutch judges have a benevolent approach to surrogacy and try hard to find solutions 
that are favourable to linking the child with his parents of intent, despite the red-tep and 
the complexities of the rules applicable in Dutch substantive law.
With regards to that, the notion of best of interest of the child should be highlighted in 
cases concerning revocation of custody of the surrogate mother and her husband and 
the designation of the parents of intent as tutors. On several occasions, the Dutch courts
thus felt that it was in the interest of the children to be entrusted to the parents of 
intent’s joint guardianship to then be able to be adopted by the latter90. In principle, this 
procedure for revocation of parental authority is a measure for the protection of children
when parents are no longer able to care properly for their children, which is the reason
why only the Child Protection Council may initiate the legal action, and not the parents of
89 See for example: Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October, 2008 LJN: BG8903 (surrogate motherhood in Belgium),
Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039 
(surrogacy carried out in Russia). 
90 Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039:
“The Court grants the adoption in the apparent interest of the minors. It is in the interest of the minors that 
they are allowed a family relationship with their biological parents”; and Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October 2008:
“The Court considers that seeing the particular circumstances in which the [child] finds itself, and the 
associated inaptitude and/or incapacity of the surrogate parents, the appointment of the parents of intent as
guardians of the [child] will be the best guarantee of upholding the interests of [child]. The Court considers 
that the following provision is in the best interest of the child [child]”. See also Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 
18 August 2011, LJN: BR 5334. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
intent91. In the absence of a more suitable procedure for these special situations, the 
procedure is also used in surrogacy cases. In these cases, the Courts deprive the
surrogate parents of parental authority on the ground that they are not able to care 
properly for the child, whom they did not conceive for themselves. 
In parallel, it should also be noted that, in a decision of the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 
21 June 2010, Dutch judges refer to the concept of “family life” to accept to establish 
filiation towards a child born out of surrogacy on the grounds that a biological father is
entitled to the protection of the "family life" he has with his child under article 8 of the
ECHR, no matter the circumstances of the pregnancy. In other words, the Dutch
jurisprudence refers to article 8 of the ECHR and the concept of "family life" to disregard 
the distinction made in Dutch law between a "progenitor father" and a "sperm donor 
father", according to which the paternal filiation may only be established with the man 
who "created" the child (art. 1:207 DCC) and not with the man who only gave his 
semen. The Dutch courts have found that the European Court was unaware of this
distinction. What matters is the combination of blood ties and concrete circumstances 
that there is a family life92. 
Both concepts – the “best interest of the child” and “family life” – support each other. It
is further interesting to note an isolated decision on social issues: the mother of intent 
was seeking to receive maternal leave.  
- Centrale Raad van Beroep, 7 December 2011, LJN: BU7192: surrogacy was carried
out in the Netherlands between parents of intent of Dutch nationality and a surrogate 
mother of Dutch nationality who is related to the parents of intent (sister-in-law of the 
mother of intent). The action brought by the mother of intent is to be awarded 
compensation during maternity leave ("zwangerschaps- en bevallingsuitkering"). The 
Court refused to grant her application on the ground that the right to these allowances is
only open to the legal mother, or to woman who has given birth. The legislation on work
and health (Wet arbeid en zorg - Wazo) does not have formal legal effect on surrogate 
motherhood. 
ROMANIA
1) Applicable rules 
Presently, the regime of surrogacy is not expressly regulated by the Romanian legislation
in force. The Civil Code in force doesn’t forbid, neither allows this kind of agreement.
Still, the systemic interpretation of all provisions related to the medically assisted human 
reproduction doesn’t offer consistent legal solutions for the surrogacy related issues.
Although it is allowed in theory, this kind of agreement doesn’t produce legal effects as 
long as the surrogate mother cannot be forced to forego the legally presumed maternal 
bond. 
91 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double Dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 
Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 
international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
Legislation, 2011, p. 212. 
92 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: “Under this article [art. 8 ECHR], the
biological father who has a "family life" with his child has the right on the "right to protection of family life", 
irrespective of the way in which the pregnancy was incurred. The Court must thus determine whether in the 
present case there are sufficient concrete circumstances on the basis of which the existence of "family life" can 
be assumed. Considering that the minor was included in the family of the man and [Mr C] after his birth and 
that they have since then taken on the care and upbringing of the minor, the Court considers that it is 
established that there is a "family life" between the man and the minor. Considering that the man is the 
biological father and that there is "family life", the Court is of the opinion that the man in this case should be 
equated with the parent, so that the request of the “particular guardian” (“bijzondere curator”) can be 
received”. 
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Establishing the paternal bond  
Art. 414 (1) C.civ adopts the presumption of paternity for the husband of the child’s
mother if the child is conceived or born during their marriage. A genetic father who is
not married with the mother can either recognise the paternity bond (if the mother is not
married), or contest the legal paternity presumption if the mother is married to another 
man (Art. 434 C.civ.). A new legal presumption of paternity is established by the New 
Civil Code for the man who usually lived together with the mother during the period of
the conception (Art. 426). He must formally recognise paternity of the child; if he 
refuses, the mother can file a claim to establish his paternity – which is where the 
presumption of paternity rule intervenes.
Establishing the maternal bond  
Romanian legislation provides that the maternal bond is established by the fact of giving
birth to a child - Art. 408 (1). This fact is proved through the medical certificate provided 
by the medical unity where the child was born. In theory, the presumption of maternity 
is absolute and cannot be contested.  
If the child is not born in a medical establishment and the birth is not declared in due 
time, Art. 415 (1) C.civ provides that the genetic mother can declare the maternal bond
to the authorities. In practice, the birth certificate for the child is not delivered in the first
year after the birth, unless the mother provides a medical certificate. After one year, the 
maternal bond can be proven by any means (testifying witnesses in front of the Court,
DNA tests, etc), according to Art. 422 C.civ. Nevertheless, the parties involved in a
surrogacy agreement have no interest in avoiding the medical unity for the child’s birth;
moreover, the child would have no legal status unless he has a birth certificate. 
Art. 416 (1) C.civ provides that the genetic mother can recognise the maternal bond in 
an authentic declaration or, post mortem, in a testament. In practice, this declaration of 
maternity is used only if the child already has a birth certificate and has been lost or
abandoned by the parents. The parentage recognition by the mother (stipulated in art. 
416 C.civ) cannot result in the creation or modification of a birth certificate. The aim of
the article is for the mother mentioned in the birth certificate to be able to confirm the
identity of the minor who has been lost and found by the authorities. Such a procedure
could therefore only serve to establish the parentage of the mother of intent, who didn’t
give birth to the child but would be the genetic mother of the child carried by another 
woman.
Adoption
A possible solution for the intended (genetic) parents would be to adopt their own child
from his legal parent(s). The father of intent admits paternity of the child and, with the 
consent of the surrogate mother (legally presumed to be the child’s mother), the mother 
of intent can adopt the child of her partner (not immediately but under more flexible 
conditions than a normal adoption). Nevertheless, the adoption procedure is very long 
and difficult, and there is always a risk that the Court could reject the adoption 
request93. Moreover, the paradox of this solution exists in the obligation for the genetic 
mother to adopt her own "natural" child.  
93 Since the 2000s, the adoption procedure in Romania has become very cumbersome due to
public scandals of organ trafficking through international adoptions in the 1990s, when the law on 
adoptions was very liberal. 
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2) Analysis of case n° 7874/302/2009 
Taking into account that medically assisted reproduction generally remains a very 
sensitive issue, Romanian judges usually impose a strict privacy policy in this kind of
affaires. Many decisions are not published, except those of the Supreme Court. No
decisions on surrogacy can be found on the websites of the Bucharest Courts; the case 
cited below was extracted from a specialised trimestral magazine. The Case No 
7874/302/2009 submitted to the Sector 5 Bucharest Court94 is a perfect example of two 
different solutions to the same legal problems, made possible by the complete lack of
legislation for surrogacy issues. 
In contradiction with the Custody Authority (defendant), the genetic mother claimed
that the surrogate mother (defendant) is not the genetic mother of the child, so that the
Court should recognise the effects of: 
- the maternal bond between the child and his real genetic mother (the claimant) 
- the lack of paternal bond between the surrogate mother’s husband and the child
- the paternal bond between the genetic mother’s husband and the child
Consequently, the Court was asked to authorise the corrections in the child’s birth
certificate, so as to allow the child to have the name of his genetic parents. 
Also in contradiction with the Custody Authority, the genetic father brought to justice 
both the surrogate mother and her husband by a separate application later merged with
the first one. He asked the judge to recognise his paternal bond with the child and to
authorise the modifications in the child’s birth certificate. With regard to the same
application, the legally presumed father (the surrogate mother’s husband, also 
defendant) formulated a counterclaim of paternity contest. 
State of facts 
In this decision all parties were Romanian. 
The medical report issued by the Department for Assisted Reproduction of a Hospital
from Bucharest confirmed that the child was born as a result of in vitro fertilisation. The 
genetic mother had already had two spontaneous abortions and six failed attempts of 
insemination with the sperm of her husband. The medical report shows her physical 
incapacity to be inseminated and to give birth to a child. After the failure of the 
insemination with three in vitro embryos, the other 9 embryos obtained were congealed. 
After having given her written consent, the surrogate mother, a married woman, was 
inseminated with 3 of the 9 embryos obtained following the in vitro fertilisation of the 
two claimant’s genetic material. A girl was born.  
The defendant (the surrogate mother) had previously signed a standard “Declaration” 
provided by the Hospital, in which she was giving up any rights on the child to be born. 
She also declared that she had received a sum of money and an additional sum was to 
be paid after the child’s birth. It is indeed worth specifying that some private clinics
accept to inseminate surrogate mothers. This remains however a solution of last resort,
when the mother of intent has already been unsuccessfully inseminated several times 
94 Unpublished; extract from Veronica DOBOZI, Curierul Judicar 10/2011. These Court decisions were anterior 
to the New Civil Code enforcement, which now includes the former Family Code as amended and completed.
The legal situation of the parties would have been mostly the same under the New Civil Code regime, as long 
as surrogacy issues are not at all regulated. Except the case of the reproduction with a third-party donor 
(which doesn’t include surrogacy), filiation rules essentially didn’t change under the New Civil Code. 
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and/or has had several miscarriages – as is the case of the mother of intent in the 
present case. The practice of declarations is common in hospitals; it seems to be their 
way of waiving any responsibility and reassuring the parents of intent who paid for the 
procedures. 
The DNA test confirmed the genetic bond between the claimants and the child. 
After the birth, the child had been taken in charge and stayed with his genetic parents. 
The surrogate mother and her husband had no claims with regard to the child, neither 
before, nor during the trial. 
Legal arguments 
Regarding the maternal bond: the claimants first invoked the Family Code95 in order to
contest the parentage that doesn’t correspond to the reality. They also cited a 
Constitutional Court decision96 observing that some of the Family Code provisions
seriously affect the possibility to give legal effects to the genetic reality. Cumulating the 
above-mentioned arguments with Art. 8 of the ECHR, the claimants sustained that the 
maternity presumption could be overthrown if the genetic reality is different.97 
It should be noted that decision 349/2001 of the Constitutional Court referred to the 
genetic father’s impossibility to contest the presumed parentage links (between the child
and his mother’s husband); this affected the possibility of giving legal effect to the 
genetic reality and was therefore judged to be unconstitutional. This decision was 
relevant at the time because the New Civil Code was not yet in effect (the New Civil 
Code allows the genetic father the possibility of having his paternity established). We 
shouldn’t forget however that at the time, the Constitutional Court’s decision 349/2001 
did not target assisted procreation and only concerned paternity.  
Regarding the paternal bond: the same arguments prevail (the Family Code should be
interpreted according to the ECHR, in order to give legal effects to the social and genetic
reality, even against legal presumptions).
- The First Court’s decision: strict application of the national legislation to give limited
legal effects to the reality
By the decision no 1405/201098 the Court rejected the application of the genetic mother
and the application of the genetic father but accepted the counterclaim of the presumed 
father (the only legal application expressly regulated by the Romanian legislation in force
at that moment) who contested the paternal bond between himself and the child.  
Regarding the paternal bond: the Court mentioned that the genetic father cannot claim 
the recognition of parentage between himself and his genetic child if the latter already
has a legally presumed father99. The only one who could claim the cancellation of the
paternal bond between himself and the child was the legally presumed father. Under the
legislation in force at that moment, as long as the legally presumed father (surrogate
mother’s husband) didn’t contest his paternity, the genetic father had no means to give
legal effect to the genetic reality. Only after the legal presumption of paternity was 
overthrown (by the DNA test result), the genetic father had the possibility to prove his 
95 At present, the Family Code was modified, completed and included in the New Civil Code.
 
96 Constitutional Court, Decision 349/2001.
 
97 The genetic reality is a fact and it can be proven by any means of evidence.
 
98 Unpublished.
 
99 The situation changed, the New Civil Code gives the genetic father the possibility to claim the recognition of
 
the real parental bond even if the child has a legally presumed father. The solution would nowadays 

substantially be the same, except that the genetic father would now be able to file a case to have his rights 

recognised. 
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paternity and recognise the child. In this case, the paternal link between the legally
presumed father (surrogate mother’s husband) and the child was annihilated and the 
paternal bond between the genetic father and the child was recognised. The Court 
authorised the modifications in the child’s birth certificate in order to allow her to have
the genetic father’s name.
Regarding the maternal bond, the Court mentioned that in the absence of derogatory
legislation, the medical reproduction techniques couldn’t generate a different parentage 
regime. As long as Romanian legislation doesn’t make a difference between “genetic 
mother” and “surrogate mother who gives birth to the child”, the judge has no power to
do it. 
Regarding the discrimination between man and woman (both genetic parents) the Court
mentioned a fundamental difference: maternity is closely related to the capacity of 
giving birth, while paternity can potentially be limited exclusively to the participation
with genetic material.  
Regarding the surrogacy convention: the above-mentioned “Declaration” was annulled.
Not only did this declaration contravene to the public order, but it also represented an 
onerous title whose object (the surrogate mother’s body) is not in the civil circuit and 
cannot be rented. 
- The Bucharest Court of Appeal’s decision: application of the national and 
international law in order to give the maximum of legal effects to the reality 
By the decision 1309 A/2010100, the Appeal Court admitted the appeal and partially
modified the First Court’s decision, by also recognising the legal effects of the maternal 
bond between the claimant (genetic mother) and the child. The genetic filiations’ legal
effects become thereby complete. To reach that result, the judges rely on the 
compatibility of Romanian legislation with Art. 8 ECHR.  
The Court of Appeal decided that the bond between the child and the legally presumed 
parents didn’t fit within Art. 8 ECHR’s meaning of “family”, as the child did not live with
these people, nor had a close relationship with them.
All the evidence showed that the claimants had always considered themselves the child’s
parents and acted accordingly; thus, the relationship between the claimants and their 
genetic child correspond to the meaning of “family” as provided by Art. 8 ECHR.
The protection conferred by Art. 8 ECHR is not absolute; nevertheless, the superior 
interest of the child must overrule the strict application of the national law, in order to
guarantee the child’s right to an identity and his other personal rights provided by Art. 
8 ECHR. By ignoring the genetic and social reality for a formalist application of national 
legislation, the First Court violated Art. 8 ECHR.
With regards to the scope of this decision, we would like to remind the reader that it was
not pronounced by the Supreme Court and that the practice varies significantly across 
Romanian courts of law. This decision wasn’t much talked about, even though the debate
on surrogate motherhood remains topical; the debate focuses mainly on arguments of 
social and religious and not so much on the legal aspects of surrogacy, which are too 
technical for the majority of people.  
Because of the complete legislative void, the Courts can choose between adhering 
strictly to the law (inadequate with the modern living conditions and medical techniques)
or to interpret the law more liberally (in particular by applying the principle of the ECHR 
100 Final decision (no other appeal was made), unpublished. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
case-law). For that reason, the solution of adoption should not be side-lined, even 
though it doesn’t coincide with the biological reality. Both procedures (recognition of 
genetic parentage and adoption) are equally heavy and unpredictable.
International case law  
BELGIUM: PARTIAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN BIRTH CERTIFICATES
1) Applicable rules 
It should be noted that a birth certificate established abroad following a case of
surrogacy is recognised in Belgium if its validity is established in conformity with the
national law of the persons in relation to whom parentage is being established. This
solution results from the combined application of articles 27 and 62 of the Code of
international private law, dealing respectively with the recognition of foreign authentic 
certificates101 and with the law applicable to parentage102. In other words, in order to 
recognise parentage as established by a foreign birth certificate, the validity of the 
parentage has to be verified in relation to the national law of the intended parents. 
In the current state of the case law on the question, if the intended parents are Belgian,
parentage is established in relation to the intended father if the latter is also the 
biological father103, while his spouse (homosexual or heterosexual) should have to 
engage an adoption procedure. 
Belgian embassies seem however to categorically refuse to recognise birth certificates
established as a result of surrogacy, without distinguishing between the father and the
intended mother and without analysing the certificate under the light of the principles
currently resulting from the case law104.
2) Analysis of the decisions 
In the disputes implicating a surrogacy taking place abroad, the action undertaken can 
aim to condemn the Belgian State into delivering the travel documents to the child105, or 
101 Art. 27, § 1st, al. 1 Code of IPL: “An authentic foreign certificate is recognised in Belgium by any authority
without it being necessary to engage in a procedure if its validity is established in conformity to the applicable
law established by the current law, taking especially into account articles 18 fraudulent evasion of the law and 
21 public order”. 
102 Art. 62. § 1st Code of IPL: “The establishment and the contestation of paternity or maternity of a person are 
ruled by the law of the state from which the person is a citizen of at the moment of birth of the child or, if this
establishment result from a voluntary act, at the moment of the act”. 
103 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139 ; Civ. Brussels, 15th 
of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 et Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p.
695. 
104 See the warning that can be read on the website of the Belgium embassy in Kiev: “In the current state of 
texts, the Belgian legislation does not treat the question of surrogacy or of children born to a surrogate 
mother. Facing this legal gap, our services are obliged not to recognise any effect to foreign documents 
produced in this frame (birth certificates, sentences,…). This position is adopted even if the legal procedure as 
provided for locally has been scrupulously followed. The effects produced abroad by this do not produce any 
effects in our domestic legal order. If a Belgian citizen decides to engage a procedure of surrogacy in Ukraine, 
even if following the local law, there is no assurance that his/her paternity/maternity will be recognised by the 
Belgian law, or that the child will be delivered a document of travel. The services of the Public Federal Service 
of Foreign Affairs will refuse to recognise their paternity/maternity, will not deliver any travel documents and 
will invite applicants to go before the competent court of first instance (ref. articles 23 and 27 of the Belgian 
Code of international private law). In light of the aforementioned and faced with the difficulties to which a 
Belgian citizen will be confronted if he/she decides to engage a procedure of surrogacy, we would like to 
remind you that adoption is provided for by the Belgian law and constitutes, thus, a possible alternative”. The
same warning is found on the sites of the embassies of Belgium in New Delhi, Atlanta, New York and Los
Angeles, a situation that raised questions by some parliamentarians. See Written question n° 5-2661 of the 1st 
of July 2011, Parl. doc., Sen., n° 5-2661 (question asked by Mrs S. de Bethune). 
105 Civ. Brussels (interim), 4th of February 2010, RR 09/1694/C, unpublished (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Brussels (interim), 9th of July 2010, RG 10/830/C, unpublished (birth certificate established in
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to obtain the recognition of a birth certificate established in a foreign country (State non­
member of the EU)106. 
Of the three sentences concerning the deliverance of a travel document to the child, only
one succeeds, allowing the child born from surrogacy to join his/her intended father.  
When it comes to actions undertaken to obtain the recognition of birth certificates, the 
courts indeed accept to recognise these not as birth certificates (on the basis that these 
certificates mention either the name of the intended mother or do not indicate any
name, which is contrary to Belgian law according to which the name of the woman giving 
birth has to be mentioned in the birth certificate), but as authentic and legally valid 
certificates, from which results the recognition of the paternity in relation to the child
born from the surrogate mother107. However, the courts refuse to consider that a foreign
birth certificate could establish the maternal parentage of the intended mother when her 
name is mentioned, as it is the case in Ukrainian law108, or a double paternal filiation
with regards to the spouse of the intended father, as the Californian law allows it109. The 
partner (homosexual or heterosexual) will have to follow an adoption procedure.
It would furthermore seem that after the partial recognition of the foreign certificate
establishing the parentage of the intended father, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepts 
to deliver a passport to the child allowing him/her to travel to Belgium. As a 
consequence, the child can always, it would seem, join his/her intended parents either at
the state of the procedure of interim relief through the conviction of the Belgian State 
into delivering urgently the travel documents, or at the state of the main proceedings
through the partial recognition of the foreign certificate establishing the parentage of the 
intended father. 
In connection with Ukraine: 
- Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008 and Youth Court Antwerp, 22nd of April
2010: case Hanne and Elke: the surrogacy took place in Ukraine between an 
Ukrainian surrogate mother and heterosexual Belgian intended parents. The intended 
parents are also the genetic parents of the children (gestational surrogacy). The birth 
certificates mention the intended parents as the legal parents of the children given birth 
to by the surrogate mother. The Embassy of Belgium in Kiev refuses to acknowledge the 
birth certificates and, thus, refuses to deliver a passport to the children in order to allow
them to travel to Belgium. The intended parents undertake an action before the tribunal 
of first instance of Antwerp on the basis of articles 23 and 27 of the Belgian Code of 
Private International Law so as to request the recognition of the birth certificates. The 
tribunal acknowledges the certificates but not as birth certificates (on the basis that the 
mention of the name of the intended mother in the Ukrainian birth certificate is contrary 
Ukraine) ; Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1164 (birth
certificate established in India) 
106 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140 (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Huy, 22nd of March 2010, Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 420, note N. GALLUS ; Jurisprudence de
Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2010, n° 38, p. 1815, note P. WAUTELET et Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue 
trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S. SAROLÉA et J. SOSSON ; Jurisprudence de 
Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2011, n° 2, p. 52, note P. WAUTELET ; Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 634 (birth
certificates established in California as a result of a sentence) ; Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. 
fam., 2011, p. 695, note C. HENRICOT (birth certificate established in India) and Civ Brussels, 18th of December 
2012, unpublished and non-final. 
107 Cf. however below the isolated decision given by the First Court in Brussels on the 18th of December 2012 
(unpublished and non-final) : the Court refused to recognise the Indian birth certificate on the grounds that, in
its opinion, Belgian law would not have allowed the establishment of the father of intent’s parentage. The 
argument developed by the Court is not convincing as it seems that, contrary to the opinion of the Court,
Belgian law did allow the father of intent to establish his filiation despite the fact that the child was born from a 
surrogacy agreement.,. 
108 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140. 
109 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
to Belgian law according to which the birth certificate must mention the name of the 
mother giving birth to the child) but as authentic and legally valid certificates from which
the paternity of the genetic father, also the intentional father of the children born from 
the surrogate mother, is acknowledged.  
The maternal parentage of the intended mother is, thus, not acknowledged.
Following the sentence of the tribunal of first instance of Antwerp, the intended mother
undertakes a legal procedure before the Youth Court to request the adoption of the
children. The tribunal approves the adoption based on the best interests of the children,
that is of having parentage with their genetic mother. The tribunal specifies that 
considering an adoption procedure contrary to public order or as not being founded on
fair basis (art. 344-1 Civil code) only due to high-technology surrogacy would penalise 
the children who did not choose the way they were born. The tribunal also consider that
the limit line with the commerce of children was not crossed in this case and that the 
case is not one of coercion, exploitation, fraud or legal fraud (neither in Belgium nor in
Ukraine). Furthermore, the tribunal considers that the adoption procedure must be ruled 
by the national laws on the basis that it is not proven that the adopting candidate had 
the intention to adopt the children before their transfer to Belgium. 
- Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011: case Samuel: the surrogacy took place in
Ukraine between a Ukrainian surrogate mother and a homosexual couple formed by a 
Belgian citizen and a French one, both residing in France. The biological father is the
husband of Belgian nationality. The facts mentioned by the sentence do not mention if
the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother of the children to be born or if there was
a donation of ovules. The birth certificate mentions the name of the surrogate mother as 
being the legal mother of the child and the name of the Belgian husband as being the 
legal father of the child. An Ukrainian sentence ascertains that the surrogate mother 
refuses to assume the education of the child and, thus, strips her of parentage towards 
the child, in favour of the intended father. The Embassy of Belgium in Kiev refuses the 
birth certificate and, thus, refuses to deliver the necessary travelling documents. The 
intended father undertakes an action of interim relief to condemn the Belgian State to
deliver a passport to the child. Ruling in interim, the tribunal refuses to settle in favour 
of the applicant considering that “ordering the Belgian state to deliver the child a
passport, with an eventual visa, would equate to recognise the parentage of the 
applicant to Samuel as well as the Belgian nationality of the child as a passport cannot 
be delivered by the Belgian State to anyone but a Belgian citizen. The decision would be,
thus, declarative of the rights invoked and exceeding the provisory nature of the ruling”
(Civ. Brussels (interim), 4th February 2010, RR 09/1694/C, inedited). A second interim 
procedure is undertaken and is also settled by a refusal on the basis that the conditions
of an interim ruling are not fulfilled (Civ. Brussels (interim), 9th of July 2010, RG 
10/830/C, inedited).  
In its substance, the action undertaken by the intended father aims at the recognition of
the birth certificate by the Belgian authorities (articles 23 and 27 of the Code of private
international law). The tribunal acknowledges the act as an authentic and legally valid
certificate from which results the paternal parentage of the applicant to the child. The
tribunal reaches this conclusion after verifying the authenticity of the birth certificate in
relation to the Ukrainian law as well as after verifying the validity of the birth certificate
in relation to the Belgian law, the law of the nationality of the intended father trying to
establish parentage (application of the rule of conflict of laws in matters of parentage 
(article 62 of the Code of Private international law on the recognition of foreign authentic 
certificates). For the purpose of Belgian law, the tribunal considers that the parentage of 
the intended father is established as the conditions of the article 329bis, on the 
acknowledgement of paternity, are fulfilled.
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Following the sentence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that a Belgian passport 
would be delivered to the child, allowing him to join his father110. 
In connection with India: 
- Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010: case C: the case of surrogacy took place 
in India with an Indian surrogate mother and a man of Belgian nationality, genetic and
intentional father of the child. The surrogacy took place through an IVF with an 
anonymous ovule donation (gestational surrogacy). Parentage by the intended father 
was established by an act of acknowledgement before an Indian notary. The birth 
certificate does not mention the name of the surrogate mother, only the name of the 
intended father. The intended father demands the Belgian consulate of Mumbai the 
deliverance of travel documents. The Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs refusing to
act in favour of his request, the intended father undertakes an action of interim relief
before the Belgian courts. The tribunal settles in his favour and condemns the Belgian
State to deliver the necessary travel documents on the basis of the existence of a family
life between the child and the intended father as well as the best interests of the child.
- Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011: case Amélie and Nina: surrogacy took place in 
India with an Indian surrogate mother and Belgian heterosexual intended parents. The
intended father is the genetic father of the children. The surrogacy took place through 
IVF with an anonymous donation of an ovule (gestational surrogacy). The birth
certificates do not mention the name of the surrogate mother, only the name of the 
intended father. The action undertook on the basis of articles 23 and 27 of the Code of 
international private law aimed at the recognition of the Indian birth certificates. The
tribunal acknowledges the certificates but not as birth certificates but as authentic and 
legally valid certificates from which results the acknowledgement of paternity of the 
intended father. The tribunal reaches this conclusion after verifying the authenticity of
the birth certificates in relation to Indian law as well as after verifying the validity of the 
birth certificate in relation to the Belgian law, the law of the nationality of the intended
father trying to establish parentage (application of the rule of conflict of laws in matters 
of parentage (article 62 of the Code of Private international law) implied by article 27 of
the Code of Private international law on the recognition of foreign authentic certificates).
In relation to the Belgian law, the tribunal considers that the parentage of the intended
father is established as the conditions of article 329bis, on the acknowledgement of 
paternity, are fulfilled. The tribunal verifies also the incidence of the fact that the couple 
sought a surrogate mother and the absence of her name in the birth certificates in
relation to the Belgian public order. The tribunal concludes that the illegality of a
surrogacy contract cannot jeopardise the best interests of the child, a reason to 
substantiate the recognition of parentage in relation to the biological father. As for the
absence of the mention of the name of the surrogate mother on the birth certificates,
the tribunal considers that it is contrary to the dispositions of the Civil code imposing the 
mention on the birth certificate of the name of the mother, this being the woman giving 
birth to the child, and thus refuses to recognise the certificates as birth certificates.
- Civ. Brussels, 18th of December 2012 (unpublished and non-final): the surrogacy 
was carried out in India with an Indian surrogate mother and a Belgian father of intent, 
who is the genetic father of the child. The surrogacy was done through IVF with 
anonymous egg donation (gestational surrogacy). The birth certificate doesn’t mention
the name of the surrogate mother but only states the name of the father of intent. The 
latter recognised his paternity through a recognition certificate established in front of a
solicitor in India. During the interim hearings, the Belgian State was sentenced to deliver
a visa or a travel document to the child, to allow him to travel to Belgium. Once the child
110 See « Samuel aura un passeport belge », available at the following URL:
http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/article/643798/samuel-aura-un-passeport-belge.html (online on the 
19/02/2011 and viewed on the 18/12/2012). 
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arrived on Belgian ground, the father of intent asked for the birth certificate to be 
transcribed in the state registers. Faced with the refusal of the registrar to do so, the 
father of intent filed an appeal in front of the Court of First Instance to obtain recognition
of the birth certificate, and hence the parentage link between the father of intent and the
child. The Court of First Instance checked the validity of the parentage link in the eyes of
the Belgian law, which is designated by the conflict of law rule on parentage (art. 62 of 
the Code of Private international law) and concluded that the certificate should not be 
recognised on the grounds that, in Belgian law, the father of intent would not have been 
able to assert his paternity over the child through a surrogacy contract. The Court also 
refused to recognise the birth certificate established by an Indian solicitor on the basis
that the declaration of paternity was not established in accordance with Belgian law,
which stipulates that to recognise a child born from a married woman, the legal paternity
should first have been annulled before the biological paternity of the child could have
been recognised. The Court finally considers that it is not in the interest of the child to
have its filiation determined on the basis of certificates drawn up in India, on the basis 
that the latter contravene to the fundamental principles of the protection of the interests 
of all children, since they spring from commercial transactions that are not concerned 
with the interests of the child. After having refused to recognise the Indian certificates,
the Court finally accepted to confirm the paternal filiation of the child on the basis that
the father of intent is also the biological father of the child and that there is a possession
of status, and further stressed that “this paternity would match the one established in
India and would be in the interest of the child”.
In connection with the United States: 
- Liège, 6th of September 2010, reforming Civ. Huy, 22nd of March 2010 and 
Youth Court Huy (11th ch.), 22nd of December 2011: case Maïa and Maureen: the
surrogacy took place in the United States with an American surrogate mother and 
Belgian homosexual parents of intent. One of the intended fathers is the genetic father
of the children. The facts exposed in both decisions do not mention if the surrogate 
mother is also the genetic mother of the children or if there was a donation of ovules. 
The birth certificates mentioning the names of the two intended fathers were established 
on the basis of a “declaratory sentence of paternity of the female twins to be born in the 
framework of a surrogacy contract and in absence of parentage between the legal 
parents and the twins to be born”, as by the Supreme Court of the State of California.
The action undertaken before the Belgian courts aims at recognising the birth certificates
established in California (articles 23 and 27 of the Code of international private law). At
first instance, the tribunal refuses to settle in favour of the applicant, considering that
the recognition of the birth certificates would be contrary to the Belgian international 
public order and that by travelling to the United States to engage in a contract of
surrogacy and thus bypass the applicable principles on the matter provided by Belgian 
law, the intended parents committed a fraudulent evasion of the law. The tribunal 
refuses to recognise the birth certificates “as they are the last phase of a more general 
process having as an objective to allow a couple to receive in their household children
conceived in the execution of a surrogacy contract”. On appeal, the Court reforms the 
judgement on reasons of procedure and rectifies the reasoning by the tribunal of first
instance. In conformity to article 27 of the Code of international private law, the Court
verifies the validity of the birth certificates in relation to Belgian law, the law of the 
nationality of the intended father trying to establish parentage. Belgian law is designed
by the application of the rule of conflict of laws in matters of parentage (article 62 of the 
Code of Private international law implied by article 27 of the Code of Private international
law on the recognition of foreign authentic certificates). In relation to the Belgian law,
the Court considers that the parentage of the intended biological father is established as
the conditions of article 329bis, on the acknowledgement of paternity, are fulfilled. In
relation to his spouse, no parentage can be established as the Belgian law ignores the 
establishment of double original paternal parentage. The Court verifies also the incidence
of the fact that the couple sought a surrogate mother in relation to the Belgian public 
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order. It concludes that the illegality of the surrogacy contract cannot jeopardise the 
best interests of the children, a reason to substantiate the recognition of parentage in
relation to the biological father. 
Receiving a request of simple adoption by the spouse of the intended father, the Youth 
court of Huy settles in favour of the applicant, after considering that the adoption was 
founded on fair basis, to the extent that the children are, from their birth, integrated to
the family of the intended parents. 
Therefore, we see that the recognition of parentage of the parents of intend, who are of
Belgian nationality in all cases considered, is not direct but takes place in two stages: 
- the paternal filiation of the biological father is established, after validating the 
parentage link established by the foreign birth certificate considering the Belgian
law on parentage111; 
- the maternal filiation of the mother of intent (who hasn’t given birth) cannot be
established using the same argument. The fact that the mother of intent is also 
the genetic mother does therefore not inform the outcome of the dispute, as
motherhood is defined by childbirth in Belgian law112. 
The same applies to the establishment of the paternal filiation towards the homosexual
partner of the biological father, insofar as Belgian law ignores the establishment of an
initial double paternal parentage link.
The second link of parentage can only result from an adoption procedure.  
The concept of “best interest of the child” has been put forward several times, either to
justify the deliverance of travel documents to a child born in India in order to allow him
to join his intended father in Belgium (in the framework of an interim relief action)113, or 
to justify the establishment of the parentage of the biological father in relation to the  
children born in California, independently of the nullity of the contract of surrogacy114 or
even to justify the adoption of the child by the intended mother after a surrogacy 
concluded in Ukraine in order to match the legal reality with the genetic and social-
psychological reality115. 
It’s worth stressing, however, that when this notion is invoked in an international case
dealing with a request for the recognition of birth certificates established abroad, it
seems to allow to “neutralise” the illegality of the surrogacy contract116 without 
111 Cf. however contra Civ Brussels, 18 December 2012. 
112 For an example where the intended mother was also the genetic mother of the children, see Civ. Antwerp, 
19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140. For an example where the intended mother
wasn’t the genetic mother of the children, see Civ. Nivelles, 6 avril 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695. 
113 Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1164: “That the best 
interest of the child does not appear to be, in view of these elements, to stay in India – country in which he 
does not seem to have any link – without M. R., a situation that appears contrary to the article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights”. 
114 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S.
SAROLÉA et J. SOSSON: “ In what concerns the relation of parentage with relation to the biological father, A.J., 
we can however consider that the illegality of the surrogacy contract – from which result the birth certificates
of which recognition is requested – cannot harm the best interest of the children M. and M. guaranteed by 
article 3 of the Convention on the rights of children as well as article 22bis of the Constitution. The refusal of 
recognising the birth certificates to the extent they concern the establishment of the parentage relation with
the biological father would deprive the children from any relation to him while at the same time the maternal 
parentage is not recognised in the country of the surrogate mother. This situation would be greatly harmful for 
them” In the same sense, See Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 and Civ.
Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695, note C. HENRICOT. 
115 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 
Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22. 
116 Cf. however contra Civ Brussels, 18 December 2012, unpublished and non-final. In a strange and perhaps
somewhat inconsistent way, the best interest of the child was invoked by the Court of First Instance of Brussels 
to justify the non-recognition of an Indian birth certificate and a recognition of paternity on the basis that it
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constituting by doing so the autonomous foundation of the recognition of parentage.
Indeed, it is because the parentage of the biological father can be established by rules
on the acknowledgement of paternity, that the tribunal admits to recognise this
parentage as it is established by the birth certificates117. 
As for the concept of family, it is put forward to support the reference to the principle of
the best interest of the child118. Thus, it seems to play a complementary role in order to, 
for example, justify the issuance of travel documents to a child born abroad119. 
It is an interesting fact that the financial aspects related to a contract of for-profit
surrogacy are rarely debated by Belgian courts. Thus, in the case Hanne and Elke 
(surrogacy taking place in Ukraine by heterosexual intended parents), it was revealed
that an amount of 30.000 EUR was paid by the intended parents to the Ukrainian law
firm. According to the parties, these costs aimed at covering not only judicial advice but 
also all practical aspects of surrogacy: fees related to travels, translations, contact with
professionals in a private clinic of fertilisation, attempts to perform IVF, ultrasounds,
medical follow-up of the surrogate mother, etc. When the procedure of adoption was 
engaged by the adopting mother, the tribunal considered it did not possess enough 
objective information to know if the amount exceeded the normal amount of 
compensation concerning the costs resulting from surrogacy and concluded that the 
parties acted without the intention to make profit120. 
THE NETHERLANDS
1) Administrative stakes: delivering travel documents  
In connection with Ukraine: 
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 
9 November 2010, LJN: BP 3764: surrogacy was carried out in Ukraine with the
gametes of the Dutch parents of intent implanted through IVF into the Ukrainian
surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy). The action filed for interim proceedings
concerns the issuance of travel documents to the children. This is rejected by the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry on the grounds that the surrogacy done in Ukraine is of commercial
nature, which is contrary to the Dutch public order. The Court in interlocutory 
proceedings sentences the Dutch State to issue the travel documents to the children
after finding out that the parents of intent already have a "family life" with the children
under article 8 of the ECHR and that it is in the interest of the parents and children that
this "family life" is respected.
In connection with India:
would not be “in the interest of child C. to establish his filiation based on acts drawn up in India, as the latter 

contravene to the fundamental principles of the protection of the interests of all children, since they spring 

from commercial transactions that are not concerned with the interests of the child” before finally agreeing to
 
establish, on the basis of the Belgian law, filiation from the father of intent with respect to the child on the 

grounds that “this paternity would match the one established in India and would be in the interest of the 

child”116. This isolated decision does however not reflect the dominant position that the Belgian Courts seem to
 
be developing
 
117 J. SOSSON, « La filiation d’enfants nés d’une gestation pour autrui à l’étranger », note on Liège, 6th of 

September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1153.
 
118 Civ. Brussels (interim), 6 April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1171: “Considering that
 
it is appropriate to take into account the fact that M.R. takes care of C. from childbirth; that it is, thus, evident 

that a privileged link exists between the child and M.R and that a situation of family life has come to being (we 

know the importance of the links created during the first weeks of life).
 
119 Ibidem.
 
120 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 

Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22.
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- Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10
January 2011, LJN: BP0426: surrogacy was done in India between an Indian surrogate 
and a Dutch same-sex couple, with an egg donation from an anonymous Indian woman. 
The ovum is fertilized by the sperm of one of the fathers of intent and is then
implemented into the Indian surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy). The birth
certificate of the child mentions the name of the surrogate mother and the name of the 
biological father. The action filed for interim proceedings concerns the issuance of travel 
documents to the child. The Dutch Foreign Ministry refused on the ground that the child
does not have the Dutch nationality, as no relationship of parentage exists between the 
biological father and him. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the fact that the 
biological father’s name appears on the birth certificate does not mean that he should be 
regarded as the father of the child in Dutch law. The Court in interlocutory proceedings
sentences the Dutch State to issue the travel documents to the child after establishing
that the father of intent already has a "family life" with the child and that as such, he is
entitled to the respect of article 8 of the ECHR. The Court also notes that it is likely that, 
as a result of this interim judgment, the filiation of the child will be established with the 
father of intent, which will allow the child to receive a Dutch passport. After balancing
the various interests at stake, the Court finds that in the present case, the interests of 
the child and of the father of intent must take precedence over the interests of the Dutch 
state.
- Rechtbank Haarlem, 28 November 2012, LJN: BY4231: surrogacy has been 
performed in India between an Indian surrogate mother and Dutch parents of intent, 
who entered into a partnership registered in the Netherlands. Surrogacy was conducted
using an anonymous egg donation. The ovum is fertilized by the sperm of the father of 
intent and is then implemented in the Indian surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy).
The Indian birth certificate mentions the names of the surrogate mother and of the 
biological father as the child's legal parents. Shortly after birth, the father of intent
obtained a judgment from an Indian Court stating that he is the child's legal father. The 
father of intent then asked his Consulate in Mumbai for a Dutch passport for the child. 
When the Consulate refused to issue a passport, he filed an interlocutory application. On
10 January 2011, the Judge sentenced the Mumbai Consulate to issue a travel document
to the child. Once the child arrived on Dutch territory, the biological father filed a 
declaration of paternity (November 2011). The juvenile court subsequently appointed
the father of intent as guardian of the child. In May 2012, a Dutch passport was issued
to the child. The proceedings introduced by the father of intent before the Court of first
instance aim to establish that the Consulate wrongly refused to issue a Dutch passport to 
the child. The Court refuses to follow the father of intent and confirms the position of the 
Consulate as it considers that the refusal to issue the passport was based on proper 
reasons since no parent-child relationship existed between the child and the father of
intent at the time of the passport application. The father of intent indeed declared his
paternity of the child upon the child’s arrival on the Dutch territory. In the Court's view, 
filiation with the father of intent was therefore established by this recognition of
paternity and not by the Indian birth certificate mentioning his name. Furthermore,
referring to a report by the International Law Institute (IJI: Internationaal Juridisch 
Instituut)121 according to which Indian law cannot establish paternity by law, the Court
refuses to acknowledge the relationship established by the Indian Court. According to
the same report, the mention of the name of the father of intent in the Indian birth 
certificate doesn’t establish with certainty his filiation with respect to the child. 
As such, the Dutch courts refer to the ECHR’s article 8 concept of "family life" to 
sentence the Dutch state to issue travel documents to children born of a surrogacy in
121 The decision of 28 novembre 2012 refers to a "report by the International Law Institute of the Hague from
27 March 2011", but does not provide a specific reference. 
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Ukraine122 and India123 as soon as they discover that the parents of intent have already a
family life with the child. 
2) Civil stakes: recognising foreign birth certificates
a. Applicable rules
When the surrogacy presents a cross-border aspect, the Dutch courts apply their rules of
private international law to decide of the parent-child relationship established abroad in
the Dutch legal order.
Two different scenarios should however be considered: on the one hand, where the
parents of intents’ parentage is established in accordance with the parentage law of the 
country where the child is born, either directly in the birth certificate or as a result of a 
judicial decision; on the other hand, where the parentage of the parents of intent is the
result of an adoption pronounced abroad. These two situations must be distinguished 
because the rules for determining the law applicable to the recognition of parentage will
be different. 
Under the first scenario, Dutch private international law rules on filiation are
applicable. These are codified in the Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act (Wet 
conflictenrecht afstamming). Where specific private international law rules on surrogacy
are missing, the general rules are used. With regards to parentage, section 10 of the
Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act establishes the rules with regards to the recognition of a 
legal act (e.g. the paternity recognition made abroad for a child born to a surrogate
mother) or of a legal fact (e.g. a legal fact established by a foreign birth certificate). The 
Dutch civil registry officer will thus have to check whether the parent-child relationship
mentioned in a foreign filiation act was validly established under foreign law and if the 
Dutch public order has not been violated. According to article 10 (2) of the Parentage 
(Conflict of Laws) Act, a foreign act establishing a recognition of paternity is contrary to
Dutch public order if, in particular, this recognition was made by a Dutchman who did 
not have the right to recognize the child according to Dutch law (Art. 1: 204 (1) (e) 
DCC: conditions for the recognition of paternity). If the parent-child relationship is the
result of a Court order, the Dutch civil registry officer must ensure that the conditions
laid down by article 9 of the Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act, including the rule on the 
Dutch public order exception, have been respected124. 
Under the second scenario, three instruments are likely to apply: the Hague
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, the rules of Dutch private international law on recognition of
adoptions (Wet conflictenrecht adoptie) and the Dutch law regulating the adoption of 
foreign children (Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie or Wobka)125. 
122 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 9 November 2010, LJN: BP 3764.
 
123 Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10 January 2011, LJN: BP0426.
 
124 I. CURRY-SUMNER and M.J. VONK, “National and International Surrogacy: an Odyssey”, in The International 

Survey of Family Law, 2011, Edition (ed. B. ATKIN), Bristol, Family Law, 2011, pp. 272 – 277.
 
125 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 215.
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b. Analysis of the decisions 
1st hypothesis
In connection with France: 
One should set aside a decision in which surrogacy was carried out on the Dutch
territory. It is classified among the decisions of international nature as childbirth took
place anonymously in France (“accouchement sous X”), which led the Dutch courts to 
examine the recognition of French birth certificate in the Dutch legal order.
- Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: surrogacy was 
realized between a Dutch surrogate mother and a homosexual couple whose spouses, 
Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands, had been married since 2001 (previously
bound by a registered partnership (geregistreerd partnerschap), later transformed into
marriage). Surrogacy was done by artificial insemination of a surrogate mother, who is
therefore the genetic mother of the child (traditional surrogacy). The birth of the child
occured anonymously in France. The French birth certificate only mentions the name of
the biological father as the father of the child. The Dutch civil registry officer refused to 
transcribe the birth certificate due to the absence of the name of the mother on it. The 
action is primarily filed with the view of having the French birth certificate transcribed in
the civil registry and seting out in legal terms that the surrogate mother has given her
consent to the recognition of paternity by the biological father. The second aim of the 
filing is to establish the paternity of the biological father. The Court considers that the
absence of the name of the mother in the birth certificate is contrary to Dutch public
order, which is why it refuses to recognise the French birth certificate.
The Court also refuses to declare that the surrogate mother has validly consented to the 
recognition of paternity by the biological father on the grounds that the surrogate 
mother had already declared this in the contract of surrogacy, while at that time she was 
not yet pregnant.  
With regards to the paternal filiation of the biological father, requested as an alternative, 
the tribunal refers to article 1:207, al. 1 of the Dutch Civil Code according to which the 
father of a child is the one that has "created it". Having established that a "sperm donor"
cannot be described as "progenitor" within the remit of the Dutch law, the tribunal refers 
to the case-law of the ECtHR relating to article 8 of the ECHR and notes that the ECtHR 
ignores the distinction made by the Dutch legislator between a "progenitor father" and a
"sperm donor father”. What matters is the combination of blood ties and the concrete 
circumstances of a family life. Therefore, the Court accepts the relationship of filiation of 
the biological father on the grounds that, under the circumstances of the case, the latter 
maintains a "family life" with the child. This is the reason why he is entitled to the
protection afforded by article 8 of the ECHR. 
In connection with the United States: 
Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), 
unreleased126: surrogacy was carried out in California between a same-sex Dutch-
American couple residing in the United States and a US national. The Californian birth 
certificates only mention the identity of the two fathers of intent as being the legal
parents. Back in the Netherlands, the Dutch courts have refused to recognize the 
paternity of the two fathers on the grounds that the Californian authorities had not 
established the maternity of the woman who gave birth to the children.  
126 Cited by J.S. KEES, European private international law on legal parenting?) Thoughts on a European
instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238,
available at: http: / / arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540 
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In connection with India: 
Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: surrogacy was 
conducted in India between an Indian surrogate mother, a Dutch father of intent and an 
Irish mother of intent. The parents of intent are residing in the United Arab Emirates.
Surrogacy was conducted with anonymous egg donation and sperm from the father of
intent. The surrogate mother is not the genetic mother (gestational surrogacy). The
Indian birth certificates mention the parents of intent as the legal parents. Back in the 
Netherlands, the mother of intent seeks to transcribe the Indian birth certificates in the 
Dutch civil registry. The Registrar refuses the transcription on the grounds that the 
mother of intent cannot be mentioned in the birth certificate as being the legal mother
since she did not give birth to the child. The action brought by the parents of intent aims
at sentencing the Registrar to record the birth in the registers of civil status, to establish
the Dutch nationality of the child and the legal parentage of the parents of intent. The 
Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction over the dispute on the grounds that the mother 
of intent and the child reside in the Netherlands, that the father of intent has the Dutch
nationality, and that the child will receive Dutch citizenship due to the establishment of 
the paternal filiation by the Court (art. 3 Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). 
In accordance with the rule of conflict of laws on filiation, the Indian law shall apply to
the determination of parentage of the surrogate mother to the child (art. 3 Wet 
conflictenrecht afstamming127 - WCA: the determination of the relationship between a 
woman and a child born out of wedlock is determined by this woman’s national law).
According to Indian law, when a child is born of a surrogacy with anonymous egg
donation fertilized by the sperm of the father of intent, the surrogate mother and the 
father of intent are the legal parents of the child. As a result, the Indian birth certificate
mentioning the parents of intent as being both the genetic and the child's legal parents 
is contrary to the Indian law and to reality and therefore contrary to public order as far 
as, in Dutch law, the legal mother is the woman who gives birth to a child or who 
adopted it (art. 1: 198 DCC). This legal provision must be regarded as a fundamental
principle of the legal Dutch order. The mother of intent must use the adoption
procedure, as long as the Dutch legislation offers no alternative to establish a 
relationship between a mother of intent and a child born out of surrogacy. The Court 
therefore confirms the position of the Registrar and refuses to sentence him to transcribe 
the birth certificate in the Dutch civil registry.
To determine the paternal filiation from the father of intent, the Court applies the Dutch 
law, designated by the rule of conflict of laws on filiation from the moment the child's
usual residence is located in the Netherlands and has spent most of his life there (art. 6 
WCA: determination of paternal filiation is governed by the law of the residence of the 
child, in the absence of a common nationality between the father and the mother and 
failing for the father and the mother to have a common usual residence). In accordance 
with Dutch law, the paternal filiation is established if the father is the progenitor of the 
child (art. 1: 207, 1st § DCC). In this case, when the child was conceived by IVF, the 
father of intent is the genetic father of the child and not its progenitor. Having 
established that a "sperm donor" cannot be described as "progenitor" within the remit of
the Dutch law, the tribunal refers to the case-law of the ECHR relating to article 8 of the 
ECtHR and notes that the ECtHR ignores the distinction made by the Dutch legislator 
between a "progenitor father" and a "sperm donor father”. What matters is the 
combination of blood ties and the concrete circumstances of a family life. The Court
states that, under the concrete circumstances of the case, the biological father has a 
"family life" with the child and that as such, he is entitled to the protection afforded by
article 8 of the ECHR. As such, the Court admits to establish the paternal filiation of the 
father of intent. In accordance with article 1: 5, § 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, the child 
127 Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act. 
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bears the surname of the father of intent, chosen by the surrogate mother and the
father of intent who are the legal parents of the child.
With regard to parental authority and the temporary guardianship, the Dutch Court 
confirmed that it had jurisdiction over the case according to article 8 of the Brussels II 
bis regulation, on the grounds that the child has its usual residence on Dutch territory.
As the child usually resides in the Netherlands, Dutch law is applicable in accordance
with article 16 of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility 
and Measures for the Protection of Children. According to Dutch law, the surrogate 
mother has exclusive parental authority over the child. Insofar as the paternal filiation
from the father of intent will be established only after a period of three months following
the decision by the Court, provided that an appeal is not lodged against this decision, he 
may not be vested with parental authority over the child. The case is postponed to a 
later date to allow the Court to rule on parental authority and the temporary
guardianship. 
In this hypothesis, the recognition of the double parentage link of the child towards the
couple of his intended parents is therefore not possible. Only the paternity of the 
(biological) father of intent can be established on the grounds of the concept of “family
life”, which combines blood ties and the appreciation of a concrete common life between 
father and child.  
On the other hand, the Dutch courts consider that foreign laws that allow the 
establishment of maternal parentage towards the mother of intent who has not given 
birth to the child are contrary to the Dutch public order. The Dutch Courts likewise refuse 
to recognise foreign (Californian) birth certificates that mention the identity of two 
fathers of intent (homosexual couple) as being the parents of the child without 
mentioning the identity of the surrogate mother, on the grounds that the rule mater 
semper certa is of public order128. 
The Courts reason in the same way when it turns out that the birth certificate does not 
mention the name of the mother who gave birth. Thus, in case of a surrogacy that 
involved an anonymous birth in France (“accouchement sous X”), the Court held that the 
absence of the name of the mother in the birth certificate was contrary to the Dutch 
public order129. 
2nd hypothesis  
In connection with the United Kingdom:
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844: surrogacy was carried
out in the United Kingdom with the gametes of the intended parents implanted through
128 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, 
European private international law on legal parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition in legal parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at:
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540: "The judicial decision from the Superior Court of California of 15th
April 2008 cannot be recognised since this is contrary to Dutch public policy, bearing in mind the
aformentioned fudamental rule of family law (mater semper certa est) and the fact that the judicial decision 
was ordered without the legal mother first being determined"(translated by I. CURRY-SUMNER and M.J. VONK, 
“National and International Surrogacy: an Odyssey”, in The International Survey of Family Law, 2011, Edition 
(ed. B. ATKIN), Bristol, Family Law, 2011, p. 279). 
129 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: "Registration of the French birth certificate
conflicts with the Dutch public order". In a similar sense, see Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 
(328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, European private international law on legal 
parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal 
parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540: the Dutch 
courts have refused to recognize California birth certificates on the grounds that it did not establish the 
maternity of women who have given birth to children. 
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IVF in the surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy). The father of intent is a Dutch-
Austrian national and the intended mother is of Austrian nationality. Although both are 
resident in the Netherlands, they decided to carry out the surrogacy in the United 
Kingdom because they did not know anyone in the Netherlands who would have agreed 
to be surrogate mother. They therefore called upon an English organisation
(Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy, COTS) that put them in contact with a 
surrogate mother. The child was born in the United Kingdom and received British
citizenship. The parents of intention file a procedure of adoption in the Netherlands. The
Court states that article 2 of the Wobka (Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter
adoptie), applicable to the adoption of foreign children, requires that prospective 
adoptive parents must obtain the approval (beginseltoestemming) of the Minister of 
Justice to be able to adopt a foreign child. In this case, such an agreement was lacking. 
However, the Court held that by adopting the Wobka, the Dutch legislation did not 
intend to target children conceived with the genetic material of the adoptive parents.
This is why Dutch law shall apply to an application for adoption sought as a result of an
IVF surrogacy, and not the Wobka. As such, the Court grants adoption to the parents of 
intent after verifying that the surrogacy had been carried out in accordance with English 
law and met the conditions laid down by Dutch law, namely that it was not a commercial
surrogacy and that the surrogacy complied with the guidelines laid down by the Society
for Obstetrics and Gynaecology (medical indications, age of the surrogate mother and 
the mother of intent, surrogate mother having already given birth to a living child,
counseling, etc.). The name of the child, such as shown on the British birth certificate
(family name of the parents of intent) was recognized by the Dutch authorities in
accordance with the law applicable in respect of names (art. 1 Wet conflictenrecht
namen conflict rule).
It should be stressed that in this solution that is very favourable to the child, the fact
that the mother of intent is also the genetic mother of the child does not seem to have 
mattered. The Court indeed held that the Dutch law did not intend to apply the law on 
the adoption of a foreign child (Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie) 
when this child is conceived with the genetic material of the parents of intent. The Court
therefore granted the adoption despite the fact that the parents did not respect the
procedure, namely that they had not obtained the agreement of the Minister of
Justice130.
AUSTRIA
1) Applicable rules 
Concerning surrogacy, there is no explicit prohibition.
According to Art. I, §3 of the  Fortpflanzungsgesetz – FmedG (Law on Reproductive
Medicine) (BGB1 275/1992), (1) artificial reproductive technologies are only allowed
when the sperm and ovum of the married couple or life partners are used (2) for
artificial insemination of a woman, the use of the sperm of a third person is authorised,
under the condition that the husband or the male partner is infertile; (3) eggs and cells
capable of development can be used only by the woman who originated them.  
Establishing the maternal bond  
Under Austrian law, there is a legal presumption, according to which the mother is the
woman bearing the child131 (§137(b), ABGB ((§137(b), Allgemeinen bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch - ABGB (JGS 946/1811), modified by Art. II, Fortpflanzungsgesetz – FmedG
(BGB1 275/1992)). No indication can rebut this presumption, as ovum donation is illegal.
130 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844. 
131 “The mother is the woman who has carried the child“ 
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The child has only one legal mother. In case of surrogacy, the surrogate would be 
considered as the legal mother. 
Establishing the paternal bond  
Under §138(1) ABGB132, the father of a child is: (1) the man married to the mother while
she gave birth to the child, or her husband who deceased not earlier than 300 days
before the birth; or (2) the man who made a paternity recognition, or (3) the man
whose paternity was established in court. Also, according to §138(2) ABGB, if several 
men are concerned, the father would be the man who was the last one to be married to
the mother. 
The names entered on the child’s birth certificate are exclusively those of his parents, 
also in case of surrogacy.  
 2) Analysis of the decisions 
- Verfassungsgerichtshof, 14.12.2011 
Facts: Two children whose genetic parents are Austrian citizen (a woman) and Italian
citizen (a man), residing in Vienna, were born (2006, 2009) in Georgia, USA, through 
surrogacy by an American surrogate. Because of removal of her uterus the Austrian
mother could no longer bear children herself. The children became American citizens by 
birth in the USA and were recognized as the Austrian parents’ children by American
courts: the Superior Court of Cobb County (3.8.2006) and the Superior Court of Fulton 
County (10.2.2009) gave an Order of Declaratory Judgment, declaring that the intended
parents were the legal and genetic parents, with all respective rights and obligations.
The hospital was asked to mention on the birth certificates the name of the intended 
parents, without any reference to the surrogate and her husband.  
Based upon these birth certificates, the children, back in Vienna, were registered as 
Austrian citizens by the City (“Magistrat”) of Vienna (5.9.2006 and 30.4.2009). When the 
mother claimed child benefits, the Ministry of Interior asked (4.9.2009) the City of
Vienna to examine the Austrian citizenship of the children arguing that surrogacy was 
illegal under Austrian law (§137(b) ABGB – the mother is the woman bearing the child), 
and that the American judgments establishing parental rights of the Austrian mother 
could therefore not be recognized by Austria. The Ministry of Interior also asked the  
Ministry of Justice whether, surrogacy being authorised under American law, the public 
order was not infringed, or, on the contrary, as according to American international law,
the applicable law is determined in relation to the domiciliation, Austrian law was 
applicable, and so does §137(b) ABGB.  
The City of Vienna began its inquiries; a genetic test confirmed the biological relation
between both children and both intended parents.  
On November 15th, 2010, the administration took a decision according to which no 
filiation had been established in regard to the intended mother, and that the children
were not Austrian citizens. This decision was grounded upon §21 and 25 IPRG 
(Internationale Privatrecht – IPR Gesetz (BGBl 304/1978, 135/2000), stipulating that the
personal status of the children had to be determined according to their domicile, in other 
words, Austrian law was applicable, as well as §137(b) ABGB. Also, the administration 
132 „The father of the child is the man who 
1.	 was married with the mother at the time of the birth or dies as husband of the mother less than 300
days before the child was born; or
2.	 declared his paternity 
3.	 whose paternity is established by law“ 
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considered that public order included the prohibition of surrogacy, and therefore was 
opposed to the recognition of the foreign judgments.  
The Constitutional Court of Austria 
This decision provides a framework to children born through foreign surrogacy: it
confirms the maternal filiation of the biological and intended mother, and, in
consequence, their Austrian citizenship if she is Austrian. The main considerations are 
the following:
- The American decisions establishing legal motherhood of the American genetic mother 
was valid under norms of international private law.
- The Austrian law prohibiting surrogacy is not part of Austria’s public order (ordre 
public), thus overriding the American decisions. The federal law on Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies does neither have constitutional status nor does it protect fundamental
rights. 
- The American surrogate mother cannot be forced into the position of the legal mother 
against her will by Austrian law.  
- The Ministry of Interior had decided arbitrarily by neglecting scholarly opinion and case 
law on ordre public, and by neglecting the welfare of the child as a key concern while
determining the children’s nationality.
- The intended parents’ right to equal treatment by law was infringed. 
It should be noted that the §8 of the ECHR, which was explicitly mentioned as an
argument against the decision, neither was included in the list of law presented by the 
court, nor was considered in itself by the judges (this argument was completely 
ignored).
Yet, the second decision pronounced by the Austrian Constitutional Court rests precisely
on this argument. 
- Verfassungsgerichtshof, 11.10.2012 – B 99/12 ua
Facts and procedure
A pair of twins was given birth in June 2010 in Ukraine. On the birth certificates Mrs T.L
is named as the mother, and Mr P.L as the father, both being Austrian. In order to travel 
with the children, Mr P.L, translated these documents in German, and with an apostille, 
requested the Embassy of Austria in Kiev to issue passports. The official at the embassy 
suspected a case of surrogacy (without engaging a penal procedure). As a result of this 
suspicion, the Ministry of Interior requested from the City of Vienna to determine the 
nationality of these children.
The couple contests engaging surrogacy, and holds that Mrs T.L. was inseminated with 
the sperm of her husband, and that she gave birth to these children by a caesarean
section. The Embassy of Austria in Kiev and the City of Vienna requested proof from the
couple, who was unable to mitigate the suspicions (inexistence of Austrian birth 
certificates, the lack of disclosure of the name of the Ukrainian clinic, non-disclosure of
the identity of the doctor in charge of the medically assisted reproduction procedure, 
adducing their right to privacy, refusal of the woman of being assessed by a doctor from 
the embassy, non-disclosure of an individual in Vienna capable of witnessing to her 
pregnancy).
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The youth officer observes that the children are reared by the intended parents.  
Through a letter dated the 7th of December 2011, the City of Vienna refuses to give the
Austrian nationality to the children. As a justification, the suspicion of a surrogacy is
highlighted (with the elements previously mentioned).  
This refusal is justified by the City of Vienna based on the following legal dispositions:
the §137 ABGB (the mother is the woman giving birth), the §3(3) of the FMedG, and the
incompatibility of surrogacy with the Austrian public policy, which implies the exclusion
of the Ukrainian order (§6 IPRG). Mrs T.L. is, thus, not considered as the mother of
these children, who, in consequence, are not Austrian. 
The Constitutional Court of Austria 
-The scope of protection of art. 8 of the ECHR includes the relations of a child with
his/her parents. Under this protection of family life, the right of a child to a nationality is
included, when it is based on the relation of parentage between the child and his/her 
parents. 
-According to the §7 StbG (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz – StbG, 1985 (BGB1 311/1985, 
122/2009), a child has the right to the Austrian nationality from his/her birth (for a
legitimate child – if one of the parents is Austrian; for a natural child – if the mother is 
Austrian). In this case, there is no doubt that the children have a genetic relation with
the intended parents. There is only doubt on the identity of the surrogate mother. This
doubt would lead the administration, as understood by §7 StbG, to ignore the 
verification of the genetic parenthood, and to concentrate exclusively on the legal 
parenthood, and to ignore the DNA carried out according to §5 StbG. 
- The administration opposes the non-evidential character of the Ukrainian birth 
certificates, issued with an apostille, as the intended parents are the legal parents of the 
children.
- Invoking an incompatibility between the Austrian public policy and the fact of
recognising these birth certificates, only on the basis of the authorisation of surrogacy in
Ukraine, the administration ignored the rule of law within the constitutional sphere.  
- Public policy includes basic values protected by the Austrian law (OGH, 13.9.2000, 4
Ob 199/00 v), these are value positions that cannot be renounced, and which are in the 
legal order. Constitutional rights (in particular, human rights protected by the ECHR) 
play an essential role. The §6 IPR (Internationale Privatrecht – IPR Gesetz (BGBl 
304/1978, 135/2000) includes in the basic values, and thus, in the public policy,
principles such as personal freedom, equal rights, the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of origins, race and religion, the freedom of marriage, the prohibition of marriage
between children, and, not less importantly, the protection of the well-being of children
by the children’s law. As the Constitutional Court has already ruled before (VfSlg. 
19.569/2011), the dispositions of the FMedG and those associated, included in the 
ABGB, are not a part of these fundamental values of the Austrian law and, this including 
those prohibiting surrogacy, do not belong to the constitutional sphere.  
- The fact that the administration includes in the public policy the prohibition of
surrogacy and the §137b of the l’ABGB ("the mother is the woman who gives birth”), 
which excludes the recognition of Ukrainian birth certificates as well as the application of
Ukrainian law on the basis of §6 IPR, exclusively founded on the fact that it authorises 
surrogacy, is contrary of the well-being of the child. This well-being is threatened by the 
refusal of recognising foreign certificates bearing an apostille, which conduces, on the
terms of §137b ABGB, to consider the surrogate as the legal mother, and to force her to 
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a maternal role, when she is not the biological mother, and when she does not want, or 
can assume this maternal role and has not conformed a family nucleus with the child.  
In cases as this one, it will be excluded constitutionally, for the determination of 
parentage (and nationality, as a result) with regards to the child, to apply the
substantive Austrian law, in particular §137b ABGB. Such an application would preclude
the benefit of the child to his/her genetic parents (but also ‘factual), to his maintenance 
entitlements, to his right of succession etc. Moreover, by refusing the recognition of this
foreign legal instrument, these children would be left without the right to the Ukrainian
nationality, which would leave them stateless.
Considering art. 8 of the ECHR, the applicable law in cases such as the one at hand is 
the foreign law, and thus, the right to an Austrian nationality by parentage according to
§7 StbG, on the basis of the pertinent public certificates.
- The administration has, in this case, applied the dispositions of Austrian law 
unreasonably, which led to a violation of the respect of the right to a private and a 
family life of the applicants.
Comment  
- “The best interest of the child” was a primary consideration for the courts in these 
decisions, as it was clear that these children’s well-being was to be raised by the 
intended parents, and not to stay with the surrogate; it was also in their interest to have 
Austrian citizenship (in the second case, if Austrian citizenship would have been refused, 
the children would stay with no citizenship at all, as they did not have the right to an 
Ukrainian citizenship).
- In the second case, the protection of “family life” (§8 of the ECHR) covered the 
relations between a child and his intended parents, and also his right to a nationality,
where this right is conditioned by filiation. Grounding this decision on §8 of the EC, the
Constitutional Court applies foreign law rather than Austrian law (this foreign law giving
the child the right to Austrian citizenship). One can consider that the protection of 
“family life” provides a challenge to the “best interests of the child”, as in this particular
decision the refusal of Austrian citizenship is in fine considered as a violation of §8 (in 
the first decision, the formal reason was the infringement of the constitutional right of 
the parents to equal treatment by the law).
- In both decisions, even though surrogacy is not authorised in Austria, no adoption 
procedure was necessary, as the intended parents were recognised as the legal parents 
of the children.
- In both decisions, foreign norms are applied, for two reasons, firstly, as the prohibition
of surrogacy was not considered as being part of the Austrian ordre public. It was 
explicitly stated that the federal law on Assisted Reproductive Technologies (FMedG)
does neither have constitutional status, nor does it protect fundamental rights. Secondly, 
applying Austrian filiation law would prejudice the child’s best interest. Also, a foreign
surrogate cannot be forced into the position of the legal mother against her will by
Austrian law. 
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2.3.2. MEMBER STATES IN WHICH SURROGACY IS FORBIDDEN 
2.3.2.1. Ex-ante 
Law (prohibition)
FRANCE 
Case-law has lead in France to the prohibition of associations facilitating surrogacy. In
the 1980s, the growth of associations acting as “middle-men” between infertile couples 
and prospective surrogate mothers, prompted the administrative bodies to ban such
associations. The administrative court validated this prohibition (Conseil d'Etat, 22
January 1988, no 80936, Assoc. « Les cigognes ».). The ordinary court likewise declared 
the nullity of such association due to the illegality of their object (Cass Civ. 1st, 13 
December 1989, Assoc. « Alma Mater »: D. 1990, p. 273, rapp. Massip; JCP G 1990, II, 
no 21526, note Sériaux; Defrénois 1990, p. 743, obs. Aubert ; RTD civ. 1990, p. 254, 
obs. J. Rubellin-Devichi.). These rulings are at the source of the legal arrangements on 
agents in surrogacy agreements. 
Since 1994, French law prohibits peremptorily all forms of surrogacy (regardless of its 
purpose, altruistic or profit, and whatever the context, medical or parental). The 
prohibition of the use of this practice is sanctioned in the civil field by the absolute nullity
and in the criminal field by correctional penalties.
On the civil front, specific provisions nullify conventions that affect the reproductive
performance of women (laws of 29 July 1994).  
“Any agreement relating to human reproduction or pregnancy on behalf of others is void” 
(article 16-7 Civil Code).
“The conventions conferring patrimonial value to the human body, its elements or its 
products are null” (art 16-5 Civil Code).
These dispositions “are of public policy” (art 16-9 Civil Code); surrogacy agreements are 
therefore null and void in all cases.
Generally, article 323 of the Civil Code provides that "actions relating to parentage
cannot be subject to waiver”. This article provides for the principle of “unavailability of
the State”, which dictates that a woman cannot conventionally undertake to abandon the
child she carries and that she cannot conventionally renounce being a mother. 
On the criminal front, there are two instances that can constitute a criminal offence by
the penal law: the incitement to abandon a child (a) and the substitution of a child (b).
a) Article 227-12 of the penal code punishes “the incitement of the parents or one of 
them to abandon a born or unborn child, made either for pecuniary gain, or by gifts, 
promises, threats or abuse of authority, is punished by six months' imprisonment and a 
fine of €7,500; acting for pecuniary gain as an intermediary between a person desiring 
to adopt a child and a parent desiring to abandon its born or unborn child is punished by 
one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000; the penalties provided by the second 
paragraph apply to acting as an intermediary between a person or a couple desiring to
receive a child and a woman agreeing to bear this child with the intent to give it up to
them. Where the offence is habitually committed for pecuniary gain, the penalties
incurred are doubled”. 
It is worth noting that neither the couple of intended parents, nor the surrogate mother
would be able to be indicted on the basis of the charges specifically on acting as an
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
intermediary and that concern intermediaries between the surrogate mother and the 
intended parents. The couple could be eventually prosecuted on the basis of the 
incitement to abandon a child, if facts pointing to this incitement emerge from the 
133case . 
b) Article 227-13 punishes the “wilful substitution, false representation or concealment 
which infringes the civil status of a child » with « three years of imprisonment and a fine 
of €45,000 » 
This article targets in particular the hypothesis in which the intended mother is falsely
attributed by the birth certificate a child that she did not give birth to (for example if the
surrogate who really gave birth declares the child before the Civil Registry forging the 
identity of the intended mother who did not give birth). 
But it is worth recalling that the French penal law does not punish offences not
committed on the French territory. It is the application of the principle of the territoriality
of the penal law.
A French citizen leaving abroad to engage in facts that would be qualified as criminal
offences in France but that do not constitute offences in the hosting country, cannot be 
subjected to penal prosecution on his return to France in the absence of reciprocity
(articles 113-2 and 113-6 of the penal code). 
The solution would be different if the offence were qualified by the French law as a 
“crime”. The crime committed by a French citizen abroad is always punishable, even in
the absence of reciprocity. 
Criminal case law  
Can a couple of French citizens engaging in surrogacy abroad be prosecuted in France on 
the basis of article 227-13 of the penal code? In principle, the absence of reciprocity
previously mentioned should constitute an obstacle to prosecution.
But it was held that to the extent that some administrative procedures had taken place 
by the couple at the Consulate of France of the foreign country, a part of the offence had 
taken place in France, which justified the prosecution. The Court of Créteil judged that 
“the French penal law is not applicable in this instance; article 113-2 of the penal code
prescribes that the offence is considered as committed on the territory of the republic
when one of the constitutive facts of it took place on the territory; as all the constitutive 
facts of what could be qualified simulation, as defined by article 227-13 of the penal
code, took place on the territory of the United States, in conformity to the legislation in
force in that country. … The attempt to transcribe the birth certificates at the Consulate 
General of France in Los Angeles cannot be considered as taking place on the French 
territory to the extent, in international law, the premises of the consulate do not enjoy of
extraterritoriality and are a part of the receiving State” (Court of First Instance of Créteil 
ordinance of the 30th of September 2004 D 2005. 476 Note V. Depadt-Sebag).  
Could it be perceived from this decision a will of the French judge to avoid convicting
under the penal law French couples engaging in cross-border reproduction? 
GERMANY
In Germany, surrogacy in itself is not explicitly prohibited or punishable. However, the 
bringing together of the party who is willing to adopt a child born through surrogacy or is 
in some other way ready to take permanently care of it (ordering parents) with a woman
133 F. Dreifuss-Netter, Atteintes à la filiation, Jurisclasseur Pénal, 2000, arts. 227-12 to 227-14. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
who is willing to serve as a surrogate, is subject to sanctions. Also, surrogacy 
agreements are ineffectual and unenforceable. 
Three legal sources deal with surrogacy (no amendment is under discussion): 
i) The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB): §134- any legal transaction 
violating a statutory prohibition is void if the law does not say otherwise; §138(1)- any 
legal transaction violating the public policy (bonos mores) is void. 
ii) The Embryo Protection Act 1990134: according to §1(1)(7), “anyone will be punished 
with up to three years imprisonment or a fine, who … attempts to carry out an artificial 
fertilisation of a woman who is prepared to give up her child permanently after birth
(surrogate mother) or to transfer a human embryo into her”. Under this provision, no
“agreement” in a technical sense is required; the mere willingness of the surrogate to 
relinquish the child to a third party is sufficient.
Neither the surrogate, nor the ordering parents can be punished. According §1(3)(2),
“…the surrogate mother and likewise the person who wishes to take long-term care of
the child will not be punished”. If a woman is being inseminated with the sperm of the
ordering father with no medical assistance, through sexual intercourse or “home
insemination”, this kind of operation will be subject to no sanction.
iii) The Procurement Adoption Act135: according to §13(a), the surrogate mother is a
woman who by agreement has consented (1) to an artificial or natural insemination, or 
(2) to having somebody else’s embryo implanted, and, after giving birth to it, to hand
the child over in view of an adoption or other permanent accommodation. Once more,
this kind of activity is not in itself prohibited. According to §13(b), the procurement of a
surrogate mother means the bringing together of the party who is willing to adopt a child
born by a  surrogate or is in some other  way ready to take permanently care of it
(ordering parents) with a woman who is willing to serve as a surrogate mother. Such
procurement is formally prohibited (§13(c)), and even, following §14(b), punishable 
(imprisonment up to one year or a fine). Any publicity is prohibited (§13(d)). With an 
imprisonment up to 2 years or a fine can be punished who has a pecuniary benefit or the 
promise of such a benefit out of the procurement of a surrogate mother. If the offender
turns it into a business activity for financial profit or proceeds on commercial basis, the 
punishment amounts even to an imprisonment of 3 years or to a fine. §14(b)(3)
confirms that the surrogate and the ordering parents cannot be sanctioned. 
ITALY
In Italy all forms of surrogacy are forbidden, whether it be traditional or gestational,
commercial or altruistic. The Italian parliament provided very strict guidelines in matters
of assisted reproduction. Act n. 40 of 19/2/2004, entitled Rules about medically assisted
reproduction, introduces a prohibition on employing gametes from donors, and 
specifically decrees: “Anyone who, in any form, realizes, organizes or commercializes 
gametes or embryos or surrogate motherhood is sentenced to 3 months to 2 years’
imprisonment and to pay a 600,000 to 1,000,000 euro fine” (art. 12, par. 6).  
According to the main interpretation136, this article incriminates not only intermediary
agencies and clinics practising surrogacy, but also the intended parents and the 
134 Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – EschG)), Federal Law Gazette, Part I, n°69, 
19.12.1990, p. 2746 
135 Gesetz über die Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern 
- Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz – AdVermiG, 2001 (BGBl. 2002, I, p. 354), last modified in 2008 (BGBl, I, p.
2403) 
136136136 See R. Villani, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 
2008, pp. 1828-1834; M. Sesta, Procreazione medicalmente assistita e status del figlio, in Rivista 
dell’Associazione italiana degli avvocati per la famiglia e per i minori, 2, 2006, pp.77-92. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
surrogate mother too. This interpretation is found out ab contrariis from paragraph 8: 
“The men and the women subject to the reproduction techniques forbidden by par. 1
[assisted reproduction with gametes from donors], 2 [application of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ART) post mortem, or to underage, single, or homosexual
couples], 4 [application of ART without the patient’s consent] and 5 [application of ART
in unauthorized clinics] cannot be condemned”. This list does not include paragraph 6, so 
the doctrine supports the theory of punishability of the patients subject to the application 
of surrogacy technology. Furthermore, paragraph 9 of the same article provides an
accessory penalty for doctors: “the forced interruption of professional practise by 1-3 
years”. 
So far the regime of surrogacy restrictions, providing an absolute ban with penal
consequences, has not been applied; no criminal case has emerged; no intended parents 
or surrogate mothers have ever been criminally convicted.
SPAIN
In Spain, the prohibition of surrogacy was determined by the law of the 22nd of
November 1988 on the techniques of medically assisted reproduction (TRA, for its 
Spanish acronym), and confirmed by the law nº14 of the 26th of May 2006. 
This law stipulates that: “1. A contract convening the gestation, whether for profit or
gratuitous, of a woman who will renounce to maternal parentage in favour of a co­
contracting party or a third party, will be null and void. 2. The parentage of the children
born from surrogacy will be determined by childbirth. 3. The biological father retains the 
possibility to contest the paternity, in conformity to the rules of common law” (art. 
10)137 . 
This law forbids surrogacy explicitly and reinforces the presumption according to which 
the mother is the woman who gives birth.  
From a penal point of view, Art. 221 of the Penal code (based on the version of 2003) 
establishes: 1. Those who, through economic compensation, deliver a child to another 
individual, without the existence of a relation of parentage, eluding the legal procedures 
of custody, hosting or adoption, with the objective of establishing an analogous relation
to that of parentage,  will be punished with imprisonment of a duration of from one to  
five years, and with a legal impediment to exercise parental authority, tutelage or
custody during a period going from four to 10 years138. 2. The same sanction will apply
to the person who receives the child as the intermediary, even if the case of the 
“delivery” of the child took place in a foreign country139 140 . 
Moreover, sanctions are provided for in the form of fines. Surrogacy is sanctioned by a
fine going from 10.000 to a million euros and can lead to the closing of the medical 
centre or the services of medically assisted reproduction that participated in it.
No penal case has been documented until today.  
137 BUSTOS PUECHE, J-E., El derecho español ante las nuevas técnicas genéticas, Diario La Ley, Ed. LA LEY, 

tome 3, 1992.
 
138 It is impossible to know if the incrimination concerns both parents or only the mother, as there has not been
 
a penal case concerning surrogacy until today. 

139 PEREZ VAQUERO, C. “Las pensiones de la poligamia”, Revista Quadernos de Criminología, 2009, nº 7; pp.
 
38-39. http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3104389.
 
140 The penal process develops within the principle of territoriality (regardless of art. 221 of the Penal Code).
 
This principle has to be articulated with the principle of minimal intervention of penal law and the principle of
 
proportionality. This is the reason why the article 221 of the PC has never been applied to cases of 

international surrogacy. 
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2.3.2.2. Ex-post 
Internal civil case law 
FRANCE
Establishing the paternal bond  
Recognition seems to be the effective way for a man to create a bond between him and 
the child of a surrogate mother who gave birth anonymously, “sous X”, in France. The
comment specifically concerns prenatal recognition.
Initially, the courts felt that a prenatal recognition by a man of a child later born “sous 
X” should be without effect as it relates  to the child of a woman who is supposed to 
actually have never delivered (Riom, 16 Décembre 1997 D 1998 Somm 301). 
But this jurisprudence seems to be abandoned. The Court of cassation, in light of articles 
335 and 336 of the Civil Code relating to a child’s recognition and in light of article 7 of
the CRC (right of the child to know his origins), now judge the paternal prenatal 
recognition made before birth "sous X" of the child to be effective. This recognition
therefore confers effect of creating the paternity bond at birth, as soon as it is  
transcribed on the birth certificate. It should therefore constitute an obstacle to the
placement of the child in social services with a view to its adoption. The child of a woman 
who gives birth “sous X” can therefore have his paternal link established it he has been
recognised prenatally by his father (Civ 1st April 7, 2006, Bul Civ 1 n ° 195 R p.67; D 
2006 IR 1065 Obs. I. Gallmeister; D 2007 Panorama 1461, Obs F. Granet Lambrechts: in 
this case, because the parties has so agreed, the Second Court of Appeal pronounced
the adoption of the child by the adoptive couple with maintenance of the relations of the 
child with his biological father, Reims 12 December 2006, Defrenois 2007. 795, Obs J. 
Massip). 
Paternal filiation can be validly established in case of delivery “sous X” by the mother. A 
presumption of fraud cannot be derived from this action (CA Versailles 17 May 2001 No. 
3717 AJ 2001 26 family). In this case the adoption by the wife of the father (adoption 
that was requested five years after the birth of the child) has been pronounced and the
Prosecutor’s application for annulment of recognition was dismissed on the grounds that
it failed to provide evidence of its falsity. In this case, the results of a blood compatibility
test pronounced in favour of fatherhood. Faced with the sole assumptions of the 
Prosecutor, the Court refused to order a biological expertise.
Establishing the maternal bond 
Establishing the maternal bond is still premised on the principle that the mother is the 
woman giving birth to the child (mater certa est). This principle was confirmed by the 
2005 statute reforming the law on parentage. The indication of the mother’s last name 
on the birth certificate is henceforth enough to establish the maternal bond.  
The possibility for a woman to give birth anonymously « sous X… » and to abandon her
child at birth remains. This decision is based on a freedom and can therefore not be the 
result of an agreement. The principle of inalienability of personal status precludes a
women from aggreeing to give birth anonymously and to abandon the borne child. The 
nuance is important and sheds light on the reason why surrogacy agreements are 
radically null from their underwriting.
Adoption has been historically the first procedure proposed to settle the situation: a
woman agrees to abandon the child that she gave birth to. The father acknowledges the 
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child to establish paternal parentage and his spouse adopts the child in the framework of
a full adoption. 
The illegal character of the procedure was not obvious, however: the Court of Appeal of
Paris accepted to pronounce, in this context, the adoption of a child considering that the 
adoption was in the child’s interest. Recourse to surrogacy was not by then judged 
contrary to public policy (decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris of the 15th of June 
1990). At that time the situation had been highly publicised. The Court of Cassation, in 
plenary assembly, on appeal from the State Prosecution Office and inspired by the 
hearing pronounced by the French National Ethics Committee President, Jean Bernard, 
judged that this venue was a “distortion of the adoption”. The Court added that "The
decision pronouncing the full adoption of a child violates articles 6 and 1128 of the civil 
code and article 353 when this adoption was not but the last phase of a process destined
to allow a host couple into their household of a child conceived in execution of a contract
leading to his/her abandonment at the moment of birth by his/her mother and
threatening the principles of the non-availability of the human body and the civil status,
this process constituted a distortion of the institution of adoption”  (C. Cass Plenary
Assembly 21st of May 1991 Bul Civ. 4 Rec. page 247 D 1991 417 Note D. Thouvenin 
JCP 1991 II 21 752 note Terre Concl. Dontenwille RTD Civ 1991 517 Obs D. Huet 
Weiller). At this moment emerged the expression of “distortion of adoption”. 
The Court of Cassation was lead as a result to confirm its case law (V° Civ 29th of June 
1994 D 1994 581 note Y. Chartier; V° also on a request of full adoption undertaken 
twelve years after the birth of a child born from a surrogate mother: C. Cass 9th of 
1stDecember 2003  civil chamber n°01/03927 « …given that surrogacy, which is
deduced as illegal… from article 16-7, involves a distortion of the institution of adoption
that the judges of substance are entitled by law to refuse to pronounce... »). The 
interest of the child is not dismissed. The decision was commented by the doctrine 
(Defrenois 2004 592 Obs. J. Massip, Dr. Famille 2004 n°17 Note P. Murat, RJPF 2004. 
4135, Obs T. Garé, RTD Civ 2004 75 Obs. J. Hauser.). 
Thus, adoption would seem impossible to undertake. The case law seems stable on this. 
GERMANY
Given the legal frame of surrogacy, in particular §134 and 138(1), BGB, surrogacy 
agreements are not enforceable by the courts, and cannot in any way, be pre-approved
by a court in order to be considered as enforceable. This has been confirmed by the 
jurisprudence (see below): the sole fact that a woman has been a part to a surrogacy 
agreement is not a reason to take back the child to whom she gave birth (this kind of
measure can only be pronounced in exceptional circumstances, when the child141 suffers 
from a bodily or mental damage142), despite the biological relation between the ordering 
father and the child, and the financial motivation of the surrogate. 
Establishing the maternal bond  
Under German law, there is a legal presumption, according to which the mother is the 
woman bearing the child (§1591, BGB). No indication can rebut this presumption, as 
ovum donation and surrogacy are illegal. The mother’s identity has to be mentioned in
the act of birth. There is no formal possibility of giving birth anonymously. The child has
only one legal mother. In case of surrogacy, the surrogate would be considered as the 
legal mother.
141 In case of a bodily or mental damage to the child, he can be institutionalised, because as a rule, the 
surrogate is only allowed to deliver the child into the hands of the ordering parents when the court has given 
personal custody to them. Eventually the court will decide on a case to case basis: it can decide to deliver the 
child to the ordering parents, who will adopt the child; it can also decide to institutionalise the child. 
142 §1666, 1666a BGB. 
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Establishing the paternal bond 
Under German law, the father is: the husband of a woman while bearing the child
(§1592(1) BGB); a man who has recognised his paternity (§1592(2) BGB)143; or a man
whose paternity has been stated by court (§1592(3) BGB). No specific provisions have
been made for the case of surrogacy. If the surrogate was married while the child was 
born, her husband will be considered as the legal father of the child.
The names entered on the child’s birth certificate are exclusively those of his parents (as 
defined in question 9, 10), also in case of surrogacy.  
Adoption 
The ordering parents can adopt the child born through surrogacy under the following 
conditions: the consent of the surrogate, since the consent of the biological parents in 
general is mandatory, which cannot be given before the child is 8 weeks old (§1747
BGB). This consent might become unnecessary (§1748 BGB) if the parent has neglected
his / her duty to the child permanently or has shown by his / her attitude that he / she 
doesn’t care about the child, and if the child would suffer a disadvantage not being
adopted. Also, the consent might be replaced if the child suffers from a serious (although
not continuous neglect), or if the parent, suffering from a particularly great emotional
disease, or a particularly serious mental or psychological disability, is permanently 
unable to assume the care and the education of the child.
According to §1741(1) BGB144, while deciding upon the adoption, the judge has to take 
into account the well-being (Kindeswohl) of the child, and only if it is to be expected that 
a parent – child relationship will result between the adopting party and the child.
Nevertheless, whoever participates in an unlawful and unethical arrangement or
transportation of a child with regard to an adoption, or delegates such an undertaking to
a third party against payment, shall only be able to adopt the child, if this is necessary to
the welfare of the child. In this context, a surrogacy agreement would not necessarily
exclude adoption, and the judge would decide case by case. In any event, the mother is
allowed to hand over the child to the ordering parents only under the condition that an
order has been given by a court.
The child might be adopted by the couple (if the couple is married) or by one parent 
(§1741(2) BGB). The guardianship court (Vormundschaftsgericht) decides on the 
adoption of the child.  
2) Analysis of the decision 
- Kammergericht (KG) ( “Provincial Court of Appeal” of Berlin) 19th of march 
1985, 1 W 5729/84; JZ 1985, 1053 
Contract of surrogacy between a couple and a surrogate, involving pecuniary 
compensation. The couple requests the refund of the compensation after discovering 
that the biological father of the child is the husband of the surrogate. The intended
parents invoked the threat to the interests of the child, as a result of the non-execution
of the contract by the surrogate and the husband. The court declares that such a 
convention is contrary to public moral and decency (§134 and 138(1) of BGB), as there 
is a degradation of the child, through its commodification, the fact that he/she is the 
object of a for-profit contract (even if the remuneration is qualified by the parties as 
143 A paternity recognition can be made before the child is born (§1594(4) BGB).
 
144 « Wer an einer gesetzes- oder sittenwidrigen Vermittlung oder Verbringung eines Kindes zum Zwecke der 

Annahme mitgewirkt oder einen Dritten hiermit beauftragt oder hierfür belohnt hat, soll ein Kind nur dann 

annehmen, wenn dies zum Wohl des Kindes erforderlich ist »
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voluntary, and that it took place after birth); constitutes a threat to his/her well-being.
Moreover, the judges highlighted the threat to the family and matrimonial order.
As the existence of a child without a genetic link within the family can cause suffering
and conflicts, and that the agreement of the biological mother to an adoption cannot be 
given before 8 weeks after birth (in this case, this period had not been respected), the 
judges transferred the case to another court, competent on the matter, the question of
the adoption (Vormundschaftsgericht).
- Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Hamm, 2nd of December 1985, 11 W 18/85 (FamRZ
1986, 159; JZ 1986, 441; NJW 986, 781) 
A woman having had the role of surrogate, with the agreement of her husband, was 
inseminated with the sperm of another man. The child was born, and the surrogate and 
her husband refused to give him/her to the intended parents. The court declared that 
the fact that the mother concluded a surrogacy convention is not sufficient reason to
separate the child from her, as the fact of separating a child from the family where
he/she was born is an exceptional measure, taking place only when a physical or mental 
injury in relation to his/her wellbeing is observed.
- Amtsgericht (AG) Gütersloh, 17th of December 1985 – 5 XVI 7/85 
Refusal of an adoption requires, following a surrogacy convention (artificial insemination
of the surrogate with the sperm of the intentional father). However, the judges declared
that the adoption was not contrary to the interests of the child on the exclusive reason of 
the existence of a surrogacy convention, as the court is not the guardian of public moral
and decency, it has to deliberate only on the question presented before it, in this 
instance the wellbeing of the child.
International case law 
Administrative stakes: delivering travel documents 
GERMANY
1) Rules applicable in terms of nationality 
A child is considered to be a German citizen if at least one of his parents his German145, 
thus requiring his / her filiation to be determined. According to §19(1) of the 
Introductory Law of the Civil Code (EGBGB), in respect to the filiation of a child at first 
the law of the state in which the child has its habitual residence is applicable. However,
the filiation, in relation to each parent, can be decided according to the law of the state 
to which this parent belongs146. In the context of surrogacy, the establishment of a 
filiation is complicated, given that, under German law, the mother is the woman bearing
the child (§1591 BGB), and, if she is married, her husband is considered as the legal 
father (§1592(1) BGB), and not the ordering father.  
These kinds of presumptions often do not exist in countries where German citizens 
choose to make a surrogacy agreement, like India or Ukraine, where the ordering
parents are considered as legal parents, and where children born within their territory 
are not always automatically given the local nationality. This conflict of law can cause 
painful situations, where these children have neither a filiation in relation to the ordering
145 §4(1) Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz –StAG : « Durch die Geburt erwirbt ein Kind die deutsche 
Staatsangehörigkeit, wenn ein Elternteil die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt » 
146 §19(1) Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB: « Die Abstammung eines Kindes 
unterliegt dem Recht des Staates, in dem das Kind seinen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt hat. Sie kann im Verhältnis 
zu jedem Elternteil auch nach dem Recht des Staates bestimmt werden, dem dieser Elternteil angehört » 
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parents, nor any citizenship, even if the ordering parents (who are, sometimes, also the 
biological parents) are German. Nevertheless, this state of the law has been confirmed
by the Federal State Department, warning that entrance to Germany of these children,
who don’t have German passports, is impossible147. 
- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 26th of November 2009 - VG 11 L 396.09
An Indian woman, surrogate, was inseminated in India with the sperm of the German
intended father148. He requested the acknowledgement of his paternity in order to take 
the children into German territory without a visa.  
The court dismissed the argument of the biological paternity adduced by the intended
father, as the question of the nationality of the children is ruled by the laws of the State
where the children live (§19(1) of the law introducing the BGB (EGBGB)149), in this case 
India. According to Indian law, no legal disposition provides for surrogacy, but, in 
general, the mother is the woman who gives birth, even if she is not the genetic mother;
the father is the husband of the woman who gives birth and, if the woman who gave
birth to the children were to be married at the time of their birth to an Indian man, he is
considered the as the legal father150. But the judges take the time to highlight that even
according to the German law, the applicant is not considered as the legal father of the 
children as he is neither married to the woman who gave birth151, nor did he 
acknowledge these children152, nor is his paternity legally attested153. 
The fact that the intended father is mentioned in the birth certificate as the legal father 
is not a proof of paternity. Even if we are to follow the rules determined by the Indian
Council for Medical Research as the applicable law according to §19(1) of the EGBGB,
these dispositions contravene the German public policy following the §6 of the EGBGB, 
as surrogacy is, for the judge, contrary to public morals and decency; the intended 
parents were aware of the rule of law and the risks they were engaging.  
In fine, neither the Indian government, nor the German government, consider these
children as citizens of their State. The Indians consider the couple of intended parents as 
legal parents, and that their children are German. The Germans consider the surrogate
mother as the legal mother, and the children, as a result, to be Indians. The twins are
left stateless, and without the possibility of entering Germany, a situation more severe 
than that of other countries equally prohibiting surrogacy, but allowing the intended 
parents return to the national territory with the children. As a result, neither the 
intended mother, nor the intended father, himself being the biological father, can 
establish their parentage in any of the countries, even if they are mentioned in the birth
certificate of the providing country.
It will be noted that this decision is concluded in a very surprising fashion, as the judges 
suggest the intended parents, and not only the father to attempt an adoption 
procedure154 after demonstrating paternity in order to establish a relation to the children. 
147http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/FAQ/GeburtAusland/06­
Leihmutterschaft.html?nn=383016) 
148 The Court declares that according to the elements submitted, the surrogate is probably not the genetic 
mother, a fact that has no incidence in the sense of the decision 
149 According to art. 18 section 1 of the law of introduction to the civil code (Einführungsgesetz zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, EGBGB), the law of a country where the child has his/her habitual residence is 
applied with priority to determined parentage 
150 According to art. 112 of the Indian Evidence of 1872 
151 §1592 al.1 BGB 
152 §1592 al.2 BGB 
153 §1592 al.3 BGB 
154 Confirming the decision AG Gütersloh, of the 17th of December 1985, 5 XVI 7/85, which had rejected an 
adoption request as a result of surrogacy, while declaring that the adoption does not have to be declared 
contrary to the interests of the child for the exclusive reason of a surrogacy convention, as the court is not the 
guardian of public morals and decency, its role being to deliberate on the question of the child’s well being 
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In theory, thus, if one of these two procedures is achieved, the children could enter 
Germany and would be associated, at least to the biological father – intended in case 
that the paternity is established, and maybe even to the intended mother in case that
the adoption procedure is concluded successfully. It would seem that a solution was 
found as, in May 2010, the German Embassy conceded them a visa, so that the whole 
family could return to Germany155. 
- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 15th of April 2011- VG 23 L 79.11 
The case concerns a child born in India to an Indian surrogacy. The intended couple is
made up of a woman of 56 years of age and a man of 61 years of age. This man, whose 
sperm fertilised the oocyte of a donor, is the biological father of the child. The German
Embassy in India refuses to give a German passport to the child, as it considers that his
right to German nationality is not established156. The Court confirms the existence of 
doubts on the right of the child to the German nationality, as one of the parents has to 
have it (birth right), the existence of a relation of parentage between the couple and the
child is not established: the maternal parentage is highly unlikely on the basis of her
advanced age, and moreover not proved by any medical document. Even if the man is 
the biological father, this element is not pertinent, as according to the German law and 
the Indian law, the father of a child born in marriage, is considered to be the husband of 
the gestating woman. Insofar as the identity of the mother remains contested, and that 
the paternity is not legally established, the parentage (Abstammung) of the child is
doubtful, and the embassy was right to refuse the passport. 
This decision, avoiding to reference the interests of the child, denies any parentage 
relation, maternal or paternal as a whole, regardless of the biological relation with the 
intended father; the judges prefers to give priority to the presumption of the indivisibility 
of matrimonial parentage of a married man, which allows them not to recognise the 
biological relation with the intended father. 
- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 5th of September 2012 – VG 23 L 283.12
The decision concerns a contract of surrogacy concluded in Ukraine, with the gametes of
the intended parents. As in precedent decisions, the court in Berlin declares that a child
can be given a passport only if he/she is a German citizen, and thus through a parentage 
relation with one of the parents. The German embassy was right not to give the
passport. This child cannot enter German territory. The judges concluded the decision 
declaring that an adoption was the only means to the intentional mother, who is also the 
genetic mother, to cause the exclusion of the application of the rule according to which a 
mother is the woman who gives birth.  
As we can note from this series of decisions, the “best interest of the child” consideration
has never been used to allow the administration of travel documents to children born
through foreign surrogacy agreements, this question had to be examined according to
nationality and filiation legal provisions. The decisions taken by the administrative court
of Berlin which dealt with the child’s right to enter German territory without a visa, don’t 
mention this criterion, and refuse these requests. 
FRANCE 
It is necessary here to cite two decisions of the Council of State (Conseil d’État) (CE 4th 
of May 2011) in relation to refusals of the request of “travel documents”. The first
decision concedes the document, the second refuses it. 
155 “Fertility treatment in Germany”, 19th of August 2011, Dr P. THORN, BioNews 621 
156 On the basis of §1 al.4 PassG, only German citizens have the right to a German passport 
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The first decision concerns a French citizen who travels to India with the objective of
requesting the transcription into the French Civil Registry of births, the birth certificates 
of two Indian children born in Bombay as well as two passports allowing him to take the 
children to France. The Prosecutions Department, suspecting a convention of surrogacy,
refused the transcription into the French Civil Registry and did not settle in favour of the 
request of passports. The father of the children requests an interim relief measure from
the Ministry in order to obtain a “document of travel” (not a passport) to allow the 
children to enter France. The interim relief judge settles in favour of the request. (TA 
(tribunal administratif) Lyon, ordinance n°1102538 of the 22nd of April 2011). The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertakes an appeal before the Council of State, invoking the 
best interest of the child to remain with his/her mother in India and noting that the
practice of surrogacy is contrary of the public policy. The Council of State confirms the 
first decision, highlighting that the administration did not criticise through its appeal the 
basis on which the first judge considered the condition of urgency to be fulfilled. It was
the only question to be considered by the interim relief measure. 
The ordinance issued through the interim relief procedure does not question details of
the substance; it does not settle on the existence or not of a surrogate or with regards to 
the alleged fraud. It does not grant a “passport” and does not question the nationality of 
the children. It only grants a “travel document”.
In the same sense, see however: TA Paris, 15th of November 2011 (n° 1120046/9­
1): consular authorities were obliged to grant a document of travel allowing a child, born 
in Ukraine through surrogacy, to enter the French territory.  
However, in a case almost identical, the Council of State nullifies on the 8th of July 2011
(Interim relief judges, n° 350486) this time the decision of the first judge ordering the 
granting a laissez-passer on the basis that there were doubts on the identity of the 
mother and the children. 
Civil stakes: recognising foreign birth certificates  
FRANCE
- It was suggested that the recognition of the child would establish the paternal bond,
and this proposition was adopted successfully.
An unmarried French couple engaging a procedure of surrogacy from an American 
woman in order to have a child imagined a different solution. The American Civil Registry
established the parentage of the twins born in California with the French couple. The
female partner was hence registered as the mother in the birth certificate of the State of 
California, even though she did not give birth. When the American birth certificates were
asked to be registered, the French Public Prosecutor requested that the identity of the 
surrogate mother be rectified and the maternal acknowledge that occurred in the 
meantime to be annulled. The Court of Appeal of Rennes confirmed the decision of the 
first judges who nullified the maternal acknowledgement and ordered the annulment of 
the mention in the registration of the American birth certificates of the female partner as 
a mother – the basis of the decision being the adage “mater certa est” as well as articles
16-7 and 16-9 of the civil code; however, the mention of the father in the Californian 
birth certificates was registered and the paternal acknowledgement substantiating the
certificates was upheld (Rennes Court of appeal of the 4th of July 2002 n°01/02 471
D 2002 29 02 Note F. Granet; Dt famille, 2002, December, comm. n° 142, note P.
Murat). 
A recent decision however calls into question the validity of the recognition of paternity
when the child is born out of a surrogacy procedure carried out abroad (CA Paris 10
January 2012, n° 11/01846; see analysis below). 
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- Regarding the establishment of maternal filiation through adaption, one singular case 
from the Paris Court of Appeal of the 25th of June 1990157 is worth mentioning. The 
case concerned a traditional surrogacy performed by an American woman for a sterile 
French couple. The woman, spawning and gestational carrier, had given birth in
Kentucky, and at the end of a judicial procedure, had abandoned its rights over the child 
for the benefit of the progenitor and father. The intended mother had requested the 
adoption of the child and the Court of appeal, reversing the previous decision, had
acceded to her request. She had then boldly stated that surrogacy allowed the couple to 
exercise their "natural right to found a family by procreation" and that the conditions in
which this surrogacy took place did not clash with the French conception of public policy,
intervening in its attenuated effect. It should be noted that the Prosecution had not 
finally seen fit to form an appeal against this judgment, whilst the second ruling 
delivered on the same day the Court of appeal of Paris, in a similar case but without 
international scope, specifically gave rise to the appeal by the plenary Assembly of the 
Court of Cassation on 31 May 1991, which has long informed case law in France. The fact
that the breach of the French ban on surrogacy was the result of a judgement rendered 
abroad justified without doubt at the time that the sanction of public order was not
triggered. 
This decision has remained isolated, as it is in contradiction with the solution adopted by
the Court of Cassation and expanded to cross-border surrogacy practices. 
- A de facto child-parent relation has also been proposed in vain: a French couple 
travelled to the United States to meet a surrogate. The child born in the United States 
had an American civil status establishing parentage with the French couple. But the birth
certificate was not registered in the Civil Registry of Nantes158. The French couple, faced 
to the impossibility of producing a French birth certificate, requested a notarial deed
establishing the de facto child-parent relation, constituted in France, before the judge of 
first instance of Tourcoing who granted it. But the Prosecutor’s Department of Nantes
refused the registration of the instrument into the birth certificate held by the Consular
Civil Registry of Nantes. The Court of Cassation confirmed the decision issued by the 
court of Douai: the nullity of the convention of surrogacy “creates an obstacle in France 
to the de facto child-parent relation invoked for the establishment of parentage as a 
consequence of this convention, illegally concluded abroad, regardless of its legality
abroad, as a result of its incompatibility with the French international public policy” (C. 
Cass, 1st Civ, 6th of April 2011 couple Labassée/MP). Is it legal, then, to rear a child
who entered regularly in France? Is the de facto child-parent relation flawed? An appeal
was undertaken before the European Court of Human Rights. 
- The option that has been envisaged the most has been the demand for transcription of
foreign birth certificates on French civil status registers.  
It was proposed to the Court of Cassation to say that a “foreign (judicial) decision 
recognising the parentage relation of a child with regards to a couple having concluded a 
convention with a surrogate mother is not contrary to the international public policy,
which is not the same as the internal public policy".
The Court of Cassation did not follow this reasoning: C. Cass, 1st Civ., 6th of April
2011 (3 successive decisions, V° Dr Fam Mai 2011 Note C. Neirinck; D. 2011. 1522, 
note. L. Brunet and D. Berthiau). The judges held “that it is justified to refuse to register
a birth certificate established through the execution of a foreign decision, based on the
opposition to the French international public policy of the decision, when it includes 
dispositions that infringe essential principles of the French law; that in the state of the 
157 CA Paris, 15 juin 1990, D. 1990, p. 540, note F. Boulanger ; JCP 1990.II.21653, note B. Edelman et C.
 
Labrusse-Riou ; JDI 1990, p. 982, note H. Gaudemet-Tallon.
 
158 Le service central de l'état civil du ministère des affaires étrangères se trouve à Nantes. 

116
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
  
 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
settled law, it is contrary to the principle of non-availability of the human body and the 
civil status, an essential principle of French law, of giving effect, in matters of parentage,
to a convention on surrogacy, that, even if legal aboard, is null and void in relation to
public policy in the terms of articles 16-7 and 16-9 of the civil code”
Often, the reference to the interest of the child is invoked: is it not contrary to the 
interests of the child to annul the registration of the name of the host mother from the
Civil Registry, especially when this registration occurred years ago? (See for example the 
decision of the 9th of December 2003 previously mentioned). Nevertheless in the three
decisions mentioned above, the Court of Cassation in 2001 affirmed that the interest of
the child has to cede before the principle of the non-availability of the human body and
the civil status. The Court however observes that “the situation thus reserved to the 
child, which does not deprive him from the parentage that [the State in which he was
born] recognises, nor prevents him from living with those raising him in France, does not
affect the right to respect for private and family life of the child within the meaning of 
article 8 of the ECHR, nor does it affect its best interests (…)” (C. Cass. 6th of April 2011 
previously cited).
The wording of the Court of Cassation is awkward. If the child does not have parentage 
in the sense of the French law, he disposes of parentage in the sense of the American
law. Whilst on the one hand the High court of law refuses to transcribe the birth
certificates, on the other hand it considers that this does not deprive the children of the 
filiation ties acquired abroad and that it does not prevent them from living with their 
parents. How should we understand a decision that sets out a sanction (the refusal of a 
French civil status), and in the meantime removes any concrete effect of this sanction 
(the filiation established abroad is recognised and the ownership of the foreign birth 
certificate suffices to guarantee a normal family life)? The decision contradicts itself.  
What should be taken away from this? It could be that the refusal of delivering French
birth certificates has a symbolic effect, the parent being sufficiently established in the 
light of the foreign birth certificates. The paradox inherent to the decision of the Court of
Cassation solves itself when the French refusal to issue a birth certificate has only a
formal scope, without real impact on the daily lives of children who will have access to
care and can go to school. One can also think that it would be possible to obtain a 
French identity card, on the basis of a French parentage bond established by a foreign 
certificate. Even in special situations, such as in cases of divorce or death of a parent, 
why would the judge or the notary, seized many years later, not be content with the 
foreign certificates without any suspicion about the circumstances of the birth of 
children?
At the end of the interview that Ms. Valérie Delnaud, Head of the Office of law of persons 
and family to the Directorate of Civil Affairs and the Seal (as of 26 March 2013) kindly 
granted us, it seems that this is the correct interpretation of the three decisions of the 
Court of Cassation159. 
But if ultimately the violation of the statutory prohibition on surrogacy has so little effect, 
then is this not the legal ban itself which is emptied of its substance? Did the venture of
the judges of the Court of cassation not involve, in a hidden form, to subvert the 
effectiveness of the prohibition of surrogacy in favour of the best interests of the child?
The increase in surrogacy procedures and the imperative need to protect the children
therefore led the jurisprudence to bend the law, in veiled terms.
159 The authors would like to thank Valérie Delnaud, head of the « bureau du droit des personnes et de la
famille » at the « Direction des affaires civile et du sceau » for the enlightening interview she gave Laurence 
Brunet on the state of French positive law on these matters. 
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The balancing act of the Court of cassation can no doubt be explained by the desire to 
avoid a condemnation of France by the European Court of Human Rights. In two of the 
three cases decided by the Court of cassation in 2011, remedies have indeed been 
introduced before the European Court of Human Rights and two proceedings are now
pending (application No. 65192/11 Sylvie MENNESSON and other introduced 6 October
2011 vs France and query no. 65941/11 Francis LABASSEE and others vs France, 
introduced on 6 October 2011). It remains to be seen whether the ambiguity cultivated 
by the Court of cassation will succeed. Can an uncertain protection, dependent upon the 
interpretation judges or notaries make of an obscure theoretical solution, suffice? Can
the best interests of the child rely on random and smokescreen guarantees? Does 
formally depriving a child of French civil status while allowing him to enjoy a de facto
family life and conditional family rights, whilst betting on the fact that no legal obstacle
will intervene, constitute a compromise in accordance with the right to the respect of the 
child’s family life, which is protected by article 8 of the ECHR? 
Be that as it may, the clever attempt of the Court of cassation to neutralize the French 
law which condemns surrogacy found a relay with some judges. 
- Recently, solutions based on domestic dispositions in relation to the authority 
of foreign certificates of civil registry (article 47 of the civil code) were also 
proposed.
Article 47 of the civil code disposes that “all certificates of the French or foreign civil 
registries issued in a foreign country and written with the forms used in that country is
authoritative, except if other certificates and available documents, of exterior
information or elements of the certificate itself establish, in the case all useful
verifications had been undertaken, that the certificate is irregular, forged or that the 
facts declared therein do not correspond to reality”.  
One set of decisions deserves to be analysed here. They concern similar cases where a 
single man, either living alone or with a same sex partner, asks that the French state 
recognises the birth certificate of a child born in India from a surrogate mother. The child 
possesses an Indian birth certificate mentioning the name of his biological father and
that of the woman who has given birth. Unlike the decisions mentioned previously, the 
mother's name appearing on the birth certificate is not the mother of intent (in a 
heterosexual couple) but that of the woman who actually gave birth to the child. This
specificity will give an opportunity for judges to retain a formalistic and literal
interpretation of article 47, favourable to the protection of the child. 
Court of Appeal of Rennes, 29th of March 2011, n°10/02646 (Dt fam. 2012, comm.
67, obs. C. Neirinck): If the irregularity or fraud are not demonstrated by the 
Procurator’s office, the registration will be ordered. In this case, two children born in
Bombay in 2009 from an unknown mother were acknowledged in June 2009 in Nimes by 
their father. The Consul General of France refused to register the birth certificate on the 
Consular Registry, observing that the birth certificates do not mention the name of the 
mother (anonymous childbirth not existing in India). The birth certificates were, 
however, rectified and the name of the mother added. But the Procurator’s office insisted 
in its refusal, suspecting this time a surrogacy convention. The Court of Appeal of 
Rennes considered that the Procurator’s office (in charge of demonstrating the fraud) did
not bring forward proof of its suspicions and ordered as a result the registration. 
Court of Appeal of Rennes, 6° ch, sect. A, 21st of February 2012, n° 11/02758 (Dt
fam. 2012, comm. 67, obs. C. Neirinck): a man, in a civil partnership with another man 
in France, obtained the recognition in France of the birth certificate of his twins born in
India through surrogacy. The birth certificate indicated the name of the biological father
and of the Indian surrogate. It therefore coincided with the biological truth. The action of 
the Prosecutor is therefore doomed to failure. Its action can indeed not prosper on the 
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basis of article 47 if the certificates contain false statements or irregularities. However
this was not the case here; the Prosecutor could therefore challenge nor the formal 
regularity or the compliance with the biological reality of the particulars of the birth
certificate.
Court of Appeal of Rennes, 6° ch. A, 15 January 2013, RG 11/07500, unpublished:
a child was born thanks to a surrogate mother who donated her own egg to be fertilised. 
The birth certificate mentioned the name of the biological father and of the Indian 
surrogate. The same reasoning was followed by the judges here as in the previous
decision to authorise the transcription of the Indian birth certificate. It is considered to
be in line with the particulars of article 47.
A decision taking the opposite stance should also be mentioned: Court of Appeal of
Rennes, 10th January 2012, n° 11/02758 (Dt fam. 2012, comm. 67, obs. C. Neirinck).
In this case the request for transcript was accompanied by a recognition underwritten by 
the French father to the Registrar of the Civil Status of his place of residence. The
Prosecutor then acted in cancellation of this recognition, citing legal fraud, as article 336
of the Civil Code permits. Despite the compliance of the recognition to the biological
truth, the judges ruled in this case that it was not only "a surrogacy contract prohibited
by French law, but a purchase of child, obviously contrary to public policy". The
recognition has been cancelled and the transcription of the birth certificate denied.
Comment 
It is difficult to predict the evolution of the jurisprudence even if there is a clear
tendency in favour of the recognition of the child’s parentage. The three decisions of the
Court of Appeal of Rennes which have accepted the transcript of the birth certificates are 
the object to appeal on the part of the Prosecutor. New decisions by the Court of 
cassation are therefore pending. 
The effort of judges to separate the question of the validity of the contract of surrogacy 
from the transcript of a child’s birth certificate should however be stressed in the
decisions of 21 February 2012 and 15 January 2013 rendered by the Court of appeal of 
Rennes. The judges are careful not to combine the two issues in a way that the nullity of
the surrogacy agreement does not obstruct the argument on the establishment of 
filiation. This cleavage of two legal issues deriving from surrogacy guards the debate 
from being focused on the issue of fraud to the French law fraud, paralysing the 
establishment of filiation. By dissociation judges limit the assessment of the legality of 
birth certificates to the sole article 47 of the Civil Code. They can avoid "opposing or 
prioritising concepts of public policy such as the best interests of the child or the
inalienability of the human body" (Rennes, 21 February 2012). Some Quebec judges 
seized in closely related cases of surrogacy put forward the same reasoning (see below). 
The line of jurisprudence favourable to the recognition of the status of the child has very
recently found unexpected backing from the Ministry of Justice, Ms Christiane Taubira. 
The increase in the number of children born out of surrogacy160 and living with one or 
more French parents indeed led the Minister of Justice to adopt a measure which, if it is
applied, will have much wider implications then it seems at first reading. A circular
CIV/02/13 was indeed published on 25 January 2013 relative to the issuance of 
certificates of French nationality (CNF) to children born abroad of French citizens and out
of a surrogacy procedure. Under the hypothesis of requests for CNF being made, the 
160 We only know conclusively the requests for transcription filed before the Court of Nantes. Since 2008, 44 
transcript requests were recorded, which have led to this day to 38 decisions of the public prosecutor in Nantes 
refusing the creation of birth certificate for these children. Out of these 38 negative prosecution decisions, 13
have been the subject to litigation. It is quite clear that these applications are the tip of the iceberg of practices 
of much greater importance (see section: empirical data). Parents are reluctant to confront justice, and it 
seems that the decision of the Court of Cassation would actually allow them to avoid them. 
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Minister recommends that "they be granted in the event that the parentage with a
French citizen results from an act of convincing foreign civil State under article 47 of the
Civil Code". Minister Taubira takes care to specify that “the sole suspicion that such an 
agreement was concluded abroad cannot suffice to refusing CNF requests, as long as the 
local civil registry attesting parentage with a French citizen, legalised or apostilled unless
otherwise conventional, are conclusive in the sense of article 47 cited above”. 
The CNF, single mode of extra-judicial proof of French nationality, is an administrative  
document. Issue falls within the exclusive competence of chief clerks in some 
magistrates’ courts (art. 31-1 Civil Code). It controls neither the establishment of the 
birth certificate nor the resulting parentage of the child, but it facilitates the issuance of
a passport or a French identity card during a first application, when parentage with 
French citizen is insufficiently established. As one author explains with far-sightedness, 
“the circular calls implicitly those who resort to surrogacy agreements to just do a CNF – 
now obtained without difficulty – that allows their child to have a relationship and a 
French nationality based on a birth certificate that escapes from the Prosecutor's Office 
checks” (C. Neirinck, La circulaire CIV/02/13 sur les certificats de nationalité française ou
l'art de contourner implicitement la loi, Dr fam. 2013, mars, comm. 42). We can
therefore clearly see how the work started by the Court of cassation in the three 
decisions of April 2011 is pursued. The objective is to arrange a semi-statute for the 
children born abroad out of surrogacy, on the fringes of the law that is protective enough 
to allow them to have a normal family life, without officially recognising their legal
parentage, which would blatantly contradict the principle of public policy prohibiting
reproduction and surrogacy agreements. The objective is clearly to empty the law of any
efficiency without giving the impression of doing so. 
It remains to be seen if this last manoeuvre will produce the effects expected by the 
Minister of Justice. It is indeed feared that such circular encroaches upon the legislative
power. Moreover, is it not in contradiction with a law of public order? Is such a circular
not ultra vires? It is precisely the object of the appeal which was introduced by a
Member of Parliament before the Council of State (administrative High Court).
It looks like we can authorise ourselves to conclude as follows: French law has become 
illegible.
GERMANY 
- Amtsgericht (AG) Nürnberg, 14th of December 2009 - UR III 264/09 
A German married man recognises a child born in Russia from a Russian mother. The 
administrative tribunal suspected surrogacy, as the man admitted that the child was 
born of an extramarital relation, and that the Russian surrogate requested a visa to
attend Germany on the sixth month of pregnancy, probably to engage a procedure of 
adoption by the wife of the father. Very soon after birth, the father requested the 
German embassy in Moscow to grant a passport for the child, to be able to return with 
him to Germany, without the surrogate. The surrogate agreed for the child to acquire the 
German nationality of his/her father and for him/her to live with him. 
The judged declared that the child, through the acknowledgement of paternity, was of
German nationality (§4(1)(2) StAG). The parentage of the child is to be determined
according to German law (§19(1) EGBGB), his/her habitual residence, and different
alternative elements chosen on the basis of the interest of the child. As a result, the  
interest of the child consists in establishing the identity of his/her parents, and as fast as 
possible. The residence of the child was organised by the parents in Germany, and, 
according to German law, the man acknowledging the child is his/her father (§1594 
BGB), the unmarried mother consenting to it (§1595 BGB), the formal conditions being
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
respected (§1597 BGB). German law is equally applicable to determine the nationality of
the child (§4 StAG) - the child is German through his father. 
For the issue of nationality and parentage, there cannot be a threat to the public policy 
(§6 EGBGB), as it is not a matter of recognising a foreign legal instrument in the sense
of §16(a) FGG (Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit-
Jurisdiction Act), and in particular, of §107 FamFG (Familienverfahrensgesetz- Family
Procedure Act. The judges declared that the document at stake was not a foreign
judgment161, and even if it were, there would be no contradiction with public policy 
(ordre public), for two reasons: first, because of the right to know one’s own origins,
considered as derivative from another right, a constitutional one, concerning the right to 
one’s own personality development (§2 and 1 of the German Constitution); this kind of 
right cannot be void by any party to a surrogacy agreement (intended father, surrogate, 
etc.). Second, even if this surrogacy agreement would have taken place within the 
German territory, there would be no infringement to public policy, as §1594 BGB sets 
conditions to paternity recognition, which do not include any genetic tie between the 
recognizing father and the child, this provision being possible to use also in a surrogacy
context. Accordingly, any foreign decision, which achieved the same result, cannot be 
considered as contrary to public policy.
The judges take the considerations to note that even applying the Russian law on
parentage, the admission into Germany of the certificate of acknowledgement does not
threat public policy.  
- Amtsgericht (AG), Hamm, 22nd of February 2011, Az. XVI 192/08 (confirmed by
Landesgericht (LG), Dortmund, 8th of July 2011, Az. 9 T 210/11) 
The decision concerns a contract of surrogacy taking place in the United States 
(anonymous donor, sperm of the intended father). In the birth certificates issued by the 
State of Pennsylvania, the intended parents are mentioned as the legal parents. 
Returning to Germany, the intended father takes a genetic test before the Amtsgericht
(administrative tribunal), confirming his relation with the child. Then, he engages a
procedure of adoption with his wife, and with the agreement of the surrogate.  
The judges refuse this request: According to §1741(1) BGB, an adoption decision can be 
pronounced even if the origin of the child-parent relation relates to a convention contrary 
to public morals and decency, which is the case, the child being considered as a
commodity, which is degrading for his status (Hamm, 1985). The surrogacy contract is 
not in conformity with articles §134 and 138 of the BGB. It violates the law of 1990, as 
§1(1)(2) prohibit that a woman undertakes a pregnancy with the oocyte of another
woman, and §1(1)(7) prohibits surrogacy.  
The judges justified their decision by declaring that even if §1741(1) BGB might have
allowed the adoption in the interest of the child, the child is in this case growing up
under optimal conditions with the care of the intended parents, this situation should 
continue in the future, and authorising adoption cannot make his situation better. The 
judges mentioned that the intended parents, along with the surrogate, have planned to
continue their cooperation in making an adoption request, and, in full conscience and 
knowledge, took the decision to undergo such a risk of legal uncertainty for the child,
whose only paternal filiation could be determined. Adoption is therefore seen as a try to
regulate an illegal situation under the Embryo Protection Law. This situation hurts the
child’s interest, being unable to know the identity of his biological mother, and being 
conscientious of the fact that he was considered as the object of a commercial 
agreement. For the abovementioned reasons, the court has decided to refuse this
161 In the sense of §16(a) FGG, and in particular §107 FamFG 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
request for adoption, and proposed to take some testimonial dispositions to guarantee 
the inheritance rights of the child.  
- Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Stuttgart, 7 Feb. 2012 – Az 8 W 46/12
The case concerns a surrogacy agreement entered into in the United States, with the
gametes of the parents of intent. Twins were born. A request to recognise a birth 
certificate issued in California has been refused162, on the ground of §36(1) PStG
(Personal Status Law), according to which only the transcription of German citizens born
abroad is possible. This provision requires German citizenship. §19 EGBGB provides that 
German law is applicable for questions of nationality. In the present case, the children
were not German citizens, as their legal mother is the one who was bearing them 
(§1591 BGB), and their legal father the husband of the surrogate. The only option that
remains open is that of the adoption of the children by the parents of intent.  
- Landesgericht (LG), Düsseldorf, 15 March 2012 – 25 T 758/10
The case is concerning an adoption request in favour of the partner (an American citizen) 
of the biological father of a child (a German citizen), the men having concluded a civil 
partnership in Germany. The couple had concluded a surrogacy agreement in the US,
which involved an ovum donation from a third party, and the German citizen’s sperm.
The American birth certificate mentions the surrogate as the mother, and the German
citizen as the father. The men (ordering parents) returned to Germany in order to settle 
down, and asked for an adoption judgment in favour of the American citizen, partner of 
the biological father, with the surrogate’s consent (which was made before a notary in
California). This adoption request was refused in first instance by the Amtsgericht, but 
was admitted by the Landesgericht, on the basis of the “best interest of the child”
consideration. The court has decided that German law was applicable, as the civil 
partnership was concluded in Germany: following §19(1)(1) EGBGB, the child’s filiation
is to be determined according to the law of the state where he / she resides habitually. 
In German filiation law the legal mother was the surrogate (§1591 BGB), and, as she
wasn’t married when she gave birth, and as no paternity recognition has been made, no 
paternal filiation could be established (the fact that the birth certificate mentioned the 
biological father was irrelevant). The court has therefore declared that the paternal
filiation would be determined following rules respecting the most the child’s best interest.
Several “child’s best interest theories” could be possible. The one which respects the 
child’s need to determine his paternity as soon as possible, even up to his birth; the one 
which respects the child’s need to access, as soon as possible, the knowledge of his
genetic origins. Following both theories, the Californian law was applicable, recognising 
the German citizen (the biological father) as the father.
Nevertheless, the judges decided that in this precise case, §1741(1), al. 2 BGB would be
the most respectful of the child’s need to have a stable relationship with the people who
take care of him, thus an adoption. Also, according to §9(7) of the  
Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz, under the condition of the child’s best interest (which, in
this case, is respected, given the harmonious environment in which the child was 
growing up), the biological child of one of the civil partners could be adopted by the
other partner, thus considering both civil partners as legal parents. The judges
considered that, in this particular case, the subjective relationship between the parties
and the child, and the fact that he would have to face objective difficulties in the future, 
were sufficient to justify a legal solution, namely an adoption. The child’s need for a
double filiation would be fulfilled; he would be allowed to inherit and to get other 
financial rights.
162 OLG Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12. This case dealt with a surrogacy agreement made in the US,
where the intended parents had both a genetic relation to the twins. 
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Comment 
The series of decisions mentioned lead to a very contrasted appreciation of the German
law. The German judges attribute to themselves a great freedom when it comes to 
interpreting the legal rules and in the application of the public policy exception public.
The receptivity of certain courts (AG Nürnberg and LG Düsseldorf) contrasts with the 
severity of others (OLG Stuttgart and AG Hamm). The conceptions of public policy are
opposed between the two blocs of decision; similarly the comprehension and application
of the right to know about one’s origins differ strongly between judges. This great 
variability of decisions harms the predictability of the rules of law and the security of 
legal situations. 
ITALY
Act 40/2004 (Rules about medically assisted reproduction) forbade surrogacy in Italy,
causing an increase in “procreative tourism”. Nevertheless only two relevant cases arose 
in the courts, both dealing with the recognition of documents issued by foreign
authorities.
The decision taken by the Civil Court of second instance of Bari163, in 13/2/2009, 
is very interesting. A couple (an English husband and an Italian wife), who were resident
in Bari, drew up two surrogate agreements in Great Britain with the same Englishwoman 
(the genetic and surrogate mother), who bore two children: one in 1998 and one in
2001. She gave up her parental rights and, pursuant to two different parental orders,
British authorities recognised the commissioning couple as legal parents. As Italian
children’s birth certificates indicate only the genetic parents, the “social mother” asked 
the judges to order the Bari mayor to change these documents, effectively enforcing in
Italy the parental orders issued by British judges. The Civil Court of Bari approved the
instance. The decision is based on some principles that are very progressive in the 
Italian legal context: 1) surrogate motherhood, as it is permitted in some Member 
countries, does not contrast with international public order; 2) the best interest of the
child is a primary consideration for every judicial decision (according to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child of New York, 20 November 1989) and 3) in the case of Bari,
the best interest of child is the recognition of the “social mother” as the legal mother;
finally, 5) favor filiationis can be higher a higher priority than favor veritatis. 
[There was no referral to the Cassation Court] 
The latest case arose in the Civil Court of first instance of Napoli in 1/7/2011. A 
single man benefited from a surrogacy arrangement in Colorado and became the father 
(both the genetic, and legal father according to Colorado rulings) of two children164. 
He asked the Neapolitan judge to recognize his parental status. In this case, the Court 
also approved the instance, decreeing that “the forbidding of surrogacy is not found in
the need to guarantee the constitutional principles about child protection, but this 
forbidding is based on a legislator’s choice”. So, a child’s birth certificate which is issued 
abroad does not contrast with the Italian public order, as it is possible to “harmonize the 
domestic ban of using surrogacy arrangements in Italy with the recognition of the
parental relation between the social father and the child born due to surrogacy in the 
U.S.A”. [There was no appeal.] 
163 It’s a Court of second degree as the case has dealt with the registration of a foreign judicial decision (see 

art. 67, act. N. 218/1995)
 
164 It was not possible to know who was mentioned as the mother in the birth certificate and if the father lived 

with a partner.
 
123
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
   
   
  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
Comment 
The Court of Bari found its decision on the best interest of the child as a primary
consideration and used such a notion to allow the enforcing of the British parental order
in Italy. The interpretation of the judges of Bari underlay the need for analysis, in each
single case, of the material, deep, real issues of the child, supporting the innovative
conception of the prominence, in some case, of the favor filiationis over the favor 
veritatis. The proceedings, rather than affirm the truth at any cost, have to guarantee 
above all the well-being of the child. So, in the case of Bari, the children require: 1) to
have a definite status filiationis and not two different statuses, one in Britain, one in
Italy; 2) to continue to live with their social mother even if the genetic reality indicates
another woman. 
Favor filiationis is a notion generally used in decisions about divorce. It was considered
the main principle to be followed when the divorcing couple has children and it was
necessary to solve capital and practical issues related to them.  
There is no real difference between the notions “best interest of the child” and favor
filiationis. The Italian judges used both expressions with the same meaning. 
Nevertheless, the second one could be more precise and immediately related to the 
condition of the child within the family: the child considered as a member of a parental
group, the child to be protected as a daughter or a son. There is a new, heavy, question 
for Italian jurists: following the introduction of special technology such as ART and 
surrogacy, what is the best interest of the sons and the daughters born due to these 
arrangements? Is it more important to protect the right to the genetic truth or the right
to grow up with the intended parents? The last two Italian decisions (Bari and Napoli)
gave a clear answer to this issue.   
In the cases analysed, if the intended mother is also the genetic mother, it does not 
make a difference to the judicial reasoning. Italian judges have never focused on these 
two different situations because of the presence of art. 269 par. 3 (“the mother is the 
woman who bears the child”), so the most important point in the judicial reasoning has 
always been the difference between “social” and “bearing” mother. 
In the case of Bari, the document is a judicial one: a parental order attributing legal 
motherhood to the Italian intended mother. In the case of Napoli, the document is a 
birth certificate. In both situations the intended parents had petitioned the relevant
administrative office for the registration of each document. As a consequence of the 
refusal, both the intended mother of Bari and the intended father of Napoli have
commenced judicial proceedings. The judges accepted to recognise both types of 
document. So, we could say that paternal genetic connection is no more a favoured 
condition than intended motherhood. 
In a broader interpretation of the rulings of Bari and Napoli, the “public order” has to 
mean a notion of international order, that is the need to guarantee that human rights 
and dignity are universally recognised. According to such reasoning, neither the British
parental orders nor American birth certificate damage the public order, even if in Italy
surrogacy is illegal165. 
In the context of surrogacy cases, the Courts appeared more able to accept the issues 
coming from public opinion rather than legislative or administrative institutions. In the 
context of surrogacy cases, Italian judges don’t have more discretion or more freedom to 
decide; they are ordinary judges in ordinary courts; they have the power to apply the
law following a complex procedure of interpretation. On the one hand they suggest the 
165 See M. Castellaneta, Dietro l’interesse del minore si nasconde il rischio di un turismo procreativo, in
Famiglia e minori, 5, 2005, pp. 66-69; L. Mazzanti, G. Pavan,
http://www.studiocataldi.it/news_giuridiche_asp/news_giuridica_11416.asp
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need for legal reform, on the other hand they take on a substitute creative role, and 
through more liberal decisions they can bring new principles into the Italian set of rules.
Unfortunately the Cassation Court has not even decided about surrogacy cases; we have 
to wait for a statement of the Unified Sections of Cassation in order to discern the main
determining tendency of Italian jurisprudence. The power of such a decision could really
influence the legislature’s next choices. 
It’s also worth noting one last case which is presently in front of the European Court of
Human Rights: the Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy case, introduced on 27 April 
2012. A surrogacy contract was agreed between an Italian couple and a Russian 
company, « Rosjurconsulting ». A child was born from a Russian woman. The birth
certificate states that the child is the son of the Italian couple of intent. Upon their return
to Italy, the parents asked to have the birth certificate transcribed, but the Italian
administration (Ufficiale di Stato civile) refused to do so under the premise that the birth
certificate did not state the name of the real parents. 
It dealt with a very special case of surrogacy, because neither the intended father nor 
the intended mother were the genetic parents of the child born through the Russian 
woman. Biological tests were indeed carried out. 
This couple avoided not only the ban on reproduction with gametes from donors, but the 
rules about the adoption too. The Court for minors had to declare a state of abandon 
(and adoptability) regarding the child, because the biological parents were unknown and 
the intended parents could not be considered parents – according to Italian law –
without any genetic or legal ties to the minor. The Court refused to foster the child to the
intended parents. The judgment denying the foster is related to the discretion of the
judges, as it is generally employed in the Italian Court of minors. The Court of Appeal 
confirmed the first judgment166. The child was entrusted to the social services and placed 
in foster care. The couple has no contact with him. 
It will be interesting to know the ruling of the Civil Court called to decide about the 
transcription of the child’s birth certificate. But neither the civil sentence nor the Penal 
Court’s sentence (about the violation of the art. 567 of Italian Penal Code) has yet been 
published. 
SPAIN
According to some publications and in the light of some data (see report on Spain in
Annexe) it seems that Spanish heterosexual couples were able to successfully obtain the 
transcription of foreign birth certificates in the Spanish Civil Registry, as if the children
born from surrogacy were children born through natural means. It is evident that the 
gay couples struggling to register their children in the Spanish Civil Registry from abroad
made visible an issue that was until then invisible (or taboo). The discretion of this 
practice, even in recent cases, is explained by the fact that the heterosexual couples
could misrepresent reality and pretend to be both legal and biological parents of the
child.
In this respect, we should mention the reform of the L.T.R.A. in 2007 recognising
explicitly the possibility of engaging in a procedure of recognition of parentage in favour
of the non-biological mother, so as for it to enter into force when the child is born: 
“When the woman is married, and not legally or de facto separated, with another 
woman, the latter will be able to manifest before the officer in charge of the Civil 
Registry of the matrimonial home that she consents to a relation of parentage to her
favour, when the child of her spouse is born”.
166 These cases were not publicised and they are not described in the most famous generalist legal reviews. 
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Thus, according to article 235-8 of the Spanish Civil Code, the children born from a
surrogacy to which the partner (no matter his sex) gave his approval are the latter’s
children.
1) The position of the Directorate General for Registers and Notaries (DRGN)
Resolution of the Directorate General for Registers and Notaries  (RDRGN)167 of 
the 18/2/2009 (RJ/2009\1735)168: assessing the action undertaken against 
the legal decision of the officer in charge of the Consular Registry, and ordering
the transcription into the Spanish Civil Registry of the contents of the foreign
birth certificates of the twins born through surrogacy in California.
The Resolution of the 18/2/2009 (RDGRN) resolves the legal action undertaken by two 
married men, both Spanish citizens residing in Spain, against a legal sentence of the 
officer in charge of the Spanish Consular Register Office in Los Angeles-California, who
refused the registration after birth of their two children born through surrogacy in that
American state. The parents of the minors appeared before the Spanish Consular 
Register Office in California with the objective of obtaining the documentation necessary
to return to Spain with the newly born children.
In this case, the officer in charge of registration at the consulate refuses the registration 
because the children were born through surrogacy, which is prohibited by article 10 of
the law on the techniques of assisted human reproduction169. 
The Directorate General for Registers and Notaries (DGRN) orders for the children to be 
registered in the Civil Registry, arguing that the question of parentage in relation to the 
minors is not the object of the procedure but to attend to the issue of recognising the
validity of the proof of the certificates issued by the foreign registry office170 (Art. 81 of 
the Decree of the 14th of November 1958 concerning the Regulation of the law on the
Spanish Civil Registry171).
The DGRN settles in favour of the couple and orders the registration of the birth of the 
minors with parentage, identically to what appeared in the Californian civil registry: the 
children born in California are the “natural” children of the Spanish gay couple. On the 
Spanish family record booklet they are identified as having a direct relation of parentage
with the gay couple. 
The RDGRN invokes the best interests of the minor, on the basis of the supranational 
norm of the article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC
1989), in force in Spain from the 5th of January 1991. Moreover, the RDGRN adduces the 
need to guarantee a single identity to the minors through national borders. 
167 The DGRN is not a judicial entity but an administrative one depending on the Ministry of Justice. The 
decision of the DGRN can be contested and taken before the courts. But the DGRN is the supreme entity
governing registries and gives instructions (directives) to ensure the correct functioning of the registries 
(certificates, registrations). 
168 N° 1032/2009 TSJ Madrid, the Resolution of the Directorate General of Registers and Notaries (DGRN) of 
the 18th of February 2009 (RJ 2009\1735), “The DGRN instruction of 5 October 2010 on the registration regime
of children born out of surrogacy arrangements” (OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE STATE, n° 243, 7th of October 
2010).
169 QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ, A., “Doble filiación paterna de gemelos nacidos en el extranjero mediante maternidad 
subrogada. En torno a la RDGRN de 18 de febrero de 2009”, WWW. INDRET.COM, 2009. QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ,
A., « La famille homosexuelle en Espagne », Homoparentalité? Approche comparative, Société de législation
comparée, Paris 2012, pp. 41-79. 
170 CALVO CARAVACA A.-L. et CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ, J., « Gestación por sustitución y derecho internacional 
privado: consideraciones en torno a la resolución de la dirección general de los registros y del notariado de 18 
de febrero de 2009 », Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, vol. 1, n° 2, October 2009, pp. 294-319. 
171 Decree of the 14th of November 1958 concerning the Regulation of the law on the Spanish Civil Registry. 
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Besides, the RDGRN considers that refusing the registration of the demanded parentage 
is a case of discrimination, because such a refusal would be motivated by the fact that
both partners are of the same sex.
After ordering the transcription of such documents, the DGRN does not solve neither the 
questions of substance in relation to the legality of the surrogacy contract (according to 
article 10 of the Law on Assisted Reproduction) nor the question of parentage of the
children (according to the law designed by article 9.4 of the Civil Code), nor the question
of the eventual recognition in Spain of the Californian legal sentence (according to
articles 951 and following of the Law of Civil Procedure172). 
- Directive of the 5th of October 2010, by the Directorate General of Registers
and Notaries (BOE nº 243, of the 7th of October 2010). 
The content of the directive of the 5th of October 2010 of the DGRN is the following: 
when it comes to the registration of minors born through surrogacy in California, the 
question is not to determine parentage but to transpose into the Spanish Civil Registry a 
parentage that has already been determined by a certificated issued by a foreign Civil 
Registry offering all the necessary guarantees173. 
The directive of the DGRN confirms what expressed the RDGRN of 2009 and pretends to 
grant with legal protection the Spanish children born abroad through surrogacy. Unlike
the RDGRN (2009), this directive specifies that only one birth certificate will not be 
sufficient174. 
Indeed the DGRN indicates that: “In no case will it be admitted as a document allowing 
for the registration of birth and parentage of the new-born child, a foreign civil registry
certificate or the simple declaration accompanied by a medical birth certificate of the
minor, in which the identity of the gestating mother is not established”.
As a result, the Directorate General of Registers and Notaries abandons the position that
it had held in the Resolution of the 18th of February 2009, in which it had admitted the 
possibility of registering the parentage of children born through surrogacy on the basis of 
a simple certificate of registration of birth. On the contrary, while the DGRN admits the 
registration in the Consular Civil Registry of the children born through surrogacy, it will 
be necessary to present to the officer in charge of the Registry, a legal resolution 
(sentence), issued by the competent jurisdiction on the matter in the country of
origin175. 
As a result, the attribution of parentage of the newborn children born through surrogacy 
should be based on a previous judicial decision, which must be the subject of an
exequatur, in conformity with the procedure established in articles 954 and subsequent 
172 Law 1/200 of the 7th on Civil Procedure. 
173 QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ, A., “Maternité de substitution et droit international privé (commentaire à la 
Instruction du 5 octobre 2010, de la Direction Générale des Registres et du Notariat, sur l’enregistrement de la
filiation des enfants nés par gestation pour autrui)”, Revue Critique droit international privé, 2011-1, pp.
183-188. 
174 CERDA SUBIRACHS, J., “La insostenible legalización de facto de la maternidad subrogada en España. A 
propósito de la Instrucción de 5 octubre de 2010 de la DGRN”, Abogados de Familia, Nº 60, Section Tribuna 
Abierta, Second trimester of 2011, Editorial LA LEY. LA LEY 4893/2011. 
175 The introduction of this new requirement is argued in the following way:
“The requirement of a judicial resolution in the country of origin aims at controlling the compliance with the
conditions required by the contract within the legal framework of the country where it was formalised, as well
as the protection of the best interests of the minor and the gestating mother. Especially, it allows to ascertain 
the full legal capacity of the gestating mother, the legal validity of her consent, which must have been given 
without being affected by an error on the consequences and the scope and without being submitted to
deception, violence or coercion (…). It allows also to verify that no simulation exists in the surrogacy contract, 
which would disguise the international traffic of children”. 
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of the Law of Civil Procedure176 of 1881 (Law 1/1881) (after the reform introduced by 
Law 62/2003, of the 30th of December (Law 2013/2003) on fiscal, administrative and 
social measures). 
E.g.: Registration of childbirth from a Spanish homosexual couple in the United States
through surrogacy. It is necessary to assess if the conditions of the Directive of the 
DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 are complied with, that is: a) the presentation before 
an officer in charge of the Civil Registry of a judicial sentence issued by a competent 
court; b) the foreign resolution was issued according to a procedure comparable to that
of the Spanish law; c) the Californian legal entity founded its international judicial
decision on criteria equivalent to those of the Spanish legislation; d) the best interest of
the child is respected by the Californian judicial resolution; e) the rights of the gestating 
mother are guaranteed. If all the conditions are complied with, there is no basis to
refuse the recognition of the sentence of the Supreme Court of the State of California. 
- Resolutions of the DGRN ordering the registration in the Consular Civil
Registry of the Spanish children born through surrogacy 
All the decisions relate to married gay couples. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 6th of May 2011: In the case of the registration of the birth
of two minors presented to that Direction Centre (the DGRN) in a procedure of appeal by
the applicants against the resolution of the officer in charge of the Consular Civil Registry 
of Los Angeles (United States). 
The DGNR granted the appeal, leaves the resolution of the officer in charge of the  
Consular Civil Registry of Los Angeles without effect and then orders the indicated 
registration. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 9th of June 2011: In the case of the registration of the birth
of two minors presented to that Direction Centre in a procedure of appeal by the 
applicants against the resolution of the officer in charge of the Consular Civil Registry of
Los Angeles (United States). 
The DGRN granted the appeal, leaves the previously mentioned legal decision without
effect and then orders the indicated registration. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 23rd of September 2011 (children born in India through 
surrogacy): The DGRN refuses the registration because the conditions required by the 
Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 are not complied with.  
The DGRN refuses the action and does not revoke the decision of the officer in charge of 
the Consular Civil Registry refusing the registration of the birth of children born in India 
through surrogacy, as the conditions required by the Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of
October 2010 are not complied with. Indeed, the sentence issued in Mumbai does not
guarantee the respect of the best interest of the child, it doesn’t guarantee either the
free consent of the gestating mother.  
DGRN, resolution of the 22nd of December 2011 (In a case of the registration of
birth of two minors presented to that Direction Centre in a procedure of appeal by the
applicants against the resolution of the officer responsible of the Central Civil Registry; 
children born in the United States) 
176 Law 1/2000, of the 7th of January on Civil Procedure. 
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The local birth certificate does not mention the gestating mother but only the 
international parents. The parentage regime of newborn children was determined by a
judicial sentence)
Considering that this case respects all the conditions stipulated by the Directive o the 5th 
of October 2010 of the DGRN, the DGRN censors the refusal of the registration of the 
two children to the Civil Registry. Thus, the registration is agreed 
2) Courts and Case law
- Sentence of the Court of First Instance nº 15 of Valencia, of the 15th of 
September 2010 
The legal position reflected by the referenced legal sentence is founded on the 
prevalence of the express prohibition of surrogacy in the Spanish norm, and the control
that the Civil Registry must carry out in conformity to the art. 23 of law on the Civil 
Registry, as it specifies that the registration will occur “…whenever there is no doubt of 
the reality of the fact registered and its legality in conformity to the Spanish Law "177. 
The sentence highlights that, due to the fact that in Spain surrogacy is prohibited, the 
registration in the Civil Registry cannot be allowed. 
For the judge of Valencia, the couple undertaking the action was aware of the prohibition
in the Spanish law, and was aware that the request could be refused. Thus, for the 
judge, the two adults made an informed choice. In this sense, according to the sentence 
–adopting fully the action undertaken by the Public Procurator (Ministerio Fiscal) against
the RDGRN– there is a prevalence of the Spanish norm (prohibition of surrogacy) in
relation to the recognition of foreign birth certificates, especially in cases of fraudulent
“forum shopping”. Let us note that the sentence does not mention the best interest of 
the child, a fundamental argument of the RDGRN.  
The sentence of the Court of First Instance nº 15 of Valencia notes that the resolution of 
the RDGRN opposes the prevalence of the Spanish norm (prohibition of surrogacy). 
According to the court of Valencia, it is a responsibility of the officer in charge of the Civil 
Registry to verify the “reality of the registered fact”, and a formal control of qualification
would not be enough, as it is also necessary to prove that both applicants are the “real” 
fathers of the children, something that is biologically impossible and, thus, would have
left without legal effect the registration.  
However, the sentence highlights that the “nullity of the registration is not in relation to
the fact that the applicants are two men, but to the fact that the infants born are the 
consequence of a contract of surrogacy”; “this observation would be applicable to their 
situations, concerning two women, a single woman, or a heterosexual couple. It is 
possible that on the cases concerning women or heterosexual couples, the problem of 
surrogacy will be harder to identify, but if the identification takes place, the consequence
should be the same: to refuse the registration”. 
- Sentence of the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia, of the 23rd of 
November 2011). (nº. 8621/2011) Appeal of the sentence by the Court of First 
Instance of Valencia of 2010. Questioning of the Directive of the DGRN of the 
5th of October 2010. 
177 According to this article: Childbirth should be declared before the registry of the competent consulate in 
relation to the place of birth. The registration is based on general rules. The foreign birth certificate can be 
subjected to a registration, if there is no doubt of the reality of the childbirth and of the legality of the 
certificate according to Spanish law (art. 16 and 23 of the Law of the Civil Registry). 
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The Sentence of the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia confirms the sentence of the 
Public Procurator (Ministerio Fiscal) against the RDGRN, it proposes to nullify the
practiced registration and agrees to its annulment.  
The Sentence of the Supreme Court of Valencia defends that there are “important
obstacles to the registration to the Spanish Civil Registry of the pretended parentage, 
even without demanding […] that the foreign sentence coincides with the one that could 
have been adopted by applying the Spanish law. These obstacles concern the
infringement, through the Californian registration certificate, of the Spanish international
public order”.178 
In this case, the conditions specified by the directive with the objective to recognise the
paternity were not complied with. However, the question of a potential invalidation of the 
directive of the DGRN by the judges is raised. 
Conflict of the hierarchy of laws 
The sentence of the Court of First Instance nº 15 of Valencia, of the 15th of September 
2010 refuses the solution given by the DGRN, on the basis of the nullity of surrogacy 
conventions in the Spanish legal system (art. 10 of the law on the techniques of assisted 
human reproduction)179. According to this sentence, founded on articles 81 and 85 of the
Regulation of the Civil Registry, and art. 23 of the Law of the Civil Registry, which have a 
major normative value, the registration requires that there “should be no doubt with
regards to the reality of the birth”. According to this point of view, the parentage of 
children born from Spanish persons through surrogacy should be determined by 
childbirth. In this sense, the Spanish law explicitly prohibits that parentage in cases of
surrogacy is not attributed to the mother giving birth. 
For some authors, this regulation is void as it infringes the principle of normative
hierarchy of the Spanish legal order. The Ministry of Justice, through the Directorate 
General of Registers and Notaries, would have made the mistake of thinking that
regulatory norms can be arbitrarily used against the Law in force, affecting critically the 
legal system constitutionally established and guaranteed. In particular, article 9.3 of the
supreme law establishes that the “Constitution is the hierarchic norm”; as does article
1.2 of the Civil Code: “the dispositions opposing the norms of superior level will not be
valid”180. 
Outside Europe
QUEBEC
It is enlightening to go beyond the European sphere and to extend the comparison with
the law of Quebec. Indeed, in matters concerning surrogacy, it is very similar to many
national European laws, in particular the law of France and the law of Belgium.
Under Quebec law, the prohibition of surrogacy was codified in the Civil Code under the 
chapter concerning parentage of children born through medically assisted procreation. 
Article 541 provides expressly that “the conventions by which a woman agrees to
procreate or gestate a child for the benefit of others are null and void”. The nullity
178 VELA SÁNCHEZ, A. J. (2012), “De nuevo sobre la regulación del convenio de gestación por sustitución o de
maternidad subrogada en España A propósito de la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Valencia de 23 de 
noviembre de 2011”, Diario La Ley. Section Doctrina, nº 7815, Year XXXIII, pp. 1-12. 
179 VELA SÁNCHEZ, A.-J., “Propuesta de regulación del convenio de gestación por sustitución o de maternidad 
subrogada en España. El recurso a las madres de alquiler (1): a propósito de la Instrucción de la DGRN de 5 de 
octubre de 2010”, Journal La Ley, Nº 7621, Section Doctrina, 3rd of May 2011, Year XXXII, Ref. D-190, Editorial
LA LEY. 
180 VELA SÁNCHEZ, Op.cit. LASARTE ÁLVAREZ, C. (2012), “La reproducción asistida y la prohibición legal de
maternidad subrogada admitida de hecho por vía reglamentaria”, Journal La Ley, nº 7777, pp. 1. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
targets both the conventions agreed free of charge and those providing for payment. 
When the Civil Code of Quebec came to force in 1994, the Minister of Justice insisted on 
the objective of article 541 that seemed to concern not exclusively the act of surrogacy 
per se but particularly the impossibility to establish parentage with regards to a child
born from surrogacy. Indeed, it is necessary to interpret the law of Quebec by
contextualising it in the more general framework of the law of Canada that does not 
condemn this practice. The Assisted Human Reproduction Act (SC 2004), on the
contrary, has the objective of providing a legal framework for the practice. In this sense, 
it sets the minimum age required to become a surrogate at 21 years. The article 6 of the
law does not attribute a criminal sanction to the surrogacy per se but to the financial 
retribution received or given to become a surrogate (which does not exclude the
possibility to reimburse the fees incurred by the surrogate). 
As parentage cannot be established on the basis of a surrogacy agreement, it is
necessary to abide by Quebec’s common law181: the establishment of paternity will be 
done by declaration of parentage; with regards to maternity, it is derived in the law of
Quebec from the certificate of birth that the birth attendant has the obligation to
produce, indicating the place, the date and the hour, the sex of the child as well as the 
name and the residence of the mother. The birth assistant has to transmit a copy of this
certificate to those who will have to declare the birth and address the other copy to the 
director of the civil registry; on her side, the mother giving birth has the obligation to
declare her maternity in relation to the child. “None of the parties will oblige the director
of the civil registry to enter into the registry the name of an intended parent as being 
the mother or, in the cases in which a homosexual couple engages the services of a
surrogate, as being the second father of the child"182. 
Hence, to establish parentage, the mother will have to engage a procedure of adoption. 
It will be necessary for both of the birth parents to agree to the adoption. It will be a 
special consent in favour of the spouse of the father, as it is provided for by article 555
C. civ. Q (if the persons are cohabitants, cohabitation for at least 3 years shall be
demonstrated). 
To complete the presentation of the normative context, it is worth mentioning the 
reflection published in 2009 by the Commission of Ethics, Science and Technology of 
Quebec, named “Ethics and Assisted Procreation: orientations for the donation of 
gametes and embryos, surrogacy and pre-implantation diagnosis”183. In the discussions 
dedicated to surrogacy, this commission concludes recommending to upkeep the 
principle of nullity of surrogacy agreements (p. 80). However, when in the event that a 
surrogacy convention was agreed upon and by which a child was given to the intended 
parents, it is primordial for the birth mother to be able to give a special consent for the 
adoption of the child by the spouse of the biological father, in order to fully integrate the 
child to the family in which he/she lives. The Commission considers that the interest of
the child ex-post has prevalence on the child´s interest ex-ante, which justifies the 
disincentive of surrogacy and the non-facilitation of the regularisation of such situations.
Once the child is born his/her interests implies, on the contrary, that “the people who 
really desire to assume the role of parents can do so” (p. 71). The Commission reasons
using an analogy with the situation of a child born in adultery, for a long time the subject
of discrimination: the child born from surrogacy should not suffer prejudice from his/her 
parents behaviour”. While the solution is explained with precaution, as it would allow to 
181 Québec, Ministry of Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, Montréal, Publications DAFCO, 1993, p.
201 (art. 541 C.civ. Q.). “It seems opposed to public order to allow for parentage to be determined by an 
agreement. As this is considered as having never existed, parentage will be established following the forms of 
evidence previously provided for”. 
182 M. Giroux, Le recours controversé pour établir la filiation de l'enfant né d'une mère porteuse: entre ordre 
public contractuel et intérêt de l'enfant; Revue du barreau/ Tome 70/Autumn 2011, p. 509-544 
183 The opinion is accessible online on the site of the Commission of Ethics, Science and Technology: 
http://www.ethique.gouv.qc.ca/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=109 
131
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
  
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                            
 
  
   
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
“do indirectly what cannot be done directly”, the Commission insists, nevertheless, that
it should remain a possible option. The work of this commission had an influence on the 
courts. 
At first, the legal conviction of surrogacy agreements was reinforced by the refusal of a 
tribunal to pronounce the adoption of a child by his/her intended mother. This was the
decision of judge Dubois in the decision of the Court of Quebec, youth division, 6 of 
January 2009: Adoption-091, 2009 QCCQ 628: in this case all parties were from
Québec; the intended parents, living in cohabitation, recruited online a surrogate having 
previous experience (she had 5 children and had already done one surrogacy). She was 
inseminated with the sperm of the child’s father. It was, thus, a surrogacy agreement in 
which the surrogate uses her oocytes. The contract was concluded with a financial 
retribution (20,000 dollars to account for the inconveniencies and expenditures of the 
surrogate). After birth, the child was given to the intended parents. In this case the birth 
certificate only specified the paternal parentage, the field concerning the mother being 
left blank, while in the certificate produced by the birth assistant “the name of the child’s
biological mother” was indicated. 
Little after the child’s birth, the father consented to his/her adoption by his spouse (art. 
551 C. civ. Q.), and she had asked for the court to obtain an order of placement in view
of the adoption (which would ultimately lead to an adoption). 
Interpreting article 543 par. 1 C. civ. Q., according to which “the adoption cannot take 
place but in the interest of the child and within the conditions provided for by the law”,
the judge Dubois specified that “the conditions provided for by the law” mentioned by
the text went beyond the formal and procedural respect of the consent of adoption 
issued by the father. He explained that, hence, it “is not […] possible to dissociate the
question of the validity of this consent from the preceding stages engaged by the couple 
in view of realising their parental project […]”. For this reason, the judge concluded that
the consent was not but “the logical and foreseen continuation of carefully planned 
parental project, a distorted way to give validity to a contractual arrangement by
producing legal consequences to what is prohibited by the law”. To refuse the request of 
adoption of the intended mother, the judge explained that he refused to “voluntarily
pretend to be blind to the facts and to confirm that the ends justify the means”.
In the eyes of the judge, the nullity of the surrogacy agreement affected the validity of
the consent of the parent to the adoption of his child by his spouse and left void all the 
adoption process. The interest of the child to have a maternal parentage with regards to
the woman raising him/her cannot have precedence over the circumvention of the
institution of adoption.
However, a clear shift away from this interpretation that results in prejudice to the child,
left without maternal parentage, took place in five subsequent decisions of the Court of 
Québec (Youth Division) that, on the contrary, accepted the request of adoption tabled
by the social mothers. If the interest of the child, understood concretely, guided the 
judges, the richness and the diversity of reasoning deserve that we assess in detail these 
decisions184 
In these cases, the judges insisted on the fact that the parties were transparent and did
not try to dissimulate the agreement concluded with a surrogate. The name of the 
surrogate giving birth appears always in the birth certificate under “mother”; it is, thus, 
her that is considered ab initio the legal mother of the child. 
184 For more details, we suggest the reference of the previously mentioned analysis of Mr Giroux, which 

inspires this section of our study. 

See also M-F. Bureau et É. Guilhermont, Maternité, gestation et liberté : réflexions sur la prohibition de la
 
gestation pour autrui en droit québécois, Revue de droit et santé de McGill 2011 [vol. 4., no. 2], p. 42-73.
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Adoption-09184, 2009 QCCQ 9058 and -09185, 2009, QCCQ 8703 (judge
Tremblay), 9th of June 2009 (case of twins) 
The intended parents live in cohabitation. The surrogate mother is the aunt-in-law of the 
intended mother who could not bear children without risking her life (two previous
miscarriages with uterus rupture); according to the words of the judge, the actions of 
the surrogate are inspired “on pure altruism and appear to be the fruit of extreme 
generosity”. It is highlighted that the woman acted “with the mission of giving life and 
giving a very atypical gift to two people on her extended family”. No compensation was
obtained. Two twins were given birth. It is the intended mother that chose the name and 
breastfeeds the children thanks to a special hormonal treatment. 
After observing that the contentment for the adoption was given, the judge Tremblay
favoured the interest of the child. To decided that it was in this case in his/her interest to 
be adopted by the applicant and that she should be given the full exercise of the 
parenting authority, the judge points to the fact that “the child receives a complete
response to his/her moral, intellectual, emotional and physical needs from Mrs A and Mr
B […]”. It is only in a later stage of the decision that the judge evokes the validity of the
agreement with the surrogate in relation to article 541 C. civ. Q. While he recognised
that the text is applicable in this case and that the verbal agreement is definitely void,
this is done to explain that the intended parents would not have been able to oblige the 
surrogate to successfully complete her pregnancy or to consent to the adoption by virtue 
of the verbal agreement concluded between them. Indeed, this agreement being null 
and void, it would not have been able to produce any of its effects. But this nullity does
not concern anyone beyond the contracting parties. Thus, the judge highlighted that in
the case it was not on this matter that he was deciding on. It was a matter of “deciding
on the status of a child who exists and who needs his rights to be fully respected”. 
Hence, contrary to judge Dubois, judge Tremblay sought to “decide from the point of
view of the child and not from the point of view of the people that in good faith and 
moved by pure altruism, in what regards the surrogate, concluded an assisted 
procreation agreement” and to order the placement of the child in view of his/her 
adoption by the intended mother. It was, thus, desirable in the eyes of the judge to
“allow for this child, who represents the future of our society, to benefit from all the 
advantages of having a real maternal parentage”. 
Moreover, to the extent that the social mother was also the genetic mother, the judge
determines that other means were possible to determine the maternity (an action
claiming maternity together with an action to contest the current status of the child). 
In this decision, the judge asserts a power of discretion to assess the contours of public
order that has to be “modelled to take into account the fundamental values of society at
moments of its evolution”. 
Adoption-09367, 2009 QCCQ 16815 (judge Grégoire), 4th of August 2009 
The social parents are two men in a civil partnership. The surrogate was inseminated
with the sperm of the child’s father. Thus, it is a surrogacy agreement and it was 
concluded with the provision of financial compensation (the cost of the agency and the 
surrogate as well as those pertaining to medical fees). The contract was concluded in the 
United States, but the surrogate gave birth in Quebec; her identity is declared and her 
name is mentioned in the birth certificate. After childbirth, the child is given to the
intended parents. Each of the legal parents -the surrogate mother and the biological
father- having consented to the adoption of the child by the spouse of the father, the 
latter requests an order of placement of the child in the shared household of the 
intended parents.  
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The judge bases the decision on articles 522 and 523 C. civ. Q. according to which 
parentage is established by the birth certificate that grants the same rights and 
responsibilities to all children, regardless of the circumstances of birth. Hence, the court
fails to see why this child would be treated differently to any other child. Also, it is “clear
that the interest of the child involves being adopted by the applicant and thus become a
member of a family, to be the daughter of parents who wish and want to educate her,
raise her and assume all the responsibilities concerning the status of parent”. The judge
specifies that “the nullity provided for by article 541 C.c.Q. does not have an effect in 
anyone but the contracting parties” and cannot be dealt with by a request of adoption 
that has to be assessed independently of the conditions of validity of the surrogacy 
agreement. The Court recognises that the “right to be a parent” does not exist, he 
considers that “the right of a child to be taken care of by his/her parents or the people
serve as parents, is real itself. This right is recognised by different conventions, charters
and the civil laws dealing with the child’s interest”.
The judge settles in favour of the request, granting the adoption to the father’s spouse. 
We must then mention a series of four decisions concerning surrogacy. In each of these 
cases the names of the father and the surrogate are mentioned in the birth certificate:
the birth certificate is, thus, in conformity with the law of Québec on parentage; each of 
the parents consented specially to the adoption of the children by the spouse/partner of 
the father. 
Adoption A.C./E.S. and A-M.M., n° 525-43-005788-092 (judge Wilhelmy), 7th of 
January 2010
The social parents are married. The husband is a doctor and he confessed to one of the 
nurses working in his service the problems of fertility that his couple faced; the nurse 
“offered to bear the child for them”. The father discussed this with the ethics committee 
of the hospital to be sure that the procedure was acceptable and, according to him, he 
was received full backing.
The agreement is verbal and compensation is provided (between 10,000 and 15,000 
dollars) for any disadvantage and reimbursement of expenditures. The judge considers
that this implies that the agreement involves financial profit (“in view of renting the 
uterus of the surrogate”). 
In the arguments exposed, the court considers that it is pertinent to “point to a 
distinction between a situation of surrogacy in which the surrogate lends not only her
uterus, but the ovule that is necessary for fertilisation and the surrogate who accepts to
host the fertilised ovule of another woman”. 
When the intended mother and her spouse are both biological parents and take the child
into their household from childbirth, “the interest of the child implies that the child has a
relation of parentage with his/her biological parents”. In this case, the child has to be 
able to benefit from “his/her real maternal parentage, in conformity with the existing
and constant parent-child relation”. On the contrary, if the intended mother is not also 
the biological mother, it is the opposite solution that should be taken, in the name of the
“best interest of the child to know the persons involved in his creation”. 
The judge also highlights that the question does not concern the nullity of the agreement
between the parties and the sanctions that the competent authorities could inflict to 
those who engaged “an illegal procedure that is contrary to the public order, aiming at 
producing legal consequences from an illegal act by circumventing the law”.
The judge, here also, asserts a power of discretion to assess the contours of the public 
order, a power that has to be exercised gradually. 
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Adoption-10329, 2010, QCCQ 18645 (judge Garneau-Fournier), 1st of October 
The intended couple is married. The surrogate is a colleague from work of the intended 
mother. The name of the surrogate is mentioned in the birth certificate, in conformity
with the prescriptions of the law of Québec. 
According to the judge, the request has to be analysed from the point of view of the 
child, even if it is understood that “the agreement convened, by which the surrogate
committed herself to bear the child for the intended mother, is null and void”. Indeed,
the judge considers that the request of adoption is not a request executing the 
agreement. 
The judge recalls the decision of judge Wilhelmy distinguishing between cases in which
the surrogate is or is not the genetic mother. If the surrogate had lent her ovule then 
the request of adoption by the social mother would have to be rejected. 
According to the judge, the request of the intended mother “converges towards the real 
interest of the child who has the right to have parentage in conformity with reality,
regardless of “the circumstances of his/her birth”. 
As it was the case in the two previous decisions, the judge invokes her power to assess
the contours of the public order that has to take into account the fundamental values of
society at a certain point in its evolution.
Adoption-10489, 2010 QCCQ 19971 (judge Leduc), 13th of December 2010
The intended parents are married. The surrogate is not close to the couple: the couple
contacted her after watching a TV programme where she explained having already bore
a child for another couple. She accepts to repeat the experience out of altruism: the 
surrogacy agreement is concluded not for profit. 
The judge takes into consideration the genetic relation to receive favourably the request 
of placement of the child in the household of the social mother. “The current objective is
to give the child his/her real maternal parentage, which is the one derived from the
biological relation and the parent-child relation existing constantly since childbirth".
To underpin the arguments, the judge makes reference to the decision of judge 
Tremblay. 
Comment 
Thus, two opposed judicial currents of thought exist in Quebec, in the absence of a
decision by a higher court that could settle the question. In any case, it seems that the 
second current is predominant today, the one that gives prevalence to the interest of the
child to have a relation with his/her social mother through adoption. 
We note that the judges of the second current carefully distinguished the question of the 
adoption by the social mother and that of the legality of the surrogacy convention. It is
following this reasoning that they justified not following the first current pioneered by
judge Dubois, refusing, on the contrary, to dissociate the request of adoption from the 
illegal convention concluded ex-ante by the parents. In this  current, the opposition to 
the establishment of a legal maternity works as a sanction, in the frame of a global
assessment by the judge of the actions of the social parents. In the second current, 
conversely, the judges consider that the question of the nullity of the illegal convention 
should not be addressed by the debate on the adoption of the child by the spouse of the 
father, as the convention was already fully executed. Without pretending to encourage 
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the practice of surrogacy –which certain judges do not shy from denouncing, such as is 
the case for judge Wilhelmy– they consider that the request that is presented to them
does not concern the validity or the forced execution of the surrogacy convention. This 
argumentative ability allows them to ignore the way a child was conceived and to 
consider that parentage is established in the birth certificate in conformity with the rules
of the law of Quebec. As a result, it is possible to consider that the surrogate validly
gave her consent to the adoption and that it is in the interest of the child to be adopted 
by the spouse of the father who already raises the child.
This reasoning of the judges of Quebec deserves to be highlighted to the extent certain
judges in France recently undertook a similar path. Indeed, except for the Court of 
Cassation of France that adopted a global assessment where the violation of French 
policy leads to blocking the recognition of maternal parentage of the social mother,
many tribunals adopted the same reasoning, differentiating the question of parentage 
from that of the legality of the surrogacy convention and limiting their decision to the 
former. 
We will also notice that out of the five decisions, four evoked the genetic link to motivate 
granting the placement of the child in view of his/her adoption by the intended mother.
The biological parentage seems, thus, to be a solid support for the legal recognition of
the maternity of the intended mother. Is it a necessary and essential requirement for the 
judges of Québec? In other words, will the absence of the genetic link between the child 
and his/her social parent create an obstacle for the adoption? For judges Wilhelmy and 
Garneau-Fournier, it would be definitely the case; it is less evident for judge Tremblay.
The fact remains that only the judge Grégoire decided in favour of the adoption by a
social parent without a genetic link to the child, to the extent that he is the same-sex
spouse of the father.  It is difficult to know to which  extent the  biological link is a  
determinant criterion for the judges of Québec when it comes to establish (through
adoption) the parentage of a child born from surrogacy with regards to the parent that 
did not procreate him/her.  
Lastly, we will note that the judge of Québec retains quite a large margin of manoeuvre
in matters of assessing the consequences with regards to the law on parentage of the 
practice of surrogacy. Three of the judges (Tremblay, Garneau-Fournier, Wilhelmy)
assert it openly considering that the notion of public order has to be the subject of a 
renovated and creative interpretation to take into account the evolution of the 
fundamental values of society. The judges do not make explicit, however, what the
fundamental values of society have to say with regards to surrogacy. Do they mean that 
society has become more tolerant with regards to certain practices of surrogacy? Or is it 
a way to place an accent on the fundamental objective of protecting the interest of the 
child?  
136
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
                                                            
 
    
 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
3.  LEGAL ANALYSIS – EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
As this study has indicated, the factual and legal recognition of surrogacy has garnered
considerable attention around the globe. The substantive discussion about whether to
permit couples to use the services of a surrogate mother in order to have a child is one
of the most contested issues within Europe and the world. The issue becomes even more 
disputed and complicated in cross-border situations because private international law
approaches to these relationships differ greatly. After having previously seen how the 
Member States of the European Union cope with the problems created by the movement 
of surrogacy users across internal borders, it must now be seen how the European  
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Union (EU) frame surrogacy. 
The aim of this section is to assess the EU’s ability to frame this diversity. Analysing the
European Union’s capacity to legislate implies to study 1) the fundamental rights 
framework and 2) the tools available within the EU to substantially frame surrogacy,
especially the freedoms of movement across countries. 
1) As regards European fundamental rights, the ECHR is applicable in the EU and its
Member States185. It is also a good mirror of the European national evolutions as the 
Court always relies on national traditions. 
2) As regards the EU freedoms of movement across Member States, the analysis goes
into two directions: we should first analyse the EU mechanisms in order to identify the
available tools, particularly the legal bases and then use these legal bases in order to re­
read the national mechanisms.  
Imagining a legal framing of surrogacy involves assessing the management of surrogacy 
practices (ex-ante) and the adequacy of legal parenthood frameworks (ex-post). In other
words, when confronted with surrogacy, one asks two questions: Does the national legal 
order authorise or prohibit this practice and how is it regulated? This prompts the 
question of the practical arrangements around the identification of intended parents, a
surrogate mother, possibly a contract or agreement between them, an in-vitro
fertilisation (IVF) procedure and the taking care of the pregnant woman until the birth 
and finally the delivery of the child. It raises issues of contract law as well as protection
of each of the parties. The existing (ex-ante) provisions cover these different questions. 
Once surrogacy has taken place and a baby is born, ex-post questions are raised: Who
are the parents of child: the bearer? The genetic parents? The intended parents? Can the
child be registered on the civil status of the State where he/she was born? Of the State
of origin (residence or nationality) of the parents? What is his/her nationality? Many legal
consequences will be derived from the answers to these three questions such as issues
relating to inheritance, right to access information on his/her origin, etc. At the European
level, these two aspects are touched upon by different bodies of law.
3.1. EX-ANTE: THE MANAGEMENT OF SURROGACY PRACTICES 
The ex-ante management of surrogacy practices can be summarised in four questions:  
 Are surrogacy acts authorised or prohibited? By which means?  
 How to frame the movement towards a Member State which allows surrogacy in
order to proceed to it and return to the Member State of origin?  
 How to protect the different parties to the arrangement?  
185 The ECHR has been applied in the EU for a long time as general principles of EU law(art. 6
TEU). This is about to be reinforced by the pending adhesion of the EU to the ECHR and Council of
Europe. The ECtHR should soon have jurisdiction over EU fundamental rights. 
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	 How to control the legality of a surrogacy contract between the intended parents 
and the surrogate mother? 
Even if neither the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), nor the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) have come across cases specifically devoted to surrogacy, an
analysis of their case law allows for a partial consideration of these questions.
3.1.1. ECtHR 
3.1.1.1. Authorisation or prohibition of surrogacy’s acts
None of the cases presented to the ECtHR directly concerns medically assisted
reproduction in the context of surrogacy or cross-border reproduction. This does not 
mean however that the ECtHR does not provide useful thoughts on the issue. Indeed,
travel for the purpose of medically assisted reproduction received an unexpected
encouragement from this jurisdiction. In a recent Austrian case, the S.H. case186, the 
Court had to deal with an Austrian law forbidding two Austrian couples from attempting 
to conceive a child through IVF. One couple needed the use of sperm from a donor and
the other, donated ova. Austrian law prohibits the use of donated sperm for IVF and ova 
donation in general. The Court noted that, although there was a clear trend across 
Europe in favour of allowing gamete donation for in-vitro fertilisation, the emerging
consensus was still under development and was not based on settled legal principles.
The Court relied on Article 8 (family life) on its own and together with Article 14 (non­
discrimination). It noted that Austrian legislators had tried, among other things, to avoid
the possibility that two women could claim to be the biological mother of the same child. 
They had approached carefully a controversial issue raising complex ethical questions 
and had not banned individuals from going overseas for fertility treatment unavailable in
Austria. The Court concluded that there had been no violation of the Convention. 
However, it underlined the importance of keeping legal and fast-moving scientific
developments in the field of artificial procreation under review. 
The ECtHR is not banning a law which forbids egg donation, IVF and gamete donation187. 
But it suggests the possibility to go abroad to have the desired fertility treatment. It thus
respects the sovereignty of the State and chooses a more procedural control (it checks
that the legislator identified and dealt with the ethical issues of protection of the parents 
and child) instead of a substantial one (assessment of the values themselves). 
We don’t know whether this case could be extended to surrogacy. If a case arose, the 
Court would probably underline the lack of emerging consensus as a recent report of the 
Council of Europe on the question shows188. It would probably respect the State’s 
choices, and could therefore confirm a prohibition. The factual and legal contestation of
motherhood, as between not only the ovum donor and the intended mother (who may or 
186 S.H. and Others v. Austria (no. 57813/00) 03.11.2011 (Grand Chamber)
 
187 But another corss-border option is proposed, see further.
 
188 This is not case law, but still an interesting declaration made within the Parliamentary assembly where 22
 
MP from about 7 countries solemnly affirm that “surrogacy is incompatible with women and children’s dignity 

and constitutes a violation of their fundamental rights”, see 

http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=18711&Language=FR. For IVF, see: 

41.  Principle 11 of the principles adopted by the ad hoc committee of experts on progress in the biomedical 
sciences, the expert body within the Council of Europe which preceded the present Steering Committee on
Bioethics (CAHBI, 1989), states: “1.  In principle, in vitro fertilisation shall be effected using gametes of the 
members of the couple. The same rule shall apply to any other procedure that involves ova or in vitro or
embryos in vitro. However, in exceptional cases defined by the member states, the use of gametes of donors 
may be permitted. ” 42.  The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of 1997 does not deal with the 
question of donation of gametes, but forbids the use of a medically assisted reproduction technique to choose 
the sex of a child. Article 14 reads as follows: “The use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not 
be allowed for the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex, except where serious hereditary sex-related disease 
is to be avoided.” 43.  The Additional Protocol to the above Convention, on Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin, of 2002, which promotes the donation of organs, expressly excludes from its scope
reproductive organs and tissues. 
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may not be the same person), but also of course the woman who bears the child, is
highly controversial. The Court may pay particular attention to the interests, life and
dignity of a surrogate mother, given her particularly onerous bodily contribution to the 
surrogacy arrangement. 
In the S.H. case, the Court notes down that the objective of the Austrian legislator was
“to avoid to create atypical family links (a child with two biological mothers) and to 
prevent the exploitation of women”189. This argument perfectly be used again in the case 
of surrogacy and it appears likely that it would go substantively unchallenged by the 
ECtHR. 
3.1.1.2. Protection of the different parties  
Protection can be given to the surrogate mother, to the intended parents, to the child to
be born and to the genetic parents. This protection has been developed through the 
application of fundamental rights mainly by the ECtHR. As we just saw, in the S. H. case, 
the Court acknowledged the intent of the Austrian legislator, to avoid the possibility that
two women could claim to be the biological mother of the same child, on the basis that 
this would protect the interests of the child and the parents (as defined by the Austrian
legal system)190. 
Another relevant case is the Evans v UK (10 April 2007) case, which concerned the 
ability of a woman to use frozen embryos without her former partner’s consent191. The
background to this case was that Natallie Evans, when diagnosed with ovarian cancer, 
had her remaining eggs extracted and fertilised with her then partner’s sperm, prior to
having her ovaries removed. Six embryos were created and placed in storage for future 
use in fertility treatment. When the couple’s relationship ended, J withdrew his consent 
for the embryos to be used, not wanting to be the genetic parent of Ms Evan’s child.
National law consequently required that the eggs be destroyed, thus preventing Ms 
Evans from ever having a child to whom she would be genetically related. While
sympathising with Ms Evan’s plight, the European Court of Human Rights found no 
violation of Articles 2 (right to life), 8 (right to respect for family life) or 14 (prohibition
of discrimination) of the ECHR: the embryos created did not have a right to life; there 
was no European consensus; and, the rules on consent were clear, brought to Ms Evan’s 
attention before she underwent IVF and the refusal to allow her to use the embryos was 
deemed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests. 
Here again, even though this case is not directly about surrogacy, we see a timidity from
the ECtHR which is not willing to condemn a national law where there is no European 
consensus. Instead, it tries to strike a balance between the competing fundamental 
rights of the various parties.  
As regards children’s rights, even if several programs are dedicated to them,192 none of
them consider the establishment of legal parenthood. The only related area concerns a 
child’s interest in knowing about the circumstances of his/her origins and/or genetic
parents. However, this is a complicated area and the primary motivation behind the 
assertion of article 8 and 14 in this context by the Court is to ensure that an abandoned 
child is not left without any information about his/her identity193. If again these cases are 
not directly applied to surrogacy, they are relevant. The ECtHR has a case by case 
189 §19
 
190 See previous section.
 
191 Evans v. United Kingdom (application no. 6339/05) 10.04.2007 (Grand Chamber).
 
192 There is a program of the Council of Europe entitled “Building a Europe for and with children”, 

COM(2011)35, 19 April 2011 , see
 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2011)35&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DC&BackColorInt 
ernet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864 
193 http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/09/29/laccouchement-anonyme-a-lepreuve-europeenne­
du-droit-a-la-connaissance-de-ses-origines-cedh-2e-sect-25-septembre-2012-godelli-c-italie/ 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
analysis approach, where it tries to balance the child’s right to know who their parents 
are and the parent’s right to e.g. privacy194. The existing cases may not be
straightforwardly applicable to the context of surrogacy, where sometimes the problem 
is that there are too many persons seeking parental recognition, rather than nobody 
seeking such recognition.
But the fact that the Court attempts to strike a fair balance is likely to be applicable to all
birth cases. The answer is to be found in the balancing of the fundamental rights of
family life and equality (a child’s personal development and right to know her/his 
origins; a mother’s right to protect her health by giving birth in appropriate medical 
circumstances; and, the protection of other members of the various families involved) 
and public interest (the prevention of abortions – especially illegal abortions – and the
abandonment of babies).  
Regarding surrogacy contracts, the ECtHR has never been given the opportunity to rule
on this question. 
3.1.2. EU 
EU law, like the ECtHR, does not specifically regulate surrogacy. The different questions
about the authorisation or prohibition and management of surrogacy practices and the
protection of the parties have never been answered by the legislator or the CJEU. But 
general EU law and more specifically the freedom of movement of patients could be
applicable to the situations where intended parents and/or surrogate mothers who are
EU citizens (or third-country national who are also legal residents of a Member State)
choose to move from their Member State towards another Member State which allows 
surrogacy in order to proceed to it and return to the Member State of origin. To this day,
there is only one Member State with a comprehensive ex-ante legal framework for 
surrogacy: Greece195. 
Since a legally enforceable surrogacy agreement can take place in one Member State, 
one could imagine a situation where EU citizens decide to leave their Member State of 
origin196. It can then be asked if cross-border surrogacy is made possible and how the 
different parties to the arrangement are protected as well as how to control the legality 
of a surrogacy contract between the intended parents and the surrogate mother.
3.1.2.1. The recognition of the Member States sovereignty 
The non-recognition of an EU right to reproduce 
A right to reproduce is not clearly recognised. There is no consensus in the EU and
nothing on surrogacy in EU law. IVF, which is a necessary step in a gestational surrogacy 
194 In the Grand chamber Odièvre case194, the applicant, who was adopted, found out that she had three 
biological brothers. Her request for access to information to identify them was rejected because she had been 
born under a special procedure which allowed mothers to remain anonymous. In addition, she could not inherit 
from her natural mother. The Court found that there had been no violation of Articles 8 or 14 in that France 
had struck a fair balance between the various competing interests at stake. But, more recently, in the Godelli 
v. Italy case, the Court held that the Italian system did not take account of the child’s interests. It considered 
that a fair balance had not been struck between the interests at stake since the legislation, in cases where the 
mother had opted not to disclose her identity, did not allow a child who had not been formally recognised at 
birth and was subsequently adopted to request either non-identifying information about his or her origins or 
the disclosure of the birth mother’s identity with the latter’s consent. See ECtHR, Odièvre v. France (no.
42326/98) 13.02.2003 (Grand Chamber) and ECtHR, Godelli v. Italy (no. 33783/09), 25.09.2012.
195 See the country report on Greece in the Annex. 
196 We are not saying nationality here as they could be living permanently and legally in another Member State 
than that of their nationality. We are not saying residence either as the intended parents might decide to
change their residence in order to proceed to surrogacy. We could say their Member State of affiliation (to 
national social security), but again this would not be the best as again the intended parents might decide to
change their State of affiliation in order to proceed to surrogacy. The State of origin is normally the State of
residence and affiliation where the parents are before they start thinking of surrogacy. 
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agreement, is already seen as controversial. It appears in Directive 2004/23 of 31 March 
2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, 
processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells. It indicates
that “this Directive should not interfere with decisions made by Member States 
concerning the use or non-use of any specific type of human cells, including germ cells 
and embryonic stem cells. If, however, any particular use of such cells is authorised in a 
Member State, this Directive will require the application of all provisions necessary to
protect public health, given the specific risks of these cells based on the scientific
knowledge and their particular nature, and guarantee respect for fundamental rights”. 
The choice is left to Member States.  
Tamara Hervey has proposed to build a right to reproduce around Articles 8 (right to
privacy) and 12 ECtHR (right to marry and found a family) or around the Charter of
fundamental rights which recognises the same rights (Articles 7 and 9) as well as new
rights such as “a right to physical and mental integrity”197 which includes “the prohibition
on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain”198. 
The right of the Member States to decide on whether authorising or prohibiting 
surrogacy
In the Grogan case199, a Students’ Union at an Irish University was distributing
information regarding the availability of abortion services in Member States where the 
termination of pregnancy, in contrast to the position in Ireland, was lawful. The Society
for the Protection of the Unborn Child objected and claimed that Article 40.3.3 about the 
right to life of the unborn of the Irish Constitution was applicable. A preliminary 
reference was made by the Irish High Court to the Court of Justice. The students claimed 
that the distribution of materials was supported by the freedom to provide services.   
The Court judged that “it is not contrary to Community law for a Member State in which 
medical termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit student associations from 
distributing information about the identity and location of clinics in another Member 
State where voluntary termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried out and the means of
communicating with those clinics, where the clinics in question have no involvement in
the distribution of the said information”.
It is interesting to know that after this case Ireland introduced a protocol in the 
Maastricht treaty ensuring its right to difference200 and a change of the Irish constitution.
It was also followed by an ECtHR judgment (Open Door and Dublin Well Woman
judgment of 29 October 1992).
The CJEU clearly indicated that it did not want to judge the moral/constitutional position
of Ireland by stating that "it is not for the Court to substitute its assessment for that of
the legislature in those Member States where the activities in question are practised
legally".
“With respect to abortion, the European courts so far have only enforced a coexistence 
among the different national traditions. To that extent, European limits to national 
sovereignty have been set”201. 
197 Article 3 of the Charter, see S. Millns, Reproducing inequalities ; assisted conception and the challenge of 

legal pluralism, 24 Journal of Social Welfare and Family law (2002) 19, p. 32, quoting Tamara Hervey.
 
198 Article 3, §2, subparagraph 3.
 
199 CJEUEU, Judgment of the Court of 4 October 1991. - The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 

Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others, Case C-159/90.
 
200 Which was then forgotten. 

201 RICK LAWSON The Irish Abortion Cases: European Limits to National Sovereignty? European Journal of 

Health Law 1: 167-186, 1994.
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The Grogan case showed that constitutional principles can put a limit to the freedom to 
provide services. It appears that Member States can keep their policies provided they 
can show that there is a necessary and legitimate interest and that its protection is
proportional. Several public interest justifications have been identified such as the
burden on the public purse, the organisation of national health (insurance) schemes, the 
need for planning or the management and capacity building of a national healthcare 
system. Moreover, ethical issues or a specific understanding of dignity (of the surrogate 
mother) can justify a limitation to the European freedom of movement.
Nonetheless, the freedom of movement of patients is authorised and promoted and as a 
consequence, national rules on rights to treatment cannot prevent citizens of the EU
seeking treatment elsewhere in the EU, however unethical the treatment is in the State 
of origin. 
3.1.2.2.	 The freedom of movement of intended parents and surrogate mother as 
patients 
“National rules on rights to treatment cannot prevent citizens of the EU seeking 
treatment elsewhere in the EU, no matter how unethical or immoral such treatment may 
be seen in the home state, provided it is acceptable in another Member States”202. This
was already ascertained in the Grogan case even though it also showed the limitation
which could be brought to this principle. The diversity of the Member States legislations
makes modern reproductive technologies one obvious area in which patients may seek 
treatment in another Member State of the EU.  
This makes the freedom of movement of patients relevant. There is case law on cross-
border healthcare mainly when a treatment is not available in the member state of 
origin/affiliation. Since Article 22 of Regulation 1406/71 on social security coordination
as completed by the Kohll and Decker cases203, the freedom to provide treatment has
expanded to cross-border healthcare treatment.
The recent Directive 2011/24 on the freedom of movement of patients204 now confirms 
the possibility for patients to get treatments abroad and sometimes to be reimbursed by 
their Member State of affiliation. Point 7 states -in Grogan’s line- that Member States  
cannot be forced to provide a treatment. But the principle remains that patients have a 
right to move and get treatments in another Member State of the EU. In the same line
as the S.H. case (and this is probably an explanation of this decision in a period of
convergence of the two legal systems), it seems that nothing prevents patients from 
going abroad to get a treatment which is forbidden in their country of origin.
The question remains as to whether surrogacy can be considered as a ‘treatment’ in the 
national legal order205. This is not only because traditional surrogacy may not actually
necessitate medical intervention, but also because surrogacy per se, even in Member
States where it is not legally prohibited, is not straightforwardly countenanced as a
medical treatment. While a surrogacy arrangement may certainly involve medically
assisted reproduction techniques, it is questionable whether the process of gestating and 
giving birth to a child will be defined as ‘treatment’. While pregnancy and child birth
usually involves medical intervention, we must ask whether pregnancy and child birth in
and of themselves constitute a treatment. The collaborative use of bodies in surrogacy 
arrangements presents challenges for the definition of ‘treatment’, which is more 
commonly used to refer to an intervention on a particular person and their body. 
202 T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 151
 
203 C-120/95 and C-158/96.
 
204 2011/24.
 
205 The definition is given by the Member States. See Article 3)a Directive 2011/24.
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In terms of the medical treatments that some surrogacy arrangement may involve,
these include the collection of sperm and  an ovum from donors (who can be the  
intended parents or not), the IVF, the impregnation of the surrogate mother, the
healthcare of the surrogate mother and the prenatal care of the child and the delivery of 
the child. These different procedures can all be considered as services in the sense of the
Treaties. Taken all together, surrogacy can also be considered a treatment. As it is put in 
the Grogan case, services which are illegal or immoral as a matter of national law may 
constitute services in the sense of the treaty206. Where some Member States permit an
economic activity, and others do not, those national prohibitions do not have the effect
of removing the services from the scope of EU law207. EU law would therefore extend to
various medical services relating to human reproduction, for instance all forms of 
assisted reproduction, which may, or may not, include the service of a surrogate
mother208. 
Similarly the question must be asked of who the patient is: is it one or both of the 
intended parents, the gamete providers or the surrogate mother? Again this will be 
answered by national laws209. 
The patient has three rights: the right to go abroad to get surrogacy treatment, to right
to information about it and the right to be reimbursed for the medical costs. 
The right to go abroad to get IVF and/or prenatal care
“National rules on rights to treatment cannot prevent citizens of the EU seeking 
treatment elsewhere in the EU, no matter how unethical or immoral such treatment may 
be seen in the home state, provided it is acceptable in another Member States”210. 
A decision to move around EU for health care services can take place because a therapy 
is not available in the home state because it is a new experimental therapy (Smits,
Peerbooms case211), where an individual is seeking access to care which can be provided
more rapidly (Kohl, Van Riet cases212) or more cheaply (Vanbraekel case213) or where 
the patient believes it can be provided at a higher standard (Muller-Faure case214). The 
movement for health care services can also be in situations where the services are
unavailable in his/her own Member State, due to the fact that the home Member State 
has chosen to limit the provision of such services on “ethical” grounds. It can be cultural
or religious perspective, which may be opposed to certain health care services or the use 
of certain technologies. This may be inherent in national law, and possibly even
expressed within the Constitution of that Member State215. But patients cannot be 
prevented from going abroad to access fertility treatment which is part of a surrogacy
agreement, or to engage in a surrogacy agreement. 
The right to information about surrogacy in another Member State 
The Grogan case teaches us that “it is not contrary to Community law for a Member
State in which medical termination of pregnancy is forbidden to prohibit students
associations from distributing information about the identity and location of clinics in
another Member State where voluntary termination of pregnancy is lawfully carried out
206 It was known that the sale of unlawful drugs did not fall within the provisions of EU law, see C-294/82 

Einberger.
 
207 Grogan, §16-21.
 
208 T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 150.
 
209 See Article 3)b Directive 2011/24.
 
210T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 151.
 
211 CJEU, Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, 12 July 2001.
 
212 CJEU, Case 158/96, Raymond Kohll, 28 April 1998 Van Riet): Case C-385/99 and f., Van Riet, 13 May 2003.
 
213 CJEU, Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel, 12 July 2001.
 
214 CJEU, Case C-385/99 and f., Muller-Faure, 13 May 2003.
 
215 T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 144.
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and the means of communicating with those clinics, where the clinics in question have
no involvement in the distribution of the said information”.
Many comments of this case have shown that the Court tried to avoid the actual 
confrontation between the fundamental right to life and the economic freedom by 
considering that the associations providing information about abortion did not have an 
economic activity, which entailed the non-application of the EU freedom of services. The 
question therefore remains open: would the Court forbid a law prohibiting the provision
of information about an unethical medical procedure by the foreign hospitals or providers
of surrogacy services? 
Directive 2011/24 does not take position. It provides that “appropriate information on all 
essential aspects of cross-border healthcare is necessary in order to enable patients to 
exercise their rights on cross-border healthcare in practice. For cross-border healthcare, 
one of the mechanisms for providing such information is to establish national contact
points within each Member State”216. It adds that “information that has to be provided 
compulsorily to patients should be specified” thus leaving the question of the right to 
know about procedures which are forbidden in the Member State of affiliation to come 
either to the national authorities, the EU legislative bodies or to the CJEU.
The right to be reimbursed by the State of affiliation
The principle is that the obligation to reimburse cross-border healthcare under Directive 
2011/24 is “limited to such healthcare that is among the benefits to which the patient is
entitled within its Member State of affiliation”217. 
In the Smits and Peerbooms case, the Court gave a right to reimbursement to the
patient undergoing a new experimental therapy. We don’t have an example of
reimbursement of a treatment forbidden in the Member State of affiliation. But point 34 
and Article 7§1 of Directive 2011/24 on general principles for reimbursement of costs 
state that there will be no reimbursement if the procedure is not provided for in the
national legislation of the Member State of affiliation218. 
There can be hesitations in case of a rare disease219, but it is unlikely that it can include 
unethical treatments. 
Directive 2011/24 adds that the Member State might choose to reimburse the cost of 
cross-border healthcare beyond simple reimbursement of the treatment itself. “Member 
States are free, for example, to reimburse extra costs, such as accommodation and
travel costs, or extra costs incurred by persons with disabilities even where those costs
are not reimbursed in the case of healthcare provided in their territory”220. It remains to 
be seen whether Member States are willing to go in this direction.
The alternative of the freedom of establishment of EU citizens 
An alternative to relying on the freedom to provide services is to use the freedom of 
movement and residence and establishment of EU citizens (Article 21 and 49 TFEU). The
idea is then to move and legally reside in a Member State which legalises surrogacy in
order to proceed to it. There are very few States in Europe which allow it, one example is
Greece. This is an inconvenient burden for the surrogate mother, citizen of the EU, who 
216 Point 48 and Article 5§3 of Directive 2011/24.
 
217 Point 34 of Directive 2011/24.
 
218 Article 7/1 states that “the Member State of affiliation shall ensure the costs incurred by an insured person 

who receives cross-border healthcare are reimbursed, if the healthcare in question is among the benefits to
 
which the insured person is entitled in the Member State of affiliation”. A contrario, there will be no 

reimbursement if the procedure is not provided for in the national legislation of the Member State of affiliation.
 
219 Article 8 §4 of Directive 2011/24.
 
220 Point 34 of Directive 2011/24.
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should accept to move for at least four years to Greece, but it is reimbursed as the
Greek social security system pays the expenses related to IVF and pregnancy care221. 
Greece allows altruistic surrogacy and its welfare state provides for all the healthcare
needs of the surrogate mother. The condition put to access the Greek scheme is to be a
legal resident of Greece according to EU law and the freedom of movement of EU citizens 
and/or freedom of establishment. According to Directive 2004/38, the acquisition of the
right of permanent residence can take up to five years (Article 16). Until this time, the 
Member State of residence does not have the obligation to provide social assistance 
(Article 24). For example, the Greek law222 provides that an EU citizen can obtain social 
assistance and surrogacy in Greece when he/she has stayed there for three years. 
It must also be remembered that in addition to the payments for medical treatment, 
surrogacy agreements usually involve other costs which are incurred by the intended 
parent(s). These are sometimes referred to as “reasonable expenses” associated with
the pregnancy and the surrogacy agreement. 
3.1.2.3. The protection of the parties 
In the EU, the protection can be found in the protection of fundamental rights and in the 
existence of medical standards. 
Human Rights 
Application of ECtHR rights
The EU Court and legislator ensure the protection of fundamental rights (art. 6 TEU).
Further, the adhesion of the EU to the ECtHR pushes for a greater respect of ECtHR’s
judgments. It is likely that the EU will follow the ECtHR’s interpretation of fundamental
rights. 
Non-discrimination rights are also applicable. They do not allow for surrogacy per se, but
once it is authorised for a category of people, the non-discrimination principle could be
used to try and ensures that other categories fairly access the same rights. For instance, 
article 14 ECtHR or Article 19 TFEU could be used to allow homosexual parents to 
acquire the same reproductive rights as heterosexual parents. It has not been done yet, 
and it must be said that the ECtHR’s interpretation has been shy223. But new cases on
equality have shown a remarkable activism of the CJEU for instance in the field of age 
equality224, or sexual orientation225, but there has been no case concerning surrogacy. 
Protection of children
In the EU’s texts, children’s rights have been protected but again, not in specific relation
to surrogacy226. 
221 It creates a real burden on Greek healthcare services. Greece might become a destination for procreative 
tourism. It would not be able to ask other Member States to reimburse its expenses in the case of foreign 
surrogates as, according to EU law, legal residents are not considered to belong to their Member State of 
origin. This is the difference between establishment and provision of services. 
222 See the national report included in this study. 
223 See below. 2.1. 
224 In the line of the Mangold case, etc ; 13 septembre 2011  C-447/09 Prigge e.a.
225 C-147/08 Römer A supplementary retirement pension paid to a partner in a civil partnership, which is lower 
than that granted in a marriage, may constitute discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
226 All texts about children’s rights are focused on the protection of the children after they are born and without 
link to their origins. See COM (2011) 60: After the European strategy, An EU Agenda for the Rights of the
Child: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/children/docs/com_2011_60_en.pdf
Going on: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_6682_fr.htm; COM (2006) 367 : Communication of 
the European Commission : Towards a European strategy on children’ s rights
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Medical Standards 
The protection of reproductive cells
Directive 2004/23 creates a minimum standard in the use of reproductive cells. It has 
been seen already that the Directive will only apply to reproductive cells if Member 
States have decided so227. When it is so, as the explanatory text of the Directive 
explains, the Directive applies to tissues which are defined as “groups of cells, which 
may be transplanted or implanted as viable cells, or otherwise preserved, fixed or
altered. Originating from alive or dead donor, they include reproductive cells (e.g. 
semen, sperm, and ova)”228.
There is thus a whole procedure to be followed in order to ensure that the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of cells are
controlled by accredited establishments229. 
Import and export of cells
The Directive mentions the possibility of import/export of human tissues and cells which 
could be particularly relevant in the framework of surrogacy. The only requirement,
however, is the collaboration between accredited establishments meeting the standards 
of quality and safety equivalent to the ones laid down in the Directive, whether the 
movement is from or towards a third country230 or a Member State.  
Protection of the genetic parents/donors 
The Blood case231 is not an CJEU case. It was decided by the English Court of Appeal on
the basis of EU law. The Court considered that Article 59 TEC (now 56 TFEU) was 
applicable in order to allow the movement of sperm from Stephen Blood, husband of the
claimant who had died in the UK to a fertility clinic in Belgium. It could be said that the 
application of EU law on free movement to the export of the sperm effectively
undermined the provisions of national criminal and civil law with respect to the storage 
of the sperm232. It raised numerous questions regarding the protection and movement of 
reproductive cells, thus leading to Directive 2004/23.  
Unpaid donation
The protection of the genetic parents/ donors is stated by Article 12 of Directive 
2004/23. 
The donation should be voluntary and unpaid. “Donors may receive compensation, which 
is strictly limited to making good the expenses and inconveniences related to the 
The EU Parliament’s resolution on adoption 19/1/2011 : http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:136E:0024:0026:FR:PDF; Programme “Building a 
Europe for and with children”, COM(2011)35, 19 April 2011 , see
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2011)35&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DC&BackColorInt 
ernet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864 
227 See point 12 of the Directive, and upon.
 
228 As well as bone and musculo-skeletal elements (e.g. cartilage, tendons), cardiovascular tissues (e.g. 

arteries, veins, and heart valves), ocular tissue (e.g. cornea), nerve and brain cells, skin, foetal tissue and 

stem cells. See Quality standards for human tissues and cells,
 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/public_health/threats_to_health/c11573_en.htm (Seen on the 

11/12/12).
 
229 Directive 2004/23 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 on setting 

standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and 

distribution of human tissues and cells. 

230 Article 9 Directive 2003/24.
 
231 English Court of Appeal, R v Human Fertilisation and Embriology Authority, ex parte Blood [1997] 3 All ER
 
232 T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 151.
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donation. In that case, Member States define the conditions under which compensation 
may be granted”233. Member States shall endeavour to ensure that the procurement of 
tissues and cells as such is carried out on a non-profit basis. 
This is very interesting as we know that some countries allow commercial surrogacy234. 
Also, pregnancy and child birth are very different bodily experiences from the 
procurement of tissues and cells. 
Right to information
A further protection relates to the information provided to gamete donors to insure their 
informed consent to their donation. They must be properly informed prior to the
procurement 235 and they should consent to the donation. The information must cover: 
the purpose and nature of the procurement, its consequences and risks; analytical tests,
if they are performed; recording and protection of donor data, medical confidentiality;
therapeutic purpose and potential benefits and information on the applicable safeguards 
intended to protect the donor236. It should be given by a trained person able to transmit 
it in an appropriate and clear manner, using terms that are easily understood by the 
donor237. 
Anonymity
A last protection is particularly relevant in the context of surrogacy. It is the anonymity
of all data, including genetic information. The data protection and confidentiality
obligations ensure that neither donors nor recipients remain identifiable, to anyone other 
than persons with a legal right to access such information238. An possible exception is
mentioned in §3 where it is said that “Member States shall take all necessary measures
to ensure that the identity of the recipient(s) is not disclosed to the donor or his family
and vice versa, without prejudice to legislation in force in Member States on the  
conditions for disclosure, notably in the case of gametes donation”. 
Again this is very interesting as it is not an obvious conclusion drawn by the ECtHR239. 
3.1.2.4.	 Legality of a surrogacy contract between the intended parents and the
surrogate mother 
	 The legality of a surrogacy contract between the intended parents and the surrogate 
mother will not be grasped by EU law. Its several aspects regarding the eligibility,
suitability and capacity of both the intended parent(s) and the surrogate mother, as 
well as the consent to arrangements, its formal and essential validity and 
enforceability will depend on national law.
	 Performance issues (such as discharge of contract, and remedies for non­
performance by the surrogate mother (including frustration by way of miscarriage or 
abortion; responsibility for over-performance: multiple birth) or by intended parents 
(including total or partial non-payment; or repudiation of contract) and consequences 
of total/partial breach of contract), compensation/remuneration to the surrogate
233 Article 12 Directive 2003/24.
 
234 For instance, Russia, Illinois, and California: detailed in Section 2 of this Report.
 
235 Article 13 Directive 2003/24.
 
236 Annex of Directive 2003/24.
 
237 A similar procedure is in place for deceased donors. In this case, it is for the relevant persons in accordance 

with the legislation in Member States to make the decision. See Annex of Directive 2003/24.
 
238 Article 14§1, see also §2 : “For that purpose, they shall ensure that: (a) data security measures are in 

place, as well as safeguards against any unauthorised data additions, deletions or modifications to donor files 

or deferral records, and transfer of information; (b) procedures are in place to resolve data discrepancies; and 

(c) no unauthorised disclosure of information occurs, whilst guaranteeing the traceability of donations”. 
239 See 2.13. 
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mother; costs and expenses of surrogate mother and mandatory protective
provisions or public policy conditions also depend on national laws.
Insofar as a surrogacy arrangement is contractual in nature, it is important at the outset
to note the non-applicability of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (‘Rome I’). By Article 1.2.of Rome I, contractual obligations
involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons (Art 1.2.a, subject only to Art 13
‘incapacity’), and contractual obligations arising out of family relationships (Art 1.2.b),
are excluded from the scope of the instrument. Hence, any court in the EU, whether it is
a national court or one of the EU courts, currently must apply its own (private 
international law) national rules in order to assess the validity and enforceability of a
surrogacy agreement which involves a conflict of laws.
So too, insofar as any non-contractual obligations may be said to derive from 
international surrogacy arrangements (e.g. a claim in unjust enrichment), it is important 
to note the non-applicability of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’). By Art 1.2.a of Rome II, non-contractual 
obligations arising out of family relationships are excluded from the scope of the
instrument240. 
In most European countries, contracts on surrogacy are considered as either void and/or 
unenforceable as they are contrary to public order. But other countries/states do enforce 
surrogacy contracts in certain circumstances (e.g. Greece, Illinois, California). A 
European citizen could use his/her freedom of movement in order to have the contract 
written in a country which allows it and then attempt to have it recognised in a country 
which would not initially allow it. We need to distinguish between two situations:  
1) The contract is enforced so that the surrogacy takes place. This can only happen 
in two States which allow surrogacy.
2) The contract is enforced in another Member State after the surrogacy has taken 
place and a child is born. This is an ex-post mechanism of a posteriori recognition
(see infra, mutual recognition section).
3.1.2.5. Preliminary conclusion: Tools and Legal basis 
The case law of the ECtHR has been based on Articles 8, 9 and 14 ECtHR. These articles
are at the basis of all family issues. As it stands, we are waiting for one case on 
surrogacy, the Mennesson case241. It is also based on these articles. The ECtHR is likely
to check that a balance has been found between the interests of the child (right to a 
family life) and those of the intended parents (right to a family life, equality between
heterosexual parents and homosexual parents), the genetic parents (right to privacy,
right to anonymity) and the surrogate mother (right to anonymity, right to health
protection). Some authors have proposed to add Article 1 ECtHR on dignity mostly in
order to prohibit surrogacy practices which would amount to an objectification of the 
woman’s body. 
The legal bases used in the previous section were Articles 114 (approximations of laws) 
and 168 TFUE (public health). They provided competence to adopt Directives 2004/23 
and 2011/24. These two legal bases could provide a useful combination to adopt texts 
relating to the free movement and the healthcare of surrogate mothers.  
The case law of the CJEU on freedom of movement of patients are based on the legal 
bases of articles 56 TFUE (freedom to provide services) and 34 (freedom of movement of 
goods). If this does not stem from the case law, one could also think of relying on Article 
240 For more details as to the contractual arrangements, see Section 4 of this Report (Private International Law 

Issues, written by Professor Janeen Carruthers).
 
241 Mennesson and Others v. France (no. 65192/11) Communicated on 12.02.2012.
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21 TFEU (free movement of EU citizens) and Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment)
as it has been suggested in the Greek scheme for surrogacy242. These four freedoms
allow for the movement of a patient (the gamete donors and/or the surrogate mother) in
order to access the ‘treatment’, i.e. the collection of ovum and sperm, the IVF, the
implantation procedure and the care associated to pregnancy and delivery of a child.  
3.2. EX-POST: LEGAL PARENTHOOD FRAMEWORKS 
Once surrogacy has taken place and a child is born and given to the intended parent(s), 
several questions are raised: who are/is the child’s legal parent(s) and is an adoption
procedure required? Where is she/he inscribed on civil status registers? And what is
his/her nationality? Then, the legal consequences which flow from such a determination
(immigration status, parental responsibility, duty to maintain the child, inheritance etc.)
must be assessed.  
We must distinguish between two situations: either the birth and recognition are taking
place in one single country, or the parents moved to one country to proceed to
surrogacy and have then come back to their country of origin. In both cases, the 
previous questions must be answered.  
Again, it is easier to distinguish between the protection provided by the ECtHR and the 
EU. 
3.2.1. ECtHR 
The European Court of Human Rights has considered the right to the recognition of
parental legal status and authority, and the child’s civil status (1) and nationality (2), the 
right of parents to access and visitation (3) and the right to inheritance (4). It also takes 
into account the possibility to move to another State in order to proceed to surrogacy 
(5). 
3.2.1.1.	 Personal identity, civil status, legal parentage (filiation / adoption) and 
parental authority 
The establishment of the legal parenthood of a child born through a surrogacy 
agreement can be tricky. Most countries recognise the bearer of the child as his/her 
mother. Only some countries, mostly the ones which authorise surrogacy procedures, 
recognise the intended parent(s) as the parent(s) of the child. The countries which 
accept IVF may take into account the gamete providers and sometimes the intended
parents, who are not genetically related to the child, but indicate their intention to be 
parents. 
The ECtHR has not judged on surrogacy cases, but it has tried to accommodate the 
different approaches to IVF and adoption, especially in the case of homosexual partners.  
The most relevant cases, the Francine Bonnaud and Patricia Lecoq v. France case243 
about parental authority, and the X and Others v. Austria case244 about adoption have 
not been judged yet245. 
The Bonnaud case concerns the rejection of the applicants’ requests to each be granted
parental legal status in respect of the other’s child. The female applicants, who live as a 
couple, each had a child using medically assisted reproduction. The claim is based on 
242 See upon, 1.2.2.4 
243 ECtHR, Francine Bonnaud and Patricia Lecoq v. France (no. 6190/11) (no. 6190/11) Communicated on 
03.02.2012 
244 X and Others v. Austria (no. 19010/07) Grand Chamber hearing on 03.10.2012 
245 A third case, the Mennesson case is also relevant in terms of legal parentage, see right below, 2.1.2 
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Articles 8 and 14 trying to make a comparison between the rights of homosexual and 
heterosexual couples to create a family. They rely on the notion of ‘social parent’ which
can be equated to the intended parent. We need to see how the ECtHR will define this 
notion and what role it is prepared to give it.  
The X and Others v. Austria case246 concerns the complaint by two women, who live in a 
stable homosexual relationship, about the Austrian courts’ refusal to grant one of the 
partners the right to adopt the son of the other partner without severing the mother’s 
legal ties with the child. A Chamber hearing took place on 1 December 2011. On 5 June 
2012, the Chamber to which the case had been allocated relinquished jurisdiction in
favour of the Grand Chamber.  
These two decisions will be an opportunity for the ECtHR to assess two national legal 
systems and consider adoption, legal parenthood and the recognition of the parental
status of homosexual couples.  
A rather old ECtHR case shows the limitation which could be put to the recognition of
legal parenthood in cases of surrogacy. The X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom247case
concerned X, a female-to-male transsexual who was living in a stable relationship with a 
woman, Y, and their child, Z, born after donor insemination in a licensed fertility clinic.
The applicants complained that X’s role as Z’s father was not recognised and that their
situation amounted to discrimination. The Court considered that there was no violation of
Article 8 given that transsexuality raised complex issues in respect of which there was no
generally shared approach in Europe. The fact that the law of the UK did not allow
special legal recognition of the relationship between X and Z did not amount to a failure
to respect family life within the meaning of that provision. Here again, the Court is not
willing to transform the definition of traditional family. The same line could be chosen in
case of surrogacy. 
A recent empirically-informed Council of Europe study on the legal status of children 
across Europe was silent on the possibility of recognising more than two legal parents in
the context of collaborative reproduction, as well as the singular grounding of legal
motherhood in gestation.248 The possibilities would be interesting to consider in the 
context of surrogacy, particularly as a way of responding to competing claims of parental 
status. 
3.2.1.2. Nationality 
When it comes to nationality or citizenship, the question is double: Can the child get the
nationality of the territory where he/she was born? Can the child get the nationality of
his/her intended parent(s)? 
The ECtHR has not given any answer to this specific question, but a pending case, the 
Mennesson case249, should be an occasion to shed some light on this question. The case 
concerns the refusal of the French authorities to recognise a heterosexual married couple 
as the parents of twin daughters, despite their parental status being legally established
in another country and to give them their parents’ French nationality. The couple had
recourse to in-vitro fertilisation using the applicant’s gametes and a donated ovum, with
implantation of the embryos thus obtained into the uterus of a surrogate mother in
California.
246 X and Others v. Austria (no. 19010/07) Grand Chamber hearing on 03.10.2012 
247 ECtHR, X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (no. 21830/93)22.04.1997 
248 Nigel Lowe (2009) A study into the rights and legal status of children brought up in various forms of marital
and non-marital partnerships and cohabitation (Council of Europe). 
249 Mennesson and Others v. France (no. 65192/11) Communicated on 12.02.2012 
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Meanwhile, the most relevant case is the Genovese case250 which applies Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) and Article 8 (right to respect for private life) to recognise 
the right of a child to obtain his mother’s citizenship even though he was born out of 
wedlock.  
It is not obvious that this solution could be transposed to children born after surrogacy,
asking for the same nationality as their parents. In this instance, the Court relied on the
European consensus existing on the question, as reflected by the 1975 European
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock in force in more than 20 
European countries. But a similar text does not exist when it comes to surrogacy. The 
right of children to obtain the nationality of their intended parent(s) gets very different 
answers in the Member States. Some courts have relied on the interest of the child, but
it is likely that a balance should be found between the child’s interest and the State’s 
understanding of public order. 
3.2.1.3. Access and visit, custody 
The right to access and visit the children is a difficult one, not least because an 
application for such may come from an adult/parent, and or a child, with different
situations raising considerably different interests. The following cases are useful to 
consider. 
The Anayo case251 concerned the refusal of German courts to allow the applicant to see 
his biological children, twins, with whom he had never lived. The Court identified a 
violation of Article 8 as it found in particular that the authorities had not examined the 
question of whether a relationship between the twins and the applicant would have been 
in the children’s interest.
The pending Jiaoqin Zhou v. Italy case252 concerns the suspension of a genetically-
related mother’s access rights in connection with an adoption procedure, whereas an
expert had found that whilst the mother was incapable of looking after her child, her
conduct was not negative for him. 
Again, these cases should be considered with circumspection as none of them are 
specifically about surrogacy. It is nonetheless interesting to get a broader picture253. 
3.2.1.4. Inheritance 
It is now clear in European law that non-biological children have the same rights in
terms of inheritance rights as biological children254. In the Negrepontis-Giannisis v.
Greece255, the Court sees a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of 
property), because the decision of the Greek courts had deprived the applicant of his
status as heir where it acknowledged the refusal of the Greek authorities to recognise 
the full adoption order made in the United States allowing a monk to adopt his nephew.  
3.2.1.5. Recognition of a surrogacy which has taken place abroad 
None of the cases presented to the European Court of Human Rights directly concerns 
surrogacy. This does not mean however that the ECtHR does not provide useful thoughts 
on the issue. Procreative tourism indeed received an unexpected encouragement from 
250 ECtHR, Genovese v. Malta (no. 53124/09), 11.10.2011 
251 ECtHR, Anayo v. Germany (no. 20578/07) 21.12.2010 
252 (no. 33773/11) Communicated on 06.07.2011 
253 There are also cases which address these issues in the context of divorce or separations. However, these 
are less useful for this study as they typically relate to families where existing child-parent relationships are 
well established. 
254 ECtHR, Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra (no. 69498/01) 13.07.2004.
255 no. 56759/08) 03.05.2011.
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this jurisdiction. In the recent S.H. v. Austria case256, the Court decided that, for lack of 
efficient harmonisation, it would take advantage of the very different national legislations 
on medically assisted reproduction. This case concerned two Austrian couples wishing to
conceive a child through IVF. One couple needed the use of sperm from a donor and the 
other, donated ova. Austrian law prohibits the use of sperm for IVF and ova donation in
general. The Court noted that, although there was a clear trend across Europe in favour 
of allowing gamete donation for in-vitro fertilisation, the emerging consensus was still 
under development and was not based on settled legal principles. Austrian legislators
had tried, among other things, to avoid the possibility that two women could claim to be 
the biological mother of the same child. They had approached carefully a controversial 
issue raising complex ethical questions and had not banned individuals from going
overseas for infertility treatment unavailable in Austria. The Court concluded that there 
had been no violation of the Convention. However, it underlined the importance of
keeping legal and fast-moving scientific developments in the field of artificial procreation
under review. 
It becomes more interesting: instead of sentencing Austria’s prohibition of egg donation, 
in vitro fertilization and gamete donation, it stresses that it is possible to receive these 
treatments elsewhere than on Austrian soil.257 The Court notes that national rules on
filiation law can be comprehensive enough to absorb and validate situations that were 
originally created in contradiction with the law. Does this not come down to indicating
“procreative tourism” as a real alternative to escape the conditions set by each legal 
framework regarding the access to medically assisted reproduction? We don’t know
whether this cross-border situation could include surrogacy undertaken in a foreign 
country that authorises it.
Again the S.H. case can be further interpreted. One can wonder if the decision of the 
Court according to which national rules on filiation law can be comprehensive enough to
absorb and validate situations that were originally created in contradiction with the law
should be understood as a confirmation of the existing Austrian system or as an 
incentive to this State to adapt its legal regulations in order to acknowledge the filiation
of the child born in surrogacy and in particular the maternal filiation of the intended 
mother who did not give birth to the child. 
The above-mentioned Mennesson case258 should also bring some lights as to the  
reception of a foreign surrogacy in France. Does the interest of the children imply
recognising their intended parents as legal parents and does it imply giving them the 
nationality of their parents? 
3.2.2. EU 
Two routes can be followed: freedom of movement of EU citizens and mutual recognition 
on the one hand and European private international law on the other hand.  
3.2.2.1. Free movement of citizens and statuses recognition 
The freedoms of movement are a very powerful way of developing EU law.
The principle of the free movement of EU citizens is granted by article 20 and 21 TFEU. 
It has become one of the leading principles in the discussion on the unification and 
harmonization of family law in Europe259. It will only apply to EU citizens moving from
256 S.H. and Others v. Austria (no. 57813/00) 03.11.2011 (Grand Chamber)
 
257 The Court developed the same argument with regards to abortion: ECTHR, G.C. 16 December 2010, A. B. C.
 
v. Ireland. The judges explicitly allowed for Irish women, who can only abort in their country under very
restrictive conditions, to have the procedure abroad. 
258 Mennesson and Others v. France (no. 65192/11) Communicated on 12.02.2012. See upon, 2.1.2 
259 133. Katharina Boele-Woelki, The European Agenda: An Overview of the Current Situation in the Field of 
Prnvate InternationalL aw and Substantive Law, in 2006 INT'L FAM.L. 149, 149-54.
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
one Member State to another. If a case concerning the non-recognition in one Member 
State of a status obtained in another Member State is brought to the Court of Justice, 
chances are high that the Court will ensure the useful effect of the free movement of EU
citizens260. 
The situation is the following: an EU citizen has moved from one Member State to 
another and wants his/her name of his/her civil status to be recognised on the Member
State of residence. The Court has developed a broad-ranging case law on the question. 
Since the Dafeki case261, mutual recognition is presumed. Since EU citizenship has been
created, some cases have directly concerned family names. For instance, in the Garcia
Avello case, the Court was asked whether a right to get the same name as one’s parents
existed. The question was not about surrogacy, but about the obligation for the Belgian
State to register two family names of a Belgo-Spanish child instead of one, thus
following the Spanish tradition of giving the father’s name and the mother’s name and 
not the Belgian rule which imposes to give only the father’s name. The Court relied on
EU citizenship and non-discrimination to give a right to be given a Spanish name in 
Belgium. The useful effect of the movement of citizens implies to give them the  
possibility to name their children in the way they would have done in their country of 
origin.
The Court has never been asked to deal with the intended parent(s) of a child born
following a surrogacy agreement. But it is interesting to wonder whether it would oblige
national courts to recognise the civil status of a child born after surrogacy and indicating 
the intended parent(s) as his/her parent(s); whether this civil status is made in the 
Member State where the surrogacy arrangement took place (ex: Greece) or in a Member
State where a parental order was made in order to recognise the intended parents as the
legal parents after the surrogacy arrangement has taken place in another State (ex: UK
after a surrogacy in California).  
The Court has developed case-law about the useful effect of having a foreign name 
recognised in the other Member States. However, it has recently recognised that the
State can limit the recognition. Two recent cases, the Runevic Vardyn case and the Sayn 
Wittgenstein case have shown that the Court is willing to take into account the 
sovereignty of the Member States when it reflects constitutional traditions. In the former 
case, the Court recognised the right for the Member State to refuse to change the 
spelling of a name in order to protect the distinctiveness of its alphabet262. In the latter 
case, the Court accepted that Austrian constitutional rules forbid nobility titles in the 
name even if this name had been given by adoption and had been used for a long time 
in the host Member State263. 
This line of analysis could easily lead us to imagine the CJEU confirming the refusal of a
Member State to change the civil status of a child born from a surrogacy arrangement. 
The following public policy arguments could be used. First, and most importantly,
reference could be made to the traditional concept of family. Moreover, it is often argued 
that this concept is protected by the national constitution. Finally, it is submitted that
non recognition does not violate the human rights protected by the European Convention
134. For the results of the Commission on European Family Law, which are aimed at providing a contribution to
this process, see Katharina Boele-Woelki et al., Principles of European Family Law Regarding Divorce and 
Maintenance Between Former Spouses, in 7 EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW SERIES 176 (2004); Katharina Boele-
Woelki et al., Principles of European Family Law Regarding Parental Responsibilities, in 16 EUROPEAN FAMILY 
LAW SERIES 1-276 (2007). 
260 See Peter McEleavy, Free Movement of Persons and Cross-Border Relationships, in 7 INT'L L. F DU DROIT 
INT'L 153, 153-58 (2005); Clare McGlynn, Family Reunion and the Free Movement of Persons in European 
Union Law, in 7 INT'L L. E DU DROIT INT'L 159, 159-66 (2005); Johan Meeusen et al., General Report, in 
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 7-11 (Johan Meeusen et al. eds., 2007). 
261 Dafeki, C-336/94 
262 CJEU, Runevic Vardyn, C-391/09 
263 CJEU, Sayn Wittgenstein, C-208/09 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
on Human Rights. In other words, it is for each national state to decide how to regulate 
formalized relationships according to its own constitution, culture, religion, and family
system. 
At the level of private international law, it is under discussion whether the primary role
of the free movement of persons may serve as a "theoretical gateway" for establishing a 
private international law principle of mutual recognition that facilitates the recognition of
EU citizens' personal status and family relationships within the Union264. 
3.2.2.2. Mutual recognition 
At present there is no EU private international law regulation of surrogacy per se, and so 
any individual Member State forum would apply its own national jurisdiction rules and 
choice of law rules on a case-by-case basis, according to the facts and circumstances of 
the particular cause. There is no established body of choice of law rules to deal in a
systematic way with surrogacy. The question of what law governs various legal issues is 
of pivotal importance265. 
More Precisely, Article 1.3 of Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters 
and the matters of parental responsibility states that “this Regulation shall not apply 
to:(a) the establishment or contesting of a parent-child relationship; (b) decisions on 
adoption, measures preparatory to adoption, or the annulment or revocation of 
adoption; (c) the name and forenames of the child; (d) emancipation; (e) maintenance 
obligations; (f) trusts or succession”. It does not apply to the establishment of legal
parenthood, since this is a different matter from the attribution of parental responsibility, 
nor to other questions linked to the status of persons (recital 10). 
When determining parental status and legal parenthood, and the legal effects thereof266, 
it is mostly national law which will be applied.
But Brussels II bis applies to all civil matters concerning the ‘attribution, exercise,
delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility.’ (Art 1.1.b)  
By Art 1.2, the Regulation shall apply, in particular, to rights of custody and access (Art
1.2.a); guardianship, curatorship and similar institutions (Art 1.2.b); the designation and 
functions of any person or body having charge of the child’s person or property, 
representing or assisting the child (Art 1.2.c); and measures for the protection of the 
child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property (Art
1.2.d). 
As the national case law analysis in Section 2, Part B of this Report has indicated, all
European countries accept to formally recognise (with more or less enthusiasm) the
relationship between the surrogate child and the intended parent(s). Again, EU law does 
not regulate this recognition. If there was a trial in the Member State (and whether the
issue was intra-European or not), EU law would not be applicable267. 
264 For discussion on this matter, see Roberto Baratta, Problematic Elements of an Implicit Rule Providing for
Mutual Recognition of Personal and Family Status in the EC, 27 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND 
VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX] 4, 6-11 (2007) (ER.G.).
265 For more details, see Section 4 of this Report (Private International Law Issues, written by Professor Janeen
Carruthers). 
266 Framework for legal parenthood: 2-parent framework; how is legal motherhood attributed; how is legal 
fatherhood attributed; judicial authorisation of transfer of parenthood after birth; cf. Adoption. withdrawal of 
parental rights and responsibilities from the surrogate mother (and spouse); conferral of parental rights and 
responsibilities on the intended parents. 
267 See Section 4 of this Report (Private International Law Issues, written by Professor Janeen Carruthers). 
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3.2.2.3. Preliminary conclusion: Tools and Legal Basis 
Here again, the freedom of movement and specially that of EU  citizens can be called  
upon in order to rely on the fundamental status of EU citizens and promote equality
between nationals of different Member States (Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU).  
The principles of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality (Article 18 TFEU) and 
on the grounds of sex and sexual orientation can also be relevant. The latter has been
argued before the ECtHR, but a similar construction could be thought of in the EU (19 
TFEU) especially in the light of the recent Römer case268. 
Mutual recognition instruments could also be relevant. Regulation 2201/2003 on parental 
responsibility was adopted on the basis of Articles 67 (4)269 and 81 TFEU270 on civil 
statuses. 
268 See CJEU, C-147/08, Römer, upon, 1.2.5. 
269 4. The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition of 
judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters. 
270 Article 67(4) and Article 81 TFEU give the Union the power to enact secondary law for the recognition of
judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil and commercial matters, which includes the power to lay down 
jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws rules. The Brussels I Regulation on the jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, the Rome I and II Regulations on the law applicable to contractual 
and non-contractual obligations, the Brussels II Regulation on matrimonial proceedings and parental 
responsibility (2201/2003) and the new 1259/2010 Regulation on the law applicable to divorce provide
relevant examples of harmonisation of EU PIL and show that the EU is slowly turning from commercial and 
trade issues towards family law. These developments are associated to the building of an area of freedom, 
security and justice for the European citizens (see the Stockholm programme, COM 2010/171). The building of 
the Area of freedom, security and justice is part of the completion of the Internal Market (art. 3 TUE).  
They are not applicable to surrogacy but they provide interesting examples of mutual recognition. 
155
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
Table 13 Summary table 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK MEMBER 
STATES
POSITIONS
ECtHR 
PROTECTION
EU ACTION
EX-ANTE
Authorisation or Disagreement National constitutional
prohibition of surrogacy’s among MS traditions and 
acts sovereignty recognised 
(gestation/procreation)  (Grogan+ 2004/23) = 
Limit to EU action  
Movement towards a MS 
which allows surrogacy 
and return
+ information on 
movement 
Possible Art 2 (life), 8 
(family), 14
(equality),  
HS v Austria 
Mennesson case 
expected 
Freedom of movement 
of patients/ Freedom of 
Establishment 
Reproductive tourism 
(Directive 2011/24) 
+ right to information 
+ NO reimbursement  
EX-POST
-Child's legal 
parentage 
- Inscription 
on civil status 
registers 
- Nationality  
- the protection of the 
different parties 
(surrogate mother, child, 
intended parents)  
- the establishment of a 
contract 
=> 
Recognitio 
n in the 
state of 
the 
parents 
Protection only 
organised in 
the MS where 
the procedure 
is authorised  
Idem 
Art 8, Art 14, Child 
& Mother (S.H. v
Austria) 
EU general protection of 
children, EU general 
protection of healthcare
standards
=> Automatic in Art 8, Art 14, Impossible 
Establish MS where adoption 
ment in procedure X v Austria 
the state authorised XYZ v UK 
of birth: + fathers  
not automatic  HS v Austria  (European) IPL 
Automatic recognition?  
Mutual recognition of
statuses (see the 
Grunkin case) 
Legal consequences which Diverse  Art. 1 proto 1, Art (European) PIL 
flow from such a 8, Art 14, Right to Idem: no need to know  
determination of access, parental 
theparentage (immigration authority, 
status, parental inheritance  
responsibility, duty to
maintain the child, etc.)
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3.3. CONCLUSION 
“The potential of EU law to undermine legally enshrined national ethical choices raises
the question of whether deregulatory EU-level rules relating to the internal market are 
best equipped to fulfil the function of legal enforcement of the types of moral or ethical 
choices made by European society or societies”271. 
The EU remains a relevant place for action given the existing differences between
Member States, the multiplication of questions sent to the ECtHR, and the sui generis
effective legal order that the EU proposes. But one could wonder if the EU is the best 
level at which to regulate.
3.4. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The section excludes international private law concerns which are treated further. The
interest of studying these texts relies in the option for the EU and/or for the Member 
States to adhere to a convention about surrogacy. Such a convention does not exist to 
this day, but this hypothesis is starting to be considered by the ICCS and by the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. Even if this would not be directly relevant, the 
EU could also consider joining UN international convention on children’s rights. It must
finally be noted that some States of the  Council or Europe have made declarations
concerning surrogacy. 
3.4.1. ICCS 
The International Commission on Civil Status (ICCS) is an intergovernmental 
organisation created by a Protocol signed in Bern on 25 September 1950, made up of 16 
member States, whose seat has been established in Strasbourg272. According to the
Protocols which founded the ICCS and the Commission’s internal Rules, the mission of 
the ICCS is to facilitate international cooperation in civil-status matters and to further
the exchange of information between civil registrars. The internal Rules specify that the 
Commission carries out all studies and work aimed at harmonising the provisions in force
in the member States in these same matters, in particular by the drafting of Conventions
or Recommendations, and at improving the operation of civil-status departments in
those States. 
One report on ‘maternal filiation and surrogacy in the ICCS States’ was drafted in
2003273. It presents the different legal answers of France, Spain, the United Kingdom
and Greece. 
A convention on surrogacy does not exist to date.   
3.4.2. The Hague Conference on International Private Law 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law decided to focus on the question of 
surrogacy in 2010274. It is about to send a questionnaire to all States about their laws 
and practices as regards surrogacy. This is in process275. The other conventions are 
taken into account further276. 
271T. Hervey and J. McHale (2004) Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge University Press), p. 153 
272 See http://www.ciec1.org/Documentation/CLARCIEV-PresentationCIEC-CN-EN-Mexico-29.07.2007.pdf. 
273http://www.ciec1.org/Documentation/EVS-Congres7-Gand-14-15mai2007-MeresPorteusesExposeCN­
Francais.pdf. 
274 Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Conseil sur les affaires générales et la politique de la 
Conférence (7-9 april 2010), p. 3.
275 Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council, Council 
on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (17-20 April 2012) (April 2012); Hague Conference Permanent 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
3.4.3. The UN International Convention on Children’s Rights
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most widely ratified human rights treaty 
in history. Together with other international and regional standards on the rights of the 
child, including those adopted by the Council of Europe, it contains a comprehensive set
of legally binding international standards for the promotion and protection of children’s
rights. It is relevant to surrogacy only where it protects the interest of the child. It is
referred to by the EU277: Article 7 is about the right to a name, the right to a nationality,
and, as far a possible, the right to know one’s parents and to be raised by them; Article 
6 is on the right to life and Article 21 is about adoption framing278. 
3.4.4. Council of Europe declarations
Several declarations were made by the Council of Europe. One was recently declared
within the Parliamentary assembly where 22 MP from about 7 countries solemnly affirm 
that “surrogacy is incompatible with women and children’s dignity and constitutes a 
violation of their fundamental rights”279. 
Bureau, Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements (General Affairs 

and Policy: Doc. Prel. No 10) (March 2012); Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Private International Law 

Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, including Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements 

(General Affairs and Policy: Doc. Prel. No 11) (March 2011).
 
276 See Section 4 of this Report (Private International Law Issues, written by Professor Janeen Carruthers).
 
277 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/.../16031.07.pdf. 

278 UN International convention of children’s rights of 20 November 1989.
 
279 See http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=18711&Language=FR.
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4.  LEGAL ANALYSIS –PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1. SCOPING 
4.1.1. Aim of the current report 
To examine the private international law dimension of the legal issues arising from 
cross-border surrogacy, following the classic analytical structure viz.: jurisdiction; 
applicable law; recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, taking account also of
softer concepts such as international cooperation and administrative best practice.  
To consider the possibility of an EU level response to the legal issues arising from cross-
border surrogacy (noting the significance of territorial ambit of such a response – intra-
EU/ vis-à-vis third States?), including the possible harmonisation of private international
law principles relative thereto, and/or the facilitation of cross-border co-operation among
states, with particular reference to legal issues such as legal parenthood and the 
determination of the nationality of children born as a result of surrogacy arrangements, 
and the regulation of matters pertaining to the parent-child relationship; and further to
consider the legal management of cross-border surrogacy as a practice, and the legal 
deliberation of cross-border disputes consequential to a cross-border surrogacy
arrangement. 
4.1.2. Bibliography 
Select literature re. surrogacy agreements having a cross-border dimension 
	 D Cullen, ‘Surrogacy: ‘Commissioning’ parents not domiciled in UK – matters to be 
borne in mind by those contemplating surrogacy arrangements’ (2008) 32 Adoption 
& Fostering 1 
	 Hague Conference on Private International Law: 
- Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Private International Law Issues 
Surrounding the Status of Children, including Issues Arising from International
Surrogacy Arrangements (General Affairs and Policy: Doc. Prel. No 11) (March
2011) 
- Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising
from International Surrogacy Arrangements (General Affairs and Policy: Doc. Prel. 
No 10) (March 2012) 
- Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Conclusions and Recommendations 
adopted by the Council, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference
(17-20 April 2012) (April 2012) 
- Hague Conference Permanent Bureau, Report of the Council on General Affairs 
and Policy of the Conference of 17-20 April 2012: Doc. Prel. No 1) (July 2012) 
	 K Horsey and S Sheldon, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating
Surrogacy’ 2012 Medical Law Review 67
	 D Howe, ‘International Surrogacy: A Cautionary Tale’ (2008) 38 Family Law Journal 
61 
	 I Lebowitz-Dori, ‘Womb for Rent: The Future of International Trade in Surrogacy’
(1997) 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 329 
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	 L Theis, N Gamble and L Ghevaert, ‘Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy): ‘A Trek Through 
a Thorn Forest’ (2009) 39 Family Law Journal 239 
	 K Trimmings and P Beaumont, ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent 
Need for Legal Regulation at the International Law’ (2011) J. Pr. I. L. 627 
Select UK case law 
	 Re X (Children) (Parental Order: Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam); 
[2009] 1 F.L.R. 733
	 Re S (Parental Order) [2009] EWHC 2977 (Fam); [2010] 1 F.L.R. 1156 
	 Re L (A Child) (Parental Order: Foreign Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam); 
[2011] Fam.106
	 Re D (Minors) (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam); [2013] Fam Law 38
	 A v P [2011] EWHC 1738 (Fam)
	 Re IJ (A Child) (Foreign Surrogacy Agreement: Parental Order) [2011] EWHC 921
(Fam)
	 Re X (Children) (Parental Order: Retrospective Authorisation of Payments) [2011]
EWHC 3147; [2012] 1 F.L.R. 1347
Cognate instruments
At present, there is no EU private international law measure which regulates cross-
border surrogacy agreements, or the legal effects thereof. Cognate instruments, 
however, are:  
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental
responsibility (Brussels II bis).
Since 1 March 2005, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments on
parental rights and responsibilities have been governed by Brussels II bis. Brussels II
bis lays down rules on jurisdiction (Chapter II), recognition and enforcement 
(Chapter III), and cooperation between central authorities (Chapter IV) in the field of 
parental responsibility, and contains specific rules on child abduction and access
rights. The Regulation applies to all civil matters concerning the ‘attribution, exercise, 
delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility’ (Art 1.1.b).
Brussels II bis does not apply, however, to the establishing or contesting of a parent-
child relationship (Art 1.3.a): ‘… it does not apply to the establishment of
parenthood, since this is a different matter from the attribution of parental 
responsibility, nor to other questions linked to the status of persons’ (recital 10). 
 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘1980
HC’).  
 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of 
Intercountry Adoption (‘Adoption Convention’). 
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 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement 
and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children (‘1996 Convention’).  
4.1.3. Overarching questions 
1.	 Is there a need for the articulation of rules and the establishment of standards legally
binding on (all/some?) EU Member States in connection with cross-border surrogacy 
(as that term is to be defined, a matter of key importance)?
2.	 Is there a need to impose a system of supervision, to ensure that such standards are 
observed? 
3.	 Is there a need for co-operation between/among EU Member States (state of origin
and receiving state, q.v.)? 
4.	 What would be the objectives of an EU response? 
5.	 Is there a need for a ‘global’ international response? 
4.2. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF PUTATIVE EU REGIME 
Given the factual matrix which may occur in these cases, the territorial scope of an EU
level response would require to be delineated very carefully.  
The main participants in a surrogacy arrangement appear to be:
 Surrogate mother; 
 Surrogacy services provider (‘the agency’); 
 Intended parent(s);
 [Egg donor – in cases of gestational surrogacy/collaborative use of bodily 
materials]; 
 [The child]; and 
 Other consenting parties – e.g. surrogate mother’s spouse/partner. 
The interested legal systems appear to be: 
 State of origin (personal law of the surrogate mother – say, her habitual
residence); 
 Receiving state (personal law of the intended parent(s) – say, their habitual
residence); 
 Principal place of business of the surrogacy services provider (if any); 
 (Branch office of the surrogacy services provider); 
 Locus of reproductive procedure/services; 
 Place of birth of child, likely to coincide with state of origin; and 
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	 Personal law of the child (say, its habitual residence, arguably coinciding with the
state of origin, depending on the facts).
The most straightforward set of cross-border surrogacy circumstances would be where 
all participants have a personal law connection with the EU (say, habitual residence in an 
EU Member State); all interested legal systems are EU Member States; and all Member
States are bound by a common regulatory framework (‘the putative EU regime’).  
Legal complications would emerge where the factual matrix involves one or more
connections with a non-EU Member State (‘third State’). For example, it may occur that 
one or more participants – most likely the surrogate mother and/or the agency – is/are 
not habitually resident in an EU Member State. Alternatively, or in addition, some or all
of the reproductive procedure/services and/or the birth of the child might take place in a 
third State. It would require to be determined to what extent one or more connection(s)
with a third State would remove the case beyond the reach of the putative EU regime. 
Conversely, it would have to be determined to what extent only minimal factual  
connection with an EU Member State would bring the case within the remit of the 
putative EU regime (e.g. if neither the surrogate mother nor the intended parent(s) is
habitually resident in an EU Member State, but some element of the reproductive
procedure took place within the EU, or the agency had a presence in an EU Member 
State, or the egg donor was habitually resident in the EU).
The geographical reach of the putative EU regime would be a matter of central 
importance, and so the territorial scope of any European framework would require to be 
drawn with exacting care, not least because it can be anticipated that, in the context of
cross-border surrogacy, connections with Third States are very likely to be present.  
The instrument in which any harmonised response would be delivered would require to
recognise the wide spectrum of domestic law attitudes to surrogacy across states: if, as 
a matter of policy, a given legal system does not admit surrogacy in its domestic law, it
would be inappropriate to impose on it a (European) structure of cross-border surrogacy 
regulation, based on the premise that the fulfilment of a cross-border surrogacy
agreement would be facilitated and enforced in such a state (cf Council Regulation (EU)
No 1259/2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to
divorce and legal separation ‘Rome III’, Arts 10 and 13). 
In relation to choice of law in divorce, recourse was had, per Rome III, to the enhanced
co-operation procedure, creating a ‘two-speed’ Europe on this matter. In the context of 
cross-border surrogacy, in the event of insurmountable policy difficulties liable to make
unanimity of response among all Member States impossible, it is likely that, as a 
legislative model, the enhanced cooperation procedure would be one meriting 
consideration. However, if this procedure were utilised, problems of hybridity would arise
if, with regard to such an instrument, there were to be participating Member States and
non-participating Member States. The concept of hybridity, i.e. the problem of
demarcating the scope of application of an EU instrument, is well known, and has been
encountered, e.g. in relation to the application of the Brussels I Regulation; and can be 
expected to arise, e.g. in Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement 
of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of 
succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (‘Rome IV’), as a 
result of there being Member States bound by the Regulation, Member States not bound 
by the Regulation, and third States. 
In the matter of choice of law, the principle of universal application must be considered.
It is usual in EU instruments in the field of private international law for the universality
principle to apply, that is to say, that a participating EU forum must apply the law
162
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
indicated by operation of the choice of law rules contained in the instrument, no matter
whether the law identified is that of an EU Member State or that of a third State.  
In the context of cross-border surrogacy, a regulatory framework imposed by means of a
European regulation may sit uneasily with the universality principle. Where, for example,
the authorities of the state of origin and of the receiving state each were to have a role
and function to perform, it would be problematic if one of those states were not bound 
by the putative EU regime. An EU response, necessarily capable of binding, at best, only 
(all) EU Member States would be deficient in this regard; such a response could not
impose administrative or other requirements on the authorities of a third State. This
would be likely to produce, therefore, a limping system. The only way to have a balanced
system would be to negotiate an instrument of potentially global reach, through, e.g.,
the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. An instrument under 
the aegis of the Hague Conference would be one which Contracting States would be free 
to ratify/accede to or not. A framework set in place by such a Convention would operate 
bilaterally between Convention States in the same manner as does, e.g., the 1980
Hague Convention. 
4.3. ISSUES OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction, in the sense of rules conferring competence on a court to determine issues
arising in any given area of law, is normally the first matter to be addressed in a conflict
of laws analysis or harmonisation exercise.
In the context of cross-border surrogacy, disputes potentially requiring court
determination may arise pertaining to any one or more of the following issues: 
	 the process of negotiation of contractual terms between the surrogate mother
and the putative intended parent(s), with or without an intermediate surrogacy
services provider (‘contractual issues’); 
	 there may be an anterior or parallel contract between/among the surrogate 
mother, intended parent(s), the surrogacy services provider, and an egg donor, 
from which contractual issues may derive; 
	 the process of enforcement of agreements entered into by the surrogate mother 
and intended parent(s), and resolution of disputes pertaining to, e.g. alleged non­
performance or defective performance of the contractual terms, including (non-)
payment of expenses/compensation to the surrogate mother (‘enforcement 
issues’); 
	 the process of assessment of participants’ eligibility/suitability to act as surrogate
mother or putative intended parent(s), respectively, and of securing due consents 
(‘regulatory issues’);  
	 the conferral of legal parenthood in respect of a child born or to be born, and the
attribution of parental rights and responsibilities (‘parental civil status issues’); 
	 the determination of a child’s status, incidents of his status, and rights, including
his permitted departure from the state of origin, entry to the receiving state, and 
citizenship (‘child civil status issues’). 
4.3.1. Jurisdiction in respect of contractual issues and enforcement issues 
Contractual issues and enforcement issues are likely to result from the arrangement 
between or among the following participants:
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	 Surrogate mother; 
	 Surrogacy services provider (‘the agency’); 
	 Intended parent(s); and
	 Egg donor – in cases of gestational surrogacy/collaborative use of bodily 
materials. 
Contractual issues of a justiciable nature are capable of arising at any point in the 
sequence of events inherent in the practice of surrogacy, from the point of initiation of
negotiations between the surrogate mother (or the surrogacy services agency), the
putative legal parent(s), [and the egg donor], to the point of physical transfer of the 
child to the intended parent(s), and the transfer in law of legal parenthood.
With regard to these issues, there are, at present, no harmonised rules allocating
jurisdiction in the surrogacy context. Specifically: 
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I 
Regulation’) (and Council Regulation (EC) No 2015/2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(recast) (‘Brussels I bis Regulation’) shall not apply to the status or legal capacity 
of natural persons (Art 1.2(a)). 
But such issues are capable of generating litigation in a traditional sense, and therefore
may require rules of jurisdiction. At present, with regard to disputes pertaining to such 
issues, each country will apply its own national rules to determine jurisdiction allocation, 
on a case by case basis. One question which emerges from the current study is whether 
it would be a valuable exercise to create bespoke harmonised rules of jurisdiction. 
Since these issues may arise irrespective of the birth of a child, it is arguable that any 
rules of jurisdiction could be modelled on rules of civil and commercial jurisdiction, rather 
than on rules of jurisdiction pertaining to parental responsibility.  
Restricting analysis to an ‘intra-EU’ solution (i.e. to circumstances concerning an EU-
domiciled defendant), and taking as a template the rules in the Brussels I Regulation,
the following rules might be put forward for debate: 
1.	 In the event of a bipartite contract (surrogate mother – Party A; intended
parent(s) – Party B), a person domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their
nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. (cf. Article 2, Brussels I 
Regulation). 
2.	 Alternatively, a provision akin to Article 5 (special jurisdiction) might be utilised,
to the effect that in a matter relating to a surrogacy agreement, the claimant may
sue in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question (cf. Art 
5.1.b of the Brussels I Regulation).  
An autonomous definition of ‘place of performance’ would be required. By analogy
with EU jurisprudence concerning civil and commercial contracts, ‘place of 
performance’ in commercial surrogacy arrangements (as in gratuitous surrogacy
arrangements) should not be the place of payment for surrogacy services (or 
expenses related thereto). The likeliest contender, it is submitted, would be the
place where the child was born, or should have been born.  
164
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
                                                            
 
  
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
Claims  in tort or delict (e.g. damages for culpa in contrahendo in relation to
negotiation of the surrogacy contract) founded on a ground equivalent to Article 
5.3 seem fanciful.  
3.	 A suggestion that a surrogacy contract should be treated as one of imbalance 
between the participants, such as to warrant ‘weaker party protection’ akin to
Section 4 (consumers) of the Brussels I Regulation, would seem unwise. In policy
terms, it would be harsh to treat a surrogate mother as a ‘professional/business
party’ in a consumer contract, and thereby to impose jurisdictional disadvantages
upon her. Indeed it is arguable that the surrogate mother herself should be 
entitled to a forum actoris rule for, in this uncharted subject area, in which legal
systems vary in attitude (e.g. in the extent to which they will enforce commercial
surrogacy arrangements), a surrogate mother seeking to sue the intended
parent(s) in the court of a legal system (their domicile) which is antagonistic
towards commercial surrogacy services, would be foiled by the public policy of
that forum. In this sense, the availability to her of the defendant’s forum would 
be worthless. The exercise of public policy by the forum (against enforcement)
shows the intimate link between jurisdiction rules and choice of law rules. 
Arguably, both in matters of jurisdiction and of applicable law, the surrogate
mother would benefit from, and be entitled to, the comfort of her home legal 
system. 
4.	 In the event of a multiple (related) contracts (among surrogate mother – Party A;
intended parent(s) – Party B; and surrogacy services provider – Party C), a
related actions provision akin to Article 6 of the Brussels I Regulation could
operate, conferring jurisdiction, in the case of an action against a number of EU-
domiciled defendants, in the Member State of the domicile of any one of them.  
4.3.2. Jurisdiction in respect of regulatory issues 
Regulatory issues (pertaining to the process of assessment of participants’ 
eligibility/suitability to act as surrogate mother or putative legal parent(s), respectively,
and of securing consents) are unlikely to be the subject of litigation in a traditional
sense. 
There is, at present, no set of harmonised rules regarding eligibility etc to participate in
a cross-border surrogacy arrangement. Each legal system would apply to such issues its
own national conflict of laws rules, if they exist, and, in the absence thereof, its own 
domestic rules. Questions of interpretation may arise as to the territorial application of
the domestic statutes of any country concerning surrogacy and related matters.280 
If, as a matter of policy, it were deemed appropriate to advance a common EU approach 
to regulatory issues, orthodox conflict of laws rules of jurisdiction allocation may seem
less appropriate than would a framework of Central Authority regulation and co­
operation, such as is found in the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and 
Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption (‘Adoption Convention’) (q.v.).  
The Adoption Convention does not lay down expressis verbis rules of jurisdiction, but
nonetheless it may yield assistance in the context of surrogacy. 
Intercountry adoption: jurisdiction – applications to adopt281 
There is no chapter in the Adoption Convention specifically devoted to jurisdiction. The
only criterion to be satisfied to enable parties to utilise the intercountry adoption process 
280 E.g., in the UK, Part 2 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.
 
281 See EB Crawford and J M Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective, 3rd edition (2010),
 
W.Green, para 14-74.
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provided is that the parties (i.e. the prospective adopters) are habitually resident in a
Contracting State (the receiving state), and that the child is habitually resident in
another Contracting State (Adoption Convention, Art 2). By Article 14 of the Adoption 
Convention, persons habitually resident in a Contracting State who wish to adopt a child
habitually resident in another Contracting State shall apply to the Central Authority in
the state of their habitual residence. Requirements for intercountry adoption are
assessed by the state of origin and the receiving state acting in concert (q.v.).
Cross-border surrogacy: jurisdiction in an intra-EU situation282 
A gateway similar to that used in the Adoption Convention could be devised for use in
cross-border surrogacy arrangements, that is to say, in circumstances, e.g, where the
surrogate mother and the intended parent(s) are habitually resident in (different) EU
Member States. On this premise, a putative EU regime could operate in the following
manner, by analogy with the Adoption Convention:
A person or persons (‘the intended parent(s)’), habitually resident in a Member State
(‘the receiving state’) who wish(es) to enter into a surrogacy arrangement with a person 
(‘the surrogate mother’) habitually resident in another Member State (‘the state of
origin’) shall apply to the Central Authority in the receiving state.
This model would be effective only where both the state of origin and the receiving state 
were (participating) EU Member States. As indicated, above, further deliberation would 
be required in the event of one or more factual connection(s) with a third State.
4.3.2.1. Jurisdiction in respect of parental civil status issues and child civil status issues 
Parental civil status issues and child civil status issues, unlike contractual issues and
enforcement issues, are dependent upon the birth of a child.  
Disputes concerning the conferral of legal parenthood in respect of a child born or to be
born, and the attribution of parental rights and responsibilities (‘parental civil status 
issues’) might emerge, e.g. where there is doubt or challenge concerning the status of
the intended parent(s) and his/her parental rights and responsibilities. Challenge to 
his/her status or the incidents of his/her status may occur at the point of attempted 
departure of the child from the state of origin, or at the point of entry to the receiving 
state. 
So too there could be expected to be disputes concerning the determination of the child’s 
status, the incidents of his status, and rights, including his permitted departure from the 
state of origin, entry to the receiving state, and citizenship (‘child civil status issues’). It 
seems likely that some of the issues in dispute would be of a ‘public law’ nature,
concerning nationality and immigration.  
There is, at present, no set of harmonised rules allocating jurisdiction in the surrogacy 
context. Specifically: ­
 The 1996 Convention does not apply, inter alia, to the establishment or 
contesting of a parent-child relationship (Art 4(a)).
 Brussels II bis does not apply to the establishing or contesting of a parent-child
relationship (Art 1.3.a): ‘… it does not apply to the establishment of parenthood,
since this is a different matter from the attribution of parental responsibility, nor 
to other questions linked to the status of persons’ (recital 10). 
282 See re. scope of application of EU level response, Section II above. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
At present, therefore, with regard to parental civil status issues and child civil status
issues, each country will apply its own national rules to determine jurisdiction allocation.
If an EU-level response were deemed appropriate, consideration ordinarily would be
given to the question whether or not rules of jurisdiction would require to be drafted, to 
clothe courts with the power to adjudicate in relation to such matters. Arguably, if
parental civil status issues or child civil status issues were to arise ‘in isolation’ (i.e.
separate from any dispute as to contractual or enforcement issues), reference could be
made to two existing models of jurisdiction in respect of parental responsibility and the 
person and property of a child, in order to arrive at, by analogous reasoning, a possible 
scheme of rules of jurisdiction, viz.:  
Jurisdiction per 1996 Hague Convention
The scheme of jurisdiction rules (Chapter II, Arts 5 – 14) in the 1996 Convention is
broadly as follows: 
Article 5
The first ground of jurisdiction, in favour of the habitual residence [undefined] of the
child, is concerned with measures directed to the protection of the child’s person and 
property. It is notable that jurisdiction is conferred on the habitual residence for the 
time being of the child.
Article 6 
Article 6 is a special rule, which applies principally to refugee children and displaced
children, but also to children whose habitual residence cannot be established (a 
category more likely to be of importance in the context of the subject under 
examination), conferring jurisdiction on the court of the territory in which the child is
present. 
Article 7
Article 7 is a special rule, applicable in cases of wrongful removal or retention of a 
child, which confers jurisdiction on the authorities of the contracting state of the
habitual residence of the child immediately before the removal or retention. 
This jurisdiction continues until the acquisition by the child of a habitual residence in
another state, and there has been acquiescence in the removal/retention by each
person, institution or other body having rights of custody, or the child has resided in
that other State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other
body having rights of custody has or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts
of the child, no request for return lodged within that period is still pending, and the 
child is settled in his or her new environment. 
So long as the authorities of the contracting state of the immediate pre­
removal/retention habitual residence of the child keep their jurisdiction, the 
authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which
he or she has been retained can take only such urgent measures under Article 11 as 
are necessary for the protection of the person or property of the child. 
Articles 8 and 9 
Article 8 provides an exception to the jurisdiction conferred by Articles 5 and 6, and 
is to the effect that the authority of a Contracting State having jurisdiction under 
Article 5 or 6, if it considers that the authority of another Contracting State would be 
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better placed in the particular case to assess the best interests of the child, may
either request that other authority to assume jurisdiction to take such measures of
protection as it considers to be necessary, or suspend consideration of the case and 
invite the parties to introduce such a request before the authority of that other State.
Such other Contracting State may assume jurisdiction if it considers that this is in the
child’s best interests. 
The Contracting States whose authorities may be addressed are limited to a State of 
which the child is a national; a State in which property of the child is located; a State 
whose authorities are seized of an application for divorce or legal separation of the 
child's parents, or for annulment of their marriage; or a State with which the child
has a substantial connection. 
Article 10 
Without prejudice to Articles 5 – 9, the authority of a Contracting State exercising 
jurisdiction in respect of the matrimonial status of the parents of a child habitually
resident in another Contracting State may, if the law of their State to provides, take
measures directed to the protection of the person or property of such child if certain 
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.  
Article 11 
In all cases of urgency, the authorities of any Contracting State in whose territory the 
child or property belonging to the child is present have jurisdiction to take any 
necessary measures of protection, such jurisdiction lapsing as soon as Contracting 
State authorities having jurisdiction under Articles 5 – 10 have taken the measures
required by the situation. 
Article 12 
Subject to Article 7, Article 12 confers jurisdiction on the authorities of a Contracting 
State in whose territory the child or property belonging to the child is present, to
take measures of a provisional character for the protection of the person or property 
of the child which have a territorial effect limited to the State in question, in so far as 
such measures are not incompatible with measures already taken by authorities
which have jurisdiction under Articles 5 to 10. Article 12 jurisdiction lapses as soon
as Contracting State authorities having jurisdiction under Articles 5 – 10 have taken
the measures required by the situation. 
Article 13 
Article 13 recognises that more than one Contracting State may have jurisdiction
under Articles 5 – 10, and imposes a priority of process rule.  
Article 14 
By Article 14, measures taken in application of Articles 5 to 10 shall remain in force,
even if a change of circumstances has eliminated the basis upon which jurisdiction
was founded, so long as the authorities which have jurisdiction under the Convention
have not modified, replaced or terminated such measures. 
AND 
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Jurisdiction per Brussels II bis
The scheme of jurisdiction rules (Chapter II, Section 2, Arts 8 – 15) in Brussels II bis in
respect of parental responsibility is broadly as follows:  
Article 8
The primary ground of jurisdiction, subject to Arts 9, 10 and 12, is that the courts of 
the Member State shall have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility over a 
child who is habitually resident [ undefined] in that Member State at the time the 
court is seized (defined in Art 16). 
Article 9 
Although habitual residence is not defined in Brussels II bis, Article 9 provides for the 
situation where a child moves lawfully from one Member State to another and 
acquires a new habitual residence there. The position is that the courts of the 
Member State of the child’s former habitual residence shall, by way of exception to 
Article 8, retain jurisdiction during a three-month period following the move for the 
purpose of modifying a judgment on access rights issued in that Member State 
before the child moved, where the holder of access rights pursuant to the judgment
on access rights continues to have his or her habitual residence in the Member State 
of the child's former habitual residence 
Article 10 
Article 10 provides for the situation where a child, habitually resident in one Member
State, is wrongfully removed or retained to/in another. This article contains a
complex construct of rules to ensure retention of jurisdiction by the court of the
Member State of the child’s erstwhile habitual residence. 
Article 12 
Article 12 contains rules on prorogation of jurisdiction, principally to clothe the court
having matrimonial jurisdiction in respect of the child’s parents with jurisdiction in
any matter relating to parental responsibility, subject to certain provisos. 
Article 13 
Article 13 provides a rule based on presence, applicable in relation to children whose 
habitual residence cannot be established, refugee children and displaced children.
Article 15 
Article 15 contains a transfer mechanism on a discretionary basis whereby the court
seized, if it considers that a court of another Member State with which the child has a 
particular connection would be better placed to hear the case, and that this is in the 
best interests of the child, may stay the case in favour of such other court. 
Article 19 
Article 19 recognises that more than one Member State may have jurisdiction under 
Section II, and imposes a priority of process rule.
Article 20 
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By Article 20, the courts of a Member State may take such provisional including
protective measures in respect of persons or assets in that State as may be available 
under the law of that State even if the court of another Member State has jurisdiction
as to the substance. 
The 1996 Convention and Brussels II bis demonstrate the operation of certain common
principles, namely jurisdiction based on: 
	 habitual residence of the child (Art 5, 1996 Convention; Art 8, Brussels II bis); 
	 jurisdiction in respect of refugee/displaced children and children whose habitual
residence is uncertain (Art 6, 1996 Convention; Art 13, Brussels II bis);
	 continuing jurisdiction in the face of changed circumstances of lawful or wrongful 
removal (Arts 7 and 14, 1996 Convention; Arts 9 and 10, Brussels II bis); 
	 discretionary transfer to a more appropriate court (Arts 8 and 9, 1996 
Convention; Art 15, Brussels II bis);
	 related matrimonial proceedings (Art 10, 1996 Convention (protective measures
only); Art 12, Brussels II bis); 
	 urgency/physical presence of person or asset (Art 11, 1996 Convention; Art 20,
Brussels II bis); and 
	 priority of process (Art 13, 1996 Convention; Art 19, Brussels II bis).
Arguably a similar scheme of rules (under exclusion of the obviously inappropriate) could 
be adopted in surrogacy cases for parental civil status issues and child civil status issues, 
viz. jurisdiction based upon: 
	 habitual residence of the child; 
	 presence of the child, where the child’s habitual residence is uncertain; 
	 discretionary transfer to a more appropriate court; 
	 urgency/physical presence of child; and 
	 priority of process. 
4.3.3.	 Jurisdiction in relation to contractual issues / enforcement issues 
AND parental status issues / child civil status issues
Were such issues to arise cumulatively in a given case, it would be highly unsatisfactory
for them to fall within the jurisdiction of different courts.  
A straightforward priority of process rule would carry the risk that a court having 
jurisdiction in relation to contractual issues or enforcement issues would be seized first, 
thereby precluding proceedings in a court second seized exercising jurisdiction in relation 
to civil status issues. Against that, however, is the likelihood that the court having 
jurisdiction in proceedings for enforcement of a surrogacy contract against a (say, 
reneging) surrogate mother would coincide with that in which civil status issues ought to 
be adjudicated. 
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At best perhaps, a general transfer of jurisdiction mechanism desirably would operate,
perhaps via a ‘related proceedings’ provision (cf. Art 28, Brussels I Regulation; Art 15,
Brussels II bis). 
This brief examination reveals some of difficulties which would be inherent in allocating
jurisdiction according to the approach adopted traditionally in the subject of the conflict
of laws. 
4.4. ISSUES OF CHOICE OF LAW 
The question of what law governs various legal issues arising in connection with cross-
border surrogacy is of pivotal importance. At present, there is no harmonised private
international law regulation of surrogacy per se, and so any individual Member State 
forum would apply to the facts and circumstances of a particular cause its own national 
choice of law rules, on a case by case basis. In the UK at least, there is no established
body of national choice of law rules to deal in a systematic way with cross-border 
surrogacy. 
Insofar as a surrogacy arrangement is contractual in nature, it is important, at the
outset, to note the non-applicability of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’). By Article 1.2 of Rome I, contractual 
obligations involving the status or legal capacity of natural persons (Art 1.2(a), subject 
only to Art 13 ‘incapacity’), and contractual obligations arising out of family relationships 
(Art 1.2.b), are excluded from the scope of the instrument. Hence, any EU court
currently must apply its own (private international law) national rules pertaining to
contractual obligations in order to assess the validity and enforceability of a cross-border 
surrogacy contract. 
So too, insofar as any non-contractual obligations may be said to derive from 
international surrogacy arrangements (e.g. a claim in unjust enrichment), it is important 
to note the non-applicability of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II’). By Art 1.2.a of Rome II, there are excluded from 
the scope of the instrument non-contractual obligations arising out of family
relationships. 
Cross-border surrogacy may give rise to queries about choice of law in some or all of the 
following areas, for each of which choice of law rules (i.e. rules by which to determine
applicable law) may require to be framed, either by each national legal system for its 
own private international law purposes, by way of EU-level harmonised response, or by
way of global (Hague Conference) harmonised response.  
4.4.1. Contractual aspects of surrogacy
–	 Eligibility/suitability/capacity  
 of intended parents  
	 legal eligibility: age; permissibility of sole/joint application; application
by married parties/parties to a civil partnership/de facto cohabiting
parties/single applicant;
	 mental/physical eligibility.
 of surrogate mother  
	 legal eligibility: age; married/unmarried status; 
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	 mental/physical eligibility.
–	 Consents to arrangements  
 of intended parents;  
 of surrogate mother;  
 of 3rd parties, e.g. spouse of surrogate mother. 
–	 Formal validity of arrangement 
–	 Essential validity of arrangement
 applicable law per party autonomy, if permissible; 
 applicable law in the absence of choice of law;
 enforceability. 
–	 Interpretation of surrogacy contract 
 ensuring party giving consent understands the effect and consequences of 
that decision; 
 ensuring consent was given freely, and not induced or otherwise 
improperly obtained.
–	 Performance issues 
 Discharge of contract, and remedies for non-performance by surrogate 
mother (including frustration by way of miscarriage or abortion; 
responsibility for over-performance: multiple birth) or by intended 
parents (including total or partial non-payment; or repudiation of 
contract); 
 Consequences of total/partial breach of contract. 
–	 Compensation/remuneration to surrogate mother; costs and expenses of
surrogate mother 
 ensuring prevention of improper [?] financial gain and corruption.
–	 Mandatory protective provisions  
 of the forum; of other interested states (e.g. habitual residence of 
surrogate mother; situs of fertility clinic);
 vis-à-vis putative child? surrogate mother? spouse of surrogate; intended
parents? 
–	 Public policy
 of forum (qua receiving state?; qua state of origin?);
 awareness of ‘reproductive tourism’/‘lab shopping’: surrogacy-friendly
states v. exploitation.  
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
Broadly equivalent considerations would apply to the contractual aspects of any parallel 
contract between/among the surrogate mother, intended parent(s), the surrogacy
services provider, and an egg donor.
4.4.2. Civil status implications of surrogacy 
There is an important difference between contractual consequences in personam and 
issues of personal status contra mundum. By Scots and English law, parties (the
surrogate mother and the intended parents) cannot by contract determine the civil 
status of a child born or to be born, nor deny/confer upon themselves, through exercise
of party autonomy, the status of legal parenthood. There are also public law issues 
concerning citizenship and permitted residence.  
Brussels II bis applies to all civil matters concerning the ‘attribution, exercise,
delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility.’ (Art 1.1.b) 
By Art 1.2, the Regulation shall apply, in particular, to rights of custody and access (Art
1.2.a); guardianship, curatorship and similar institutions (Art 1.2.b); the designation and 
functions of any person or body having charge of the child’s person or property, 
representing or assisting the child (Art 1.2.c); and measures for the protection of the 
child relating to the administration, conservation or disposal of the child’s property (Art
1.2.d). 
Brussels II bis does not apply to the establishing or contesting of a parent-child
relationship (Art 1.3.a): ‘… it does not apply to the establishment of parenthood, since 
this is a different matter from the attribution of parental responsibility, nor to other
questions linked to the status of persons’ (recital 10). 
A putative EU regime would require to give consideration to the framing of choice of law
rules to determine the following issues:
–	 Legal parentage (a parent/child relationship based on bio-genetic affinity), 
and the legal effects thereof; 
–	 Legal parenthood (i.e. the attribution of parental status, that is the 
attribution of legal status to someone as the parent of a child. cf. filiation)
and the legal effects thereof: 
	 framework for legal parenthood (2-parent framework?); 
	 attribution of legal motherhood;
	 attribution of legal fatherhood;
	 judicial authorisation of transfer of parenthood after birth; 
 withdrawal of parental rights and responsibilities from the 
surrogate mother (and spouse); 
	 conferral of parental rights and responsibilities on the intended 
parents; 
–	 Related civil status issues 
 authorisation of child’s departure from state of origin;
 authorisation of child’s entry to receiving state;
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 conferral of citizenship/nationality of child born from surrogacy; 
 cognate legal issues – e.g. children’s rights to genetic information;
 public policy issues – statelessness; exploitation of surrogate 
mother; welfare of child.
The likelihood is that the choice of law governance of these issues would be distributed
between the law of the state of origin and the law of the receiving state.
4.4.3. The Adoption Convention template 
In speculating as to the formulation of choice of law rules for this subject area, it is
impossible to ignore the essential contractual component of cross-border surrogacy 
arrangements (which is stronger than in intercountry adoption). This may tend to 
suggest that a body of choice of law rules corresponding to those found in the Rome I 
Regulation should apply. 
Conversely, there is a close parallel with intercountry adoption, and of the patent need 
for child welfare safeguards, which tend to the conclusion that matters cannot be left
entirely to party autonomy. That being so, it would be a matter of delineating that which
properly can be left to individual contract, from that which pertains to civil status and its
consequences and which must be monitored, therefore, at state level.  
A third consideration is the extent to which it would be advisable for a single instrument
to contain applicable law rules for both the contractual and the civil status issues. It is
probably better for this to be the aim, rather than for contractual issues to be regulated 
by a separate instrument modelled, e.g., on the Rome I Regulation. A holistic approach
may be thought to be the optimum objective, for policy reasons of internal consistency,
and coherence of regime provisions – assuming, in policy terms, that a regime
regulatory in nature were to be considered desirable in principle. 
The fundamental principles of the Adoption Convention283 are: 
‘a) best interests principle: the best interests of the child are the primary
consideration in all matters relating to Convention adoptions;
b) subsidiarity principle: the subsidiary nature of intercountry adoption is one 
element to be considered when applying the best interests principle;
c) safeguards principle: the development of safeguards is necessary to prevent 
the abduction, sale of, and traffic in children;
d) co-operation principle: effective co-operation between authorities must be 
established and maintained to ensure that safeguards are applied effectively; and
e) competent authorities principle: only competent authorities, appointed or
designated in each State, should be permitted to authorise intercountry 
adoptions.’284 
It is said that,
283 For information on the Adoption Convention, see ‘The Implementation and Operation of the 1993 Hague
Intercountry Adoption Convention: Guide to Good Practice, Guide No 1’ (2008) (‘Adoption Good Practice Guide
No 1’); and ‘Accreditation and Adoption Accredited Bodies: General Principles and Guide to Good Practice, 
Guide No 2’ (2012) (‘Adoption Good Practice Guide No 2’). 
284 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 2, p 21. See also Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, p 27 
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‘Promotion of good practices in the field of intercountry adoption accordingly 
relies on:  
• acceptance of the primary mission or object, namely protecting the best 
interests of children affected by adoption; 
• a shared understanding of the role of the Central Authority, the competent 
authorities and the accredited bodies; 
• mutual respect among those entities and a relationship of trust; and  
• continuous dialogue among the players regarding the powers and functions of
each 
and the way in which they are exercised.’285 
It is important to appreciate that the Adoption Convention does not require national 
adoption laws to be uniform: ‘The Convention is designed to operate between systems
having different internal laws relating to adoption.286 Rather it establishes minimum 
standards and safeguards. 
8.1.1 Basic procedures and minimum standards 
440. The Convention provides a clear set of basic procedures and minimum 
standards for intercountry adoption, governing inter alia the application process,
the preparation of reports on the child and the adopting parents, the obtaining of
necessary consents, the exchange of information between the two States 
concerned, the decision concerning entrustment, authorisation for the child to 
reside permanently in the receiving State, and the transfer of the child from the
State of origin to the receiving State. 287 
The Adoption Convention is an important contribution in an area of law which is difficult
to regulate.288 Its provisions appear to contain many safeguards for the child, and for 
those whose consent to intercountry adoption is necessary.  
Ex facie the Convention contains fewer conflict rules than might be expected; indeed
they must be searched out, and/or inferred. The most notable absence is of any express 
mention of choice of law amid much facilitative and precautionary provision. The dual
responsibility of the state of origin and the receiving state is a noteworthy
characteristic.289 
Whilst this last mentioned aspect would be likely to be an important feature of any
putative EU regime on international surrogacy, choice of law rules within that projected
instrument to regulate the core contractual dimension of surrogacy would seem to be 
necessary. This aspect differentiates the cross-border surrogacy legislative profile from 
the intercountry adoption profile. Therefore, although the best legislative model, it would 
appear, is the Adoption Convention, that model, to be effective in the surrogacy context,
285 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 2, p 13.
 
286 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, para 8.1.2. See also Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, p 13, ‘One of 

the great advantages of the Convention is the flexibility it gives to Contracting States in deciding how its 

provisions are to be implemented. Each State may adapt its own laws and procedures to implement the
 
Convention.’
 
287 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, para 8.1.1.
 
288 See, for detail on UK position, EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots 

Perspective (3rd edition) (2010), W Green, paras 14-72 – 14-76.
 
289 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption – 

Information Brochure (2012), p 5.
 
175
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
would require to be supplemented by certain rules with regard to choice of law in
contract (possibly deriving from the Rome I Regulation). 
The following section aims to summarise where drafting assistance could be derived from 
the template of the Adoption Convention:  
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT 
OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
CROSS-BORDER SURROGACY 
The States signatory to the present Convention,  
Recognising that the child, for the full and
harmonious development of his or her
personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love 
and understanding,  
Recalling that each State should take, as a matter
of priority, appropriate measures to enable the 
child to remain in the care of his or her family of 
origin,  
Recognising that intercountry adoption may offer 
the advantage of a permanent family to a child
for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his 
or her State of origin,  
Convinced of the necessity to take measures to
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in
the best interests of the child and with respect for
his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the 
abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children,  
Desiring to establish common provisions to this
effect, taking into account the principles set forth
in international instruments, in particular the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, of 20 November 1989, and the United
Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles 
relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, 
with Special Reference to Foster Placement and
Adoption Nationally and Internationally (General
Assembly Resolution 41/85, of 3 December
1986).
Have agreed upon the following provisions – 
The policy and aims of an EU level response would 
require to be agreed, and carefully narrated in any 
instrument. 
CHAPTER I – SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 1  
The objects of the present Convention are:  
a) to establish safeguards to ensure that
intercountry adoptions take place in the best
interests of the child and with respect for his or
her fundamental rights as recognised in
international law;
b) to establish a system of co-operation amongst
Contracting States to ensure that those
safeguards are respected and thereby prevent the
abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children;  
The objectives of co-operation and recognition would
appear to be transferable to the surrogacy context;
so too the aim of safeguarding the best interests of a 
child born, or to be born.
If an EU-level response were to be generated, 
agreement would have to be struck, in policy terms, 
as to where the balance of interests/protection
should lie (and at what time) among the surrogate
mother, the intended parent(s), the child born or to
be born.
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Article 2  
(1) The Convention shall apply where a child 
habitually resident in one Contracting State ("the 
State of origin") has been, is being, or is to be 
moved to another Contracting State ("the 
receiving State") either after his or her adoption 
in the State of origin by spouses or a person 
habitually resident in the receiving State, or for 
the purposes of such an adoption in the receiving 
State or in the State of origin.  
(2) The Convention covers only adoptions which 
create a permanent parent child relationship. 
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c) to secure the recognition in Contracting States
of adoptions made in accordance with the
Convention. 
-
As indicated in Section II of this Report, the 
geographical remit of any EU-level response would 
be a matter of critical importance.  
The most straightforward model would be premised
on a situation where all interested legal systems 
were those of EU Member States, and all Member 
States were bound by the putative instrument. 
Complications would emerge where the factual 
matrix involves one or more connection(s) with a
non-EU Member State (third State).  
The Adoption Convention envisages application 
where the state of origin and the receiving state 
both are in Contracting States. An EU surrogacy 
instrument could operate where the state of origin
(say, habitual residence of the surrogate mother) 
and the receiving state (say, habitual residence of 
the intended parent(s)) both are (participating) EU 
Member States.
Detailed consideration, however, would require to be 
given also to the weighting of alternative/ additional
connections with  EU Member States by reason of,  
e.g. principal place of business of the surrogacy
services provider; branch office of the surrogacy
services provider; locus of reproductive 
procedure/services; place of birth of child (likely to
coincide with state of origin); personal law of the 
child (probably habitual residence; arguably
coinciding with the state of origin, depending on the
facts). 
In terms of subject-matter scope of an EU- level 
response, detailed definitions would be required of
all critical words and phrases. 
CHAPTER II – REQUIREMENTS FOR 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS  
Article 4  
An adoption within the scope of the Convention
shall take place only if the competent authorities
of the State of origin –  
a) have established that the child is adoptable;  
b) have determined, after possibilities for 
placement of the child within the State of origin
have been given due consideration, that an 
intercountry adoption is in the child's best
interests;  
c) have ensured that 
(1) the persons, institutions and authorities
whose consent is necessary for adoption, have
been counselled as may be necessary and duly
informed of the effects of their consent, in
It would have to be determined whether or not an
EU­  level response would establish an exclusive 
framework for cross-border surrogacy.  
Article 4 outlines the responsibilities of the
authorities of the state of origin. 
Article 5 outlines the responsibilities of the
authorities of the receiving state.
It would be feasible to follow this model in the 
context of cross-border surrogacy, for whatever the
other connecting factors, the legal systems 
principally interested would appear to be those of 
the state of origin and the state of receipt.
Issues which would require to be addressed in a 
conflict of laws sense include, e.g., 
a. eligibility/suitability/capacity of intended parents
(legal eligibility: age; permissibility of sole/joint
application; application by married parties/parties to
a civil partnership /de facto cohabiting parties/single
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
particular whether or not an adoption will result in
the termination of the legal relationship between 
the child and his or her family of origin,  
(2) such persons, institutions and authorities 
have given their consent freely, in the required
legal form, and expressed or evidenced in writing,
(3) the consents have not been induced by
payment or compensation of any kind and have 
not been withdrawn, and  
(4) the consent of the mother, where required,
has been given only after the birth of the child; 
and 
d) have ensured, having regard to the age and 
degree of maturity of the child, that  
(1) he or she has been counselled and duly
informed of the effects of the adoption and of his 
or her consent to the adoption, where such
consent is required,  
(2) consideration has been given to the child's
wishes and opinions,  
(3) the child's consent to the adoption, where
such consent is required, has been given freely, in
the required legal form, and expressed or
evidenced in writing, and
(4) such consent has not been induced by
payment or compensation of any kind. 
applicant; and mental/physical eligibility). 
b. eligibility/suitability/capacity of surrogate mother 
(legal eligibility: age; married/ unmarried status; 
mental/physical eligibility).
c. consents to arrangements (e.g. of intended 
parents; surrogate mother; 3rd parties, e.g. spouse
of surrogate mother). (See generally also Art 16).
A balance would need to be struck between the
powers and responsibilities of the state of origin and 
those of the receiving state. On analogy with the 
Adoption Convention, issues pertaining to the 
surrogate mother could be referred to the authorities 
of the state of origin; and issues pertaining to the 
intended parent(s) to the authorities of the state of 
receipt.  
The Adoption Convention does not specify a choice
of law rule by which the authorities of the state of
origin and the receiving state, respectively, are to
determine the various issues. This probably leads to
the conclusion, with regard to that instrument, that 
the issues are to be determined by the relevant
authorities according to the domestic law of their
own state. This solution could be extended to a
surrogacy instrument.  
As noted above at Section IV.C of this Report, there 
are differences between intercountry adoption and 
cross-border surrogacy as a result of the latter being 
founded in contract. Parties cannot by contract 
determine status, but without the impetus of the 
contract no question of status would arise. 
The Adoption Convention model would secure for 
surrogacy certain safeguards, some of which have a 
contractual aspect, e.g. eligibility.  
If eligibility were construed as a matter of purely 
contractual capacity (e.g. many systems of law could 
be expected to prescribe only a minimum 
requirement of age, sanity and solvency) it would be
subject to the contractual lex causae. However, if
‘eligibility’ to enter into a surrogacy arrangement
were construed as going beyond ‘capacity’ to
‘suitability’, it would fall within the control of the 
‘civil status’ lex causae (i.e. the law of the state of
origin, or of the receiving state, as may be
determined, per the ‘status-related’ rules of the 
putative EU regime). There could be a clash between 
the applicable law in contract and the ‘civil status’ 
lex causae. Ultimately, it would appear that the
latter would have to prevail because of overarching
child welfare considerations. 
A similar clash between the contractual lex causae 
and the civil status lex causae could arise with
regard to the important issue of whether or not
commercial surrogacy is valid, i.e. whether a
contractual provision for payment of the surrogate
mother is essentially valid.
There are other ‘core contractual’ issues (which may 
arise whether or not a child is born, and therefore 
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whether or not civil status issues are engaged), for 
which the Adoption Convention has no parallel, e.g. 
formal validity of the arrangement; interpretation of
surrogacy contract; performance issues (discharge
of contract), and remedies for non-performance by
surrogate mother or by intended parents; and 
consequences of total/partial breach of contract. 
Such contractual issues (if and when litigated) would 
be referred by Member State courts to their own 
residual, national choice of law rules in contract,
unless the putative EU regime were to seek to deal 
with the entirety of the surrogacy arrangement, i.e. 
the contractual issues and the status issues.  
Article 5  
An adoption within the scope of the Convention
shall take place only if the competent authorities
of the receiving State –  
a) have determined that the prospective adoptive
parents are eligible and suited to adopt;
b) have ensured that the prospective adoptive
parents have been counselled as may be 
necessary; and  
c) have determined that the child is or will be  
authorised to enter and reside permanently in
that State. 
Article 5 outlines the responsibilities of the
authorities of the receiving state.
CHAPTER IV – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION  
Article 14  
Persons habitually resident in a Contracting State,
who wish to adopt a child habitually resident in
another Contracting State, shall apply to the 
Central Authority in the State of their habitual
residence. 
‘Convention adoptions’ must be channelled via the 
Central Authority of the receiving state.
In the context of cross-border surrogacy, a policy 
decision would require to be taken as to whether or 
not a surrogacy arrangement involving more than
one EU Member State was required to proceed in 
accordance with the putative EU regime, i.e. a 
decision would have to be taken as to how 
regulatory the system was intended to be, and 
whether it should be mandatory/exclusive. Would it
operate to render unenforceable all ‘private’ 
arrangements, territorially within the EU?   
 Article 15  
(1) If the Central Authority of the receiving State 
is satisfied that the applicants are eligible and
suited to adopt, it shall prepare a report including
information about their identity, eligibility and
suitability to adopt, background, family and 
medical history, social environment, reasons for 
adoption, ability to undertake an intercountry
adoption, as well as the characteristics of the 
children for whom they would be qualified to care.
(2) It shall transmit the report to the Central 
Authority of the State of origin. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 16  
(1) If the Central Authority of the State of origin
is satisfied that the child is adoptable, it shall –
It is of the essence of surrogacy that the contract 
between the surrogate mother and intended 
parent(s) is put in place in advance of the birth of
the child. Therefore, certain of the duties incumbent 
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Article 17  
Any decision in the State of origin that a child 
should be entrusted to prospective adoptive 
parents may only be made if –  
a) the Central Authority of that State has ensured 
that the prospective adoptive parents agree;  
b) the Central Authority of the receiving State has
approved such decision, where such approval is
required by the law of that State or by the Central
Authority of the State of origin;  
c) the Central Authorities of both States have 
agreed that the adoption may proceed; and  
d) it has been determined, in accordance with 
Article 5, that the prospective adoptive parents
are eligible and suited to adopt and that the child
is or will be authorised to enter and reside
permanently in the receiving State.
Article 17 imposes child-protective duties on the 
Central Authority of the state of origin of the child, 
after liaison with the Central Authority of the 
receiving state.
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 18  
The Central Authorities of both States shall take
all necessary steps to obtain permission for the
child to leave the State of origin and to enter and 
reside permanently in the receiving State. 
Article 18 imposes on both the Central Authority of 
the state of origin and the Central Authority of the 
receiving state the duty to ensure that the child is 
permitted to leave the state of origin, and to enter
and reside permanently in the receiving state. A 
putative EU regime in surrogacy would be required
to deliver this vital objective. 
Article 19  
(1) The transfer of the child to the receiving State 
may only be carried out if the requirements of
Article 17 have been satisfied.
(2) The Central Authorities of both States shall 
ensure that this transfer takes place in secure and 
appropriate circumstances and, if possible, in the 
Mutatis mutandis. 
a) prepare a report including information about
his or her identity, adoptability, background,
social environment, family history, medical
history including that of the child's family, and 
any special needs of the child;  
b) give due consideration to the child's upbringing 
and to his or her ethnic, religious and cultural
background; 
c) ensure that consents have been obtained in
accordance with Article 4; and  
d) determine, on the basis in particular of the
reports relating to the child and the prospective
adoptive parents, whether the envisaged
placement is in the best interests of the child.  
(2) It shall transmit to the Central Authority of
the receiving State its report on the child, proof 
that the necessary consents have been obtained 
and the reasons for its determination on the 
placement, taking care not to reveal the identity
of the mother and the father if, in the State of
origin, these identities may not be disclosed.
upon the Central Authority of the state of origin in
adoption could not be extended, mutatis mutandis, 
to surrogacy. 
Article 16 imposes child-protective duties on the 
Central Authority of the state of origin of the child. 
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company of the adoptive or prospective adoptive 
parents.
(3) If the transfer of the child does not take
place, the reports referred to in Articles 15 and 16
are to be sent back to the authorities who
forwarded them.
Article 20  
The Central Authorities shall keep each other
informed about the adoption process and the 
measures taken to complete it, as well as about 
the progress of the placement if a probationary 
period is required. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 22  
(1) The functions of a Central Authority under this
Chapter may be performed by public authorities
or by bodies accredited under Chapter III, to the
extent permitted by the law of its State.
(2) Any Contracting State may declare to the 
depositary of the Convention that the functions of 
the Central Authority under Articles 15 to 21 may
be performed in that State, to the extent
permitted by the law and subject to the 
supervision of the competent authorities of that
State, also by bodies or persons who –  
a) meet the requirements of integrity,
professional competence, experience and
accountability of that State; and  
b) are qualified by their ethical standards and by
training or experience to work in the field of inter-
country adoption.  
(3) A Contracting State which makes the
declaration provided for in paragraph 2 shall keep
the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law informed of the
names and addresses of these bodies and
persons.
(4) Any Contracting State may declare to the 
depositary of the Convention that adoptions of
children habitually resident in its territory may
only take place if the functions of the Central
Authorities are performed in accordance with 
paragraph 1.
(5) Notwithstanding any declaration made under
paragraph 2, the reports provided for in Articles 
15 and 16 shall, in every case, be prepared under
the responsibility of the Central Authority or other
authorities or bodies in accordance with
paragraph 1.
Mutatis mutandis. 
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4.5. ISSUES OF COOPERATION AND BEST PRACTICE 
In the matter of administration of cross-border surrogacy arrangements, a policy
decision would require to be taken as to whether or not a putative EU regime was to be 
facilitative (i.e. to encourage cross-border surrogacy and good practice in the
management thereof) and/or regulatory (to control the practice and to impose minimum 
standards/safeguards), i.e. a mandatory/exclusive system.  
Whatever the nature of a putative EU regime, the use of Central Authorities would seem
to be desirable and indeed necessary to establish effective co-operation between/among
participating states. This system is very well embedded in Conventions of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, e.g. the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (Arts 7-11 and 21-30), the Adoption Convention 
(Arts 6-13 and 14-21), and the 1996 Hague Convention (Arts 29-40). The creation of
Central Authorities to facilitate the operation of these Conventions is mandatory for all 
Contracting States. Contracting States bear an obligation to deter all practices contrary
to the objects and standards of the relevant Convention. The focus is on effective co­
operation; strong, open communication; expeditious procedures; and transparency of 
decision-making. Yet it must be noted that in international instruments of this type,
certain seemingly administrative measures may have a substantive component (e.g. in
determining and certifying suitability), and insofar as that were the case, authorities of
the state endowed by the regime would be very likely to apply to such issues their own
domestic law.
Were a system of best practice via Central Authorities to be being laid down, relevant
considerations would include, inter alia: 
	 Powers and duties of Central Authorities 
–	 Pre-surrogacy (eligibility etc)
–	 Post-surrogacy  
 Preservation of information (including child’s right to information)
 Reporting to state of origin
	 Location, personnel and material resources of Central Authorities 
	 Operational funding for Central Authorities’ services in the regulation and
supervision of surrogacy arrangements 
	 Dissemination of information re. cross-border surrogacy process and role and
remit of Central Authorities 
	 International co-operation among Central Authorities 
	 Collection and maintenance of statistics 
By way of example, the Adoption Convention establishes a system of co-operation
between authorities in states of origin and in receiving states, which is designed to
ensure that inter-country adoption takes place under conditions which help to guarantee 
the best adoption practices and eliminate potential abuses:
2.3 Establishing co-operation between States 
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94. Co-operation between States is the third central principle of the Convention. 
The system of co-operation envisioned under the Convention is one in which all
Contracting States work together to ensure the protection of children. In order to
achieve this goal, it is important that States: 
• create systems that complement and strengthen the protections implemented 
by other Contracting States; 
• consider the impact that their regulation of adoption, or lack thereof, may have
on other States; 
• provide mechanisms for the collection and dissemination of information and 
statistics to other States Parties, and to those who utilise the adoption and child
care and protection system; 
• co-operate with other Parties to address temporary or permanent changes in 
procedures, emergency situations, and enforcement of criminal sanctions; 
• provide the Permanent Bureau with updated contact information in respect of
Central Authorities and accredited bodies.290 
4.2.3 International co-operation and co-ordination 
183. Article 7(1) provides that Central Authorities shall co-operate with each 
other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their 
States to protect children and to achieve the other objects of the Convention. 
184. Co-operation between authorities is enhanced by: 
• clearly identifying the responsible authorities and personnel in adoption 
matters, and publishing their contact details; 
• building confidence, understanding and trust between countries and their 
Central Authority personnel;
• encouraging good communication, especially the ability to communicate with 
Central Authority personnel of countries of origin in their own language;
• attending meetings and exchanging information at conferences, Hague Special
Commission meetings, and bilateral or regional meetings.291 
Thus: 
290 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, page 27. See also Adoption Good Practice Guide No 2, page 13. 
291 Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, para 4.2.3. 
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CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF 
CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN 
RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
CROSS-BORDER SURROGACY 
CHAPTER III – CENTRAL AUTHORITIES
AND ACCREDITED BODIES
Article 6  
(1) A Contracting State shall designate a
Central Authority to discharge the duties which 
are imposed by the Convention upon such
authorities.
(2) Federal States, States with more than one 
system of law or States having autonomous 
territorial units shall be free to appoint more 
than one Central Authority and to specify the
territorial or personal extent of their functions. 
Where a State has appointed more than one 
Central Authority, it shall designate the Central 
Authority to which any communication may be 
addressed for transmission to the appropriate
Central Authority within that State.
This is a general clause requiring states party to
the Convention to designate a Central Authority 
to discharge the duties imposed by the
Convention.
Article 7  
(1) Central Authorities shall co-operate with
each other and promote co-operation amongst
the competent authorities in their States to
protect children and to achieve the other
objects of the Convention.  
(2) They shall take directly all appropriate 
measures to –  
a) provide information as to the laws of their 
States concerning adoption and other general
information, such as statistics and standard 
forms; 
b) keep one another informed about the 
operation of the Convention and, as far as
possible, eliminate any obstacles to its 
application.
This imposes on Central Authorities the duties of
administrative co-operation, and would be 
required in the cross-border surrogacy context. 
Certain changes tailored to surrogacy would be 
necessary, but the basic model of co-operation in
principle would be workable and appears to
afford the most obvious means of facilitating/ 
regulating/monitoring surrogacy practice.  
Article 8  
Central Authorities shall take, directly or
through public authorities, all appropriate 
measures to prevent improper financial or 
other gain in connection with an adoption and 
to deter all practices contrary to the objects of
the Convention.
The question of the legality of payment for 
surrogacy services is one of central policy 
importance. Any duty imposed on the Central
Authorities, akin to Art 8 of the Adoption
Convention, would require to be tied in to
whatever choice of law rule (if any) were  
formulated in the putative instrument/regime.
Article 9  
Central Authorities shall take, directly or
through public authorities or other bodies duly
accredited in their State, all appropriate
measures, in particular to –
a) collect, preserve and exchange information 
Mutatis mutandis. 
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Article 13  
The designation of the Central Authorities and, 
where appropriate, the extent of their 
functions, as well as the names and addresses 
of the accredited bodies shall be communicated 
by each Contracting State to the Permanent 
Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law. 
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about the situation of the child and the 
prospective adoptive parents, so far as is
necessary to complete the adoption;  
b) facilitate, follow and expedite proceedings
with a view to obtaining the adoption;  
c) promote the development of adoption
counselling and post-adoption services in their 
States; d) provide each other with general
evaluation reports about experience with 
intercountry adoption; e) reply, in so far as is
permitted by the law of their State, to justified 
requests from other Central Authorities or
public authorities for information about a 
particular adoption situation. 
Article 10  
Accreditation shall only be granted to and 
maintained by bodies demonstrating their
competence to carry out properly the tasks
with which they may be entrusted. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 11  
An accredited body shall –  
a) pursue only non-profit objectives according 
to such conditions and within such limits as 
may be established by the competent
authorities of the State of accreditation;
b) be directed and staffed by persons qualified 
by their ethical standards and by training or 
experience to work in the field of intercountry
adoption; and  
c) be subject to supervision by competent
authorities of that State as to its composition,
operation and financial situation 
Article 12  
A body accredited in one Contracting State
may act in another Contracting State only if 
the competent authorities of both States have 
authorised it to do so. 
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4.6.	 ISSUES OF RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
SURROGACY ARRANGEMENT
There are at least two separate issues in this regard:
(a) Recognition and enforcement of the surrogacy agreement.  
This is largely a matter of contract concerned with enforceability of a contract 
inter partes, to which rules of jurisdiction and choice of law, such as those 
described in Sections III and IV, above, would be relevant. 
(b) Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments/authentic instruments relating
to surrogacy, if any; and/or (more likely) the legal effects of surrogacy, including
in particular, the attribution of legal parenthood.
This is largely a matter of civil status. Parallels can be drawn with the situation in
intercountry adoption, and assistance could be derived from the approach in 
Chapter V of the Adoption Convention (q.v.). 
At present, there are no harmonised rules concerning international recognition of the 
legal effects of surrogacy.
4.6.1. Inter-country adoption and legal parenthood 
The main challenge in the drafting of the Adoption Convention was devising recognition
provisions apt to cover recognition of a status which varies from country to country, 
some adoption laws effecting full adoption, and others only simple adoption. This 
problem of bifurcation will not generally be present in the cross-border surrogacy 
situation, but other provisions of the Adoption Convention may be relevant.  
The solution in the Adoption Convention is that an adoption certified by the competent 
authority of the state of the adoption (being the state of origin, or the receiving state, as 
the case may be), as having been made in accordance with the Convention, shall be
recognised as having operation of law in the other Contracting States (Art 23). The
recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting State only if the adoption is
manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the child
(Art 24). 
Crucially, by Article 26(1) of the Adoption Convention, the recognition of an adoption
includes recognition of (a) the legal parent-child relationship between the child and 
his/her adoptive parents; (b) parental responsibility of the adoptive parents for the child; 
and (c) the termination of a pre-existing legal relationship between the child and his/her 
biological parents, if the adoption has this effect in the Contracting State where it was
made. 
By Article 26(2), where an adoption has the effect of terminating a pre-existing legal
parent-child relationship, the child shall enjoy in the receiving State, and in any other 
Contracting State where the adoption is recognised, rights equivalent to those resulting
from adoptions having this effect in each such state.  
Notably, in connection with citizenship: 
497. With regard to the acquisition of citizenship through intercountry adoption, 
the clear trend among States which are Parties to the Hague Convention of 1993 
is in favour of according automatically to the adopted child the nationality of the 
receiving State, provided that the adopter or one of them has the nationality of 
that State. 
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498. A fairly typical example is the United Kingdom’s Adoption (Intercountry 
Aspects) Act 1999 which provides for a child adopted under the Hague
Convention to have British citizenship conferred on him / her, provided that all 
the requirements of the Convention have been met and at least one adoptive 
parent is a British citizen at the time the adoption order is made and both (in the 
case of a joint application) are habitually resident in the United Kingdom.292 
4.6.2. Cross-border surrogacy, contractual validity and legal parenthood 
As indicated above, insofar as surrogacy is based in contract, whereas intercountry
adoption is not, the Adoption Convention does not provide a complete model. The matter 
of the enforceability of the contract between a surrogate mother and the intended 
parent(s) would be anterior to (say) the state of origin’s decision as to the eligibility and
suitability of the parties. Nonetheless, the Adoption Convention is a useful template as
regards civil status implications of surrogacy.  
As noted above, consideration would require to be given to whether or not a putative EU 
regime were intended to regulate the entirety of the surrogacy undertaking, that is, the 
contractual dimension (from the initiation of negotiations between the surrogate mother 
and intended parent(s)) AND the civil status dimension (through to completion of the 
process, and transfer of the child to the intended parent(s), i.e. the physical transfer of 
the child to the receiving state, and legal transfer of the child (and legal parenthood) to
the intended parent(s), with concomitant incidents regarding the child’s citizenship and 
right to reside in the receiving state).  
In order to eliminate potential conflict between the provisions of a contractual lex causae
(governing the contractual aspects of surrogacy, that is, rights of the contracting parties
inter se) and the provisions of a civil status lex causae (governing the civil status 
implications of surrogacy, that is, the rights and duties of the interested parties contra
mundum), it is probable that the putative EU regime should govern the entirety of the
cross-border surrogacy undertaking, and that in terms of the regime the civil status
lex/leges causae should prevail (because of overarching child welfare considerations) if
the content thereof were to differ from that of the contractual lex causae. 
An alternative solution would be for the regime to provide that the contractual lex 
causae must coincide with the civil status lex causae. Insofar as the law of the state of 
origin and the law of the receiving state are the laws most likely to form the basis of a 
putative EU regime in respect of civil status, as above suggested (cf. Arts 4 and 5,
Adoption Convention), it would seem that, in order to avoid a clash between the 
contractual lex causae and the civil status lex causae, each of the two primarily
interested legal systems, namely, the law of the state of origin and the law of the 
receiving state, would require to be recognised as the principal connecting factors with 
regard to choice of law in contract. But, if there were not a single civil status lex causae, 
but rather the laws of the state of the origin and of the receiving state operate in tandem 
(cf. Arts 4 and 5 of the Adoption Convention), there would present a further difficulty. 
It would not be appropriate to downgrade the role of the contractual lex causae to a 
vanishing point, because there could be instances where the surrogacy arrangement
would fail, and the process envisaged in the Adoption Convention model would not be
engaged (e.g. where no baby were born to the surrogate mother). In this situation, it
would be entirely possible that a purely contractual dispute would arise between the 
parties, requiring application of a governing law in contract. There would have to be a 
contractual lex causae, even if the suggestion to align it with the civil status lex/leges
causae did not find favour. 
292 See Adoption Good Practice Guide No 1, para 8.4.5. 
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Thus, on the model of the Adoption Convention:  
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AND CO-OPERATION IN 
RESPECT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
CROSS-BORDER SURROGACY 
CHAPTER V – RECOGNITION AND EFFECTS 
OF THE ADOPTION  
Article 23  
(1) An adoption certified by the competent
authority of the State of the adoption as having
been made in accordance with the Convention 
shall be recognised by operation of law in the
other Contracting States. The certificate shall 
specify when and by whom the agreements
under Article 17, sub-paragraph c), were given.
(2) Each Contracting State shall, at the time of 
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, notify the depositary of the
Convention of the identity and the functions of 
the authority or the authorities which, in that
State, are competent to make the certification. 
It shall also notify the depositary of any 
modification in the designation of these
authorities.
Mutatis mutandis. 
The Abduction Convention achieved a
breakthrough in establishing a system of 
automatic recognition of adoptions made in
accordance with the Convention. Every adoption 
certified as made in accordance with Convention
procedures is recognised in all other Contracting
States.  
‘In other words, the Convention gives immediate 
certainty to the status of the child, and 
eliminates the need for a procedure for
recognition of orders, or re-adoption, in the
receiving State.’293
Article 24  
The recognition of an adoption may be refused 
in a Contracting State only if the adoption is
manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking 
into account the best interests of the child. 
If surrogacy per se offends the public policy of a 
Member State, it would be preferable for that 
State to decline to participate in any 
harmonisation instrument reached by enhanced 
co-operation procedure.
The public policy provision which is universally
found in private international law rules would
therefore be seen as a customary ‘backstop’ in a
surrogacy instrument, permitting forum 
discretion in extreme cases, e.g. where despite
process and safeguards, exploitation and duress
could be proved.
Article 26  
(1) The recognition of an adoption includes
recognition of
a) the legal parent-child relationship between
the child and his or her adoptive parents;  
b) parental responsibility of the adoptive 
parents for the child;  
c) the termination of a pre-existing legal 
relationship between the child and his or her
mother and father, if the adoption has this
effect in the Contracting State where it was
made. 
The Adoption Convention makes provision (Arts 
26–27) about the effect of a recognisable
adoption, one of which is the recognition of the
legal parent-child relationship between the child
and his or her adoptive parents.  
This would be an extremely important provision 
in a putative surrogacy instrument. 
293 The 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption: Information Brochure (2012), p 6.
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(2) In the case of an adoption having the effect
of terminating a pre-existing legal parent-child
relationship, the child shall enjoy in the 
receiving State, and in any other Contracting
State where the adoption is recognised, rights 
equivalent to those resulting from adoptions
having this effect in each such State.  
(3) The preceding paragraphs shall not 
prejudice the application of any provision more
favourable for the child, in force in the
Contracting State which recognises the
adoption. 
Article 27  
(1) Where an adoption granted in the State of
origin does not have the effect of terminating a 
pre-existing legal parent-child relationship, it
may, in the receiving State which recognises
the adoption under the Convention, be
converted into an adoption having such an
effect – 
a) if the law of the receiving State so permits;
and 
b) if the consents referred to in Article 4, sub­
paragraphs c and d, have been or are given for 
the purpose of such an adoption.  
(2) Article 23 applies to the decision converting
the adoption. 
It is to be hoped in surrogacy that there would  
be no need to provide for two-tier status. It is
the essence of the surrogacy agreement that
there will be a termination of any legal 
relationship (per the law of the state of origin)
between the child and the surrogate mother, and 
it must be expected that the civil status
provisions of a putative EU regime would seek to
secure this outcome contra mundum.  
CHAPTER VI – GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 30  
(1) The competent authorities of a Contracting
State shall ensure that information held by
them concerning the child's origin, in particular
information concerning the identity of his or
her parents, as well as the medical history, is
preserved.
(2) They shall ensure that the child or his or 
her representative has access to such
information, under appropriate guidance, in so
far as is permitted by the law of that State. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 31  
Without prejudice to Article 30, personal data
gathered or transmitted under the Convention, 
especially data referred to in Articles 15 and
16, shall be used only for the purposes for
which they were gathered or transmitted. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 32  
(1) No one shall derive improper financial or
other gain from an activity related to an
intercountry adoption. 
(2) Only costs and expenses, including 
reasonable professional fees of persons 
The different attitudes in Member States towards
commercial surrogacy is a difficult issue. This
would become a policy issue. A choice of law rule
would have to be formulated, to reflect the 
policy decision, in order to govern the matter of
legitimacy or not of payment to the surrogate 
mother of a sum by way of 
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involved in the adoption, may be charged or
paid.
(3) The directors, administrators and 
employees of bodies involved in an adoption
shall not receive remuneration which is
unreasonably high in relation to services 
rendered. 
Article 34  
If the competent authority of the State of 
destination of a document so requests, a 
translation certified as being in conformity with
the original must be furnished. Unless
otherwise provided, the costs of such 
translation are to be borne by the prospective
adoptive parents. 
Article 35  
The competent authorities of the Contracting 
States shall act expeditiously in the process of
adoption. 
remuneration/compensation in addition to costs
and expenses. Likewise, a choice of law rule
would be necessary to determine the extent to
which accredited agencies may operate on a 
commercial basis. 
Article 33  
A competent authority which finds that any
provision of the Convention has not been
respected or that there is a serious risk that it
may not be respected, shall immediately 
inform the Central Authority of its State. This
Central Authority shall be responsible for 
ensuring that appropriate measures are taken. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Mutatis mutandis. 
Article 36  
In relation to a State which has two or more 
systems of law with regard to adoption
applicable in different territorial units –
a) any reference to habitual residence in that
State shall be construed as referring to
habitual residence in a territorial unit of that 
State;
b) any reference to the law of that State shall
be construed as referring to the law in force in
the relevant territorial unit;  
c) any reference to the competent authorities 
or to the public authorities of that State shall 
be construed as referring to those authorised 
to act in the relevant territorial unit;  
d) any reference to the accredited bodies of
that State shall be construed as referring to
bodies accredited in the relevant territorial
unit. 
It is usual in an EU instrument to have a multi-
legal system state provision, and to exclude the 
operation of renvoi (pace Rome IV).  
There would also have to be a provision such as 
Art 22(2) of the Rome I Regulation, re. ‘internal’
arrangements for states with more than one 
legal system.
Article 39  
(1) The Convention does not affect any
international instrument to which Contracting
States are Parties and which contains 
It is usual in an international instrument to have 
a disconnection clause.  
Examples can be cited of bilateral arrangements
being permitted alongside principal international 
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provisions on matters governed by the instruments, or in the absence of international
Convention, unless a contrary declaration is regulation, but if an EU instrument on surrogacy
made by the States Parties to such instrument. were promulgated, it would seem unwise to 
authorise the overlaying of the putative EU 
(2) Any Contracting State may enter into regime by bilateral agreements.
agreements with one or more other
Contracting States, with a view to improving
the application of the Convention in their 
mutual relations. These agreements may 
derogate only from the provisions of Articles 14 
to 16 and 18 to 21. The States which have
concluded such an agreement shall transmit a 
copy to the depositary of the Convention. 
4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Certain matters of overarching importance emerge, which require to be emphasised, 
viz.:  
1.	 If a policy decision were to be taken that an EU level response to the legal issues 
arising from cross-border surrogacy is required, very careful attention at the outset 
would need to be paid to the definition of the term ‘cross-border surrogacy’. 
2.	 The territorial scope of a putative EU regime for cross-border surrogacy would be a 
matter of central importance. Bearing in mind the inevitable geographical constraints 
of a purely ‘intra-EU’, i.e. regional, response, consideration should be given to the 
desirability of a global solution, e.g., on a Hague Convention basis. 
3.	 Within the framework of a putative EU regime, a decision would have to be taken as 
to whether the rules contained therein should be mandatory (in the sense of 
exclusive), and whether the regime should be facilitative and/or regulatory.
4.	 Whatever the nature  of a putative EU regime, it should be recognised that cross-
border surrogacy agreements encompass both matters of contract (private
autonomy) and matters concerning the status and welfare of children, and the status
of legal parenthood (public interest). It would be necessary for a decision to be taken 
on whether a putative EU regime should seek to regulate the private international 
law dimension of both these aspects within a single instrument/framework; and if so,
the ranking of provisions inter se. 
5.	 If an EU level response to the legal issues arising from cross-border surrogacy is
thought desirable, consideration ought to be given to the need to draft harmonised 
rules of jurisdiction to cater for contractual issues, enforcement issues, regulatory 
issues, parental civil status issues, and child civil status issues, as set out in Section
III. 
6.	 If an EU level response to the legal issues arising from cross-border surrogacy is
thought desirable, the question of what law governs various legal issues arising in
connection with surrogacy would be of pivotal importance. Attention would require to
be paid to the need, or not, for harmonised choice of law rules concerning the 
contractual aspects of cross-border surrogacy and the civil status implications
thereof, as set out in Section IV. 
7.	 Recognising the role of Central Authorities in the operation of Hague Conventions
pertaining to children, consideration should be given to whether a similar 
administrative framework could usefully be replicated for use in an EU regime. 
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8.	 Whatever the nature of a putative EU regime, it is suggested that one of the principal 
aims which it should seek to deliver is certainty as to the legal parenthood of the
child, and the child’s entitlement to leave the state of origin, and to enter and reside 
permanently in the receiving state.
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5. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Report has provided a multi-layered consideration of surrogacy arrangements, to
include empirical, policy and legal perspectives. In doing so, it has demonstrated both 
their complexity and increasing prevalence. While part of the complexity lies in the fact
that surrogacy agreements must often operate in legal and regulatory frameworks that
did not countenance their existence, or were designed to discourage or prohibit
surrogacy as a practice, complexity also lies in the wide range of ethical and policy
issues that surrogacy agreements raise. The dearth of empirical data about surrogacy as
a practice makes it difficult to know how to proceed in relation to ethical, policy and legal
concerns, particularly in light of not only a lack of public consensus about surrogacy, but 
also the polarisation of attitudes that the practice effects. Yet, to fail to respond to the 
legal and regulatory challenges presented by the increasing prevalence of surrogacy
appears untenable, both at the national and supra-national level. 
5.1. EMPIRICAL DATA 
While the empirical data collected for this Report certainly indicated an increasing
prevalence of surrogacy in the EU, to include in a Member State where surrogacy is
legally prohibited, the research process further identified and confirmed the difficulties in
collecting accurate information in the context of surrogacy. This is particularly true for 
quantitative information, as unlike other reproductive techniques such as e.g. IVF, there 
is simply no national reporting mechanism for surrogacy arrangements. Even in Greece,
as the only EU member state to provide for an ex-ante legal facilitation of gestational
surrogacy, no attempt is made to collate statistics on a national level. This makes it very 
difficult for individual fertility clinics or surrogacy agencies to respond to queries about 
the national prevalence of surrogacy, as realistically they can only report on their own 
records, if indeed such information has been collated by the fertility clinic or surrogacy 
agency. Likewise, where civil status records can be accessed in order to estimate the 
prevalence of surrogacy in a particular country, we must remain circumspect as to what
such records tell us about the prevalence of surrogacy, in light of the fact that the legal
relations between the intended parent(s) and the child born from a surrogacy 
arrangement may never be formally settled. 
This study therefore confirms that only very limit data are available across the EU and 
recommends that improved systems need to be put in place to routinely record relevant
information across all countries.
5.2. POLICY CONCERNS
The policy research carried out for this Report emphasises the wide range of policy 
concerns raised by the practice of surrogacy. Crucially, this policy research makes clear 
that surrogacy must be understood as a global phenomenon, with policy implications
both within national regimes, given differing cultural, political and national concerns 
relating to assisted reproduction, and as between different national regimes when people 
travel to other countries to engage in surrogacy agreements. Cross-border arrangements 
in particular have important health policy implications relating to not only the provision
of fertility treatment for the purposes of surrogacy, but also in relation to the health
infrastructure of the country hosting the surrogacy agreement. There may also be policy
issues surrounding the ability of children born following a surrogacy agreement to gain
access to healthcare. Moreover, the financial dynamics of surrogacy cannot be ignored,
whether these relate to disparities in wealth as between the intended parent(s) and the 
surrogate mother, or as between the relative wealth of the countries where people travel
from or to, in order to practice surrogacy. Attention must also be given to other parties 
who may profit from surrogacy, such as surrogacy agencies and medical professionals. 
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Surrogacy is also a highly gendered phenomenon and as the research for this Report
makes clear, this must be seen in the context of globalisation, whereby women from 
lower income countries are increasingly acting as surrogate mothers for women and men 
from higher income countries. Issues of wealth disparity in the context of surrogacy are 
perhaps inevitable, to include surrogacy agreements that do not involve cross-border
travel.294 The policy priority may therefore be to help ensure fair practices and reduce
the risk of exploitation of women who act as surrogate mothers, as well as the children
who are born from surrogacy agreements. Yet the gendered implications of surrogacy
are more extensive than the position of the surrogate mother, and relate also to 
intended mothers, egg donors and of course the general attitude towards women in a 
society that may emerge from the practice and regulation of surrogacy. 
This study has provided a preliminary overview of the wide range of policy concerns 
relating to surrogacy as a practice on both the national and global level. It recommends
further empirical research into these concerns, particularly those relating to health policy
and gender. In particular, qualitative research on the experience of surrogacy would add
an invaluable perspective for future policy and legislative work in this area.
5.3. LEGAL 
The legal research for this Report was fourfold. It considered:
i. National legislative models for surrogacy.
ii. National case-law approaches to a range of issues raised by surrogacy. 
iii. Possible EU legal approaches to surrogacy. 
iv. Possible private international law approaches to surrogacy. 
The extensive examination of national legal approaches to surrogacy in this Report
demonstrates the sheer array of legal issues that need to be considered in this context 
and the range of approaches that might potentially be taken. It is impossible to indicate
a particular legal trend across the EU and while an increasing number of Member States
are leaning towards legislating for surrogacy, there remains considerable debate as to
what form such legislation should take. While all Member States indicate a policy concern 
with the welfare of the child, the meaning that is given to the principle and how law is
evoked to help ensure it, varies greatly: from general prohibitions on all forms of
surrogacy, to an ex-ante legal management of the practice which frames legal
parenthood prior to the child’s birth. However, what all Member States appear to agree
on is the need for a child to have clearly defined legal parents and civil status; however 
such is eventually facilitated in legal terms.
Sections 3 and 4 of this Report consider the EU and private international law dimensions
of surrogacy respectively. Each section provides a considerable analysis of the legal
issues arising from surrogacy in each context, as well as mapping out potential ways
forward for EU and private international law.
This research indicates that while the EU remains a relevant place for action given the 
existing differences between Member States, the multiplication of questions sent to the 
ECHR and the sui generis effective legal order that the EU proposes, it may not 
necessarily be the most appropriate level at which to regulate. The territorial limitations
of a purely intra-EU regime signal the desirability of a more global response, as 
considered in detail in Section 4 of this Report.
294 See the country report on Greece in the Annex, which provides details on the women who acted as 
surrogate mothers in the applications for the approval of a surrogacy agreement before the court in 
Thessaloniki. In many cases the woman, although now residing in Greece, was originally from a lower-income
country and had worked as a domestic worker for either the intended mother or a member of her family. 
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By way of a final conclusion to this Report, we have devised a table of the different 
possible actions of the EU to accompany the phenomenon of surrogacy. This table is
reproduced below. However, what seems clear in thinking about the future competency 
of the EU in this area is that Member States will retain the competency to decide on what
moral grounds to act and what policy decisions to make on the permissibility of
surrogacy. If an action or a legislative act was adopted, the instrument in which any
harmonised response would be delivered would be required to recognise the wide
spectrum of domestic law attitudes to surrogacy across states: if, as a matter of policy, a 
given legal system does not admit surrogacy in its domestic law, it would be
inappropriate to impose on it a (European) structure of cross-border surrogacy 
regulation. As the table below indicates, any consensus that is apparent across the EU is
forced. After the table, a number of further questions about EU competency in these 
areas are considered. 
5.3.1. Why should the EU regulate in this area?
The EU would only regulate if it brings an added value to the framing of surrogacy.
The EU can regulate only if it manages to prove subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity is a test which consists in asking whether the EU is the best level to regulate
a given subject. In this case, the EU would have to show that there is an international 
(cross-border) dimension which entails its action. More specifically, this cross-border
element could be found where an intended parent moves from one country which 
prohibits surrogacy to have this procedure in another Member State which authorises it
and then returns in his/her own Member State.
As indicated above, however, we must question whether the international level or a
global approach (e.g. an international convention) would not be more appropriate as 
countries from all around the world are involved in addressing cross-border surrogacy 
issues. The EU would therefore have to establish the need for a regional response to this 
otherwise international question.
The lack of consensus between the Member States on the permissibility of surrogacy 
makes it highly unlikely that a majority or even unanimity could be obtained in the 
Council on a substantial harmonisation. Surrogacy is a contentious issue which raises 
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arguments of public order, morality, dignity and constitutional identity. In addition, the
health policies and social infrastructure of each Member State will have a significant
bearing on any regulation of surrogacy. 
In cognate cases, the ECHR has indicated that: 1) there is no consensus in relation to 
assisted reproduction; and 2) that where there is no consensus, a wide margin of
appreciation should be left to States (see Section 3 of this Report). The case-law of the 
CJEU has also indicated this approach (see Section 3 of this Report). Nonetheless, a 
fragile consensus amongst Member States can perhaps be identified, in relation to the 
acknowledgment of the child’s civil status and legal parenthood.
5.3.2. How could the EU regulate in this area? 
In any case, a political choice should be considered regarding a possible action. Three 
solutions are accounted for in this conclusion: 1) Prohibiting, 2) Authorising and 3)
Framing surrogacy.  
5.3.2.1. Prohibiting
Prohibiting surrogacy means to prevent either the conception of a surrogate child and/or 
the recognition of this child in another State than where she/he was born. If the EU is to
choose this option, it should consider both aspects.  
Prohibiting the ex-ante mechanisms of conception of the surrogate child 
If the EU is to prohibit the conception of a child through surrogacy mechanisms, it should 
look for a consensus among the Member States. This consensus is not found in the EU,
which renders this option difficult to imagine.
Prohibiting ex-post mechanisms of recognition 
If the EU is to prohibit the conception of a child through surrogacy mechanisms, it should 
look for a consensus among the Member States. This consensus is not found in the EU,
which renders this option difficult to imagine.
5.3.2.2. Authorising 
Authorising surrogacy means to allow either the conception of a surrogate child and/or 
the recognition of this child in a State other than the one where she/he was born. If the
EU is to choose this option, it should consider both aspects.  
Authorising ex-ante mechanisms of conception of the surrogate child 
If the EU is to authorise the conception of a child through surrogacy mechanisms, it
should look for a consensus among the Member States. This consensus is not found in
the EU, which renders this option difficult to imagine.
Authorising ex-post mechanisms of recognition 
We can consider that the recognition of the freedom of movement of European citizens 
and the existing mutual recognition of the civil status from one Member State to the 
other is reflecting the existing consensus regarding surrogacy.  
It must be acknowledged, however, that not all Member States are happily facilitating
the recognition of the civil status and the legal parenthood of a child born through 
surrogacy. If some Member States now provide for legal orders and guidelines in order
to make this recognition possible, others still require a painful judicial process and the 
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children (and parents) face uncertainty as to the recognition. Others still will only
facilitate this process through exceptional administrative, as opposed to legal processes. 
It could be argued that leaving the free movement rules to operate as they do so now,
amounts to an implicit authorisation of surrogacy.295 Regarding ex-ante mechanisms, the
freedom of establishment of intended parents in Greece and the freedom of patients 
generally are ways through which intended parents may be able to access legally
permitted surrogacy. Regarding ex-post mechanisms, mutual recognition within the EU
(mostly via national laws and not EU law296) allows the desired civil and parental status 
of children born though surrogacy to be recognised in their State of residence. 
This at once presents an advantage and an inconvenience. While it leaves difficult ethical
and policy questions to the jurisdiction of Member States, it is in practice an
inconvenience to their sovereignty as the choice of how to regulate is taken out of their
hands by the mere existence of competitive systems. As we know that this occurrence is
not limited to surrogacy arrangements which take place in Europe, this adds a further 
dimension to the encroachment of the sovereignty of the Member States. This 
constitutes a possible argument in favour of EU regulation on this issue. In other words,
while framing surrogacy and reaffirming civil status mutual recognition may be a difficult
regulatory option for the EU, it may be preferable to the realities of what is currently 
happening.
5.3.2.3. Framing 
Several examples of framing surrogacy are provided by legal orders which authorise it.
We need to distinguish between situations which are internal to the EU and situations
which are in and outside the EU. As regards the later, they cannot be tackled by the EU
unless the EU was to adhere to a broader international convention. As regards the
former hypothesis, it remains unlikely to date, whether we consider substantial 
harmonisation or a procedural coordination via international private law.
Substantial harmonisation 
Whatever choice is made, the action should be based on a legal basis in the EU treaties. 
Under the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice, the EU cannot extend its
competences using fundamental rights, including children’s rights. In other words, it 
does not have a general competence in the area of fundamental rights. However, under
Article 6.2 of the Treaty on the European Union, the EU must respect fundamental rights 
in whatever action it takes in accordance with its competences. These rights include in 
particular the ECHR, which contains provisions concerning children's and parents’ rights,
i.e. the rights to family life and to private life (art 8 ECHR).
Moreover, the provisions of the UNCRC must be taken fully into account. The Charter of
Fundamental Rights, independently of its legal status297, may be seen as a particularly
authentic expression of fundamental rights guaranteed as general principles of law. In
addition to the rights to family life and to private life, article 24 of the Charter is about 
the protection of children. It is reinforced by Article 3 of the Lisbon treaty, also about the
protection of children. 
The EU's obligation to respect fundamental rights, including children's rights, implies not 
only a general duty to abstain from acts violating these rights, but also to take them into 
295 As recalled by the ECHR regarding IVF in the S.H. case, see supra. 

296 See Section 2 of this Report.
 
297 One will think of the protocols regarding the United Kingdom and Poland. 
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account wherever relevant in the conduct of its own policies under the various legal 
bases of the Treaties.  
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned lack of precise treaty competence, various 
particular competences under the Treaties could allow the EU to take specific positive
action to frame surrogacy. Any such action needs to respect the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality and must not encroach on the competence of the Member States. 
 Fundamental rights: art 6.1 TEU on respect of fundamental rights and art. 3 TEU on
the protection of children. 
 Freedom of movement of patients: art 56 (services), 34 (goods), 114 (approximation 
of laws) and 168 TFEU (public health). 
 Freedom of movement of cells: art 114 and 168 TFEU. 
 Freedom of movement of citizens and European citizenship: art 20 and 21 TFEU. 
 Non-discrimination: art 19 TFEU.
 European international private law: Art 67 (4) and 81 TFEU.298 
Several methods are available:  

 Judicial change: case law effect. 

 Legislative action. 

 Soft law. 

 Mainstreaming of fundamental rights: right to family life, right to private life and 

protection of children. 
 Financial assistance. 
 Political dialogue: help organised at the EU level to the national actors.
In the context of cross-border surrogacy, in the event of insurmountable policy
difficulties liable to make unanimity of response among all Member States impossible, it
is likely that the enhanced cooperation procedure would be an interesting one. The idea 
would then be to identify a central authority in each Member State and to coordinate
between different existing legal answers to surrogacy.  
International Private Law instrument 
On the basis of Articles 67 (4) and 81 TFEU, one could imagine a harmonisation of
conflict-of-law rules or a mutual recognition. As Section 4 of this Report considers, one 
question which emerges from the current study is whether it would be a valuable 
exercise to create bespoke harmonised rules of jurisdiction. Issues of jurisdiction and 
choice of law would be raised299. Since these issues may arise irrespective of the birth of 
a child, it is possible that any rules of jurisdiction could be modelled on rules of civil and
commercial jurisdiction, rather than on rules of jurisdiction pertaining to parental 
responsibility. Restricting analysis to an ‘intra-EU’ solution (i.e. to circumstances
concerning an EU-domiciled defendant), and taking as a template the rules in the 
298 Article 67(4) and Article 81 TFEU give the Union the power to enact secondary law for the recognition of
judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil and commercial matters, which includes the power to lay down 
jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws rules. The Brussels I Regulation on the jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, the Rome I and II Regulations on the law applicable to contractual 
and non-contractual obligations, the Brussels II Regulation on matrimonial proceedings and parental 
responsibility (2201/2003) and the new 1259/2010 Regulation on the law applicable to divorce provide
relevant examples of harmonisation of EU PIL and show that the EU is slowly turning from commercial and 
trade issues towards family law. These developments are associated to the building of an area of freedom, 
security and justice for the European citizens (see the Stockholm programme, COM 2010/171). The building of 
the Area of freedom, security and justice is part of the completion of the Internal Market (art. 3 TUE).  
They are not applicable to surrogacy but they provide interesting examples of mutual recognition. 
299 See Section 4 of this Report. 
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Brussels I Regulation300. But again, insurmountable policy difficulties might appear and
make unanimity of response among all Member States impossible.  
A lighter solution would amount to assisting national authorities in the quest for practical 
solutions. 
The deepening of civil status mutual recognition also appears as a good solution. An 
opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the communication of the Commission about
‘Less bureaucracy for citizens: Promoting free movement of public documents and 
recognition of the effects of civil status records’ was released in February 2012301. It 
seems to be an encouraging direction as the Commission recently proposed to get rid of
the requirement of the so-called 'Apostille' certificate which is used by public authorities
in other states as proof that public documents, or the signatures of national officials on 
documents, are genuine302. It encourages the free movement of public documents and
the creation of a European civil status office. One proposition could also be to copy and 
adapt article 21(2) of the above mentioned Regulation 2201/2003 to state that "no
special procedure shall be required for updating the civil-status records of a Member 
State on the basis of a decision relating to SURROGACY given in another Member State".
But, here again, the Member States’ divergences might be an obstacle to such proposals. 
5.3.2.4. Other solution: Joining an international convention
There is a need to tackle issues which go beyond the EU (i.e. where one party is not a 
national from the EU/where a non EU State has an interest in the surrogacy 
arrangement). The EU could consider adhering to an international instrument regulating
these issues on the grounds of its external competences to join treaties. 
To date, no international convention on surrogacy exists. The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law and the International Commission on Civil Status are both 
envisaging such a measure.303 A solution is to start negotiating it. It would be an
instrument of potentially global reach where Contracting States would be free to ratify or 
not. 
5.3.3. More work is necessary 
This report has provided a detailed, but preliminary consideration of the direction of any
future EU measure in the area of surrogacy. We would recommend that particular 
attention be given to the following in any future EU work on the area of surrogacy:
 To question the EU legal basis and their potential to frame surrogacy. 
 To draft a hypothetical legislative act. 
 To assess the relationship between the EU, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law and the ICCS in the field of surrogacy. Their work is
progressing and the EU should remain a key-actor in the negotiations and 
research. 
300 See Section 4 of this Report.
 
301 OJ C 54, 23.2.2012, p. 23–27.
 
302 See Commission Proposal of Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting the 

free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying the acceptance of certain public documents in the 

European Union and amending Regulation 1024/2012, see also http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/en/news/no­
more-costly-and-bureaucratic-stamps-public-documents-%E2%80%93-european-commission-acts-slash-red­
ta. 

303 See Section 3 of this Report.
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6. COUNTRY REPORTS 
6.1. AUSTRALIA 
Although there are no legal provisions relating to the issues raised by the practice of
surrogacy on a federal level, the vast majority of the Australian states have recently
introduced legislation that allows for and expressly regulates surrogacy. The individual 
state legislatures are free to impose their own specific conditions that set limits, ban, or 
impose (sometimes severe) hurdles to the legal acknowledgement of the family
relationships stemming from a surrogacy contract. Commercial surrogacy is prohibited in
all states, and a criminal conviction is more than a mere possibility. Surrogacy services 
for the provision of which no money exchange is arranged, namely the form of altruistic
surrogacy, is allowed by all state legislations, with the exception of the Tasmanian
Surrogacy Contracts Act 1993, which unequivocally renders all surrogacy arrangements 
void and unenforceable as contrary to the social ethos and policy (paragraph 7). 
According to recently published statistical data, the incidence of surrogacy in Australia
was not very widespread, with just seventy four reported cases of fertilisation for the 
purpose of surrogacy in 2007, which resulted in only four live births.304 However, this 
may well be an underestimate given the accepted dearth of empirical research about 
surrogacy in Australia305, both in relation to up-to-date statistical and experiential data,
as well as studies which consider children conceived outside of the jurisdiction in cross-
border surrogacy agreements.306 In a report by the Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
reference was made to an unpublished study involving interviews with thirteen
gestational surrogates.307 
With respect to law, a series of major reforms in 2008 to the federal-level Family Law Act 
1975 (FLA) brought the issue of surrogacy and legal parenthood to the fore. In its 
previous form, the FLA did not deal with the matter of legal parenthood in cases of 
collaborative reproduction involving same-sex lesbian couples or surrogacy.
Under the 2008 amendments of subsection 60HB of the FLA, the definitions of “parent”
and “child” in federal law have been extended to include lesbian parents who have a child 
through collaborative reproduction and/or fertility treatment, and to some parents who 
have children through surrogacy arrangements. The effect of subsection 60HB FLA is to 
clarify that any transfer of legal parenthood by state and territory courts for surrogacy 
families alters legal parental status under the FLA. 
Up until 2010, surrogacy laws in Australia varied significantly from state to state. 
However, some uniformity was accomplished when all states – except Tasmania – 
adopted laws that prohibited commercial surrogacy and accepted the occurrence of
(gestational) surrogacy in limited circumstances.  
The legal regimes in most states now currently present the option of a court-based 
issuance of a ‘parentage order’ that leads to the transfer of legal parenthood to the 
commissioning couple. This possibility is generally available to all opposite and same-sex
couples in legal or ‘de facto’ relationships. The above mentioned legal process was
deemed to be in accordance with the ‘best interests of the child’ because it ensures that 
304 Constantinidis, D., Cook, R., ‘Australian Perspectives on surrogacy: the influence of cognitions, 

psychological and demographic characteristics’, Human Reproduction, Vol.27, No.4 pp. 1080–1087 (2012).
 
305 See for example, Queensland Parliament Report, Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee (2008),
 
paras 2, 11-13.
 
306 Millbank, J., ‘The new surrogacy parentage laws in Australia: Cautious regulation or ’25 brick walls’?’ 35
 
Melbourne Law Review 1-44.
 
307 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Final Report (2007),
 
paras 37, 161 and 178.
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the child will not be left stateless or parentless, as well as protecting the surrogate
mother from a coerced consent when offering her gestational services. 
The following table illustrates the different pieces of legislation that cover the issue of 
surrogacy in each Australian state and briefly explains the basic content of the legal 
provisions.
State Legal response Content of legal provisions 
Australia No express federal 
legal response to 
surrogacy other than
the Family Law Act 
1975, 60HB, which 
allows for federal-
level recognition of
any transfer of legal 
parenthood in the 
context of surrogacy 
by state or territory
courts. 
Most states have 
express legislation
permitting some 
form of surrogacy.  
Summary of generally applicable legal provisions:
 Commercial type of surrogacy is a criminal offence.
 The rule of medical necessity exists. The
commissioning couple should provide sufficient
evidence of their inability to produce a child or
carry a pregnancy to term. 
 The surrogate mother must be over 25 years old,
able to carry a pregnancy, and have a history of a 
previous live childbirth.
 Only gestational surrogacy arrangements are
accepted. The eggs should not come from the 
surrogate. 
 Criminal records check to all participants in the 
arrangement. 
 The parties must undergo counselling. 
 Informed consent free from coercion is a
prerequisite in some states. 
 Legal advice prior to the drafting of a surrogacy 
contract should be sought. 
 If state laws do not provide otherwise, it is
accepted that the person(s) who have parental 
responsibilities towards the child is/are the 
intended parent(s). Parentage is acquired through 
adoption. 
 Surrogacy contracts are unenforceable. 
 The best interests of the child are paramount. 
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Parentage Act 2004  This legislation was closely based upon s. 30 of the 
UK HFEA 1990308, but its scope is arguably more
Australian
Capital 
Territory 
(ACT)
limited. Only altruistic gestational surrogacy is 
acceptable, and the courts have no power on the 
authorisation of any payments made or to be 
made. 
 Commercial surrogacy is prohibited (para. 41).
o Parental recognition under strict 
requirements (par. 24-25):  
o the child should be conceived via IVF
performed in a fertility clinic based in the
ACT; 
o the surrogate mother and/or her potential 
partner should not have offered their genetic
material; 
o the parties have come to an agreement for
substitute parenthood; 
o the child is the product of the genetic 
material of at least one of the intended 
parents; 
o intended parents’ residence in the ACT. 
New 
South 
Wales 
(NSW) 
- Surrogacy 
Act 2010 No 
102 
- Assisted 
Reproductive 
Technology 
Act 2007 
- Assisted 
Reproductive 
Technology 
Regulations 
2009 
- Status of 
Children Act 
1996 
- Births, 
Deaths and
Marriage 
Registration 
Act 2010 
(See also NSW 
Legislative Council 
Standing Committee 
 Altruistic surrogacy allowed. 
 Presumption of motherhood for the birth mother. It 
is difficult for the intended mother to gain legal 
rights to parenthood. 
 Any surrogacy agreements must be drafted prior to 
the pregnancy, but they are unenforceable. 
 Transfer of legal parentage through parental
orders. 
 Single and same-sex parenting is acceptable.
 Age limit for the surrogate (she must be over 25)
and the intended parent(s) (he/she/they must be
over 18) 
 Payment of reasonable expenses is allowed.
308 Read further Millbank, J., ‘De facto Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents: Exploring the Scope 
and Effects of the 2008 Federal Relationship Reforms’, (2009) 23(3) Australian Journal of Family Law 160. 
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on Law and Justice, 
‘Legislation on
Altruistic Surrogacy 
in
NSW’, May 2009). 
 This state’s laws regarding surrogacy have been
criticised as harsh. Under the previous regime
(Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988) all forms of 
surrogacy were prohibited and criminal sanctions 
were in force. The maximum penalty was 100 
penalty units309 or three years of imprisonment for 
entering into or offering to enter into a surrogacy 
arrangement. 
 The change came in 2008, after the Queensland’s 
Parliamentary Select Committee’s recommendation
for the legalisation of altruistic surrogacy (see also
Queensland Parliament, ‘Investigation into Altruistic
Surrogacy’, Report 2008). Queensland’s law is said
to be the most controversial one, as it allows for 
state intervention in matters relating to private 
contracting and intimate personal relationships. 
 Altruistic surrogacy. 
 No requirement of a genetic link between the 
intended parents and the child.
 Conception can be accomplished by any means, not
necessarily through the use of ARTs. 
 Same-sex and single parenting acceptable. 
 No residence requirements: the court has discretion
to grant parenthood orders even in cases where the
intended parents do not live in Queensland 
(Surrogacy Act 2010, s. 23 (2)). 
 Payment for reasonable expenses allowed. 
During the lifetime of this study, restrictive reform
to the Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010, relating to 
access to the legislation by single and same-sex 
couples was proposed.310 This proposal has now 
been dropped.
South  
Australia 
Family Relationships 
Act 1975, as
amended. 
 Altruistic surrogacy. 
 Criminal penalties for intermediaries.
 Automatic transfer of legal parentage (s. 10 (c)). 
The intended mother’s husband is considered to be 
the legal father of the child (s. 10 (d)).
 Surrogacy is only available to heterosexual married
Queensland Surrogacy Act 2010 
309 The value of a penalty unit differs from state to state in Australia, and may be regularly reviewed by the 
state authorities. In Queensland, a penalty unit is currently 110 Australian Dollars. 100 penalty units would 
therefore be 1,100 Australian Dollars, which is approximately 847 EURO (calculated on 13th May 2013). 
310 See Smith, Malcolm K., Willmott, Lindy, Trowse, Pip, & White, Benjamin P. ‘Back to the future: prohibiting 
surrogacy for singles, same-sex and shorter-term heterosexual couples in Queensland’, (2013) 20(3) Journal of 
Law and Medicine 638-654. 
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couples or couples in a de facto relationship for a 
period of 3 years or more. 
 The intending couple must reside within the state’s 
jurisdiction.
 Pregnancy must be accomplished through the use 
of fertility treatment, which will take place in a 
licensed fertility clinic based in South Australia.
Tasmania Surrogacy Contracts 
Act 1993 
See also Department 
of Justice ‘Proposed 
Tasmanian 
Surrogacy Bill: 
Exposure Bill’, 1 
(2011). 
 ALL types of surrogacy are prohibited for reasons of
public policy.
 Surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable 
(par. 7) 
 Third-party intervention in a surrogacy agreement
is a criminal offence (par. 5-6).
Western 
Australia 
- Surrogacy Act 
2008 
- Human
Reproductive 
Technology Act 1991
 The Surrogacy Act came into force in 2009. 
 Surrogacy for commercial reasons is prohibited
(par. 8-9).
 Payments for reasonable expenses related to the 
pregnancy and insurance claims are allowed (par. 6 
(3)).
 A court authorisation process for parental orders 
and transfer of legal parentage to the intended 
parents is provided by law, and the child’s best
interests are paramount to this decision.  
 The intended parents must persuade the court for 
their fitness to parent the child (par. 13 (2)). 
 A plan of communication and contact between the 
parties must be submitted to the court.  
 The surrogate mother must be at least 25 years old 
and have a child of her own. 
 The progressiveness and innovation of this piece of
legislation can be found in the availability of
surrogacy also to a single man or a male couple. 
 At the same time, however, there are limitations 
which point to the requirement for the residency of 
the intended parent/ couple within the state’s 
jurisdiction; the requirement of a pre-conceptual 
written surrogacy agreement; as well as that of a
“cooling-off” period of 3 months for the surrogate 
mother to decide whether she would like to
relinquish the child or not.  
 The request for a parental order can be reviewed by 
a government appointed Tribunal court.  
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Victoria  The state of Victoria was the first to adopt a law on 
surrogacy. 
 In 1995 the legislature introduced the Infertility
Treatment Act, which classified commercial
surrogacy as a criminal offence. Altruistic surrogacy
was passively accepted, but in some cases it was 
practically impossible for intended parents to be 
allowed to perform fertilisation with the purpose of
surrogacy, as under the Act the woman who would 
be treated (i.e. the surrogate mother) must have 
been infertile (para 20). 
 In 2008, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 
was passed (it came into force on 1 January 2010), 
and rendered surrogacy contracts void and 
unenforceable (par. 44).  
 However, the practice of surrogacy was not illegal if
the IVF treatment of the surrogate occurred within
the Victorian jurisdiction. 
 The law states an age limit for the surrogate (she 
must be over 25), as well  as the precondition of a 
previous live birth and experience of motherhood, 
and requires prior consultation of all the 
participants with a legal professional, as well as
counselling (dictated by the Assisted Reproduction
Regulations of 2009). 
 With regards to the intending mother, she must be 
infertile, and she and her partner must undergo
and succeed in a criminal record and child
protection check. 
 Moreover, a number of organisations, such as the 
Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment 
Authority (VARTA) function in this state.
 More specifically, VARTA is responsible for the
administrative matters of the ART Act 2008 and 
ensures that the participants have complied with
the state law requirements. 
 The Act refers to a Parent Review Panel, before
which the parties of the surrogacy arrangement
must present their case and provide evidence for 
their altruistic motives, their need for surrogacy in 
order to procreate, and their suitability to become
parents. The decisions of this Panel are reviewable 
by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
 The Victorian Supreme Court holds the ultimate
decisive power for the authorisation of individual
requests for the acknowledgement of any substitute 
parental orders, which will then lead to the transfer
of legal parentage.
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6.2. BELGIUM
A. Legislation 
1. Absence of legislation framing surrogacy and proposed legislation
Currently, Belgium does not have specific legislation in matters of surrogacy. The nullity
of surrogacy conventions results from the illegality of its object and its 'cause', its 
opposition to the principles of non-availability of the human body and the civil status as
well as the inalienable and non-available right of the mother who bears and gives birth
to a child to determine parentage311. However, some hospitals take advantage of the
legislative gap to attend to requests of surrogacy312. Doing so outside any legal 
framework, these hospitals have established strict rules to condition the practice of
surrogacy. 
Considering the nullity affecting it, when surrogacy takes place on Belgian territory, the 
contract cannot be subjected to enforcement313. Besides, parentage cannot be
established in relation to the intended mother unless an adoption procedure takes place,
the surrogate mother being considered the legal mother according to Belgian law314, 
while the intended father will have to, according to the circumstances, either 
acknowledge the child if the surrogate mother is not married, or engage an adoption
procedure. 
Facing this legislative gap, legislative propositions have been tabled at the parliamentary
assemblies with the objective of either expressly forbidding for-profit surrogacy315, or to
authorise and frame surrogacy under certain conditions316. In order to expose the state 
of the legislative reflections on the subject, the core ideas of the four propositions aiming 
at accepting the legalisation of surrogacy in certain circumstances are summarised in an 
overview table, which appears in the main body of this Report. An accent will be made 
on the analysis on the ways these propositions aim to answer the different questions 
arising from the issues of surrogacy, namely: the type of accepted surrogacy, the 
311 Cf. Articles 6 (“Statutes relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by private 
agreements”) and 1128 of the Civil code (“Only things which may be the subject matter of legal transactions
between private individuals may be the object of agreements”) 
312 The hospital of the “Citadelle de Liège” and the hospital “Saint-Pierre” in Brussels, practice surrogacy in
Belgium under certain conditions. 
313 N. GALLUS, Le droit de la filiation. Rôle de la vérité socio-affective et de la volonté en droit belge, Larcier,
2009, pp. 355 and s., n° 336 à 348. 
314 Art. 312 Civil code. 
315 Proposed law completing the Penal Code on dispositions relating to the commercialisation of surrogacy and 
the settling of the practice, of the 5th of April 2011, tabled by Mr Wouter Beke and associates, Doc. parl., 
Senate, 2010-2011, n° 5-932/1 (Proposition identical to the Proposed law completing the Penal Code on 
dispositions relating to the commercialisation of surrogacy and the settling of the practice, of the 4th of May 
2011, tabled by Mrs Nahima Lanjri and associates, Doc. parl., Chamber, 2010-2011, n° 53-1429/1) ; Proposed
law to forbid surrogacy with commercial purposes and publicity thereof, of the 9th of June of 2011, tabled by 
Mrs Marleen Temmerman and Mr Guy Swennen, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010-2011, n° 5-1074/1 (identical to the
Proposed law modifying the Penal Code in matters of surrogacy with commercial purposes, of the 28th of 
October 2010, tabled by Mrs Myriam Vanlerberghe, Mr Renaat Landuyt and Mrs Maya Detiège, Doc. parl., 
Chamber, 2010-2011, n° 53-497/1) ; Proposed resolution concerning the international legal framework of 
surrogacy, of the 9th of June 2011,tabled by Mrs Elke Sleurs and Mrs Inge Faes, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010-2011,
n° 5-1075/1.
316 Proposed law framing surrogacy, of the 9th of September 2010, tabled by Mr Bart Tommelein and 
associates, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010, n° 5-130/1 ; Proposed law relating to surrogate mothers, of the 23rd of 
September 2011, tabled by Mrs Christine Defraigne, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010, n° 5-160/1 ; Proposed law 
relative to surrogacy, of the 6th of October 2011, tabled by Mr. Philippe Mahoux, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010, n° 
5-236/1 ; Proposed law on the organisation of surrogacy centres, of the 5th of April 2011, tabled by Mrs 
Marleen Temmerman et Mr Guy Swennen, Doc. parl., Senate, 2010-2011, n° 5-929/1, identical to the
proposed law on the organisation of surrogacy centres, of the 12th of May 2011, tabled by Mrs Myriam
Vanlerberghe, Mr Renaat Landuyt and Mrs Maya Detiège, Doc. parl., Chamber, 2010-2011, n° 53-1453/1.
Maya Detiège, Doc. parl., Chamber, 2010-2011, n° 53-1453/1. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
conditions to accede to it (profile of intended parents and medical indications), the 
financial aspects of the convention, the standards of protection provided for the 
surrogate mother and the intended parents, the rules determining parentage, the
dispositions legislating the donation of gametes, the attribution of Belgian citizenship to
a child, the existence and content of a model of contract for surrogacy as well as the 
existence of centres organising surrogacy on the Belgian territory. The example of 
Belgium can be particularly enriching to the extent that the need to legislate surrogacy, 
agreed by all, can give rise to numerous reflections and propositions. A study of the 
proposed laws allows us to concentrate on the construction of legislation in matters of
surrogacy, with its uncertainties, interrogations and doubts. To this extent, Belgium is 
quite a laboratory of ideas.
2. Type of surrogacy
Currently, only altruistic and gestational surrogacy (altruistic and gestational surrogacy 
arrangements) are authorised by hospitals receiving requests for surrogacy in Belgium. 
In the majority of the circumstances, both of the parents have a genetic relation with the 
child, a situation that is perceived as ideal by the hospitals receiving these requests. If,
however, the intended mother is not in the capacity of providing the oocyte, the 
donation of ovules can be provided for. It would seem that hospitals deal with each 
request on a case-by-case basis. 
In the context of the proposed laws analysed, only the altruistic surrogacy has been
considered. Three propositions expressly forbid the payment of a contribution to the 
surrogate mother even if they provide that the expenditures linked to pregnancy and
medical exams required by law are to be covered by the sterile couple. From the four 
proposed laws analysed, two demand at least one genetic relation with the intended 
parents, authorising implicitly the situations when the surrogate mother provides the 
oocyte (traditional surrogacy arrangement). Only one of the four proposed laws that 
were tabled authorises only the gestational surrogacy arrangement providing that the 
oocyte cannot be provided by the surrogate mother when it is not provided by the 
intended mother. 
3. Access to surrogacy: profile of requesting parents and medical
indications
Currently, only heterosexual couples have access to surrogacy as carried out in certain 
Belgian hospitals. These restrictions are related to the medical indications set by these 
hospitals conditioning the access to surrogacy to the sterility of the intended mother or
to her incapacity to complete a successful pregnancy. 
In the context of the proposed laws analysed, very different responses were given to the
question of the profile to be satisfied by the intended parents. The proposed law tabled
by Mr Tommelein and associates seems to reserve surrogacy to heterosexual couples 
(married or not) and single women. The proposed law tabled by Mrs Defraigne reserves
it to heterosexual couples, married or not. The proposed law tabled by Mrs Temmerman
and Mr Swennen concerns heterosexual and homosexual couples, married or cohabiting 
and ‘lasting’ (a minimum of 3 years of affective life). Finally, the proposed law tabled by
Mr Mahoux opens surrogacy to all profiles. 
As for medical indications, all the proposed laws concerned demand the intended mother 
to be in the physiological impossibility of bearing a child or that her pregnancy 
constitutes a danger for her health, her life or that of her child. One of the analysed laws
enumerates these medical indications in a very precise manner: congenital or acquired 
absence of the womb or dysfunction of it; counter-indicated pregnancy due to a risk for 
her health, her life or those of the child. 
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4. Financial aspects 
Currently, the financial aspect of surrogacy is not regulated by any convention. Such a 
contract would be in effect illicit and, thus, null and void. It would seem, then, that the 
parties convene arrangements between themselves on the responsibility for the financial 
aspects. 
In what concerns the proposed laws analysed, they all provide the responsibility of the 
costs related to the pregnancy to be assumed by the intended parents. Two of them 
detail these costs: 
- “all medical costs of any kind related to the fecundation of the surrogate mother, to the 
pregnancy, to childbirth and all of their medical consequences, including non-reimbursed 
medical costs;” 
- All legal and administrative costs relating to the pregnancy, childbirth and eventual
adoption of the new-born child;  
- all costs related to an insurance for which the surrogate mother designates a 
beneficiary or beneficiaries, covering death or permanent invalidity that she could suffer
as a result of an accident, a medical complication or an illness linked to the pregnancy or
childbirth (proposed law tabled by Mr Mahoux)”. 
The proposed law tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen goes even further 
proposing a model of convention for surrogacy detailing the “effective and reasonable”
costs that are the responsibility of the intended parents:  
« 1º miscellaneous costs: 
These include but are not limited to: 
a. clothing for pregnancy; 
b. costs of transportation, namely … euros per km, for each travel carried out in
the context of the surrogacy; 
c. where necessary, a compensation for the loss of salary (... euros/day); 
d. an arrangement for the hypothetic situation where the surrogate mother would 
suffer an accident, a medical complication or an illness related to the pregnancy. 
Except for the case of a multiple pregnancy, the surrogate mother receives monthly an
amount not exceeding … euros. In case of a multiple pregnancy, the monthly provision
cannot exceed the amount of … euros. 
2º medical costs: 

(To be detailed by the parties, taking into account the fees of the fertility centre). 

All the medical costs linked to the surrogacy are paid by the intended parents. 

3º legal and administrative costs: 

The requesting parents pay the centre a basic compensation of … euros to cover 

administrative fees. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
The parties enjoy the legal assistance of Mr/Mrs …, legal expert of the surrogacy centre. 
The costs related to the drafting of the convention are of … euros. The conversion of the 
convention into authentic instrument implies a cost of … euros. 
4º insurances: 
a. healthcare insurance:
The surrogate mother declares owning, when the convention is signed, a valid
healthcare insurance and hospital insurance. This insurance will reimburse an
important part of the medical fees related to the surrogacy, the hospitalisation,
childbirth, etc. The surrogate mother attaches to this convention a proof of 
existence and validity of these insurances. 
The surrogate mother is responsible for the presentation of bills and certificates to
the insurance company. She will also provide the requesting parents with a copy
of these documents as well as the eventual refusals to the requested
reimbursements issued by the insuring entity. She is also responsible to contest 
these refusals. 
If the surrogate mother is even at the slightest risk of losing her insurance, she 
must warn immediately the requesting parents 
b. life insurance:
The requesting parents pay for the subscription of a life insurance for the
surrogate mother. An amount of … euros is paid to … (a person designed by the 
surrogate mother)”. 
5. Standards of protection for the surrogate mother and the intended 
parents 
‐ Age of the surrogate mother: all the proposed laws set conditions relating
to the age of the surrogate mother, the minimum and the maximum age
varying from a proposition to the other. Thus, the proposed law tabled by Mrs 
Defraigne and the one tabled by Mr Tommelein and associates demand that 
the surrogate mother is of age and less than 45 years of age. However, if the
surrogate mother is the mother of one of the intended parents, the proposed
law by Mr Tommelein and associates raises the maximum age to 49. The
proposed law tabled by Mr Mahoux fixes the maximum age to 36 years of age,
while demanding the surrogate mother to be of age. As for the proposed law 
tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen, the surrogate mother has to be 
of an age of minimum 21 years and a maximum of 37 years. The limit of age 
is raised to 45 if the surrogate mother is a relative in first or second degree
with one of the intended parents.
‐ Condition related to the fact that the surrogate mother has already 
given birth to a healthy child: three of the proposed laws analysed demand
that the surrogate mother has given birth to at least one living child and two
also provide that this child must be living.
Verification of the free an informed consent given by the surrogate mother: the current practice by 
hospitals ensures the free and informed consent of the surrogate mother pointing her attention to 
the implications of the role. Similarly, the proposed laws analysed provide the verification of the 
consent of the surrogate mother: “it will be ensured in particular that the surrogate mother decides 
freely and the hardships of giving away a child after bearing it will be insisted to her” (proposed law 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
tabled by Mr Tommelein and associates). One of them provides equally that the surrogate mother 
has a reflection period of three months before the beginning of her pregnancy (proposition tabled 
by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen). 
‐ Medical and psychological consultation of the surrogate mother: As it
is done currently, the proposed laws analysed provide for medical and
psychological support and, sometimes, even social and legal.
‐ Age of intended parents: Amongst the four proposed laws analysed, three
fix a limit of age for the intended mother or the intended parents:  
° on the first one, the limit of age for the intended mother is fixed to 43 
years of age in case of a gestational surrogacy arrangement while the limit
is raised to 45 years of age in case of a traditional surrogacy arrangement
(proposed law tabled by Mr Tommelein and associated); 
° on the second one, the limit of age of the intended parents is fixed to 47
years of age (proposed law tabled by Mr Mahoux);  
° on the third one, the intended parents have to be of age and no more 
than 45 years of age (proposed law tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr 
Swennen). 
‐ Provision aiming at ensuring the impossibility for the intended 
parents to withdraw their consent: the convention for surrogacy provided
by the proposed law tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen contains a 
section concerning the anticipated termination of the convention. Once the 
pregnancy is established and accounted for, only the surrogate mother can
unilaterally terminate the convention and this in a delay of ninety days
following the implantation of the embryo, which excludes the possibility of the 
intended parents to withdraw their consent. Other proposed laws provide that 
if the intended parents do not respect the obligations imposed to them, they 
will be liable for damages (proposed law tabled by Mrs Defraigne) and specify 
that the intended parents will accept the child without the slightest reserve,
including the case of handicap (proposed law tabled by Mr Tommelein and
associates).
‐ Conditions linked to the residence, domicile and/or the nationality of 
the intended parents and/or the surrogate mother: of the four proposed
laws analysed, only three fix conditions of residence, domicile and/or
nationality for the intended parents and/or for the surrogate mother:
° the first one demands that the surrogate mother and the intended 
parents are of Belgian nationality and that one of the two intended parents 
is domiciled in the Belgian territory for at least the last two years 
(proposition tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen);  
° the second one demands that the intended parents are domiciled in
Belgium for at least the last two years (proposed law tabled by Mr
Mahoux);
° the third one demands that the intended parents and the surrogate 
mothers are of Belgian nationality or have a fixed residence in Belgium
(proposed law tabled by Mr B. Tommelein and associates). 
- Demand of legal advice: some of the proposed laws analysed provide that 
the parties will be assisted by a legal expert attached to the surrogacy centre 
and that they will have to be assisted by an independent lawyer (proposed 
law tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen). Currently, the hospitals 
practicing surrogacy demand the parties to be advised by a legal expert on
the law of parentage. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
6. Laws determining parentage 
‐ Current system 
° Maternal parentage: As there is no legislation enacted on matters on 
surrogacy, the rules determining the establishment of maternal parentage
follow the traditional adage mater semper certa est by establishing that the
legal mother is the mother giving birth317. In other words, the surrogate 
mother is the legal mother of the child, even if she has no genetic relation to
the child, while the intended mother has no legal relation to the child, even if 
she is the genetic mother. In order to establish a parentage relationship with
the child, the intended mother has to engage an adoption procedure either
through a joint adoption with her spouse/cohabitant, if he could recognise the 
child, or adopting the child on her own if she is single. Belgium authorises the 
adoption by a single parent as well as by same-sex persons.  Moreover, the  
law does not require that the candidates seeking to adopt are married. It is
sufficient to be “cohabitants”, for example, having made a declaration of legal 
cohabitation or of permanent and affective life together for at least the last
three years when the adoption request takes place (art. 343 Civil code). 
° Paternal parentage: In the absence of modifications to the rules related to 
paternal parentage, the husband of the surrogate mother is considered as the 
legal father of the child, in compliance to the rule relating to the presumption
of paternity318. The intended father will have to either engage an adoption 
procedure to establish parentage to the child or contest the paternal 
parentage of the husband of the surrogate mother to establish his own 
paternity. If the surrogate mother is not married, the intended father can 
acknowledge the child with the consent of the surrogate mother319, which
allows him to establish parentage without engaging an adoption procedure. If 
there is no consent from the surrogate mother, a court tries to conciliate the 
parties and can reject the claim by the intended father in case a conciliation is
not attained and with the condition that it is proven that the intended father is
not the biological father of the child. Moreover, the court can reject the 
acknowledgment if the child is a year or older and the acknowledgement is
obviously against the child’s best interests. 
If the intended parents engage an adoption procedure aiming at establishing
parentage to the child, it will be organised according to the classic rules
governing adoptions aiming at establishing parentage in Belgium. As a result,
no genetic relation is required between the child and the intended parents for 
these to be eligible for the adoption procedure. 
Finally, surrogacy being practiced outside of any legal framework, there is
currently no system of “birth order” or of “pre-birth order” in the Belgian legal
body. Only one of the four proposed laws, opting for a system of
establishment of parentage through an adoption procedure, proposes a 
system of “pre-adoption”, giving the surrogacy convention a status of “ex­
ante adoption declaration” (proposed law tabled by Mr Tommelein and 
associates). In this system of “pre-adoption”, no legal intervention takes place
before birth. The judicial control is done afterwards through an adoption
procedure. 
317 Art. 312 Civil code: “The child has as a mother the person designed as such at the act of childbirth”.
 
318 Art. 315 Civil code: “The child born within marriage or within the 300 days following its dissolution or
 
annulment, has the husband as a father”.
 
319 Art. 319 and 329bis Civil code: “When the paternity is not established in relation to articles 315 or 317, the
 
father can recognise the child within the conditions fixed in article 329bis”.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
‐ Proposed laws: The proposed laws analysed seek to establish maternal 
parentage proposing two different models: 
	 Conventional model: Of the four proposed laws taken into account, 
two propose establishing maternal parentage through a convention
(proposed law tabled by Mrs Defraigne and proposed law tabled by
Mme Temmerman and Mr Swennen). According to the first proposed
model, the civil registrar mentions directly in the birth certificate the 
names of the intended mother and father after receiving notice of the 
child delivery as well as a copy of the surrogacy convention. Maternal 
and paternal parentage is, thus, established directly in the birth
certificate and the child born of the surrogacy bears the surname of the 
intended father (proposed law tabled by Mrs Defraigne). According to 
the second model proposed, maternal parentage in the case of the 
intended mother results from the mention of her name in the birth
certificate while paternal parentage is ruled by the classic rules of
parentage (proposed law tabled by Mrs Temmerman and Mr Swennen). 
Thus, if the intended mother is married, the child bears the surname of
the intended father. However, if she is not married, the child bears the
surname of the intended mother. 
As a result, this conventional model does not allow to establish
maternal parentage to the surrogate mother, and its does not
guarantee a right of “retention” of the child after birth. Also, there is no
judicial control provided for, before or after. Finally, this model  
provides that the surrogate mother cannot engage any action to 
contest the maternity or paternity (proposed law tabled by Mrs
Defraigne and proposed law tabled by Mme Temmerman and Mr 
Swennen) even if she is the genetic mother of the child (only the 
proposed law tabled by Mrs Defraigne provides for the possibility of the
surrogate mother to be the genetic mother of the child). 
	 Parentage model of the “classic” type or “pre-adoption”: the
other two proposed laws analysed provide for the establishment of the
parentage of the intended parents through the figure of adoption: one 
provides for a classic adoption procedure (proposed law tabled by Mr 
Mahoux), the other one attributing to the surrogacy convention the
status of “ex-ante adoption declaration” (proposed law tabled by Mr 
Tommelein and associates). In both hypotheses, maternal parentage is
established with regards to the surrogate mother in conformity with the 
rules of the Civil code. As a result, the child bears the surname of the 
husband of the surrogate mother if she is married or the surname of
the surrogate mother is she is single, in conformity with the rules of
the Civil code regarding the attribution of name320. In the first model,
the surrogate mother has a right of “retention” as she is not obliged to 
consent the adoption (period of two months to agree to the adoption 
starting from childbirth) while in the model of “pre-adoption”, the 
surrogate mother has a reflection period until childbirth as she cannot
agree to adoption before childbirth. In both cases, a judicial control 
takes place downstream through an adoption procedure. 
7. Donation of gametes
320 Art. 335 Civil code: « § 1. The child of whom only paternal parentage is established or of whom maternal
and paternal parentage are established at the same time, bears the name of the father. § 2. The child of whom 
only maternal parentage is established bears the name of the mother”. 
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The donation of gametes is governed by the law of the 6th of July of 2007 related to 
the medically assisted procreation and the destination of supernumerary embryos 
and gametes321. According to article 57 of this law, the donation of gametes can be
anonymous or non-anonymous322. 
8. Attribution of Belgian citizenship to the child
A child can acquire Belgian citizenship either on the basis of the nationality of his/her
parents, or his/her birth on Belgian territory, or by the collective effect of an 
acquisition act.
‐ Attribution of the Belgian nationality on the basis of the nationality of 
the father, the mother or the adopting parent at the time of birth323: A 
child is automatically Belgian if he/she is born in Belgium to a Belgian parent
at the moment of birth, if he/she is born abroad to a Belgian parent born in
Belgium or to a Belgian parent with the condition that the child does not
possess another nationality before coming of age.  The Belgian nationality is
attributed to a child born abroad to a Belgian parent with the condition that
his/her parent undertakes a declaration to request the attribution of the 
Belgian nationality to the child before he/she is 5 years of age.
‐ Attribution of the Belgian nationality on the basis of birth of the child 
in Belgium324: In certain circumstances, the child will be attributed the 
Belgian nationality on the basis of his/her birth on Belgian territory even if
his/her parents are not Belgian. 
Such is the case of a child who would be stateless if the Belgian nationality
was not attributed. In this hypothesis, the attribution of the Belgian nationality 
is conditioned to the fact that the child cannot obtain another nationality, 
through the execution of an administrative procedure by his/her parents 
before the diplomatic or consular authorities of their country of origin.  
Such is equally the case if one of the parents is born in Belgium and has had 
his/her main residence there during 5 years in the last ten years preceding the 
birth of the child or if the child is adopted before the age of 18 by a foreigner
born in Belgium who has had his/her main residence there for 5 years of the 
ten years preceding the birth of the child. 
Finally, the Belgian nationality can also be attributed to children of the so-
called “second generation”, meaning born in Belgium from parents born
abroad. This attribution is conditioned to a declaration made by the parents.
‐ Attribution of the Belgian nationality to a child on the basis of the
acquisition of the Belgian nationality by the father, the mother or an 
adopting parent before the child is 18 years old325: If a parent or an 
adopting parent who has parental authority on the child acquires or recovers
the Belgian nationality, the nationality is automatically attributed to the child
(collective effect).
Model of surrogacy convention 
321 Law of the 6th of July 2007 on medically assisted procreation and the destination of supernumerary embryos
 
and gametes, M.B., 17th of July 2007.
 
322 Art. 57: “When gametes are assigned to a donation programme, the consulted fecundation centre is liable 

not to give access to any information allowing the identification of the donor. The non-anonymous donation
 
that results from an agreement between the donor or the donors is authorised”.
 
323 Articles 8 and of the Code of Belgian nationality, M.B., 12th of July 1984.
 
324 Articles 10, 11 and 11bis of the Code of Belgian nationality, M.B., 12th of July 1984.
 
325 Article 12 of the Code of the Belgian nationality, M.B., 12th of July 1984.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
Currently, the parties agree on the surrogacy arrangements without a contract, as any 
convention dealing with surrogacy would be illegal and, thus, void. 
Of the four proposed laws analysed, only one proposes a project for a standard
convention on surrogacy, annexed to this report (proposed law tabled by Mrs
Temmerman and Mr Swennen). This project of standard convention, very detailed, 
contains dispositions relating to the psychological and medical exam that the intended 
parents and the surrogate mother will have to undertake, the dispositions ruling the 
sexual relations and the behaviour of the surrogate mother, another one organising the
psychological and medical support for the surrogate mother, a disposition relating to the
possibility of the surrogate mother to get an abortion and the measures to be taken if 
the prenatal diagnostic reveals that the child will suffer from a physical or psychological 
retardation or that he/she will have a severe hereditary disease as well as a disposition
concerning the follow-ups in case of miscarriage or stillbirth. The convention rules also
the attribution of parental rights in case of separation or death of the intended parents.
The costs that are a responsibility of the intended parents are detailed. Finally,
dispositions ruling the possibility of an early termination of the convention, unilaterally or
by common agreement, and specifying the consequences of an eventual violation of a
disposition of the convention enumerating in a non-limitative manner the hypotheses of 
the non-respect of the convention by the surrogate mother or the intended parents. The 
final disposition provides that the parties will be assisted by the legal expert attached to 
the surrogacy centre and that they will be also assisted by an independent lawyer in
case of conflict. 
9. Institutions organising surrogacy
Currently, only some hospitals practice surrogacy in Belgium. The absence of legislation
on the matter justifies that there is neither a specific institution dedicated to surrogacy
nor an association organising the procedure, for this would be illegal.
B. Case law 
1. The judicial procedures concern both domestic cases of surrogacy326 (surrogacy taking 
place in Belgium between a surrogate mother and intended parents of Belgian 
nationality) and international cases of surrogacy (surrogacy taking place abroad - in
Ukraine327, in India328 or in the United States329 - or surrogacy taking place in Belgium
between a Belgian surrogate mother and foreign intended parents330). 
326 Ghent (15th ch.), 16th of January 1989, T.G.R., 1989, p. 52; Brussels (3th ch.), 1st of March 2007, Revue
trimestrielle de droit familial, 2007, p. 754 ; Antwerp (16th ch. bis), 14th of January 2008,
RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1774, note F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie na draagmoederschap revisited », 
reforming Youth court of Antwerp (7th ch.), 11th of October 2007, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1777,
note F. SWENNEN ; Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261,
note L. PLUYM ; Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 372, note G. VERSCHELDEN reforming Youth 
court Bruges, 19th of January 2012, Tijdschrift voor Jeugd en Kinderrechten, 2012, p. 260; Youth court. 
Brussels, 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1182 ; Youth court. Turnhout,
4th of October 2000, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2001-2002, p. 206, note F. SWENNEN, « Volle adoptie na
draagmoederschap: nihil obstat ? » ; Civ. Hasselt (1st ch.), 27th of March 2001, Limb. Rechtsl., 2001, p. 323 ;
Civ. Ghent (3rd ch.), 31st of May 2001, Revue générale de droit civil, 2002, p. 27, note G. VERSCHELDEN; Youth 
court. Brussels, 6th of May 2009, J.L.M.B., 2009, p. 1083 ; Youth court. Ghent, 13th of June 2012,
590.B.2011/57, unpublished. 
327 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140, note J. VERHELLEN, 
« Draagmoederschap: het internationaal privaatrecht uitgedaagd », p. 171 ; Youth court Antwerp, 22th of April
2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22 ; Civ. Brussels,
15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 ; T. Vreemd., 2011, p. 117 (somm.), note K. VANVOORDEN. 
328 Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1164 ; Civ. Nivelles,
6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695, note C. HENRICOT and Civ. Brussels, 18 December 2012,
unpublished and non-final. 
329 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S.
SAROLÉA et J. SOSSON ; Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2011, n° 2, p. 52, note P. WAUTELET ; Journal 
des tribunaux, 2010, p. 634, ayant réformé Civ. Huy, 22th of March 2010, Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 420,
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
a) Domestic cases of surrogacy 
Of the eleven decisions taken into account, relating to cases of domestic surrogacy, 
seven concern the approval of adoption procedures; five decisions concede it and two 
refuse to sentence on it. Only one decision has been taken on the subject of the
protection of childhood. 
The judicial decisions are presented in the following lines in chronological order, starting
by the decisions ruled by the highest degree of jurisdiction (courts of appeal and then, 
jurisdiction of first instance). 
- Ghent (15th ch.), 16th of January 1989: the surrogate mother was inseminated
with the sperm of the intended father. Thus, it was a case of “traditional”
surrogacy, the surrogate mother being also the genetic mother of the child. The 
legal action undertaken by the intended parents seeks to approve a full adoption
with regards to the child conceived by the surrogate mother. The Court of appeal 
refuses to settle the case, considering that it was not the intention of the 
legislator that a couple could request a child from a surrogate mother to integrate 
the child into their household after childbirth through an adoption procedure. 
- Antwerp (16th ch. bis), 14th of January, reforming Youth court Antwerp (7th ch.), 
11th of October 2007: the surrogacy took place with the gametes of the intended
parents implanted through IVF, the woman being the mother of the intended
mother (gestational surrogacy). The intended father’s parentage is established by 
the acknowledgment of paternity, the surrogate (grand-)mother not being 
married331. The action introduced before the Youth court of Antwerp seeks the
approval of the adoption requested by the intended mother. In first instance, the 
Youth court refuses to concede the adoption on the basis that a surrogacy 
convention is illegal and that it cannot be used as a fair basis framing the
adoption unless it is accepted and framed by the law. The tribunal considers,
thus, that the full adoption resulting from an intra-familial surrogacy is not in
conformity with the best interests of the child or his/her fundamental rights. The
Court of Appeal of Antwerp reforms the sentence pronounced by the Youth court 
and concedes the adoption underscoring the fact that an altruistic surrogacy by a 
surrogate mother, whose only objective is to satisfy the desire to have a child by
her daughter, is not contrary to the public order. 
- Ghent (15th ch.), 18th of May 2009, reforming Youth court. Ghent (27th ch.), 31st 
of March 2009: after an agreement concluded between the biological parents and 
the intended mother before childbirth, the child is given to the intended mother 
so that she can adopt him/her (traditional surrogacy). The circumstances of the 
case do not suggest a for-profit surrogacy. In first instance, the Youth court
considers that it is not necessary to pronounce an enforceable pedagogical 
measure with regards to the child. The Court of Appeal reforms this decision and
grants the child to an adoption family for a period of six months, considering
note N. GALLUS ; Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2010, n° 38, p. 1815, note P. WAUTELET et Youth 
court Huy (11th ch.), 22nd December 2011, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2012/2, p. 403, note. 
330 Civ. Ghent, 24th of December 2009, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, n° 4, p. 133, note J. VERHELLEN, 
« Draagmoederschap: het internationaal privaatrecht uitgedaagd », p. 17 (Belgian surrogate and Dutch 
intended parents) and Ghent, 5th of September 2005, Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht, 2006, n° 2, p. 163,
note Th. KRUGER, « Kinderhandel: welke rechters moeten/mogen de zaak horen ? » (Belgian surrogate and 
Dutch intended parents). 
331 At first instance, the acknowledgement of paternity by the intended father in relation to the child born from 
his mother-in-law was problematic in view of the article 321 of the Civil code that forbids the acknowledgement
of paternity when it crates between the mother and the father an absolute obstacle to marriage. Following a 
reform of the law on parentage, the intended father could acknowledge his child, the obstacle becoming
relative and not absolute anymore. See F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie na draagmoederschap revisited », note on 
Antwerp (16tth ch. bis), 14th of January 2008, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1775, 
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necessary to take an urgent enforceable pedagogical measure applying article 37, 
2° of the decree on the special assistance to the youth. The child was then placed 
in a centre for children care and family assistance. While this placement was first
extended by request of the public prosecutor (Youth court. Ghent (27th ch.), 4th of
November 2009, inedited), the Youth court settled in favour of the request of the 
social services, requesting the attribution of the child to the intended mother, in
whose household the child currently lives (Youth court. Ghent (27th ch.), 4th of
November 2009, inedited). 
- Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, reforming Youth court. Bruges, 19th of 
January 2012: the surrogate mother was inseminated with the sperm of the 
intended father. It is, thus, a “traditional” surrogacy, the surrogate mother being 
also the genetic mother of the child. In addition to the costs linked to the 
pregnancy, the intended parents paid an amount of 1.600 euros per month to the 
surrogate. The action undertaken seeks to obtain the approval of the adoption 
requested by the intended mother. In first instance, the Youth court settles in 
favour of her request, considering that it is not within the responsibility of the 
tribunal to carry out, within the framework of an adoption procedure, an exam of
the content, the scope and the legal (in)validity of a surrogacy contract concluded
between the surrogate mother and the adopting mother. The tribunal considers
that only the basis of the adoption requires analysis without taking into 
consideration the illegality of the surrogacy contract. In appeal, the Court of
Ghent reforms the sentence pronounced and refuses the full adoption requested 
by the intended mother on the basis that the dissimulation, through an adoption, 
of buying-selling a child is an illegal basis that makes the adoption illegal. The
Court affirms that the human individual cannot be lowered to the level of a 
monetarily quantifiable object, which makes a for-profit surrogacy contrary to
human dignity. To verify if the adoption was based on a fair basis, the Court has
to analyse the information preceding the procedure of adoption, based on article
351 of the Civil code, according to which the sale of a child can lead to a revision 
of the adoption sentence. This analysis cannot be thwarted by the circumstance
that there is a de facto parent-child relation between the child and the adoption 
candidate and that, in social relations, the child is considered the child of the 
adoption candidate. 
- Youth court. Brussels, 4th of June 1996: the surrogacy took place with the
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother 
being the sister of the intended mother (gestational surrogacy). The parental 
parentage is established by acknowledgement of paternity. The action undertaken
before the tribunal of first instance of Brussels aims to obtain an approval of the
adoption requested by the intended mother. The tribunal settles in favour of her
request highlighting that it is in the best interests of the child that his/her legal
situation corresponds to the social reality, the child being reared in the household 
by the intended mother. 
- Youth court. Turnhout, 4th of October 2000: surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother 
being the sister of the intended mother (gestational surrogacy). The action
undertaken aims to obtain the approval of the adoption requested by both
intended parents, the surrogate mother being married. The tribunal settles in
favour of their request after observing that the surrogate mother and her spouse 
(legal parents) consent to the adoption and on the basis that a surrogacy not for 
profit is not against public order.
- Youth court. Brussels, 6th of May 2009: the surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother 
not being related to the intended parents (gestational surrogacy). The parentage 
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of the intended father is established by acknowledgement of paternity. The action 
undertaken aims to obtain the approval of the adoption requested by the intended
mother. The tribunal settles in favour of her request on the basis that the request 
is substantiated on a fair basis and that that it responds to the best interests of
the child as it allows to match the law with the facts as the intended mother is the 
genetic mother of the child and considered by everyone as the child’s mother. 
- Youth court. Ghent, 13th of June 2012: the surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF (gestational surrogacy).
The parentage of the intended father is established by acknowledgement of 
paternity. The action undertaken aims to obtain the approval of the adoption 
requested by the intended mother. The tribunal settles in favour of her request, 
considering that the adoption is based on a fair basis as the twins are, from the 
moment that they were born, a part of the household of the intended parents 
In other two decisions published, the tribunals settle in favour of the approval of the 
acknowledgement of paternity of the intended father332. 
- Brussels (3rd ch.), 1st of March 2007: the surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother 
not being related to the intended parents (gestational surrogacy). The action 
undertook aims at obtaining the approval of the act of acknowledgement made by
the intended father in relation to the child to be born of the surrogate mother. 
This action is founded on the old article 319bis of the Civil code, according to 
which “if the father is married and acknowledges a child conceived by a woman
who is not his spouse, the act of acknowledgement has to be presented through a 
request of approval before the tribunal of first instance where the child is 
domiciled”. In this case, the Court tried to determine if by use the terms “child 
conceived by a woman who is not his spouse”, the legislator had aimed at
distinguishing between the different modes of conception, responding in different
ways to requests of acknowledgement on the basis of whether the child bore and
given birth to by a woman who is not a spouse was conceived with the gametes 
of the spouse or not. The Court responded negatively considering that the 
surrogate mother could equally “conceive” a child even if she was not the genetic
mother. The Court of Appeal of Brussels settles in favour of the applicant and
approves the acknowledgement made by the biological father with regards to the 
child who was given birth to by the surrogate mother. 
A procedure of approval of full adoption was then introduced by the intended 
mother, equally the genetic mother, before the Youth court, which settled in
favour of her request. 
- Civ. Hasselt (1st ch.), 27th of March 2001: the surrogacy took place with the 
gametes of the intended parents implanted through IVF, the surrogate mother 
being anonymous (gestational surrogacy). The child was born through
anonymous childbirth in France (‘accouchement sous x’). The action undertook
aims at obtaining the approval of the act of acknowledgement made by the 
intended father in relation to the child to be born of the surrogate mother. The 
tribunal settles in favour of the request of the intended father after verifying that 
the conditions of the old article 319bis of the Civil code, on the acknowledgement
of paternity of a child conceived by a woman who is not his spouse, were fulfilled. 
The tribunal considers that this disposition applies to the equally to a situation in
332 Ever since a reform on the laws of parentage came into force on the 1st of July 2007, a married man who 
acknowledges a child conceived by a woman who is not his spouse does not have to request an approval of the 
act of acknowledgement from the tribunal of first instance. See Law of the 1st of July 2006 modifying the
dispositions of the Civil code on the establishment of parentage and the effects of it M.B., 29th of December 
2006. 
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which the woman, other than the spouse, gives birth to a child even if she is not
genetically related to the child.  
A procedure of approval of full adoption was then introduced by the intended 
mother, equally the genetic mother, before the Youth court, which settled in
favour of her request. 
Finally, the last decision concerns an action to contest paternity, introduced by the 
husband of the surrogate mother, claiming not consenting the insemination of his wife. 
- Civ. Ghent (3rd ch.), 31st of May 2001: the surrogate mother was inseminated 
with the sperm of the intended father. This is, thus, a “traditional surrogacy”, the 
surrogate mother being also the genetic mother of the child. Paternal parentage 
was established in relation to her husband, in accordance with the presumption of
paternity. The action undertaken by the husband of the surrogate mother before 
the tribunal of first instance of Ghent aims at contesting his paternity on the basis 
that he had not consented to the artificial insemination of his wife. The tribunal 
declares the action admissible and well-founded, after ascertaining the absence of
consent from the husband to the artificial insemination of his wife as well as the
absence of genetic relation between the husband and the child given birth to by 
his wife. 
b) International surrogacy 
Of the eight published decisions related to international surrogacy, six concern surrogacy 
cases taking place abroad and two concern surrogacy cases on the Belgian territory
between a Belgian surrogate and foreign intended parents.
 Surrogacy cases taking place abroad. 
Of the six published decisions related to surrogacy cases taking place abroad, three 
concern surrogacy cases taking place in Ukraine, other two concern surrogacy cases 
taking place in India and the sixth concerns a surrogacy case in the United States.
Ukraine: 
‐ Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008 and Youth Court Antwerp, 22nd of April 
2010: case Hanne and Elke: the surrogacy took place in Ukraine between an 
Ukrainian surrogate mother and heterosexual Belgian intended parents. The
intended parents are also the genetic parents of the children (gestational 
surrogacy). The birth certificates mention the intended parents as the legal
parents of the children given birth to by the surrogate mother. The Embassy
of Belgium in Kiev refuses to acknowledge the birth certificates and, thus, 
refuses to deliver a passport to the children in order to allow them to travel to 
Belgium. The intended parents undertake an action before the tribunal of first 
instance of Antwerp on the basis of articles 23 and 27 of the Belgian Code of
Private International Law so as to request the recognition of the birth
certificates. The tribunal acknowledges the certificates but not as birth
certificates (on the basis that the mention of the name of the intended mother 
in the Ukrainian birth certificate is contrary to Belgian law according to which 
the birth certificate must mention the name of the mother giving birth to the
child) but as authentic and legally valid certificates from which the paternity of 
the genetic father, also the intentional father of the children born from the 
surrogate mother, is acknowledged.  
The maternal parentage of the intended mother is, thus, not acknowledged.
Following the sentence of the tribunal of first instance of Antwerp, the 
intended mother undertakes a legal procedure before the Youth Court to 
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request the adoption of the children. The tribunal approves the adoption
based on the best interests of the children, that is of having parentage with
their genetic mother. The tribunal specifies that considering an adoption
procedure contrary to public order or as not being founded on fair basis (art.
344-1 Civil code) only due to high-technology surrogacy would penalise the 
children who did not choose the way they were born. The tribunal also 
considers that the limit line with the commerce of children was not crossed in
this case and that the case is not one of coercion, exploitation, fraud or legal 
fraud (neither in Belgium nor in Ukraine). Furthermore, the tribunal considers
that the adoption procedure must be ruled by the national laws on the basis
that it is not proven that the adopting candidate had the intention to adopt
the children before their transfer to Belgium. 
‐ Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011: case Samuel: the surrogacy took place 
in Ukraine between an Ukrainian surrogate mother and a homosexual couple
formed by a Belgian citizen and a French one, both residing in France. The  
biological father is the husband of Belgian nationality. The facts mentioned by
the sentence do not mention if the surrogate mother is also the genetic 
mother of the children to be born or if there was a donation of ovules. The 
birth certificate mentions the name of the surrogate mother as being the legal 
mother of the child and the name of the Belgian husband as being the legal 
father of the child. An Ukrainian sentence ascertains that the surrogate 
mother refuses to assume the education of the child and, thus, strips her of 
parentage towards the child, in favour of the intended father. The Embassy of 
Belgium in Kiev refuses the birth certificate and, thus, refuses to deliver the 
necessary travelling documents. The intended father undertakes an action of 
interim relief to condemn the Belgian State to deliver a passport to the child.
Ruling in interim, the tribunal refuses to settle in favour of the applicant
considering that “ordering the Belgian state to deliver the child a passport, 
with an eventual visa, would equate to recognise the parentage of the
applicant to Samuel as well as the Belgian nationality of the child as a
passport cannot be delivered by the Belgian State to anyone but a Belgian
citizen. The decision would be, thus, declarative of the rights invoked and 
exceeding the provisory nature of the ruling” (Civ. Brussels (interim), 4th 
February 2010, RR 09/1694/C, inedited). A second interim procedure is
undertaken and is also settled by a refusal on the basis that the conditions of
an interim ruling are not fulfilled (Civ. Brussels (interim), 9th of July 2010, RG 
10/830/C, inedited).  
In its substance, the action undertaken by the intended father aims at the
recognition of the birth certificate by the Belgian authorities (articles 23 and 
27 of the Code of private international law). The tribunal acknowledges the 
act as an authentic and legally valid certificate from which results the paternal
parentage of the applicant to the child. The tribunal reaches this conclusion
after verifying the authenticity of the birth certificate in relation to the 
Ukrainian law as well as after verifying the validity of the birth certificate in
relation to the Belgian law, the law of the nationality of the intended father 
trying to establish parentage (application of the rule of conflict of laws in
matters of parentage: article 62 of the Code of Private international law on
the recognition of foreign authentic certificates). For the purpose of Belgian
law, the tribunal considers that the parentage of the intended father is
established as the conditions of the article 329bis, on the acknowledgement of
paternity, are fulfilled.
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Following the sentence, the ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that a Belgian
passport would be delivered to the child, allowing him to join his father333. 
India: 
‐ Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010: case C: the case of surrogacy took
place in India with an Indian surrogate mother and a man of Belgian
nationality, genetic and intentional father of the child. The surrogacy took
place through an IVF with an anonymous ovule donation (gestational 
surrogacy). Parentage by the intended father was established by an act of 
acknowledgement before an Indian notary. The birth certificate does not
mention the name of the surrogate mother, only the name of the intended
father. The intended father demands the Belgian consulate of Mumbai the
deliverance of travel documents. The Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs
refusing to act in favour of his request, the intended father undertakes an
action of interim relief before the Belgian courts. The tribunal settles in his 
favour and condemns the Belgian State to deliver the necessary travel 
documents on the basis of the existence of a family life between the child and
the intended father as well as the best interests of the child.
‐ Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011: case Amélie and Nina: surrogacy took place in
India with an Indian surrogate mother and Belgian heterosexual intended 
parents. The intended father is the genetic father of the children. The 
surrogacy took place through IVF with an anonymous donation of an ovule 
(gestational surrogacy). The birth certificates do not mention the name of the 
surrogate mother, only the name of the intended father. The action undertook
on the basis of articles 23 and 27 of the Code of international private law
aimed at the recognition of the Indian birth certificates. The tribunal
acknowledges the certificates but not as birth certificates but as authentic and 
legally valid certificates from which results the acknowledgement of paternity 
of the intended father. The tribunal reaches this conclusion after verifying the
authenticity of the birth certificates in relation to Indian law as well as after
verifying the validity of the birth certificate in relation to the Belgian law, the 
law of the nationality of the intended father trying to establish parentage 
(application of the rule of conflict of laws in matters of parentage (article 62
of the Code of Private international law) implied by article 27 of the Code of
Private international law on the recognition of foreign authentic certificates).
In relation to the Belgian law, the tribunal considers that the parentage of the
intended father is established as the conditions of article 329bis, on the 
acknowledgement of paternity, are fulfilled. The tribunal verifies also the
incidence of the fact that the couple sought a surrogate mother and the 
absence of her name in the birth certificates in relation to the Belgian public 
order. The tribunal concludes that the illegality of a surrogacy contract cannot 
jeopardise the best interests of the child, a reason to substantiate the
recognition of parentage in relation to the biological father. As for the absence 
of the mention of the name of the surrogate mother on the birth certificates, 
the tribunal considers that it is contrary to the dispositions of the Civil code
imposing the mention on the birth certificate of the name of the mother, this
being the woman giving birth to the child, and thus refuses to recognise the
certificates as birth certificates.
- Civ. Brussels, 18 December 2012 (non-final): the surrogacy was carried out
in India with an Indian surrogate mother and a Belgian father of intent, who is
333 See « Samuel aura un passeport belge », available at the following URL:
http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/article/643798/samuel-aura-un-passeport-belge.html (online on the 
19/02/2011 and viewed on the 18/12/2012). 
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the genetic father of the child. The surrogacy was done through IVF with 
anonymous egg donation (gestational surrogacy). The birth certificate doesn’t
mention the name of the surrogate mother but only states the name of the
father of intent. The latter recognised his paternity through a recognition
certificate established in front of a solicitor in India. During the interim 
hearings, the Belgian State was sentenced to deliver a visa or a travel
document to the child, to allow him to travel to Belgium. Once the child 
arrived on Belgian ground, the father of intent asked for the birth certificate to
be transcribed in the state registers. Faced with the refusal of the registrar to
do so, the father of intent filed an appeal in front of the Court of First Instance 
to obtain recognition of the birth certificate, and hence the parentage link
between the father of intent and the child. The Court of First Instance checked 
the validity of the parentage link in the eyes of the Belgian law, which is 
designated by the conflict of law rule on parentage (art. 62 of the Code of PIL) 
and concludes that the certificate should not be recognised on the grounds
that, in Belgian law, the father of intent would not have been able to assert 
his paternity over the child through a surrogacy contract. The Court also
refused to recognise the birth certificate established by an Indian solicitor on
the basis that the declaration of paternity was not established in accordance
with Belgian law, which stipulates that to recognise a child born from a 
married woman, the legal paternity should first have been annulled before the 
biological paternity of the child could have been recognised. The Court finally
considers that it is not in the interest of the child to have its filiation
determined on the basis of certificates drawn up in India, on the basis that the 
latter contravene to the fundamental principles of the protection of the 
interests of all children, since they spring from commercial transactions that
are not concerned with the interests of the child. After having refused to 
recognise the Indian certificates, the Court finally accepted to confirm the 
paternal filiation of the child on the basis that the father of intent is also the 
biological father of the child and that there is a possession of status, and
further stressed that “this paternity would match the one established in India 
and would be in the interest of the child”.
United States: 
‐ Liège, 6th of September 2010, reforming Civ. Huy, 22nd of March 2010 and 
Youth Court Huy (11th ch.), 22nd of December 2011: case Maïa and Maureen: 
the surrogacy took place in the United States with an American surrogate 
mother and Belgian homosexual parents of intent. One of the intended fathers 
is the genetic father of the children. The facts exposed in both decisions do 
not mention if the surrogate mother is also the genetic mother of the children
or if there was a donation of ovules. The birth certificates mentioning the
names of the two intended fathers were established on the basis of a
“declaratory sentence of paternity of the female twins to be born in the
framework of a surrogacy contract and in absence of parentage between the 
legal parents and the twins to be born”, as by the Supreme Court of the State
of California. The action undertaken before the Belgian courts aims at
recognising the birth certificates established in California (articles 23 and 27 
of the Code of international private law). At first instance, the tribunal refuses 
to settle in favour of the applicant, considering that the recognition of the 
birth certificates would be contrary to the Belgian international public order
and that by travelling to the United States to engage in a contract of 
surrogacy and thus bypass the applicable principles on the matter provided by
Belgian law, the intended parents committed a fraudulent evasion of the law. 
The tribunal refuses to recognise the birth certificates “as they are the last 
phase of a more general process having as an objective to allow a couple to 
receive in their household children conceived in the execution of a surrogacy 
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contract”. On appeal, the Court reforms the judgement on reasons of 
procedure and rectifies the reasoning by the tribunal of first instance. In
conformity to article 27 of the Code of international private law, the Court 
verifies the validity of the birth certificates in relation to Belgian law, the law
of the nationality of the intended father trying to establish parentage. Belgian
law is designated by the application of the rule of conflict of laws in matters of
parentage (article 62 of the Code of Private international law) implied by
article 27 of the Code of Private international law on the recognition of foreign
authentic certificates). In relation to the Belgian law, the Court considers that 
the parentage of the intended biological father is established as the conditions 
of article 329bis, on the acknowledgement of paternity, are fulfilled. In
relation to his spouse, no parentage can be established as the Belgian law 
ignores the establishment of double original paternal parentage. The Court 
verifies also the incidence of the fact that the couple sought a surrogate 
mother in relation to the Belgian public order. It concludes that the illegality
of the surrogacy contract cannot jeopardise the best interests of the children,
a reason to substantiate the recognition of parentage in relation to the 
biological father. 
Receiving a request of simple adoption by the spouse of the intended father,
the Youth court of Huy settles in favour of the applicant, after considering that
the adoption was founded on fair basis, to the extent that the children are,
from their birth, integrated to the family of the intended parents. 
	 Surrogacy cases in Belgium between a Belgian surrogate
mother and foreign intended parents 
Two published decisions concern surrogacy cases taking place in Belgium between a 
Belgian surrogate mother and Dutch intended parents. 
‐ Civ. Ghent, 24th of December 2009: case J: the surrogacy took place in
Belgium with a Belgian surrogate mother and Dutch intended parents to 
whom the child was sold beforehand via Internet. The surrogate mother and 
her spouse are the genetic parents of the child. At the moment of birth, the
surrogate mother pretends to be the intended mother and, for this reason, the 
identity of the Dutch intended mother is specified on the birth certificate in
place of the identity of the Belgian surrogate mother. Parentage in relation to
the child of the intended father is established by presumption of paternity, 
him being married to the intended mother. When the fraud is revealed, a
penal enquiry takes place in Belgium and the Netherlands and, as a result, the 
child is withdrawn from the Dutch intended parents and placed with a host
family in Belgium. The results of the penal enquiry clearly demonstrate that 
the Belgian woman gave birth to the child. The action undertook by the 
Belgian surrogate mother before the tribunal of first instance of Ghent
contests the parentage of the Dutch intended parents. The Belgian courts are 
competent as the child has habitual residence on the Belgian territory (article
61 of the Code of international private law, on the rules of international
competence in matters of parentage). The applicable law in the case of the 
contestation of paternity and maternity is the Dutch law as designed by the 
rule of conflict of laws in matters of parentage (article 62 of the Code of
Private international law). Indeed, it is the law of the State from which the 
intended parents – whose parentage is contested– are citizens of. According
to article 209 of the Dutch Civil code, parentage as established in a birth
certificate cannot be contested if there is a de facto parent-child relation
between the child and the person mentioned in the birth certificate. The 
tribunal considered that in the current case this was not the case for the 
Dutch parents to the extent that the child had not lived but only a few months
with the Dutch family and soon placed in a Belgian host family. In the absence 
222
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
   
  
   
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
of a de facto parent-child relation between the child and the parents 
mentioned in the birth certificate, the action of contestation is open to a third 
party. In conformity with the article 209 of the Dutch Civil code, the surrogate 
mother was, thus, capable of undertaking an action contesting the parentage 
as there was no de facto parent-child relation between the child and the Dutch 
parents. The maternal parentage of the intended mother was, then, easily
revoked by proving that she did not give birth do the child and the parentage
of the husband was revoked by domino effect, as the parentage of his wife 
was revoked. The parentage of the surrogate mother was, thus, re­
established.
Before the Dutch courts, the case produced a penal conviction of the Dutch
parents for forgery and illegal adoption (Rechtbank Zwolle, 14th of July 2011, 
LJN: BR1608 (sentence condemning the woman) et LJN: BR1615 (sentence 
condemning the man) (See report on the Netherlands). The surrogate mother 
and her partner (biological parents) were also the subject of penal conviction 
before Belgian courts of degrading treatment of a child (art. 417 bis, 3° Penal 
code), declaring themselves guilty of substitution of a child through a
commercial exchange, a situation that the tribunal analysed as the sale of a
child as well as a for-profit surrogacy, both contrary to the human dignity of 
the child. The correctional court of Ghent condemned them to a year of
suspended imprisonment, imposed them a fine of 550 EUR and an amount of 
7.500 EUR to be paid to the child for damages (Corr. Ghent, 14th of May 2012, 
inedited. An account of the facts can be found in this site:
ww.jeugdenkinderrechten.be). 
‐ Ghent, 5th of September 2005: case Donna: the surrogacy took place in
Belgium with a Belgian surrogate mother and Belgian intended parents.
Following the deterioration of the relations between the surrogate mother and
the Belgian couple of intended parents, the surrogate mother pretended a 
stillbirth and sold Donna to a Dutch couple. At first instance, the youth court
of Oudenaarde placed Donna under the provisional tutelage of the social
service of the Flemish Community after requesting the youth court of Utrecht
(Netherlands) to transfer the case to it. In appeal, the Court of Ghent nullifies
the decision of the youth court of Oudenaarde on the basis of the territorial 
incompetence of the Belgian courts. Indeed, the transfer of the Dutch courts 
to the Belgian courts was not in conformity with the article 15, § 2 of the 
regulation Brussels n° 2201/2003 of the Council of the 27th of November on
the competence, the recognition and the execution of decisions in matters of 
wedlock and in matters of parentage, abrogating regulation (CE) n° 
1347/2000, so-called Regulation Brussels II bis. The case was transferred to 
the tribunal of Utrecht (see report on the Netherlands). 
2. The analysis of the case law presented before demonstrates that the Belgian courts 
are confronted to questions of very diverse nature in matters of surrogacy.  
In the domestic cases of surrogacy, the legal action is almost systematically undertaken 
by the intended parents seeking to establish parentage in relation to the child, either 
through a procedure of adoption, undertaken by the intended mother334 or by both of the
334 Youth court Brussels, 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1182 ; Antwerp 
(16th ch. bis), 14th of January 2008, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1774, note F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie 
na draagmoederschap revisited » ; Youth court Brussels, 6th of May 2009, J.L.M.B., 2009, p. 1083 ; Ghent (15th 
ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L. PLUYM reforming Youth 
court Bruges, 19th of January 2012 and Youth court Ghent, 13th of June 2012, 590.B.2011/57, unpublished. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
intended parents335, or by a procedure of approval of the acknowledgement of paternity 
by the intended father336. One of the published cases concerns, however, a different 
hypothesis; that of the contestation of paternity, introduced by the husband of the 
surrogate mother, on the basis of the absence of his consent to the insemination of his 
wife by the sperm of the intended father337. As, by definition, the surrogacy contract is 
illegal, no action has been undertaken, until today, with the purpose of requesting the
enforcement of an eventual contract concluded between the parties. 
In the disputes implicating a surrogacy taking place abroad, the action undertaking can 
aim to condemn the Belgian State into delivering the travel documents to the child338, or 
to obtain the recognition of a birth certificate established in a foreign country (State non­
member of the EU)339. Of the three sentences concerning the deliverance of a travel 
document to the child, only one succeeds, allowing the child born from surrogacy to join
his/her intended father. When it comes to actions undertaken to obtain the recognition
of birth certificates, the tribunal accept to recognise these not as birth certificates (on
the basis that these certificates mention either the name of the intended mother or do 
not indicate any name, which is contrary to Belgian law according to which the name of
the woman giving birth has to be mentioned in the birth certificate), but as authentic
and legally valid certificates, from which results the recognition of the paternity in
relation to the child born from the surrogate mother340. However, the courts refuse to 
consider that a foreign birth certificate could establish the maternal parentage of the 
intended mother when her name is mentioned, as it is the case in Ukrainian law341, or a 
double paternal filiation with regards to the spouse of the intended father, as the 
Californian law allows it342. It would seem that after the partial recognition of the foreign
certificate establishing the parentage of the intended father, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs accepts to deliver a passport to the child allowing him/her to travel to Belgium. As 
a consequence, the child can always, it would seem, to join his/her intended parents
either at the state of the procedure of interim relief through the conviction of the Belgian
State into delivering urgently the travel documents, or at the state of the main
proceedings through the partial recognition of the foreign certificate establishing the 
parentage of the intended father. 
In one of the cases implicating a surrogacy taking place on Belgian territory but 
concluded with foreign intended parents, the action was undertaken by the surrogate 
335 Ghent (15th ch.), 16th of January 1989, T.G.R., 1989, p. 52 ; Youth court Turnhout, 4th of October 2000,
RechtskundigWeekblad, 2001-2002, p. 206, note F. SWENNEN, « Volle adoptie na draagmoederschap: nihil 
obstat ? ». 
336 Brussels (3rd ch.), 1st of March 2007, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2007, p. 754 et Civ. Hasselt (1st 
ch.), 27th of March 2001, Limb. Rechtsl., 2001, p. 323. 
337 Civ. Ghent (3rd ch.), 31st of May 2001, Revue générale de droit civil, 2002, p. 27, note G. VERSCHELDEN. 
338 Civ. Brussels (interim), 4th of February 2010, RR 09/1694/C, unpublished (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Brussels (interim), 9th of July 2010, RG 10/830/C, unpublished (birth certificate established in
Ukraine) ; Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1164 (birth
certificate established in India) 
339 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140 (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 (birth certificate established in
Ukraine); Civ. Huy, 22nd of March 2010, Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 420, note N. GALLUS ; Jurisprudence de
Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2010, n° 38, p. 1815, note P. WAUTELET et Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue 
trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S. SAROLÉA et J. SOSSON ; Jurisprudence de 
Liège, Mons et Brussels, 2011, n° 2, p. 52, note P. WAUTELET ; Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 634 (birth
certificates established in California as a result of a sentence) ; Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. 
fam., 2011, p. 695, note C. HENRICOT (birth certificate established in India) and Civ Brussels, 18 December 
20120, unpublished and non-final. 
340 Cf. however the isolated decision given by the First Court in Brussels on 18 December 2012 : the Court
refused to recognise the Indian birth certificate on the grounds that, in its opinion, Belgian law would not have
allowed the establishment of the father of intent’s parentage. The argument developed by the Court is not 
convincing as it seems that, contrary to the opinion of the Court, Belgian law did allow the father of intent to
establish his filiation despite the fact that the child was born from a surrogacy agreement. Cf. Civ. Brussels, 18 
December 2012, unpublished and non-final. 
341 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140. 
342 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139. 
224
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
      
     
  
  
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
mother to contest the parentage of the intended mother (the parentage of the intended
mother had been established from the birth of the child by the surrogate mother who 
had lied about her identity, the reason for the name of the intended mother to appear on 
the birth certificate)343. By settling in favour of the request of the surrogate mother and 
re-establishing her maternal parentage, the tribunal also nullified the paternal parentage 
of the intended father that had been established in conformity to the principle of
presumption of paternity of the husband of the mother.  
Concerning the nationality of the child, it results from the establishment of the parentage 
of the intended father (when it is established through the recognition of the foreign birth 
certificate), which explains that no action undertaken has as direct objective the 
transmission of the Belgian citizenship to the child. 
3. Amongst the decisions taken in matters of surrogacy, most of them have been settled 
by civil courts through substantive proceedings or, through interim relief actions when
the request concerns the deliverance of travel documents.
The only case leading to a penal conviction is the Donna case, in which both the 
surrogate and the Belgian and Dutch intended parents were judged by a correctional 
court for inflicting “inhuman and degrading treatment” to the child. On the 12th of 
October 2012, the correctional court of Oudenaarde sentenced the surrogate mother and 
her husband to a year of suspended prison as well as to pay a fine of 1.650 EUR. The 
Dutch couple that had bought the child was equally condemned to a fine of 1.650 EUR 
while the sentence for the Belgian intended couple was suspended.
A case of surrogacy led to the application of the youth protection law. In this case, the 
surrogate mother had given the child to the intended mother after a surrogacy
convention convened before childbirth. At first instance, the youth court considered that
it was not necessary to pronounce an enforceable pedagogical measure with regards to 
the child344. In appeal, this decision was, however, reformed345. The Court of appeals
granted the child to an adoption family for a period of six months, considering necessary 
to take an enforceable pedagogical measure in urgency in application of article 37, 2° of
the decree on specialised assistance to the youth346. The child was then placed in a 
childcare and family assistance centre. While initially the placement was extended as 
demanded by the public prosecutor347, the youth court settled in favour of the request of
the social service, requesting the attribution of the child to the intended mother, in
whose household the child currently lives348. 
4. Best interest of the child 
The notion of best interest of the child takes a considerable importance in the cases of
surrogacy, both in the domestic and the international cases.  
Thus, in a domestic case, the interests of the child was invoked by the judge in order to
justify the approval of the adoption requested by the intended mother in order for the 
legal situation to correspond to the social reality, the child being reared by the intended
mother and not by the surrogate mother349. In a case leading to the adoption of an 
343 Civ. Ghent, 24th of December 2009, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, n° 4, p. 133, note J. VERHELLEN, 

« Draagmoederschap: het internationaal privaatrecht uitgedaagd », p. 17.
 
344 Youth court Ghent (27th ch.), 31st of March 2009, unpublished.
 
345 Ghent (15th ch.), 18th of May 2009, 2009/JZ/39, unpublished, available at www.juridat.be.
 
346 Decree Fl. Cons., of the 7th of March 2008, on the special assistance to youth, M.B., 15th of April 2008, p.
 
19977.
 
347 Youth court Ghent (27th ch.), 4th of November 2009, unpublished.
 
348 Youth court Ghent (27th ch.), 31 December 2009, unpublished.
 
349 Civ. Brussels (youth), 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1182:
 
“Genetically, Ivo is the son of the plaintiff and he is considered as such in social life. It would seem thus in his 

interest that the law matches the fact. The split of the parentage with the surrogate mother constitutes an 
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enforceable pedagogical measure, taken in the frame of the assistance to the youth, the
best interests of the child led the Court of Appeals of Ghent to withdraw the child from 
the intended mother in order to trust it to an adoption family for a period of six 
months350 (subsequently, the child was returned to the household of the intended 
mother). 
The best interests of the child has also been invoked in international cases to justify the 
deliverance of travel documents to a child born in India in order to allow him to join his
intended father in Belgium (in the framework of an interim relief action)351, to justify the 
establishment of the parentage of the biological father in relation to the children born in
California, independently of the nullity of the contract of surrogacy352 or even to justify 
the adoption of the child by the intended mother after a surrogacy concluded in Ukraine 
in order to match the legal reality with the genetic and social-psychological reality353. In 
a strange and perhaps somewhat inconsistent way, the best interest of the child was
invoked by the Court of First Instance of Brussels to justify the non-recognition of an
Indian birth certificate and a recognition of paternity on the basis that it would not be “in
the interest of child C. to establish his filiation based on acts drawn up in India, as the 
latter contravene to the fundamental principles of the protection of the interests of all 
children, since they spring from commercial transactions that are not concerned with the 
interests of the child” before finally agreeing to establish, on the basis of the Belgian law,
filiation from the father of intent with respect to the child on the grounds that “this 
paternity would match the one established in India and would be in the interest of the 
child”354. This isolated decision does however not reflect the dominant position that the 
Belgian Courts seem to be developing.  
Thus: In domestic cases, the control of the best interest of the child serves as a basis for 
the legal decision pronouncing the adoption to the extent that the court before which the
action is undertaken has to verify if the adoption is founded on “fair basis”, within which
is included the best interest of the child355. When this notion is invoked in an 
international case dealing with a request for the recognition of birth certificates 
established abroad, it seems to allow to “neutralise” the illegality of the surrogacy 
contract356 without constituting by doing so the autonomous foundation of the 
recognition of parentage. Indeed, it is because the parentage of the biological father can 
element of legal security, in particular for the case in which the surrogate mother would wish one day to exert 
rights in relation to the child” 
350 Ghent (15th ch.), 18th May 2009, 2009/JZ/39, unpublished, available on www.juridat.be. 
351 Civ. Brussels (interim), 6th of April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1164: “That the best 
interest of the child does not appear to be, in view of these elements, to stay in India – country in which he 
does not seem to have any link – without M. R., a situation that appears contrary to the article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights”. 
352 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S.
SAROLÉA et J. SOSSON: “ In what concerns the relation of parentage with relation to the biological father, A.J., 
we can however consider that the illegality of the surrogacy contract – from which result the birth certificates
of which recognition is requested – cannot harm the best interest of the children M. and M. guaranteed by 
article 3 of the Convention on the rights of children as well as article 22bis of the Constitution. The refusal of 
recognising the birth certificates to the extent they concern the establishment of the parentage relation with
the biological father would deprive the children from any relation to him while at the same time the maternal 
parentage is not recognised in the country of the surrogate mother. This situation would be greatly harmful for 
them” In the same sense, See Civ. Brussels, 15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 and Civ.
Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695, note C. HENRICOT. 
353 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 
Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22. 
354 Civ Brussels, 18 December 20120, unpublished and non-final 
355 Art. 344.1 Civil code: “All adoptions have to be founded on fair basis and, if it concerns a child, they cannot
take place outside of his/her best interests and respecting the fundamental rights that are recognised as
his/hers by international law”. 
356 Cf. however contra Civ Brussels, 18 December 20120, unpublished and non-final. 
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be established by rules on the acknowledgement of paternity, that the tribunal admits to 
recognise this parentage as it is established by the birth certificates357. 
5. Family life
The notion of family life seems to be invoked by courts to support the reference to the 
principle of the best interest of the child358. Thus, it seems to play a complementary role 
in order to, for example, justify the issuance of travel documents to a child born 
abroad359. 
6. Donation of ovules and importance of the genetic link  
In the cases of surrogacy concerning questions of international nature (recognising the 
parentage established by a foreign birth certificate), the reasoning of the courts does not 
change, whether there was ovule donation or the intended mother is the genetic mother, 
as the case-law refuses systematically to recognise the parentage of the intended 
mother because in Belgian law the maternal parentage is established by childbirth360. 
The circumstance in which the intended mother is the genetic mother does not modify at 
all the outcome of the dispute. In all cases, she will have to engage a procedure of 
adoption in order to establish parentage in relation to the child born from a surrogate
mother361. 
When surrogacy raises questions of domestic nature (i.e. request for adoption in Belgium
following a surrogacy taking place in Belgium or abroad), it seems, on the contrary, that
the genetic reality influences strongly the outcome of the dispute. The bias towards 
genetic reality seems to justify a settlement favourable to adoption in cases where the 
intended mother is also the genetic mother even when an amount of money is suspected 
to have been given to the surrogate mother362 but, on the opposite case, a refusal is 
given to the request of adoption if the intended mother has no genetic relation to the
child in the framework of a for-profit surrogacy363. Could we consider, thus, that it is
always in the best interest of the child to have parentage maintained or established in
relation to his/her genetic mother, surrogate in some cases, intended mother in others?
This seems to be the current position of the Belgian courts confronted to adoption
requests in the framework of surrogacy. Indeed, in the two decisions deciding to refuse 
to pronounce the adoption of the child by the intended mother, the surrogate mother 
was the genetic mother of the child (traditional surrogacy) while in the cases in which 
the intended other is the genetic mother (gestational surrogacy), the courts pronounced
the adoption even when it would seem that a sum of money, exceeding the costs related
to surrogacy, was paid to the surrogate mother. 
357 J. SOSSON, « La filiation d’enfants nés d’une gestation pour autrui à l’étranger », note on Liège, 6th of 
September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1153. 
358 Civ. Brussels (interim), 6 April 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, p. 1171: “Considering that
it is appropriate to take into account the fact that M.R. takes care of C. from childbirth; that it is, thus, evident 
that a privileged link exists between the child and M.R and that a situation of family life has come to being (we 
know the importance of the links created during the first weeks of life). 
359 Ibidem. 
360 For an example of the intended mother being also the genetic mother of the children, see Civ. Antwerp, 19th
 
of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140. For an example of the intended mother not being the
 
genetic mother of the children, see Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695.
 
361 For cases of adoption in a case of domestic surrogacy, see Brussels (3rd ch.), 1st of March 2007, Revue 

trimestrielle de droit familial, 2007, p. 754 ; Antwerp (16th ch. bis), 14th of January 2008,
 
RechtskundigWeekblad, 2007-2008, p. 1774, note F. SWENNEN, « Adoptie na draagmoederschap revisited » ; 

Civ. Brussels (youth ch.), 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1182 ; Civ.
 
Turnhout (youth ch.), 4th of October 2000, RechtskundigWeekblad, 2001-2002, p. 206, note F. SWENNEN, 

« Volle adoptie na draagmoederschap: nihil obstat ? » ; Civ. Brussels (youth ch.) 6th of May 2009, J.L.M.B.,
 
2009, p. 1083.
 
362 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 

Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22.
 
363 Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L.
 
PLUYM ; Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 372, note G. VERSCHELDEN.
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7. The translation into the Belgian legal order of parentage established 
following a case of surrogacy taking place abroad
The cross-border aspect of surrogacy triggers the application of rules of international
private law, which leads Belgian courts to apply their rules of conflict of laws or of 
indirect competence to translate into the Belgian legal order parentage established
abroad following a case of surrogacy. In the absence of a specific disposition to
surrogacy in the Code of international private law, the translation into the Belgian legal
order of parentage established abroad following a case of surrogacy is done taking into
account distinct rules whether the question is to recognise a birth certificate established
following a case of surrogacy (a) or if the question is to recognise a  sentence
establishing parentage following a case of surrogacy (b).
(a) The recognition of a birth certificate established following a case of
surrogacy taking place abroad 
A birth certificate established abroad following a case of surrogacy is recognised in
Belgium if its validity is established in conformity with the national law of the persons in 
relation to whom parentage is being established. This solution results from the combined
application of articles 27 and 62 of the Code of international private law, dealing
respectively with the recognition of foreign authentic certificates364 and with the law 
applicable to parentage365. In other words, in order to recognise parentage as 
established by a foreign birth certificate, the validity of the parentage has to be verified
in relation to the national law of the intended parents. 
In the current state of the case law on the question, if the intended parents are Belgian,
parentage is established in relation to the intended father if the latter is also the 
biological father366, while his spouse (homosexual or heterosexual) should have to 
engage an adoption procedure. 
If the intended parents are foreigners, the foreign law has to be verified to determine its
provisions:
	 if the foreign law prohibits the establishment of parentage following a 
case of surrogacy, as the French law, for example, parentage cannot 
be established, unless the foreign law is considered contrary to Belgian 
international public order (in the absence of legislation framing
surrogacy in Belgium, it would seem difficult, currently, to affirm that a 
foreign law ignoring surrogacy can be discarded for being contrary to 
the Belgian international public order),
	 if the foreign law admits the establishment of parentage by surrogacy,
the conditions of parentage need to be verified to determine if it can be 
established and if this foreign law is not contrary to the Belgian
international public order,
	 moreover, it will be needed to verify that the parties have not 
attempted to escape the law normally applicable by travelling abroad
364 Art. 27, § 1st, al. 1 Code of IPL: “An authentic foreign certificate is recognised in Belgium by any authority
without it being necessary to engage in a procedure if its validity is established in conformity to the applicable
law established by the current law, taking especially into account articles 18 fraudulent evasion of the law and 
21 public order”. 
365 Art. 62. § 1st Code of IPL: “The establishment and the contestation of paternity or maternity of a person are 
ruled by the law of the state from which the person is a citizen of at the moment of birth of the child or, if this
establishment result from a voluntary act, at the moment of the act”. 
366 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139 ; Civ. Brussels, 15th 
of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 125 et Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p.
695. 
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999to obtain the establishment of a right they could not have obtained
otherwise (fraudulent evasion of the law). 
In the cases dealt with by the Belgian courts, the intended parents had systematically
the Belgian nationality, which explains that the validity of parentage established by the 
birth certificate was verified in the light of the Belgian law of parentage (designed by the
rule of conflict of law in matters of parentage), allowing this way the establishment of
the parental parentage of the biological father but refusing the establishment of the 
maternal parentage of the intended mother (as she didn’t give birth) as well as the 
establishment of a double paternal parentage in relation to the homosexual spouse of
the biological father, the latter having to engage an adoption procedure to establish
parentage in relation to the child.
As the Belgian law is designed by the rule of conflict of laws, there is no need to invoke
the exception of public order to discard the maternal parentage established by the
foreign law as the engagement of this mechanism is conditioned to the application of the 
foreign law367. Taking this into account, the result to which the application of Belgian law
conduces is the same as with regards to the intended mother, no parentage can be
established without engaging a procedure of adoption.  
It is, however, probable, that the following years will allow to question the application of
the exception of public order if, for example, the surrogacy takes place abroad by foreign 
intended parents residing in Belgium and aiming at parentage to be recognised in
Belgium. It is, nevertheless, delicate, currently, to predict the content of the exception of 
public order, as there is no Belgian legislation on the issue. To be applied, the public 
order exception requires for a legal order of reference, of which the content is inexistent
today in the Belgian legal order. The application of the exception of Belgian international
legal order will depend, thus, of the position to be taken by the Belgian legislator on the 
issue: total prohibition or regulation, under certain conditions, of surrogacy?  
Contrary to the position assumed by courts accepting a partial recognition of birth
certificates, Belgium embassies seem to categorically refuse to recognise birth
certificates established as a result of surrogacy, without distinguishing between the 
father and the intended mother and without analysing the certificate under the light of
the principles currently resulting from the case law368. 
(b) The recognition of a foreign sentence establishing parentage following a 
contract of surrogacy 
When parentage from a surrogacy is established as a result of a sentence, the court
before which the action is undertaken has to verify the absence of basis for refusal 
367 Art. 21, al. 1: “The application of a disposition of foreign law specified by this law is discarded to the extent
it would produce an effect evidently incompatible with the public order”. 
368 See the warning that can be read on the website of the Belgium embassy in Kiev: “In the current state of 
texts, the Belgian legislation does not treat the question of surrogacy or of children born to a surrogate 
mother. Facing this legal gap, our services are obliged not to recognise any effect to foreign documents 
produced in this frame (birth certificates, sentences,…). This position is adopted even if the legal procedure as 
provided for locally has been scrupulously followed. The effects produced abroad by this do not produce any in 
our domestic legal order. If a Belgian citizen decides to engage a procedure of surrogacy in Ukraine, even if
following the local law, there is no assurance that his/her paternity/maternity will be recognised by the Belgian 
law, or that the child will be delivered a document of travel. The services of the Public Federal Service of 
Foreign Affairs will refuse to recognise their paternity/maternity, will not deliver any travel documents and will
invite applicants to go before the competent court of first instance (ref. articles 23 and 27 of the Belgian Code 
of international private law). In light of the aforementioned and faced with the difficulties to which a Belgian 
citizen will be confronted if he/she decides to engage a procedure of surrogacy, we would like to remind you 
that adoption is provided for by the Belgian law and constitutes, thus, a possible alternative”. The same
warning is found on the sites of the embassies of Belgium in New Delhi, Atlanta, New York and Los Angeles, a 
situation that raised questions by some parliamentarians.. See Written question n° 5-2661 of the 1st of July
2011, Parl. doc., Sen., n° 5-2661 (question asked by Mrs S. de Bethune). 
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opposed to the recognition of the sentence by the Belgian legal order, in conformity with
the rules of indirect competence disposed by articles 22 and 25 of the Code of
international private law369. These dispositions could apply if the parentage of the
intended parents results from a sentence, as it is the case in the United Kingdom370 and 
in Greece371 in Europe as well as, in the states of California372, Texas373, Utah374 and 
Virginia375 in the United States. 
The only case brought before the Belgian courts that would have probably required for 
the application of rules on the recognition of foreign sentences is the Californian case
(case Maïa and Maureen)376. In the case, the court before which the action was
undertaken preferred, however, (by mistake?) to reason on the basis of birth certificates
established following the Californian sentence, which triggered the application of the rule 
of conflict of laws in matters of parentage (see supra: art. 62 of the Code of PIL). The
biological father being of Belgian nationality, the judge recognised the Californian birth
certificate, after verifying that the paternal filiation could be established in relation to the 
Belgian law of parentage. 
8. Language
The terms used by the case law do not change: the judges use the terms “convention of
surrogacy” or “convention of substitution of maternity”. The francophone case law seems 
to avoid naming the intended parents and qualify them simply as “applicants” while the
369 Art. 22, § 1st, al. 2: “A foreign judicial decision is recognised in Belgium, fully or partially, without it being 
necessary to engage the procedure provided for by article 23” and art. 25: « § 1st. “A foreign judicial decision 
is not recognised or declared enforceable if:
1° the effect of the recognition or the declaration of enforceability is incompatible with the public order; this 
incompatibility is considered taking into account, namely, the intensity of similarity of the situation with the 
Belgium legal order and the gravity of the effect produced; 
2° the rights of defence have been violated;
3° the decision was obtained, in a way such that the persons do not dispose freely of their rights, only to 
escape the application of the law specified by this law;
4° without prejudice to article 23, § 4, it can still be the subject of an ordinary proceeding based on the law of 
the State where it was issued
5° it is irreconcilable with a decision issues in Belgium or with a decision issues before abroad and susceptible 
to be recognised in Belgium; 
6° the request was introduced abroad after the introduction in Belgium of a request, still unresolved, by the 
same parties and with the same object; 
7° the Belgian courts were the only competent to settle the question; 
8° the competence of the foreign court was based only on the presence of the defendant or on goods without 
direct relation to the dispute in the State to which the court is attached to; or 
9° the recognition or the declaration of the enforceability clashes with one of the basis of refusal foreseen by 
articles 39, 57, 72, 95, 115 et 121 ». 
370 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 s 54 (1). 
371 Greek Civil code, art. 1458. 
372 While California does not dispose of a specific legislation on surrogacy, the validity of a surrogacy contract 
results from the case law (Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P 2d 776, 783, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 95 (Cal. 1993): « the
surrogacy agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent with public policy »). The intended parents will have to 
undertake action before the courts before the birth of the child in order to obtain a “pre-birth judgement” 
establishing their parentage with regards to the child to be born of the contract of surrogacy. 
373 Tex. Fam. Code §§ 160.756 (c): « If the court finds that the requirements of Subsection (b) are satisfied,
the court may render an order validating the gestational agreement and declaring that the intended parents 
will be the parents of a child born under the agreement ». 
374 Utah Code Ann. §78B-15-803 (1): « Hearing to validate gestational agreement: (1) If the requirements of 
Subsection (2) are satisfied, a tribunal may issue an order validating the gestational agreement and declaring 
that the intended parents will be the parents of a child born during the term of the agreement ». 
375 Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 D: « Within seven days of the birth of any resulting child, the intended parents shall
file a written notice with the court that the child was born to the surrogate within 300 days after the last
performance of assisted conception. Upon the filing of this notice and a finding that at least one of the intended 
parents is the genetic parent of the resulting child as substantiated by medical evidence, the court shall enter 
an order directing the State Registrar of Vital Records to issue a new birth certificate naming the intended
parents as the parents of the child pursuant to § 32.1-261 ». 
376 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
Dutch-speaking case law refers to a « wensmoeder » (intended mother) and a 
« wensvader » (intended father)377. 
9. Need to legislate 
In certain sentences, the judges highlight the absence of Belgian legislation on the 
matter. Thus, when they are called to approve a request of adoption introduced by the
intended mother, the judges point to the gaps in the law378 and specify that it is not their 
duty to make a fundamental political choice in lieu of the legislator379. However, it is
mostly doctrine, and not case law, that denounces the absence of legislation and insists 
on the urgency of legislating on the matter. 
10. Case law reference 
When sentencing on cases of surrogacy, judges refer exclusively to the case law relating
to similar causes and seem to avoid inspiring themselves on case law from other fields of
law, such as adoption or IVF cases. 
11. Financial aspects
The financial aspects related to a contract of for-profit surrogacy are rarely debated by 
Belgian courts. In the case Hanne and Elke (surrogacy taking place in Ukraine by
heterosexual intended parents), it was revealed that an amount of 30.000 EUR was paid
by the intended parents to the Ukrainian law firm. According to the parties, these costs 
aimed at covering not only judicial advice but also all practical aspects of surrogacy: fees 
related to travels, translations, contact with professionals in a private clinic of
fertilisation, attempts to perform IVF, ultrasounds, medical follow-up of the surrogate
mother, etc… When the procedure of adoption was engaged by the adopting mother, the 
tribunal considered it did not possess enough objective information to know if the
amount exceeded the normal amount of compensation concerning the costs resulting 
from surrogacy and concluded that the parties acted without the intention to make 
profit380. 
In the case of a domestic case of surrogacy, the Court of Appeal of Ghent took a more 
severe position. Realising that an amount of 1.600 EUR per month was paid monthly by
the parents to the surrogate mother, the Court refused to approve the adoption,
considering that an adoption resulting from a contract of for-profit surrogacy could not
be based on fair basis, regardless of the de facto parents-child relation existing between
the child and the intended mother. The Court considers that a contract of for-profit
surrogacy is contrary to human dignity and that an adoption aiming at dissimulating the
buy/sale of a child is illegal381. In the case, it must be highlighted that the surrogate
mother was also the genetic mother of the child, which seems to justify the position
taken by the Court more than the fact that a for-profit surrogacy contract was 
concluded. 
12. Margin of manoeuvre 
377 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 140.
 
378 Civ. Brussels (youth), 4th of June 1996, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Brussels, 1996, p. 1183: “In these
 
circumstances, the adoption is used to some extent to fill a gap in the law or, at least, to solve a hypothesis 

that the law has not foreseen”. In the same sense, See Civ. Brussels (youth ch.), 6th of May 2009, J.L.M.B.,
 
2009, p. 1083.
 
379 Civ. Antwerp (youth ch.) 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 

Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22: “The Court considers that it is not in its jurisdiction to make such fundamental
 
policy choices in the place of the legislator”.
 
380 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 

Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22.
 
381 Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L.
 
PLUYM ; Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 372, note G. VERSCHELDEN.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
The margin of manoeuvre that the judges have in the cases of surrogacy of international 
nature is limited by the rigorous application of the rules of international private law. To
this extent, the Californian case is quite significant: at first instance, the tribunal refused
to recognise the birth certificates from California on the basis of public order and 
fraudulent evasion of the law382 while the correct reasoning, developed afterwards by 
appeal, consisted to verify the validity of the birth certificate in relation to the national
law of the person in relation to whom the parentage was being established383. In this 
case, the intended father being Belgian, the Belgian law was applicable, which precludes 
the execution of an exception of public order for which the triggering is conditioned to
the application of a foreign law. It is the same case when it is the case to established the
parentage of the intended mother of Belgian nationality as the courts systematically
refuse to recognise a foreign birth certificate mentioning the name of the intended
mother on the basis that in the Belgian law, the mother is the woman who gives birth to 
the child, namely the surrogate mother. In other words, when the Belgian law is called
for by the rule of conflict of laws, the judges do not dispose but a very limited margin of
appreciation. It is only in the hypothesis of a foreign law being designed by the rule of
conflict of laws that the judges would find a certain margin of appreciation by examining
the exception of public order. This would also be the case if the judges would have to 
sentence on parentage established following a sentence, hypothesis that has not still
been brought up before Belgian courts. 
The only instrument that judges have as a resource is that of the “fraudulent evasion of
the law”, enshrined by article 18 of the Code of IPL384. While this mechanism could be
invoked to sanction the behaviour of the intended parents aiming at obtaining abroad
the establishment of parentage following a case of surrogacy thus bypassing the Belgian
law385, the courts seem to refuse to apply the instrument too strictly. Thus, some courts
have considered that it was not demonstrated that the travel of the parties abroad had 
as a unique objective to obtain birth certificates mentioning the intended mother as the 
legal mother and have, as a result, concluded that there was an absence of fraudulent 
evasion of the law386. Other courts consider that when the Belgian law is applied, as 
designed by the rule of conflict of laws, there is no place to evoke the question of 
fraudulent evasion of the law, the triggering of this mechanism being conditioned to the 
designation of a foreign law387. This position results from a restrictive interpretation of 
the notion of fraudulent evasion of the law according to which the application of this
mechanism depends on the modification of the connecting factor of the rule of conflict of 
382 Civ. Huy, 22nd of March 2010, Journal des tribunaux, 2010, p. 420, note N. GALLUS. 
383 Liège, 6th of September 2010, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial, 2010, n° 4, p. 1139, note C. HENRICOT, S.
SAROLEA et J. SOSSON. 
384 Art. 18 Code IPL: “To determine the law applicable in a matter in which persons do not dispose freely of 
their rights, facts and acts are not taken into account if their sole objective is to escape the application of the 
law designed by this law”. 
385 A position defended by a segment of the doctrine: P. WAUTELET, « Un nouvel épisode dans la saga de la 
surrogacy transfrontière », note on Liège (1st ch.), 6th of September 2010, J.L.M.B., 2011, p. 61; J. VERHELLEN, 
« Draagmoederschap: het internationaal privaatrecht uitgedaagd », note sous Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 
2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, p. 169 et S. PFEIFF, « Surrogacy et procréation médicalement assistée – T. II 
L’accueil en Belgique d’un lien de filiation issu d’une surrogacy réalisée à l’étranger », in Chronique de 
jurisprudence (2005-2010), Les Dossiers du Journal des Tribunaux, Brussels, Larcier, 2011, pp. 365-368. 
386 Civ. Antwerp, 19th of December 2008, Revue@dipr.be, 2010, liv. 4, p. 144: “The theory of law evasion must
be approached with caution. There can only be a case of law evasion if there is proof that the only aim of the 
applicants was to escape the Belgian law. It is not proven that the applicants have sought refuge in a hospital
in Ukraine, with the sole aim of obtaining a birth certificate in which the first applicant would be declared as the 
mother of the child instead of the surrogate mother. The main objective of the applicants was undoubtedly to 
fulfil their explicit and long-time desire to have children of their own, genetically speaking”. See also Civ. 
Brussels, 15th of February 2011, Revue@dipr.be, 2011, p. 130: “There can only be fraud to the law if it can be
proven that applicant’s only purpose was to escape the Belgian law, quod non; The unfortunate and even 
illegal attempt by the applicant to collect the child in Ukraine is not an element that should be taken into
consideration when examining the validity and legality of the birth certificate”. 
387 See for ex. Civ. Nivelles, 6th of April 2011, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2011, p. 695: “There is no reason to examine
the validity of disputes in relation to the exception of public orer of private international law (article 21 of the 
Code of international private law) or the fraudulent evasion of the law (article 18 of the Code of international 
private law), as the application of these mechanisms is conditions to the designation of a foreign law” 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
laws, in matters of parentage, on the modification of the nationality of the parties. This
stricter interpretation of the notion of fraudulent evasion of the law could be justified by
the realisation that it would be incongruous to sanction a behaviour as aiming to escape 
Belgian law if, in fine, the Belgian law is applicable.
When surrogacy requires an adoption, the judges dispose of a certain margin of 
appreciation through the notion of the best interest of the child of which the control is
required by law. Thus, it has been judged that it was in the best interest of the child to
be adopted by the intended mother (also the genetic mother) regardless of the amount
of money probably paid to the surrogate mother (case Hanne and Elke)388, while other 
court refused to pronounce the adoption, requested by the intended mother (not 
genetically related to the child) in the framework of a for-profit surrogacy, regardless of 
the de facto child-parent relation existing between the child and the intended mother389. 
This assessment could allow to conclude that Belgian courts consider that it is in the
interest of the child to see his/her parentage maintained or establish in relation to
his/her genetic parents, regardless of the for-profit or non-profit nature of the surrogacy. 
388 Youth court Antwerp, 22nd of April 2010, Tijdschrift voor Familierecht, 2012, p. 43, note L. PLUYM ; 

Revue@dipr.be, 2012, p. 22. In this case, the tribunal considered, however, that the parties acted without the
 
intention of making profit.
 
389 Ghent (15th ch.), 30th of April 2012, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 261, note L.
 
PLUYM ; Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Burgelijk Recht, 2012, p. 372, note G. VERSCHELDEN.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
6.3. BULGARIA
This report examines the issue of surrogacy, particularly, the arrangements for its 
legalisation in Bulgaria, which is currently being considered. The report is divided into six
parts. Part One describes the current regulatory framework of surrogacy in Bulgaria and
the origin of the initiative concerning possible future legalisation. Part Two examines the 
provisions contained in the draft bills presented for the first reading before the National
Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria (hereinafter cited as the National Assembly). Part
Three presents the preliminary discussions held by different parliamentary committees. 
Part Four reviews the most important issues discussed at the Plenary Sessions for the
first reading of the draft bills before the National Assembly. Part Five contains various 
proposals put forward by experts and lawyers regarding the provisions included in the
draft bills between the first and second reading. Part Six summarises the main
arguments for and against the legalisation of surrogacy as presented in the Bulgarian
debates. 
Note on terminology:
As is explained below, the terminology of “surrogate mother” has a negative connotation in Bulgaria, 
with proposals for draft legislation adopting instead the terminology of “substitute mother”. It 
appears, however, that the term “surrogacy” is still used to refer to the phenomenon generally, even 
if “substitute mother” is preferred to “surrogate mother”. 
PART ONE 
Background Information
Current Bulgarian legislation contains a series of restrictive and prohibitive provisions
relating to surrogacy. Article 60(1) of the Bulgarian Family Code indicates that the status
of the child is decided upon birth, and article 60(2) states that a mother is the woman 
who gave birth to the child even in cases of assisted reproduction.390 Furthermore,
surrogacy has been criminalised in accordance with article 182 of the Bulgarian Penal 
Code and Part IV, article 5(14) of the Ordinance Number 28 on Assisted Reproduction 
from 20 June 2007, which prohibits in vitro fertilisation for the purpose of a surrogacy 
arrangement.391 More specifically, Article 182(a)(3) provides that:  
‘The one who acts as an intermediary, with a view to obtain (sic) an illegal 
pecuniary benefit, between a person or a family wishing to adopt a child, and a 
parent, wishing to abandon a child, or a woman, who agrees to carry in her womb 
a child to surrender for adoption, shall be punished by deprivation of liberty of up 
to two years and a fine of up to BGN [3,000 (€1,531)].’392 
Article 130(4)(4) of the Health Act, states that ovum from one woman can be taken and
placed into the body of another one.393 While this Article is clearly designed to permit
390 See article 60 Family Code (Семеен Кодекс, Произход на детето, член 60)
<http://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed on 21 November 2012. 
391 See Bulgarian Penal Code, Chapter 4: Crimes against Marriage, Family and You, Article 182 available in
English, <http://www.vks.bg/english/vksen_p04_04.htm> accessed on 02 November 2012 and Наказателен
Кодекс, <http://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1589654529>. See also, Ordinance Number 28 for Assisted Reproduction 
from 20 June 2007 (Наредба №28 от 20 юни 2007 г. за дейностти по асистирана репродукция), Раздел IV 
<http://bgtransplant.bg/iat/regulations.php?target_f=ordinances.htm> accessed on 3 November 2012. 
392 See Article 182(3) of the Bulgarian Penal Code, (n 2). See also, exchange rate of the European Central
Bank, (€1=BGN 1.9558), <http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html> accessed on 30 
November 2012 
393 Health Act (Закон за здравето, Раздел III, Асистирана репродукция) 
<http://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135489147> accessed on 03 November 2012. За и против
сурогатството,<http://www.dailymotion.com/video/ > accessed on 03 November 2012. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
ovum donation, the provisions mentioned above mean that it is not extended to 
gestational surrogacy arrangements. 
Although all types of surrogacy are presently prohibited by Bulgarian law, there are,
nevertheless, medical centres in Bulgaria where surrogacy is allegedly being practiced.
Typically, a couple with reproductive problems finds a woman who gives birth to their 
genetic child. The father acknowledges formally the paternity of the child and then the 
genetic mother adopts the child. This usually but not always happens between family
members and it is altruistic.394 A simple search on the Internet shows that there are a lot
of advertisements of people looking for surrogate mothers and women who are willing to
become surrogate mothers.395 
Specialists claim that, unfortunately, the legalisation on techniques related to the 
reproductive health and methods for assisted reproduction appears to be somewhat 
untimely when compared to the development of modern medicine. The same is true for 
the relevant family law legislation which does not seem to take into account new
methods of assisted reproduction. The Family Code needs to be updated in order to be in
pace with modern methods of assisted reproduction. A detailed analysis of the Bulgarian 
legislation shows that the laws and codes prevent couples who are infertile from having a 
child of their own. Consequently, the only way to become parents in such cases is to 
adopt a child. But the procedures for adoption in Bulgaria are cumbersome, lengthy and 
more often than not unsuccessful. 
In modern society the problems related to infertility are increasing and thus the number
of couples who cannot have offspring increases as well. The perception in Bulgaria is that
more and more European Union (EU) Member States are legalising surrogacy and that 
Bulgarian legislation needs to be harmonised with the laws of Western European
countries.396 However, as this study indicates, few Western European countries have 
explicit legal frameworks for surrogacy.
At present, there is no case-law on surrogacy in Bulgaria as the bill has not been passed,
and it is therefore outside the realms of the law and the current jurisdiction of the 
courts. 
Legislative Initiative 
In Bulgaria, the idea of legalising surrogacy arose in 2009 when Kalina Krumova, the
then MP from ATAKA397, met a woman who had reproductive problems and who was not 
afraid to admit publicly that she could not have children. Kalina Krumova became aware 
of the current situation in the country and the main problems related to the “renting of
wombs” on the black market (where the price varies between BGN 15,000 - 25,000
394 See Гергана Котсакиева, “Текст от Семейния кодекс възпрепятства сурогатното майчинство у нас”, 

<http://www.zdrave.net/Portal/News/Default.aspx?page=0&evntid=31671> accessed 24 November 2012. Д-р
 
Иван Козовски, “Законът разрешава сурогатството”, <http://www.narodnodelo.bg/news.php?news=42326 > 

accessed 24 November 2012. Капитал, 

<http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/obshtestvo/2012/08/03/1880869_edno_bebe_molia/> accessed 

on 26 November 2012. “Родител търcи майка”, an article in the newspaper which talks about a 22 year old 

woman who decided to become a substitute mother after seeing an advertisement online. There was no
 
contract for substitute motherhood and all the relationships were based on mutual trust, however, she was 

paid for the “service” and she received BGN 23,000 [€11,700]. Вестник Капитал, 

<http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/obshtestvo/2011/11/04/1196126_roditel_tursi_maika/>accessed 

on 26 November 2012.
 
395 Мама под наем, Темата на Нова ТВ, <http://play.novatv.bg/play/264930/?autostart=true> accessed on 28 

November 2012.
 
396 Вестник Атака, Сурогатното майчинство спира търговията с бебета, 

<http://www.arhiv.vestnikataka.bg/archive.php?broi=1334&text=&fromDate=&toDate=&newsID=75360> 

accessed 23November 2012.
 
397 At the time when she made the proposals for the draft bills she was an ATAKA MP but now she is an 

independent MP (she resigned from ATAKA after she was disappointed that the parliamentary party will not
 
support the draft bills for legalising surrogacy).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
(€7,700 – €12,700)398 and above), and the constraint for couples with reproductive
problems to travel to other countries, in particular, to Ukraine where surrogacy is legal
and foreign couples can benefit from the procedure, but where the price is much higher
(between €20, 000 - €25,000 and above).  
After doing extensive research on the subject matter, consulting doctors, lawyers, 
patients with reproductive problems, psychiatrists, psychologists, and experts in
different areas, and organising public debates for almost two years, Kalina Krumova
submitted the draft bills presented in Part Two before the National Assembly.399 It is
important to note that the working group on the draft bills decided that the terms
“substitute mother” and “substitute motherhood” are more suitable for Bulgaria and
these terms will be hereinafter used referring to the draft legislation in Bulgaria and
“surrogate mother” and “surrogacy” when taking about the phenomenon in general.400 
More importantly, the draft legislation deals only with altruistic gestational surrogacy. It
is understood as a purely voluntary act where the services of the substitute mother are 
seen as a gift and only reasonable costs related to the carrying and giving birth of a child
are covered. 
On 30 March 2010 a roundtable discussion entitled “Surrogate Pregnancy’s Legal 
Regulation and Debate on the Age Limit for Performing In Vitro Fertilization Procedures 
in Bulgaria” was held in the National Assembly under the auspices of Dr. Lachezar 
Ivanov, chair of the parliamentary Health Committee.401 At this discussion Kalina 
Krumova announced the plan for legalising surrogacy in Bulgaria. The main reasons 
behind the initiative were the demographic crisis, the aging of the population,
immigration of young people and an increase in the number of families who experience
reproductive problems. As a consequence of all these factors there is a decrease in the 
number of Bulgarian citizens. In order to encourage childbirth and help the couples who 
wish to have children the state needs to make different instruments and methods 
available for its citizens.402 
The public opinion is divided between those who support the initiative and those who
firmly oppose it. The reactions vary from the emotional and touching appeal to give a 
chance to the childless couples who wish to be parents and for whom surrogacy is the 
only chance to have a genetic heir, to stopping the illegal business of buying and selling 
children as goods.403 For instance, both the Bulgarian Association of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists and the Bulgarian Association for Sterility and Reproductive Health
confirmed that surrogacy is a fundamental technique that needs to find its place in 
Bulgaria.404 Also, they expressed their support for the organisations and the patients 
behind the legislative initiative.405 The main political parties, namely, Citizens for 
European Development of Bulgaria (Граждани за европейско развитие на България­
ГЕРБ), Bulgarian Socialist Party (Българска социалистическа партия-БСП), and the 
398 See exchange rate of the European Central Bank (n 3).
 
399 Интервю с Калина Крумова (23.01.2012), <http://media.framar.bg/>accessed on 13 November 2012.
 
Елена Кодинова, “Сурогатното майчинство и опастността да се легализира търговията с бебета”,
 
<http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=590714> accessed on 12 November 2012.
 
400 Surrogacy is a term which is foreign to the Bulgarian culture and conveys a negative connotation. It can be 

understood as a product or something which is of not good quality or even counterfeited. Note, however, that
 
in the Bulgarian-Bulgarian dictionary (2001) ‘surrogate’ means ‘substitute who does not possess the same
 
qualities, same substance or material’, and the definition does not use the word “product”.
 
401 National Assembly, Press Release, <http://www.parliament.bg/en/news/ID/2003> accessed on 10 

November 2012. See also, News Section of the Bulgarian Association for Sterility and Assisted Reproduction,
 
(< http://www.basrh.org/?p=3&m=4&news_id=3> accessed on 10 November 2012.
 
402 See Part VI. 

403 Василена Доркова, “Близо до бебето”, <http://www.blizodobebeto.com/2010/05/11/surrogacy/> 

accessed on 17 November 2012.
 
404 Novinited.bg, <http://novinite.bg/articles/18319/Akusheri-Decata-ot-surogatni-majki-ne-sa-produkt> 

accessed on 21 November 2012.
 
405 БГНЕС Информационна агенция, Общество, Д-р Щерев: “Няма по-свято от това да помагаш”, 

<http://news.bgnes.com/view/975570> accessed on 8 November 2012.
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Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Движение за права и свободи-ДПС) support the 
draft bills as we shall see from the Plenary Session of the National Assembly in Part 
Four.406 The Ombudsman, Konstantin Penchev, confirmed that the bills have been
drafted in such a way as to prevent blackmailing of couples with reproductive problems
and the business of selling children.407 There were several online surveys on whether 
people agree or not with the legalisation of surrogacy and the results show that 58.8%
are in favour of its legalisation. Those who are “for” believe that it should be done when 
there are specific medical conditions and reasons to use it.408 
On 16 December 2011, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church-Bulgarian 
Patriarchate voted and announced that it was “against” the methods for assisted
reproduction, and in particular, against surrogacy. The statement published on the 
official website of the Holy Synod was 25 pages long and contained insulting expressions 
such as calling the children born via methods for assisted reproduction “impure” and the 
people making use of such methods “infidels”.409 Nickolay, Bishop of Plovdiv, went as far 
as saying that gestational surrogacy is the same as prostitution.410 These statements
were perhaps not surprising given religious objection to assisted reproduction, around
the world, particularly collaborative techniques such as surrogacy. However, what 
shocked the Bulgarian civil society were the rude remarks about couples with 
reproductive problems, the false accusations and misleading information, which
provoked a big scandal between the citizens and the high representatives of the Church.  
In light of this, a campaign arose against the publication of the statement led by Maria 
Cherneva, a journalist from the Bulgarian National Television, and as a result the Church
had no choice but to apologise publicly to these couples, amend its statement and clarify
that it was against the use of genetic material from donors.411 The other religious groups 
in Bulgaria such as Judaism, Islam, Catholicism, amongst others, expressed opinions
against surrogacy as well.412 In addition, various organisations protecting the rights and 
interests of children and women filed petitions addressed to the National Assembly in
order to show their position against the legalisation of surrogacy at the second reading.
Their main concerns were that the assisted reproduction is a lucrative business and the 
draft bills were only defending the interests of certain lobby groups.413 
406 Лидия Чобанова, “Заместващото майчинство е единствен шанс при някои здравослвни проблеми”, 
<http://argumenti-bg.com/18297/lidiya-chorbanova-zamestvashtoto-maychinstvo-ne-e-kapriz-a-edinstven­
shans-pri-tezhki-zdravoslovni-problemi/> accessed on 27 November 2012.
407 See Bulgarian National Television (BTV) News, Сурогатно майчинство
<http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/61085/zamestvashto_majchinstvo> accessed on 10 November 2012. 
408 “Анкета: Одобрявате ли приемането на закона?”, <http://www.bg­
mamma.com/index.php?topic=619163.2415 > accessed on 12 November 2012. See also, “За или против
утроба на заем”, <http://forum.rozali.com/viewtopic.php?p=951567> accessed on 12 November 2012.
409 “Становище на Светия Синод на Българската Православна Църква-Българска Патриаршия Относно
Методите На Асистирана Репродукция и Заместващото Майчинство” 
<http://dostoinoest.com/bg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=414:2011-12-30-17-02­
55&catid=34:novini&Itemid=116> accessed on 5 November 2012.
410 Globa IVF, “Views About Gestational Surrogacy from Around the World”, 
<http://www.globalivf.com/blog/?tag=bulgaria> accessed on 7 November 2012. Обръщение на Пловдивския
Митрополит Николай, <http://www.bg-patriarshia.bg/news.php?id=83947> accessed on 7 November 2012.
411 БНТ Продукции, Местно-време 12 Януари 2012,
<http://bnt.bg/bg/productions/143/edition/19338/mestno_vreme_13_januari_2012> accessed on 15
November 2012. See also, БНТ, Денят отблизо с Мира, 11.01.2012,
<http://bnt.bg/bg/productions/136/edition/19242/denjat_otblizo_s_mira_11_januari_2012>accessed on 26
November 2012 and БНТ Hoвини, Църквата поиска прошка, 14.01.2012,
<http://bnt.bg/bg/news/view/67252/ > accessed on 25 November 2012. 
412 Новинар, Църкви и религии против сърогатното майчинство, <http://novinar.bg/news/tcarkvi-i-religii­
protiv-surogatnoto-majchinstvo_Mzc5Njs3Mw==.html> accessed on 11 November 2012. See also, Деница
Пеева, “Майка под Наем”, (2011) 3(3) Вестник Фрамар, стр. 1-2. Тhe article discusses that there is nothing 
new about the fact that the Orthodox Churches and Islam are against surrogacy. In Islam surrogacy is seen as 
a sin. The Catholic Church and Judaism are also firmly against surrogacy because it is against anyone who 
“tries to play God”. And yet, people with reproductive problems believe in God and visit the Church to try and 
find support and blessing. 
413 Елена Кодинова, Сурогатното майчинство и опастността да се легализира търговията с бебета (n 7).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
PART TWO 
Draft Bills
The legislative initiative consisted of five draft bills which aim at amending and
supplementing existing Bulgarian legislation, namely, (1) a Draft Bill Amending and 
Supplementing the Family Code;414 (2) a Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the 
Citizen Registration Act;415 (3) a Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Social
Security Act;416 (4) a Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Employment Code,417 
and (5) a Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Health Act.418 The idea was to
have several bills governing different aspects related to this issue and not a special law
on substitute motherhood, so that it was more easily and quickly integrated in the
Bulgarian legal system and accepted by the society.419 While it was said the provisions
had been inspired and taken from the legislation of more than 20 different countries 
where substitute motherhood is legal, only England and Russia were mentioned in the 
specific in the introduction of the draft legislation.420 
On 29 July 2011 Kalina Krumova put forward the five draft bills before the National 
Assembly. It is important to note that on 8 November 2011 the Draft Bill Amending and 
Supplementing the Citizen Registration Act was withdrawn and, consequently, it will not
be included in the present report.421 
Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Family Code  
The draft bill contains the following new articles 60(a), 73(a), 73(b) and 73(c), Articles
61 and 62 were supplemented. 
Article 60(а) – Origin of the Mother in Substitute Motherhood 
(1) The mother of the child, in substitute motherhood, is considered to 
be the woman whose ovum has been inseminated in order to conceive a 
child through the method of assisted reproduction. 
(2) The mother of the child, in substitute motherhood where there is an 
ovum donor, is considered to be the woman who is making use of the
substitute motherhood. 
414 Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Family Code (Законопроект за изменение и допълнение на
 
Семейния кодекс № 154-01-84) <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/13655/> accessed on 4 November 

2012.
 
415 Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Citizen Registration Act (Законопроект за изменение и
 
допълнение на Закона за гражданската регистрация № 154-01-85)
 
<http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/13657/> accessed on 4 November 2012.
 
416 Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Social Security Act (Законопроект за изменение и допълнение
 
на Кодекса за социалното осигуряване № 154-01-86) <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/13658/> 

accessed on 4 November 2012.
 
417 Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Employment Code (Законопроект за изменение и допълнение
 
на Кодекса на труда № 154-01-87) <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/13659/> accessed on 4 November 

2012.
 
418 Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Health Act (Законопроект за изменение и допълнение на
 
Закона за здравето № 154-01-88) <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/bills/ID/13660/> accessed on 4 November 

2012.
 
419 Стоян Ставру, “Тази новост-сурогатното майчинств”, (2011) Правен свят 49-55, 51.
 
420 Вестник Атака, Заместващото майчинство спира търговията с бебета, 

<http://www.arhiv.vestnikataka.bg/archive.php?broi=1334&text=&fromDate=&toDate=&newsID=75360> 

accessed on 7 November 2012.
 
421 It was discussed at a preliminary meeting of the Committee for Regional Development and Local Self-

Government, summary discussion and report are available on: 

http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/227/reports/ID/2929
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(3) In cases of substitute motherhood, article 60 sections (2) and (5) do 
not apply.422 
(4) The substitute mother, the ovum donor and the husband cannot
challenge the origin of the child from the wife making use of the 
substitute motherhood. 
Article 61 – Origin of the Father  
(1) The husband of the mother is considered to be the father of the
child who was born during the marriage or 300 days after the end of the 
marriage. 
(2) If the child is born before the elapse of 300 days after the end of the 
marriage, but the mother has re-married then the father of the child is
the new husband.
(3) In case of a declared absence of the husband sections 1 and 2 do 
not apply if the child is born after 300 days from the last notification
from him and in case of death – from the date of the death.  
(4) Sections 1-3 apply in cases where the child is born via techniques for 
assisted reproduction according to Article 60(2) or in cases of substitute 
motherhood according to Article 60(a)(1) and (2). 
Article 62 – Challenge of Paternity  
(1) The husband of the mother can challenge his paternity if he proves 
that the child could not have been conceived by him. Such a challenge 
shall be made within one year after finding out the birth. 
(2) The mother can challenge the paternity of her husband if she proves 
that the child could not have been conceived by him. Such a challenge 
shall be made within one year after finding out the birth. 
(3) In cases covered by Article 61(2), if the challenge of paternity made
by the second husband is proven, the father of the child is the first 
husband. The first husband and the mother can contest the challenge of
paternity up to one year after they find out the decision, but no later 
than three years after the decision has been enforced.  
(4) The child can challenge the paternity within one year of its coming of
age. 
(5) Challenges as to the paternity are not allowed in cases where the 
child is born via techniques for assisted reproduction or in cases of
substitute motherhood including the cases of ovum donor if the husband 
of the mother has given a written agreement for the assisted
reproduction or the substitute motherhood.  
Article 73(a) – Substitute Motherhood 
422 Article 60(2): The mother of the child is the woman who gave birth to the child including in cases of assisted 
reproduction. Article 60(5): The origin of the child from the woman who gave birth to her/him in cases of 
assisted reproduction cannot be challenged based on such a procedure. See article 60(2) Family Code,
<http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed on 25 November 2012.
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Article 73(a)(1): Substitute motherhood is motherhood where a married
couples entrusts, by means of a contract, another woman with the task
of carrying and giving birth to a child who has been conceived by means 
of assisted reproduction with genetic material from the spouses or with 
semen from the husband and a donor ovum.  
Article 73(b) – Contract for Substitute Motherhood 
Article 73(b)(1): The relationship between the substitute mother and the
spouses making use of the substitute motherhood is governed by a 
contract for substitute motherhood. 
Article 73(b)(2): A contract for substitute motherhood can be entered 
into only by people who have the capacity to enter into contract and
only when the requirements for substitute motherhood have been
satisfied. 
Article 73(b)(3): The substitute mother can only benefit from reasonable
costs related to health matters in connection with the pregnancy, the 
fees for recovery after the birth and reimbursement for loss of earnings
due to her temporary inability to work during the pregnancy.
Article 73(c) Format and Contents of the Contract for Substitute 
Motherhood
Article 73(c)(1): The contract for substitute motherhood deals solely
with one procedure of assisted reproduction and it shall include the 
following matters:
1. The consent of the substitute mother to carry and give birth to a child
who will be raised by the married couples who have entered into
contract for substitute motherhood; 
2. The consent of the substitute mother and the spouses making use of
the substitute motherhood for the carrying out of the assisted
reproduction with generic material from the spouses or with semen from 
the husband and a donor ovum;
3. The consent of the substitute mother that all decisions related to the 
pregnancy and the conceived child, except for those related to the 
health condition of the substitute mother, will be taken by the spouses 
making use of the substitute motherhood;  
4. An estimate of reasonable costs incurred by the substitute mother 
which will be paid by the spouses during the pregnancy and the
recovery period immediately after the birth, including the expenses for
insurance according to article 136(b)(1) of the Health Act; 
5. Any other property relations as long as they do not contradict with 
the provisions of this code.
Article 73(c)(2): The contract for substitute motherhood becomes 
enforceable after the formal approval by a court and only thereafter the
procedure for assisted reproduction can begin. The court will approve
the contract only if the requirements have been satisfied. 
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Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Social Security Act
Article 9(7): Upon retirement, the periods when a mother who is not
working and taking care of a child up to three years of age, as well as
the period of time of bearing the child in cases of substitute mother from 
the transfer of the embryo up to 42 weeks after the birth are considered
as periods covered by social security. For this period the insurance 
allowance is paid by the republican budget in Fund “Pensions” on the
basis of a minimum salary calculated towards the date of the pension.
Article 50(2): When the birth takes place before the 45 days of the
start of the allowance, the allowance from section (1) and the rest of the 
45 days shall be used after the birth. 
Article 50(3): When the child is born dead, dies or is given into a 
public child care institution or for adoption, the mother has the right for 
a monetary compensation up to 42 days after the birth, and the 
allowance for the biological mother in cases of substitute motherhood is
terminated the next day. If the woman has not recovered and regained 
her capacity to work after the 42nd day, the period for compensation 
can be extended, after a consultation with a medical expert, until she 
regains it. Until the end of the period according to section (1) or section
(9), this allowance is paid as a grant for the pregnancy and birth.
Article 50(4): When the child is given into a public child care institution
or for adoption or dies after the 42nd day of the birth, the allowance
under sections (1) and (9) are terminated next day. In these cases, if
the mother has not recovered and regained her capacity to work after 
the birth, section 3 sentences two and three apply.  
Article 50(8): The insured biological mother in substitute motherhood 
for maternity and general sickness has a right to monetary
compensation for a period of 365 days, which is equal to the grant for
pregnancy and birth.  
Article 50(9): The insured biological mother in substitute motherhood 
for maternity and general sickness has a right to monetary
compensation, equal to the grant for pregnancy and birth for 87 days, 
45 out of which have counted before the birth.
Article 52а: Insured individuals for sickness and motherhood, with the 
exception of substitute mothers, have a right to monetary compensation
for raising a child, if they have 12 months social insurance for such a 
risk. 
Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Employment Code  
Article 163(1): A female employee has a right of annual leave up to 
410 days for each child, 45 days out of which have to be taken before 
the child is born. The reason for the annual leave is the carrying and 
giving birth to a child. A female employee who is the legal mother in
cases of substitute motherhood has the right to take annual leave for 
365 days after the day the child is born. 
Article 163(2): A female employee who is a substitute mother has a
right of 87 days annual leave for each child, 45 days out of which have
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
to be used before the child is born. In these cases section 3 does not 
apply and section 4, second and third sentence do not apply.423 
Article 163(4): When the child is born dead, or is given into a public
child care institution or for adoption, the mother has the right for an 
annual leave of 42 days from the date of birth, and the annual leave 
provided for in article 163(1) will terminate on the following day. If the 
woman has not recovered and regained her capacity to work after the 
42nd day, the annual leave will be extended, after a consultation with a 
medical expert, until she regains it. The annual leave is paid as a
maternity leave.
Article 163(5): When the child is given for adoption, or is placed in a
public child institution or dies after the 42nd day of the birth, the annual 
leave provided for in article 163(1) is terminated on the following day.  
Article 163(7): When the mother and the father are married and live
together, the father has the right of a 15 day annual leave after the 
child is discharged from the hospital or medical centre, including in
cases of substitute motherhood. 
Article 163(8): With the agreement of the mother and the father who
adopt the child, when the child is six months old, the father can take 
what is left of the 410 days annual leave of the mother, and in cases of
substitute motherhood, what is left from the 365 days annual leave. 
Article 164(6): Article 164 does not apply to an employee who is a
substitute mother.424 
Article 165(3): Article 165 does not apply to an employee who is a
substitute mother.425 
Article 313(a) (3): The employer and the colleagues/employees in the 
working place are obliged to keep confidential the circumstances in
subsections (1) and (2) as well as circumstances related to substitute 
motherhood.426 
Article 333(5): The pregnant employee who has signed a contract for
substitute motherhood as well as a woman in an advanced stage of her
in-vitro fertilisation, can be made redundant only with a notice on the 
basis of article 328(1) subsections (1), (7), (8), (12)427 and without 
423 Article 163(3) states that in cases of miscalculation for the due date where the birth occurs 45 days before
the annual leave, the rest of the 45 days will be taken after the birth. Article 163(4) […]If the woman has not 
recovered and regained her capacity to work after the 42nd day, the annual leave will be extended, after a 
consultation with a medical expert, until she regains it. The annual leave is paid as a maternity leave. See 
article 163(3) Employment Code (Кодекс на труда), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed 
on 25 November 2012.
424 Article 164 deals with provisions governing the annual leave for raising a child until s/he is 2 years old. See 
article 164 Employment Code (Кодекс на труда), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed on 
25 November 2012.
425 Article 165 deals with provisions governing the unpaid leave for raising a child. See article 165 Employment
Code (Кодекс на труда), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed on 25 November 2012.
426 Article 313(a)(1) The pregnant employee is undertaking an advanced stage in the in-vitro fertilisation 
procedure needs to inform the employer of her situation and present documents by the competent medical 
clinic or hospital. Article 313(a)(2) In cases of pregnancy interruption the employee shall inform the employer
of he her situation within seven days. See article 313 Employment Code (Кодекс на труда), 
< http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed on 25 November 2012. 
427 Article 328(1) states that the employer can terminate the employment contract with a written notice in the
time periods provided for in article 326(2) in the following cases: 1. When the company closes down; 7. In 
cases of refusal by the employee to continue working for the company when the company itself or the
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
notice on the basis of article 330(1) and (2).428 In cases of article 330(2) 
subsection (6), the woman can be made redundant only after a decision
based on a preliminary labour inspection.  
Article 354(1)(8): in cases of substitute motherhood the carrying of a
child for the time from the embryo transfer to the end of the annual 
leave according to article 163(2) will be considered as employment even 
though there were no employment relations during that period. 
Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Health Act  
Article 136а:
(1) Only a married couple can make use of the substitute motherhood 
and solely if the following requirements are fulfilled:
1. The wife is sterile and this has been determined beyond doubt 
according to Section 2 below dealing with sterility.
2. At least one of the spouses is a Bulgarian citizen and the other one 
has a permanent residence in the Republic of Bulgaria.
3. The spouses are registered in the List of Couples Willing to Make Use 
of Substitute Motherhood kept in accordance with Article 136(b)(5). 
4. Each spouse has a certificate for completed first stage of the 
Programme on Psychological Help in Substitute Motherhood issued from
the Ministry of Health. 
5. Each spouse has to present a written declaration certified by a notary
that s/he agrees and that hereby s/he is obliged to continue his/her 
participation in the Programme on Psychological Help in Substitute
Motherhood at the Ministry of Health.  
6. The husband has agreed to Article 62(5) from the Family Code.429 
(2) Sterility exists if one of the following disorders or diseases is
present: 
1. Agenesia of the uterus or a serious hypoplasia of the uterus; 
2. Women in their reproductive age whose uterus has been removed
after an operation, regardless of the reasons for that;  
department where s/he works is moved to another city or region; 8. When the employee has to be fired in
order to make free his/her position for a previous employee who has been illegally fired; 12. In cases of 
objective impossibility to carry out the responsibilities under the employment contract. See Article 328(1)
Employment Code (Кодекс на труда), < http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed on 25
November 2012. 
428 Article 330(1) states that the employer can terminate the contract of employment without any written 
notice when the employee is arrested for serving time for a committed crime. Article 330(2) enumerates other 
cases when the employer can terminate the contract of employment without notice, for instance, subsection 6
deals with cases of disciplinary procedures against the employee. For more information, see article 330(1)
Employment Code (Кодекс на труда), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1594373121> accessed on 25
November 2012.
429 Article 62(5) provides that challenges of paternity are not allowed in cases of assisted reproduction when
the husband of the mother gave his written agreement for the procedure. See article 62(5) Family Code
(Семеен кодекс), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed on 24 November 2012.
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3. Partial or complete obliteration of the uterine cavity which cannot be
cured; 
4. Grave innate or gained hypoplasia of the endometrium, which cannot 
be cured; 
5. Concomitant general disorders incompatible with the carrying of a
child.
(3) The sterility is determined by medical experts who are members of 
the Public Committee of Centre “Fund for Assisted Reproduction” on the
basis of a conclusive and comprehensive medical documentation.
(4) Substitute motherhood with a donor ovum is allowed in cases where 
the woman making use of this procedure is no older than 45 and has:
1. Oncological genetic disorder; 
2. Removed uterus or ovaries; or 
3. Has survived and recovered from a successful oncological treatment,
but cannot carry a child, because the stimulation of the ovaries and the
carrying of a child will have a negative impact on her health.
(5) Substitute motherhood with a donor ovum from the substitute 
mother is not allowed.
Article 136(b): 
(1) The substitute mother can be only a woman who is: 
1. a Bulgarian citizen; 
2. is between 21 and 43 years old; 
3. Has given birth to at least one child born alive;  
4. is clinically healthy and is capable of carrying a child, in accordance
with an opinion confirming it of a medical team consisting of an
obstetrician and an internal organs doctor according to a list prepared
by the Ministry of Health;  
5. has a good mental health, in accordance with an opinion confirming it 
of a team consisting of two psychologists according to a list prepared by 
the Ministry of Health; 
6. has a certificate for completed first stage of the Programme on 
Psychological help in substitute motherhood as a substitute mother 
issued from the Ministry of Health;
7. has presented a written declaration certified by a notary that she 
agrees and that hereby is obliged to continue her participation in the 
Programme on Psychological Help in Substitute Motherhood as a 
substitute mother. 
8. has not been a substitute mother more than twice;  
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9. has health insurance and life insurance at the beginning and 
throughout the procedures for assisted reproduction and until 90 days
after the birth or the termination of the substitute motherhood. 
(2) Any other requirements in section (1) or the requirements for the 
decisions of the medical teams in subsections (4) and (5) are 
determined by an ordinance issued from the Ministry of Health.  
(3) The requirements of section (1)2 do not apply in case that the 
substitute mother is a relative in the direct line of descent or collateral 
line of forth degree of one of the spouses willing to make use of the 
substitute motherhood. In this case, the permissible age of the 
substitute mother is 50 years old in case that there is a positive
assessment made by the Public Committee of Centre “Fund for Assisted 
Reproduction”. 
(4) The husband of the substitute mother gives a declaration which is
certified by a notary that he agrees that his wife will act as a substitute 
mother. The declaration applies only for one specific procedure. 
(5) A List of Couples Willing to Make Use of Substitute Motherhood is 
created in accordance with an Ordinance of the Ministry of Health.  
PART THREE 
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS 
Discussion and Report by the Health Committee 
The Health Committee discussed the draft bill amending and supplementing the Family
Code and issued a report on 29 July 2011.430 
The Health Committee pointed out the gaps in the provisions governing the protection of 
the substitute mother and expressed concerns in relation to the provisions that all 
decisions regarding the carrying and keeping of the child, except the ones dealing with 
the health condition of the substitute mother will be made by the intended parents. It
was also noted that the protection of the intended couple against careless and negligent
activities on behalf of the substitute mother does not make part of the legal framework.
In addition, the Health Committee addressed the necessity to define loose terms such as
“reasonable costs” and “necessary expenses” which appear in the draft bill. Furthermore,
the content of the contract for substitute motherhood needs to be further discussed and
others aspects should be included in order to make it more detailed and avoid future 
disputes due to the unclear provisions. 
Overall, the Health Committee agreed that the initiative is timely, adequate and is
keeping in pace with the development of modern medicine; however, they suggested
that there remained a lot of work to be done and that the provisions of the draft bills
need to be further specified and improved. The Health Committee adopted the draft bill
with 10 votes “in favour”, 1 “abstained” and none “against” and suggested that the 
National Assembly should hear and vote at the first reading above-mentioned bill. 
430 Парламентарна комисия по здравеопазването, Доклад за първо гласуване относно законопроект за
изменение и допълнение на Семейния кодекс, № 154-01-84,
<http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/233/reports/ID/2984> accessed on 16
November 2012. Стенограма от Пленарно заседание, <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2660> 
accessed on 16 November 2012.
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In addition, the Health Committee discussed the draft bill amending and supplementing 
the Health Act on 29 September 2011. The Committee agreed that the Draft Bill is
adequate and timely, however, it emphasised the need for more work on the following
points: 
1) The possibility to permit substitute motherhood in cases of a semen donor on the
condition that the ovum belongs to the wife. If this is accepted it will be helpful to
remove all uncertainties for gender discrimination;
2) The possibility to use existing agencies and foundations such as, for instance, the 
Centre “Fund for Assisted Reproduction” instead of creating new clinics which will 
be in charge of holding a List of Couples Willing to Make Use of Substitute
Motherhood, offering psychological support for the intended parents and the 
substitute mother, etc. The advantage of using the institutions which are already 
in place will be to make use of the professionalism and the experience of those 
working in the area and to reduce the amount of money and time to find and 
train new staff;  
3) The substitute motherhood procedures will need the financial help from the state;
4) The Committee discussed the necessity to have a “compulsory” participation in
the Programme for Psychological Help for both the spouses and the substitute 
mother. It emphasised on the point that the substitute mother will need 
additional psychological help after the birth of the child. There must be some kind 
of sanctions in cases of non-participation; and
5) The steps or procedures that need to be done in cases when the child is born with
chronic disease or disorder and the intended couple will no longer want the child. 
As with the draft bill amending and supplementing the Family Code, the Health
Committee adopted the draft bill amending and supplementing the Health Act with 10 
votes “in favour”, 1 “abstained” and none “against” and suggested that the National 
Assembly should hear and vote at the first reading the draft Bill amending and 
supplementing the Health Act. 
Discussion and Report by the Legal Affairs Committee 
The Legal Affairs Committee discussed the draft bill amending and supplementing the 
Family Code on 14 September 2011 and issued a report.431 At the meeting the Deputy
Minister of Justice—Ms Daniela Masheva—agreed with the need for regulation of the 
relationships in substitute motherhood. However, she expressed some concerns relating
to the comprehensiveness of the draft bills and she suggested that perhaps a special law
on the matter would be a better option to govern its multiple aspects.
The Committee also expressed concerns regarding the illegal practices for substitute 
motherhood due to the great number of couples who have reproductive problems as well 
as regarding the demographic crisis in the country. It was agreed that the legalisation of
substitute motherhood is one of the possible solutions to both problems relating to the 
reproductive health as well as the tendency of demographic decrease in the country. The
Legal Affairs Committee saw the establishment of a legal basis and regulatory regime for
substitute motherhood as a necessary measure, but in order for it to function effectively,
it would need to have the support and the understanding of families and be part of the 
country’s social and national policies. 
431 Комисия по правни въпроси, Доклад за първо четене относно Законопроект за изменение и
допълнение на Семейния кодекс, № 154-01-84,
<http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/226/reports/ID/2954> accessed on 16
November 2012. Стенограма от Пленарно заседание <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2660> 
accessed on 16 November 2012.
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The draft bill, as it stands now, does not deal with certain hypotheses, for instance, it
seems to create a discrimination against people who are not married as well as other 
individuals who have problems with reproduction.  
Moreover, it deals only with altruistic surrogacy as opposed to commercial surrogacy, 
and maybe this is not the best option as altruistic surrogacy can also involve an 
exchange of money. This is referred to as “reasonable costs”, but the term “reasonable” 
is very broad. 
The draft bill confirms the importance of the well-established institution and notion of
“mother”, it does not contradict the determination of paternity (i.e. origin of the father);
substitute motherhood will have a special status and will be treated as an exception
allowing diversion from the traditional definitions of “mother”, “father”, “family”, etc. and 
their modification in relation to the substitute motherhood.  
One of the MPs—Luchezar Toshev (Blue Coalition)—expressed his disagreement with 
legalising substitute motherhood because it goes against the basic Christian and
democratic values. According to them, the family is a basic institution where motherhood 
is inextricably linked with giving birth to a child and it is also a basic principle in family
law. In his opinion, legalising what is often called “renting a womb” is a big exception for 
Bulgarian society and as such, it calls for a serious public discussion in the context of
what measures should be taken  so that the country protects “the family”. His main  
criticism was that the preliminary debate on the matter was not sufficient and that the 
issue needed to be more widely discussed.  
The President of the Legal Affairs Committee concluded that it might be useful to have 
an additional draft bill supplementing the one which is being discussed in order to have a 
more comprehensive regulatory regime for such a delicate and complex subject matter. 
In the end, the Legal Affairs Committee adopted the draft bill amending and 
supplementing the Family Code with 16 votes “in favour” and 3 votes “abstained” and 
suggested that it should be put forward and discussed before the National Assembly.  
Discussion and Report by the Employment and Social Policy Committee 
The Employment and Social Policy Committee discussed the draft bill amending and
supplementing the Employment Code and issued its report on 28 September 2011.432 
The fundamental purpose of this bill is to regulate the employment rights of the 
substitute mother. The bill provides for the right to take time off due to her pregnancy.
The substitute mother will be entitled to 87 days, 45 out of which have to be before the
birth. The substitute mother, however, does not benefit from an entitlement to annual
leave until the child becomes 2 years old and does not benefit from unpaid annual leave 
for raising a child until s/he is two years old. The legal mother in the case of substitute
motherhood has the right to 365 days annual leave after the child is born. In cases of 
substitute motherhood, the father can benefit from a leave up to 15 days when the child
is born as well as the possibility to use the annual leave of the mother after the child has
6 months until s/he becomes one year old. The Draft Bill includes a provision for 
confidentiality which applies to the employer and all colleagues of the substitute mother 
regarding the circumstances related to the substitute motherhood.  
Moreover, it has been proposed that the biological mother who signed a contract for 
substitute motherhood will benefit from a special protection in case of dismissal from
work provided for by law for pregnant women and women in an advanced stage of an in­
432 Комисия по труда и социалната политика, Доклад относно Законопроект за изменение и допълнение
на Кодекса за социално осигуряване, № 154-01-86,
<http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/231/reports/ID/2978> accessed on 5
November 2012. Стенограма от Пленарно заседание <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2660> 
accessed on 5 November 2012. 
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vitro fertilisation procedure. At the same time, in cases of substitute motherhood, the 
time for carrying the child will be considered as a work experience even though in reality
there were no work relations.  
The bill has been sent to the National Committee for Tripartite Cooperation (NCTC) on
the basis of Article 69 of the Rules for the Organisation and Activity of the National
Assembly. In its statement the NCTC supports the need for regulating the so-called 
substitute motherhood in general and considers that the discussion in relation to the 
rights for work and annual leave of the substitute motherhood need to be regulated after 
the changes of the Family Code and many other bills and normative acts.  
The Employment and Social Policy Committee adopted the draft bill amending and 
supplementing the Employment Code with 13 votes “for”, 0 “abstained” and 0 “against” 
and suggested that it should be put forward and discussed before the Parliament.  
PART FOUR 
PLENARY SESSIONS
Plenary Session of the National Assembly and the Debate on the Draft Bills 
On 26 October 2011 the Bulgarian National Assembly held a Plenary Session on the (1) 
Draft bill amending and supplementing the Family Code, (2) Draft bill amending and 
supplementing the Employment Code, and (3) Draft Bill amending and supplementing 
the Health Act.433 A Plenary Session on the draft bill amending and supplementing the
Social Security Code was held on 2 November 2011. During the discussion different 
opinions and arguments “for” and “against” were advanced by politicians from various 
parties. The most important points and issues as presented by the politicians are 
summarised below. Please note that what is summarised below is the opinion of the
politicians speaking, as opposed to data that can be confirmed as accurate by this
report. 
Luben Kornezov (Coalition for Bulgaria): The substitute motherhood 
is one of the most delicate and complex issues not only in Bulgaria but
around the world. The draft bills talk about “donor ovum” which means
that the following case scenario is possible in that there may be up to
three women involved in the process: one who donates the ovum, 
another one who carries and gives birth to a child and a third one who is
making use of the substitute motherhood and will raise the child.
Sometimes it may be even more complicated when the donor of the ova 
is anonymous. The child who is born will be confused and his/her life will
be a mess. 
In those countries where surrogacy or substitute motherhood is legal it
is also paid. The matter of payment and expenses always come into 
question no matter whether we talk about altruistic or commercial
surrogacy. Of course, the price varies, for instance, in the USA it is
between $100, 000 and $150,000 (€76,550 and €115,000); in Russia it
is between $17,000 and $21,000 (€13,000 and €16,000). It seems to 
me that this will mean to introduce a market for children. The draft bills
talk about a contract. This contract is nothing more than a contract for 
the sale of children, and the child is treated as a product. The important
question is who will deal with the expenses and whether the state is
ready to pay and if it is, how much it can allocate. Neither in the 
433 Стенограма от Пленарно заседание, <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2660> accessed 5
November 2012accessed on 5 November 2012. Стенограма от пленарно заседание, 
<http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2661> accessed on 7 November 2012.
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Reasons Section nor in the draft bill there is a provision explicitly dealing
with the expenses. Moreover, if we read the draft bill carefully, we will
see that there are five types of costs that the intended couple has to 
pay. The bill provides for (1) reasonable costs, (2) necessary costs, (3)
financial securities, (4) insurances and (5) any other property relations.
The contract needs to state in detail how much each of these costs. This
is not an altruistic and humane act because, in practice, it is nothing 
more but a contract for a sale of a child, which is against Bulgarian
morals and values. No matter how hard we try to ban the so-called 
“commercial surrogacy” it would be impossible to do so. 
It creates discrimination among poor and rich because the rich couples
will be in a better position and will have the means to pay for the 
“reasonable costs” whilst poor couples seem to be left aside and will not
be able to benefit from such a method;  
In the countries which allow substitute motherhood (UK, USA) there are 
multiple cases where the woman carrying and giving birth to the child
refuses to give the child to the intended couple at birth giving rise to
disputes. Usually the courts protect “the interests of the child”. But in
practice protecting the interests of the child means different things in
different circumstances, sometimes the substitute mother is allowed to 
keep the child and some other times the woman who is making use of 
the substitute motherhood is allowed to keep it. There are even cases 
where the pregnant woman flees to another country, so that no one can 
find her or the child. Thus the main questions which arise are who will
decide such disputes in Bulgaria and how will these decisions be 
enforced? 
Another problem is when there is a “refusal” on behalf of the 
participants in substitute motherhood. Luben Kurnezov cited a survey in
Russia which indicated that in 75% of the cases, children born by means 
of in vitro fertilisation or other assisted reproduction techniques, have
some kind of disorder and that in the end none of the women (who 
participated in the method) wanted to raise and take care of the child.
What happens in such cases? What court will have jurisdiction to decide
such cases? There is a lacuna in the draft bills and they do not address 
such issues. 
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is against the legalisation of the
substitute motherhood. 
Moreover, according to the new Article 73(b)(2) in the Family Code the 
contract will enter into force after approval by the court, however, the
draft bill does not expressly stipulate which courts will be competent in
case of substitute motherhood. This may give rise to problems in
practice since there are multiple courts in Bulgaria: regional, county,
administrative, appellate, supreme, etc. In addition, the main task of the 
courts is to decide disputes and not to approve contracts; such a task is
carried out by the notaries. 
Article 136a of the draft bill amending and supplementing the Health Act
provides that only “spouses” can make use of the substitute 
motherhood. But why will it be legal only between spouses? Nowadays
around 50% of the young couples live together without being married.
Why is the substitute motherhood limited in such a way? Perhaps we 
should give the chance to unmarried young couples who are willing to
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make use of such a procedure? Is it possible for a gay couple to make 
use of it as well? He reminded Parliament that in Bulgaria marriage is
understood as a union between a woman and a man. In certain
countries this is not the case; are we going that far? He cited UK as an
example where any woman married or not married can make use of
surrogacy. Moreover, in the US it is very common that celebrities make
use of surrogacy.  
If we look at Article 365(2)(1) “any other requirements will be done with 
an Ordinance by the Ministry of Health.” This seems to be a double  
regime because on the one hand, we vote a bill and then we leave the 
Health Minister to write and decide the rest of the law. We cannot allow
a secondary legislation to play the role of a bill. This is completely
wrong.
In short, the bill is not well drafted and leaves a lot of gaps which give
raise to important debates and disputes.
Taking into account all the criticism mentioned above, it seems to me
that substitute motherhood should be legalised, however, it should be 
done by means of a special law on the matter governing genetic, 
biological and medical problems; also, governing the legal problems
related to determining the mother and the father of the child; it should
cover any other administrative, social and labour issues connected to 
the substitute motherhood. More importantly, it should contain
provisions regarding the punitive issues. 
Luchezar Ivanov (Citizens for European Development of
Bulgaria): Even though I agree with what was said by Luben Kurnezov
when it comes to the need for more clear and specific provisions and his
criticisms as to the legal issues, I am “for” the draft bills. It is important
to say that the assisted reproduction procedures carried out in Bulgaria
are done according to high standards and can be compared to the ones 
in developed countries that have experience with donation of semen,
ova, etc. In Bulgaria around 70% of the procedures for assisted
reproduction are successful according to data from the medical centres.
Also, we can use the Committee at the Fund for Assisted Reproduction
which has been established in Bulgaria. This will eliminate any possible
discrimination between rich and poor families. Right now the state gives
BGN 5,000 (€2,555) and the couples can make use of different 
procedures up to three times. We should develop different programs and
procedures to those families who want to have a child. If we have them
in place in Bulgaria, the child will be conceived, born and raised in
Bulgaria.
Our laws have to go hand in hand with the developments of modern 
science and medicine. Thus, Bulgarian science and medicine will develop
as well. Moreover, our doctors are as good as the foreign ones and are 
certainly capable of performing such procedures.  
Overall, the draft bills have many shortcomings, mainly legal but at the 
same time it is innovative and I admire the initiative and I believe that it
has its place in the Bulgarian legal system.  
Luchezar Toshev (Blue Coalition): I am firmly against surrogacy or
substitute motherhood. My main concern is that these draft bills will
confuse the relationships between people. In the case of substitute 
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motherhood, there are several mothers and each one of them has her
own problems. The child who is born will be confused and all his life will
be messed up. This is also the main reason for all religious groups in
Bulgaria to be against its legalisation. The position of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church is not some kind of esoteric position. The Russian and 
the Greek Orthodox Churches, for instance, have similar positions and 
condemn substitute motherhood because it traumatises the substitute 
mother and the child.  
Kalina Krumova states that not only the substitute mother but also all 
the other participants will have to take part in psychological help
programs. In the end, it will mean that the children have to participate 
as well because they will have identity problems. I really doubt that such
programs will solve the problems. Such programs are a relatively recent
phenomenon and we do not have data of their success.  
In connection with the fragile psyche of a child, I would like to mention
the problem with children who commit suicide due to problems in the
family such as divorce. This is an issue that no one talks about or talks
about it very rarely. In Bulgaria, there are more than 100 cases of
children who commit suicide because of the divorce of their parents. The
data may be somewhat old but the problem is still the same. A fortiori, 
such problems are even more serious and can further traumatise the 
child when the s/he finds out that, for instance, his/her grandmother or 
his/her aunt is his/her real mother because the draft bills provides for 
such a possibility.  
Overall, legalising substitute motherhood will confuse the fundamental 
social and civil relations. Our society will never be the same again if we 
vote “for” the draft bills. Substitute motherhood should never be 
legalised.
Chetin Kazak (Movement for Rights and Freedoms): I personally
will vote “for” the proposed draft bills. The draft bills are far from perfect
but they suggest a solution for a very important social problem. 
Substitute motherhood is a phenomenon which can solve problems
related to infertlity. Currently, the procedure is anyway de facto used by 
Bulgarian families and Bulgarian mothers outside any legal framework
on a national level. However, it is currently used only by rich families
who can afford to go abroad to India, Russia or Ukraine and pay the 
costs. In my opinion, the draft bill will allow more families with
reproductive problems to use the procedure at a more affordable price 
and more importantly they will not be obliged to go abroad or to commit
a crime. 
The only suitable and acceptable legal framework for legalising the
substitute motherhood in Bulgaria is the one presented before the 
Parliament. There is no need for additional or special laws. The matter of
substitute motherhood deals with different issues and they are covered
in several codes and the only way to enforce it is to have a draft bill (or
several draft bills as it is the case) amending and supplementing existing
laws and codes. We cannot have a single piece of legislation dealing only
with surrogacy because a separate law cannot change the provisions
contained in a code; these must be amended and supplemented by 
specific legislation. What matters here is not the technique that we are 
using but rather to adopt a legal mechanism which is adequate and can 
be applied in practice. 
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I believe that the necessary legal changes and improvements can be 
done between the first and second reading and then we can approve a 
working and efficient legislation regulating the matter.  
Emil Radev (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria): I 
consider the draft bills presented before us today are timely and meet
the requirements of 21st century. There are a lot of couples with a
reproductive problem and their problem has to be solved. In Bulgaria,
the black market for buying children, the illegal use of substitute 
motherhood and the use of a different name when giving birth exist. But
this market exists because the law does not deal adequately with, and 
does not allow such types of relations. Moreover, the draft bills propose 
altruistic surrogacy which is a very reasonable and acceptable 
hypothesis. Such a model is developed in developed European states
such as Denmark, UK, Netherlands, and Spain. We are not following the 
model of Russia or Ukraine where commercial surrogacy is legalised. The
latter is too extreme. Of course there will be costs. We talk here about 
“reasonable” and “necessary” costs. There is case law and norms that
interpret and give directions on how to decide the reasonable costs. So,
these types of relations are not new to the Bulgarian legislation. We 
should not be afraid of the word “contract”. Contract exists in various
provisions in the Family Code.  
If we accept that the wife making use of the substitute mother is the 
mother upon birth of the child, there will not be disputes. Everyone will 
have a free will to decide whether or not to use substitute motherhood. 
The law does not impose the use of such a procedure.  
Also, if we do not legalise such relations then we will not be able to 
create funds such as, for instance, Fund “In Vitro” which will be
subsidised by the state and will help people with reproductive problems 
who do not have sufficient means. Once we have a legal regime for such 
procedures the state can intervene and help the couples in need. 
I will vote “for” and I urge you to do the same.  
Dimitur Chukarski (Independent MP): Mr Toshev stated that the
child who is born by a substitute mother will be traumatised. I would like
to ask you: Is it better that the child is not born at all? What about the
mother who knows that modern medicine can allow her to deal with her 
physical problem and become a parent but we took this from her. Don’t
you think that this will be traumatising because this is exactly what will
happen if we do not allow the legalisation of the substitute motherhood. 
Regarding the substitute mother and her rights I believe that the
altruistic nature guarantees her rights and her emotional stability. When
the medicine is able to cope with such problems why should we be the 
ones to limit the possibility for those with reproductive problems to have 
their children?! Let us accept the substitute motherhood as part of the 
progress of our society and support the draft bills.
Cveta Georgieva (ATAKA): I was surprised to hear that it is horrible 
to conceive children by the means of a contract. Let us not forget that
the marriage is also a contract between the parents so that they can 
raise their children within a family.
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The absence of such legislation in Bulgaria makes people go abroad
(mainly Ukraine) where they sign contracts for substitute motherhood 
and where the child is born. Thus, we become witnesses to the export of 
human resources, capitals and moreover people have to break the law 
simply because they desire to have a child. I am against the arguments 
emphasising that the Church is against it. The Church, as any other 
institution develops with time, and there are examples of where it was 
against certain phenomena and now it has accepted them because it
understood that they were beneficial to society. I firmly believe that the
arguments that at present the Church refuses to accept substitute 
motherhood cannot be sustained. 
Emilia Maslarova (Coalition for Bulgaria): First of all, I would like to
say, that as many other people sitting here today, I am uncertain about 
my personal position on the matter. First of all, I believe that a much
broader discussion should have been organised on the issue of
substitute motherhood. Also, after reading all the materials from the 
specialised committees I saw different positions “for” and “against”.  
I do not think that substitute motherhood is a panacea for the 
demographic crisis in the country. There are many other ways to 
stimulate the demographic increase. Also, there are many children who
were abandoned in orphanages and who cannot find their parents. So 
those couples who cannot have a child should adopt one since there are
many orphanages and many children who are abandoned.  
As a woman and a person who works in the social affairs, I feel deeply
for those people who cannot have their own child. I believe in the
progress of medicine but I also believe that the moral, the human and 
the social aspects trump medicine. In my opinion, the genetic mother 
and the social mother have to be the same woman.  
Sveta Georgieva (Citizens for European Development of
Bulgaria): Under no circumstances should substitute motherhood and 
adoption be linked together because they are two completely different 
phenomena. In substitute motherhood the child is born by the genetic
material of one or both intended parents, whereas in adoption the 
responsibilities are completely different. In adoption usually the state
has a responsibility to make sure that the adopted child will be raised by
a good family. Even if the mother who gave birth to a child and 
subsequently abandoned her/him for adoption tries to find the child, she 
does not have any rights as she already gave them up and they have
been delegated. In the case of surrogacy, the surrogate or substitute 
mother is fully aware that she has to give up the child at birth and the
child has not been conceived with her genetic material (most of the 
time). It is simply a humane and altruistic act and she is expected to act
in bona fide. 
Lubomila Stanislavova (Citizens for European Development of
Bulgaria): I consider that those who are willing to use substitute 
motherhood are doing it as a last resort. Usually, they are people who 
have tried different in-vitro fertilisation methods but without success. 
Thus the legalisation of substitute motherhood is a new chance for
them. So when we are thinking whether or not to support the draft bills,
we have to think whether or not we support the new chance and the 
new choice of those people who agreed to such a procedure. We have to
look from the point of view of the intended parents, namely, the point of
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view of the mother and her new chance to have a child and not from the 
point of view of the substitute mother. As Ms Krumova mentioned the 
substitute mother knows very well the conditions and the requirements
when engaging in such relations. If the substitute mother does not 
agree with them she should not accept the procedure.  
Luchezar Toshev (Blue Coalition): In order to eliminate and deal 
with psychological, emotional and ethical problems the substitute
mother is required to attend a programme for psychological help. After 
the birth the substitute mother has to continue to participate in that 
programme. In case she does not attend, she has to pay a fine between
BGN 1000 and 3000 (€500 and €1,530), and in case of further non­
attendance the fine is between BGN 3500 and 5000 (€1,788 and
€2,550). The provisions show that those behind the draft bill realise that
the non-attendance is a plausible scenario. However, I do not believe 
that attendance at such a programme will resolve the issues at stake. I 
actually believe that the problem will remain unresolved and I am 
concerned because it seems to me that in the end all the people who 
participate in this procedure will be miserable and unhappy. He further 
added that the provisions allowing members of the family from direct or
collateral line of forth degree is a very serious violation of the widely
accepted relations within a family.
Hasan Ademov (Movement for Rights and Freedoms): First of all, I 
would like to mention that it is a very good idea to deal with the matter 
of substitute motherhood by amending and supplementing existing
legislation. However, when talking about social security, the approach is
completely wrong and unsuitable. 
First of all, in cases of substitute motherhood the legal mother will
benefit from a monetary compensation for 365 days. But what happens 
when the child turns one year? All other mothers benefit from the 
annual leave for raising a child up to 2 years.  
What happens with the substitute mother in such a case? Does she have 
the right to the same annual leave? This question has not been resolved
in the present draft bill.  
The substitute mother has the right to monetary compensation for 
pregnancy and birth as all other mothers, but it applies for 45 days 
before the birth and 42 days after the birth. However, the social security
payment is based on a minimum salary and when the substitute mother 
retires she will have a period with a low income based simply on the fact 
that she was receiving social security. This means that the substitute 
mother is deprived of a real compensation, of real payment.  
What if there are twins born? How are the compensations paid and what 
compensations should be paid? This has not been provided in any of the
draft bills and the right place to be included is the Family Allowances for
children Act.
In case, the child or children who are born with a disorder, what will 
happen then? How much should they be paid, 80% of the minimum 
salary? 
What if the substitute mother is a student? How has this issue been
regulated? As of today, there is no law dealing with this matter.
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What will happen with the monthly allowances for children up to 20
years and what if they continue to study up to age 26? All these
questions have to be addressed. All women who give birth to a child
receive a monetary allowance for the birth as a one-time child
contribution at birth. Will this apply to substitute mothers? You know
that if there is no such provision in the text explicitly allowing them to
receive the same monetary allowance, they will not have the right to
claim it. Such allowances are received regardless of the income of the
mother. How will this be estimated in the case of substitute
motherhood? 
I believe that there are a lot of things that need to be changed and
improved and perhaps the period of 21 days between the first and 
second reading is not sufficient to make them all.
All these questions have to be seriously considered and the relevant 
changes have to be made before the draft bill is accepted in its present 
state. That is why between the first and second reading of the draft bill,
many changes have to be made otherwise the law will not be useful in 
practice. The social security, social care and the policies for helping child
are very complex and they are interdependent.  
Kalina Krumova (ATAKA): First of all, I would like to reply to those
who cite the failure of assisted reproduction and substitute motherhood.
If this is correct then why do many countries, including Russia and 
India, allow it? If it is unsuccessful they would not have such a 
procedure in place. More importantly, the substitute motherhood 
procedures in the UK and Russia are some of the best in the world. It is 
not such a dangerous thing when there is a working legislation
containing the exact requirements for such procedures in order to avoid
problems. 
Also, when we talk about children born with disorders we know that
unfortunately this happens even with normal pregnancies and no one 
can predict and no one can say what exactly will happen when the child
is born.
Moreover, adoption and substitute motherhood cannot be compared. In
fact, some of the couples who are willing to make use of this method
already have adopted a child or are in the process of adopting one, and
they can benefit from both methods. 
Substitute motherhood is not a panacea to the demographic crisis in
Bulgaria. Nevertheless the state should show its desire to encourage 
childbirth and this can be done by helping the families who want children
but cannot have them without our help. However, legalising substitute
motherhood will be a clear sign that everyone who wants to be a parent
in Bulgaria is encouraged, irrespective of whether or not they have 
reproductive problems. 
Also, I would like to point out that there is no such thing as three 
mothers as mentioned above. When there is an ovum donor it is
completely anonymous and we do not know who the mother is.434 
434 The ovum and semen donation is legal and anonymous in accordance with Ordinance Number 28 for 
Assisted Reproduction from 20 June 2007. Part IV, article 5.8 states that it is illegal to give information 
regarding the identity of the donors or any other information which might lead to their identification by the 
recipients or third parties; article 5.9 prohibits the commercialisation of the donation and provides that the 
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Moreover, the donor is used only in cases when there is an oncological 
problem. In all other cases, the ovum belongs to the mother.
We heard some analogies between substitute motherhood and adoption. 
Most of the families who want to make use of the substitute motherhood 
have already at least one adopted child or are in the process of adopting 
one. The substitute motherhood and adoption are in fact complimentary.  
We also talked about the women who give birth to their children and
abandon them and then they look for them. These are the biological 
mothers and the child is their biological material. The substitute mother 
is not the biological mother because it is not her ovum which has been 
inseminated and furthermore it has not been inseminated by her partner 
or husband. The substitute mother is simply the mother who carries the 
child and the child does not possess her genes. She is entirely aware of
the procedure and she knows that the child that she is carrying is not
hers. Why would she keep the child when she has a clear mind that it
belongs to other people?  
Another point which has been made is the limitation of the draft bill that
only spouses can benefit from the substitute motherhood. First of all, at
present, in Bulgaria there is no institution of “civil partnership” or
“cohabitation”, there is only “married” or “single”. The substitute
motherhood does not aim at regulating the relationship between people.
The idea is to have a  good and healthy environment for the raising of
the child.
The compulsory programme for psychological help will be changed
between the first and second reading and we will add a requirement for 
a social worker to be present in it as well. We will follow the example of 
the structure in place for adoption. 
The amendments to the Social Security Code and the Labour Code aim 
at giving the substitute mother and the intended mother right to an 
annual leave, social security and others, rights which all parents have. 
The children born with assisted reproduction are like all the other 
children. The only difference is that they are born by means of a medical 
procedure. The biological parents are the ones who will decide when, 
how and whether to tell their child that they are born in this way. This is 
the only difference. Trust me when I say that the children born by 
means of assisted reproduction are some of the most wanted and most
loved children.
The Bulgarian Parliament adopted at first reading the draft bills
legalising surrogacy with 64 votes “in favour”, 6 votes “against” and 17
“abstained”.435 
present Ordinance allows only compensation by means of reasonable costs related to the act of donation. See 
Ordinance Number 28 for Assisted Reproduction from 20 June 2007 (n 2). 
435 Стенограма от пленарно заседание, <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/plenaryst/ID/2660> accessed on 08
November 2012. See a general information how a bill becomes an act, see
<http://www.parliament.bg/en/billbecomeact> accessed on 08 November 2012 (available in English). 
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PART FIVE
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
Between the first and second readings of the draft bills, further proposals for changes
were advanced. On 3 November 2011, Stojan Stavru, a lawyer specialised in Family and
Medical Law who also participated in the preparation of the draft bills, made the 
proposals for changes in a meeting with Karina Krumova which are presented below.436 
1) To abandon the term “biological mother” and use the term “wife or
woman who is making use of substitute motherhood.” At the moment
in certain provisions the terms “biological mother” and “woman 
making use of the procedure i.e. intended parent” are used
synonymously. However, it seems that there is a biological 
relationship between the substitute mother and the child since the 
bearing and giving birth to a child is a biological process. The woman 
who is making use of the process is the genetic mother (for the cases 
when her ovum was inseminated and used). The existence of a
marriage and husband and wife relationship has to be determined at 
the moment when the contract for substitute motherhood is decided 
by the court.
2) To add as a requirement for the availability of a positive statement on 
behalf of the regional directorates for Social Care regarding the 
capacity of the substitute motherhood and the intended parents to
participate in such a procedure. This statement will be issued on the
basis of a social survey and will be made by experts. The experts will
be the same ones who decide whether certain individual can adopt a 
child or not (according article 86(2) of the Family Code and for foster
families (article 27(5) Child Protection Act).437 It will be annexed to  
the contract for substitute motherhood and will be assessed by the 
court when they approve the contract. This will allow the use of
existing resources from the state administration that have experience
when dealing with such social surveys regarding the capacity of
individuals to become parents.  
3) To add a requirement that the contract should be signed personally
and without any representatives if not for the intended couple at least
for the substitute mother. This is necessary because the substitute 
motherhood concerns the integrity and inviolability of the substitute 
mother and as a result the contract can be signed only when the 
substitute mother personally agrees to it. This will also guarantee the
importance of the agreement. 
4) To expressly provide that the county courts which are dealing with
family disputes will have jurisdiction to homologise the contract for 
substitute motherhood as the relationships arising out of the 
substitute motherhood are complex and can be categorised as family
matters. 
436 Стоян Ставру, 12 конкретни предложения във връзка със заместващото майчинство, 

<http://challengingthelaw.com/semeino-i-nasledstveno-pravo/zamestvashto-maichinstvo-predlojenia/> 

accessed 3 November 2012.
 
437 Article 86(2): Directorate “Social Aid” carries out a survey whether the person is suitable to adopt a child.
 
See article 86(2) Family Code, <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed on 25 November 

2012.
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5) The contract for substitute motherhood is confidential and should not 
be made public. The aim of the keeping a record of the contracts for 
substitute motherhood is to allow the courts and health clinics to 
have access in cases they need to check the existence of such a 
contract, the date when it was made and the parties to it. However, 
when there is no such record its absence should not have negative 
consequences for the parties. 
6) The courts will also check that there are no simultaneous or several
contracts for substitute motherhood at the same time benefiting the 
same couple. This will be done at the beginning of the procedure 
when the court is asked to consider whether or not to allow the 
contract for substitute motherhood. The signing of several contracts
for substitute motherhood is possible only if it is subsequent
regardless of the success or failure of the procedure. In other words,
each procedure requires a new contract on condition that the same 
woman cannot be a surrogate mother more than twice. However, 
there is no prohibition that the same woman acts as a substitute
mother twice for the same couple. 
7) There needs to be a clear regulation of who can take decisions related 
to the pregnancy and the birth, including: (a) the decisions 
concerning the continuation of the pregnancy will be made by the
intended parents as long as such a decision does not impact on the
health of the substitute mother; (b) the decisions regarding the birth,
for instance, natural birth or caesarean will be made by the substitute
mother. The birth concerns to a high degree the pregnant woman and
her body and that is why she has the right to decide how it should be 
made. Of course, the decision will depend on a statement made by a 
doctor and whether the method chosen by the mother is dangerous
for her or the child. The doctor will decide in all cases based on 
objective medical criteria.
8) Prohibition for the intended couples to make a decision for the 
termination of the pregnancy. Once the couple has commenced such
a procedure and the pregnancy has started, the intended parents 
have to take all the legal consequences from parenthood. The only
exception is if the commission couples and the substitute mother
agreed for the termination of pregnancy within the legal deadline
which is 12th week from the pregnancy (article 7(1) of Ordinance 
Number 2 for the Conditions and Order for Artificial Termination of 
Pregnancy from 1 February 1990).438 After the 12th week, the 
abortion is allowed subject to medical approval (article 12(1) and (2)
Ordinance Number 2 from 1 February 1990 for the Conditions and 
Order for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy from 1 February 
1990).439 
438 Article 7(1): Abortion requested by any pregnant woman can be made within the 12 weeks from her 
pregnancy. See Ordinance Number 2 for the Conditions and Order for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy from 
1 February 1990 (Наредба № 2 от 1 февруари 1990 г. за условията и реда за изкуствено прекъсване на
бременност), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/-552069119> accessed on 25 November 2012.
439 Article 12(1): Abortion on medical grounds requested by the pregnant woman in the case of a disease,
proven beyond doubt and presented in documents, when the continuation of pregnancy can or will jeopardise
the life and health of the woman or the life of the child as per appendix 2 and within no more than 20 weeks 
from the pregnancy. In cases where the disease is not included in appendixx 2, the abortion can be allowed in 
certain exceptional circumstances. Article 12(2): Abortion within more weeks than the provided ones in section 
1 is allowed only if there are urgent reasons for the saving of the life of the woman or in cases of proven 
morphological changes or grave genetic disorder of the foetus. See Ordinance Number 2 for the Conditions and 
Order for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy from 1 February 1990 (n 49). 
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A possible termination of the pregnancy on mutual agreement of the 
intended parents and the substitute mother will have to be taken into 
account when assessing the aptitude and suitability for any future use 
of the substitute motherhood procedure. 
9) Prohibition that the substitute mother can decide to get an abortion 
unilaterally. Unilateral abortion i.e. without the agreement of the 
intended parents is allowed only according to medical criteria
according to Ordinance № 2 from 1 February 1990 for the Conditions
and Order for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy. The substitute
mother accepts “the child” of the intended parents and takes the 
responsibility to carry and give birth on behalf on them. In case that
there is no compliance with the medical criteria for termination of
abortion mentioned above the substitute mother infringes not only
the rights and the interests of the intended parents but also that of
the conceived child. That is why it is considered that the substitute 
mother takes specific responsibility towards the conceived child.  
In order to guarantee that such a prohibition is implemented, the 
woman who has an abortion must give a declaration that she is not a 
substitute mother. Moreover, the hospital or the clinic which carries 
out the abortion will have the responsibility to check whether the 
woman is listed in the Register for Substitute Mothers and whether
she has signed a contract for substitute motherhood.  
The question which is somewhat left out is the criminalisation of a
possible abortion in cases of substitute motherhood. The answer 
depends on whether the criminalisation will protect the private rights
of the intended parents i.e. the right to become parents as a result of 
substitute motherhood or whether it will protect the public interest for 
the protection of human life: the right of the embryo to become a 
human being. 
10) The need to delete “any other property relations” and leave the 
provision with reasonable costs connected to the pregnancy and the 
recovery after the birth. The court will decide what is reasonable on a 
case-to-case basis. Moreover, in order to keep the altruistic nature of 
the substitute motherhood the term “reasonable” must be changed 
with “necessary”. The term “reasonable” is very broad whilst the term 
“necessary” is more limited and has a more objective nature. In order 
to guarantee the gratuity of the relationship between the intended
parents and the substitute mother, all forms of advertisement or 
intermediary should be prohibited. When signing the contract for
substitute motherhood, the substitute mother should give a 
declaration which is certified by notary (article 89(6) of the Family
Code) that the given agreement is not bound with any financial 
compensation.440 Thus this declaration will be the basis for existence
of the criminal liability on the basis of article 313 of the Penal 
Code.441 The presence of such a declaration will be on the basis of the 
court’s approval for the contract.  
440 See Article 89(6) Agreement for Adoption in the Family Code which provides that the people who agree for 
adoption have to give a declaration that they agree to do so without any financial compensation. Article 89(6)
Family Code (Семеен кодекс), <http://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed on 21 November 2012.
441 Article 313 deals with the penalty and fine of people who have given false information in a written 
declaration or written message including a message sent via online medium of communication. The penalty is 
three years of prisons or a fine between BGN 100 to 300 (€50 to 153). See Penal Code, 
<http://lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/1589654529> accessed on 25 November 2012. 
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11) The contract can be terminated at the beginning of the pregnancy
or by mutual agreement of all parties. The contract otherwise applies
until the birth. The consequences for the origin of the child will not
depend on the existence and provisions of the contract for substitute 
motherhood. The aim of the contract is to be the objective basis for 
agreement and to regulate their relations, but the approval of the
court is more important as it decides whether or not to allow the 
substitute motherhood. Any changes of the contract will allowed only
with approval from the court.
12) In case that the spouses making use of the substitute motherhood 
divorce during the pregnancy but before the birth of the child and the
marriage of the woman making use of the substitute motherhood, a 
paternity issue arises. The paternity presumption follows the man
who is making use of the substitute motherhood and it follows that 
article 61(2) of the Family Code does not apply in such instances.
This article provides that if the child is born 300 days before the 
divorce, but after the mother re-married, the father of the child is the
husband from the second marriage.442 This is a presumption that if
the woman divorces and re-marries during that period she does it
namely because the father of the child is her new husband.
This presumption however is not adequate when applied to cases of 
substitute motherhood. It is the first husband who has given his 
agreement for the assisted reproduction procedure in a written
declaration which is certified by a notary. This agreement is the basis 
for the impossibility to challenge his paternity and it trumps the 
presumption that the second husband is the father. Moreover, the 
genetic material of the first husband has been used for the 
insemination.
PART SIX
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
Arguments in Favour
The proponents of the legalisation of substitute motherhood support the idea that since 
modern medicine offers a solution for couples with reproductive problems they should
be given a chance to make use of such methods. We cannot simply say that it is “God’s 
will” and “We should not go against nature” when we talk about couples with
reproductive problems because humans have developed non-traditional procedures and 
methods in medicine to give people a chance to live (such as an artificial heart valve) or 
conceive a child and there is nothing unnatural and horrendous to use them.443 
The bills do not impose the procedure on couples with reproductive problems but rather
give them the opportunity to decide whether or not to participate in it. Moreover, the 
bills defend a fundamental human right i.e. the right to be a parent and substitute
motherhood is sometimes the only way to have a genetic child. Such couples usually try
different methods to cure or overcome their reproductive problems (treatment of 
infertility if this is possible, in vitro fertilisation, adoption, use of donor semen and 
ovum) but sometimes without success. For instance, the success rate for in vitro 
fertilisation is between 20-25% and the most common reason for that is rejection of the
442 See Family Code, Article 61(2) (Семеен кодекс), <http://www.lex.bg/bg/laws/ldoc/2135637484> accessed 

on 25 November 2012.
 
443 Деница Никова, Сурогатна майка - законът, църквата и природата срещу желанието да се
 
възпроизведеш, <www.framar.bg> accessed on 26 November 2012.
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inseminated ovum by the immune system of the mother.444 In addition, in Bulgaria, the 
procedures for adoption are very cumbersome and after a long wait people do not get a 
child. For them substitute motherhood is their only chance to become parents.  
One of the most frequently advanced arguments against substitute motherhood is that
the woman who carries and gives birth to the child falls into severe depression after she 
gives the child away. Research, however, shows that in practice the majority of the 
substitute mothers do not experience depression, anxiety and pain after the birth of the 
child. They are aware of the fact that the child is not their own. Moreover, the child is
given immediately to the biological family and the substitute mother does not have time 
to consider and appreciate the child as hers.445 The general impression of such a 
method is that the child will have two mothers (or even three) but this is not true. The 
substitute mother is not a mother; she is simply a woman bearing the child of another 
woman. In Bulgaria, the substitute motherhood will be first encouraged within the
family i.e. between relatives, for instance, sisters, and of course if this is not possible 
the couple will have the right to look for a woman who is ready to be substitute
motherhood outside the family.446 
The psychologist Vania Savova from Foundation “I Want a Baby” states that the 
acceptance of surrogacy shows the maturity of the society in a given country. Bulgarian
society is now ready to legalise surrogacy and it has already taken the first steps with
the establishment of the Fund for Assisted Reproduction and the engagement in the 
public debate on the draft bills presented before the National Assembly.447 Kalina
Krumova stated that success should not be measured by the number of couples who 
will be making use of this procedure. What really matters is to have such a procedure in
place and allow couples to consider such an option.448 
Radina Velcheva, the Director of Foundation “I Want a Baby”, is convinced that the  
proposed regulatory framework will have positive effects in Bulgaria. According to her,
the legalisation of substitute motherhood will be beneficial because it will help society to
(1) understand that in altruistic surrogacy the substitute mother is not a “mother for 
rent”, (2) the advertisement for payment for substitute motherhood will gradually
disappear (they have actually considerably decreased since the draft bills have been put 
forward before the National Assembly), (3) couples with reproductive problems will not
be coerced to make use of the procedure illegally and break the law, and more
importantly, (4) substitute motherhood will have a regulatory framework which will not
allow it to be a lucrative business on the black market for selling and buying babies
which is exactly what is happening at the moment and (5) there will not be blackmailing 
of biological parents after the substitute mother gives birth which happens at the 
moment as there is no legal protection for those making use of the procedure.449 
Moreover, a section entitled “Reasons” in the Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the 
Family Code, the Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Citizen Registration Act, the
Draft Bill Amending and Supplementing the Social Security Act, the Draft Bill Amending
and Supplementing the Employment Code, and the Draft Bill Amending and 
444 Професор Иван Тодоров и Адвокат Николай Вълков, Готова ли е България за сурогатсвото? 

<www.framar.bg> accessed on 26 November 2012. Ваня Савова, 

<http://www.savova.org/vandaradina.php> accessed on 26 November 2012.
 
445 Професор Иван Тодоров и Адвокат Николай Вълков (n 50).
 
446 Антония Първанова, Етична и правна реалност на заместващото майчинство, 

<http://parvanova.eu/blog.php?id=31> accessed on 23 November 2012. 

447 Ваня Савова (n 50).
 
448 За и против сурогатството (n 3).
 
449 Радина Велчева, Председател на на УС на фондация “Искам бебе”, “Сурогатното майчинство няма да е
 
платено”, <http://www.monitor.bg/article?id=310288> accessed on 28 November 2012. Боряна: Не успях с
 
инвитро, търся сурогатна майка, <http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=552811> accessed on 28
 
November 2012.
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Supplementing the Health Act, gives a more detailed explanation of the reasons behind 
the initiative and summarise the main arguments in favour of its legalisation.
The data gathered from the latest census in Bulgaria show that the demographic crisis in
Bulgaria is becoming more and more serious with every year. The aging of the 
population, the immigration of young people and the increase of the number of families
experiencing reproductive problems predetermine the drastic decrease of Bulgarian
citizens. It is necessary to find and use effectively all possible means to encourage births
and to help the couples who are willing to become parents.  
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Bulgaria there are 270, 000 
couples who have reproductive problems. The statistics show that in one third of the
cases the man is infertile, in one third- the woman is infertile, and one third-the 
infertility is due to multiple factors.
In the EU Member States the treatment of infertility is a matter of national policy. The 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Finance have 
to develop a long term strategy for resolving problems with infertility, the same way as it
is done in other countries. In Bulgaria, where we experience problems with an aging 
population and increased immigration, the efforts should be directed towards resolving
the demographic problem. This problem can be solved by taking care of the huge 
number of couples who would like to have children but cannot become parents due to a 
variety of reasons. Fortunately, we already have the financial means for the in-vitro 
fertilisation programmes, so now we need an adequate and purposeful national policy.  
One of the possible solutions is the legalisation of surrogacy but in the Bulgarian context 
it is more acceptable to use the word “substitute”. The internationally accepted
terminology and use of the term of “surrogacy” is known since 1985, when the Brussels 
Declaration of the World Medical Association set up the beginning of the legal regulation
of the substitute motherhood. The same year the first law governing the surrogacy was 
enacted, namely, the Surrogacy Arrangement Act 1985, which is applicable in the United
Kingdom. 
The institution of substitute motherhood is now 26 years old and different countries 
around the world have developed a practice and gained experience in it, now it has 
proven to be a success and it can be widely applied in our society and country. For the 
very first time, hundreds of families have acknowledged publicly that surrogacy happens 
in the black market and that there is such practice already in place, however it is outside
the realm of the law or often the couples have to go to Ukraine where it is legal and 
where it is permitted for foreigners to make use of the practice in place.  
In order to make Bulgaria a country where couples are not ashamed and not afraid to 
recognise their reproductive problems and a country where they can be parents and take 
care and raise their children, the state should be the one taking responsibility for its
people.450 
Arguments Against 
The National Network for Children, which comprises 96 organisations and the Foundation 
“Centre for Research and Policies for Women”, expressed their opinion against the
substitute motherhood on 25 October 2011 and 22 November 2011 respectively.
Moreover, on 16 January 2012, 17 organisations issued a statement in the form of letter
before the second reading in order to show that they are against the legalisation of the 
450 Мотиви към Законопроект за изменение и допълнение на Семейния кодекс № 154-01-84, Законопроект
за изменение и допълнение на Кодекса за социалното осигуряване № 154-01-86, Законопроект за
изменение и допълнение на Кодекса на труда № 154-01-87, Законопроект за изменение и допълнение на
Закона за здравето № 154-01-88.
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substitute motherhood. They repeat the majority of the criticisms mentioned by different
MPs during the Plenary Sessions before the National Assembly but any additional 
criticisms are summarised below. Also, some criticisms against the substitute 
motherhood appear in various online forums, blogs and interviews on diverse Bulgarian
websites and the Bulgarian TV.451 
Statement of the National Network for Children
In the aforementioned roundtable discussion on 30 March 2010, the organisations which
were against substitute motherhood were not given the opportunity to attend even
though they registered to do so. Instead, only representatives from Association
“Conception” and Foundation “I Want a Baby” that support the draft bills were admitted.
Later in the preliminary groups, the citizens were given no more than two minutes to 
express their opinions and the draft bills were accepted very quickly without serious
discussions. 
If Bulgaria legalises substitute motherhood it will be the only country to do so in the 
Balkans. Moreover, the draft bills are very liberal; as a result, Bulgaria may become an 
attractive touristic destination for business with “wombs” as has happened with Russia, 
India and Ukraine. Even though an attempt to legalise substitute motherhood was made 
in several countries in our region it was not accepted. For instance, Romania rejected
surrogacy in 2005, when a draft bill for reproductive medicine aimed at legalising 
altruistic surrogacy was vetoed by the President Traian Băsescu. Croatia voted a new law 
which prohibits surrogacy in 2009. In Serbia, there was a very short debate which ended 
with the complete prohibition of surrogacy in 2010.  
For instance, today, Russia has become an attractive destination for “reproductive 
tourists” who seek techniques which are not available in their countries of origin. There 
is a concern that the draft bills in Bulgaria are highly influenced by the liberal legislation
in Russia, with the author Kalina Krumova borrowing many ideas from them. Moreover, 
in India, there are “Baby Farms” where women are kept and used as human incubators 
for couples from the West. It is even possible to “order” children via email or post
without any contact with the substitute mother. There are clinics where the substitute
mothers are kept locked and forced to give birth with a caesarean operation which is
very risky and may lead to death.
The legalisation of surrogacy will lead to degradation of motherhood because it turns 
motherhood into mechanical activity and a “job.” The relationship between the mother
and the baby will lose its value. The bearing of a child is not only a physiological process 
but also a unique contact and the relationship between the mother and the child
continues for a life. In cases of surrogacy this natural contact is broken between the 
surrogate mother and the child. When surrogacy becomes a legal profession women will 
be forced to rent their bodies. Just as there is trafficking of women, there will be canals
and networks of people who will make money out of “renting someone else’s wombs”. In
Russia, the example that we are using, there is already a profession called “surmama”­
surrogate mother. 452 
451 Aсоциация Обещество и Ценности, Защо сурогатното майчинство не трябва да се узаконява, 
<http://www.sva.bg/18/post/2011/10/6.html> accessed on 12 November 2012; Петър Вълков (психолог), 
http://www.blitz.bg/article/28015> accessed on 12 November 2012. See also, Василена Доткова, (n 10). 
452 Национална мрежа за децата, “Сурогатно майчинство: риск за правата на децата”, 
<http://nmd.bg/Position/stanovishte-na-natsionalna-mrezha-za-detsata-otnosno-predlozheniya-zakonoproekt­
reglamentirasht-surogatnoto-maytchinstvo/> accessed on 18 November 2012. Център за изследвания и
политики за жените <http://www.cwsp.bg/htmls> accessed on 18 November 2012. 
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Foundation “Centre for Research and Policies for Women” 
There will be chaos and confusion of the family roles as the draft bills allow relatives to 
become substitute mothers. Thus, a woman who becomes a surrogate mother can bear 
and give birth to her grandchild in place of her daughter and she will be the child’s
mother and grandmother. The requirement for substitute mothers to have at least one 
child has very serious, even traumatising, consequences for the mother and the child
itself. These children will witness how their mothers carry and give birth to children that
they abandon. They will live in constant fear and insecurity that one day they may be
abandoned and more importantly will get a wrong impression from what a motherhood 
means. 
The legalisation of substitute motherhood destroys the traditions of the family and will
give way to the legalisation of “cohabitation” and “civil partnership” and even 
homosexual couples who will be able to make use of it in future.
The author of the draft bills cites on numerous occasions that there are 270,000 families
with reproductive problems. But the exact number is unclear. In a 2005 survey made by
Professor Ivan Kozovski, founder of the Centre for Assisted Reproduction in Varna, and
given to the Ministry of Health, the number is 116,000 and not 270,000. If the number is
270,000 it will mean that Bulgaria has one of the highest, if not the highest, rate of 
infertility.
In Bulgaria there are more than 7,500 children between one and three years old that are 
abandoned, battered and injured each year. This positions us in first place for abandoned
children in Europe. Can the couples with reproductive problems find another way to
become parents? Isn’t it better to adopt and take care of an abandoned child and in this
way the children who are unwanted and cast out by our society will find a family and the 
infertile couples will find a better way to have children? First we have to think about how
to facilitate and improve the adoption procedures and only after that to talk about
substitute motherhood. 
Can the substitute motherhood really help us decide the demographic crisis since there 
are 50, 000 abortions made each year. It seems that we have so many children who are 
killed but at the same time politicians would like to solve the demographic problem with
expensive and risky technologies.
Nowadays, we often talk about “making babies” but babies are ‘born’ they are not 
‘made’. Even this terminology changes our psychological relationship with our own
children because it turns them into a product of our wishes, a good, which today can be 
placed in one womb and tomorrow in a different one. The children are a gift they are not 
a right. 
The ability to conceive a child has its natural limits, such as age and health. Today, there 
are so many people who try not to get pregnant together with the early age of sex life,
prolonged use of pills, numerous cases of abortion, etc. Then the same people find out 
that they cannot conceive. Is it better to put our efforts into preventing sterility? 
It is surprising that before the writing of the draft bills no survey had been conducted of
how many couples in Bulgaria are planning to use the substitute motherhood. Recently,
Association “Conception” announced that there are only 20 couples willing to make use 
of this possibility.453 
Miscellaneous 
453 Асоциация Общество и Ценности, Становище относно законопроекта за сурогатното майчинство, 
<http://www.sva.bg/18/post/2012/01/4.html> accessed on 12 November 2012. 
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There are serious risks associated with the legalisation of surrogacy. According to the 
draft bill amending and supplementing the Family Code, substitute motherhood is a
method where the child is conceived either with the genetic material of the married 
couple who is making use of the procedure or with a donor ovum inseminated by the
husband of the woman who is making use of the substitute motherhood. The latter will 
have a direct impact on the market for ova. This is an area where abuses are possible
because it is a very profitable business. Moreover, Bulgaria has not taken the necessary 
steps to prevent such abuses. Also, in cases of donor ova there might be instances of 
incest or illegal hormone stimulation aimed at the selling of the women’s ova. Legalising 
substitute motherhood means that what has been considered as a crime yesterday will 
become a legal procedure. 
The provisions do not seem to guarantee prevention and criminalisation of trafficking of 
pregnant women and illegal adoption. The lack of rigorous requirements for the contract
and the relationship between the substitute mother and the intended parents can easily
open “Pandora’s box” and lead to blackmailing, manipulation, requests for additional
payments, etc. The provisions need to strike a fair balance and defend the rights of all 
the participants, especially the ones of the children.454 
In case of substitute motherhood the strong and natural relation between the mother
who is carrying the child and the child is broken. The relationship between a child and a
mother are the most valuable and important and they cannot be simply agreed by a 
contract. Carrying a child is not only a physiological process it creates a bond between
the child and the mother, which remains for the rest of their lives. 
The substitute mother does not have any rights in relation to the child. The intended
parents have rights on the substitute mother during the pregnancy. When there is a
diagnosis for disorder or disease of the child there are serious problems. The intended
parents wish an abortion and might make the substitute mother do it even thou it is 
against her wishes and beliefs.  
The substitute motherhood devaluates the importance and the significance of the
reproductive activity and makes it a mechanical activity which can be compared to
“work”.
The substitute motherhood implies serious psychological and physiological risks. It is not 
clear how the substitute mother will react when the child is given up and what will be the 
psychological consequences from that. 
Legalising substitute motherhood will lead to a physical exploitation of women. Once the 
substitute motherhood becomes a legal profession, many women will use their bodies in
order to sustain their families.  
The provisions dealing with “reasonable costs” is unclear and very broad. The black
market will still be functioning even if surrogacy is legalised.
The rights of the child are violated. Both the substitute mother and the child are treated 
as biological goods for which you have to pay. This violates the rights of the child
guaranteed in the Declaration for Child’s Rights (article 6(9)). Also, there is a violation of
the right of the child to know who gave birth to him/her and in case of donor ovum 
and/or semen to know her/his origin. The substitute motherhood may lead to violation of 
the right of the child to have a legal mother. There are cases, for instance in Russia,
where only the name of the father appears on the birth certificate.455 
454 Антония Първанова, (n 55). 
455 See <http://www.sva.bg/18/post/2011/10/6.html (n 61) and <http://www.blitz.bg/article/28015> (n 61).
See also, Василена Доткова, (n 10).
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CONCLUSION 
Within the past two years, surrogacy has attracted the attention of the media where the 
issue has been widely discussed in connection with the legislative initiative put forward 
before the National Assembly. It can be said that surrogacy, despite its numerous 
criticisms, appeals to both couples with reproductive problems, who would otherwise be
unable to have a child of their own, and women who are willing to offer their services
and become surrogate mothers. A careful analysis of the draft bills reveals that it is 
necessary to further improve the language and the wording of the provisions in order to
prevent disputes over its interpretation and application in future. The time between the
first and second readings of the draft bills before the National Assembly has to be used
efficiently because it is the time when provisions can be reshaped and re-written.  
The main challenges concerning the legalisation and institutionalisation of surrogacy is to
allow a third party i.e. a substitute mother to participate in the traditional two-parent
family relations. In addition, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and certain organisations
perceive the changes to the basic principles of family law and definition of the origin of a 
child as detrimental to society and against public policy. It is believed that further 
participation by experts in Family Law and Medical Law, doctors, psychologists is needed
to enhance the legitimacy of the proposed amendments. 
Overall, there seems to be a wide support for the legalisation of substitute motherhood 
but the debate continues as there is still no official date for the second reading before 
the National Assembly. It remains to be seen whether surrogacy will be eventually
permitted in Bulgaria.
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6.4. GERMANY 
A LEGISLATION, DRAFT LEGISLATION, FORMAL GUIDELINES 
1. In Germany, surrogacy in itself is not explicitly prohibited or punishable. However, the 
bringing together of the party who is willing to adopt a child born through surrogacy or is 
in some other way ready to take permanently care of it (ordering parents) with a woman
who is willing to serve as a surrogate, is subject to sanctions. Also, surrogacy 
agreements are ineffectual and unenforceable.  
Three legal sources deal with surrogacy (no amendment is under discussion): 
i) The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB): §134- any legal 
transaction violating a statutory prohibition is void if the law does not say
otherwise; §138(1)- any legal transaction violating the public policy (bonos 
mores) is void.
ii) The Embryo Protection Act 1990456: according to §1(1)(7), “anyone will be
punished with up to three years imprisonment or a fine, who …. attempts to carry 
out an artificial fertilisation of a woman who is prepared to give up her child
permanently after birth (surrogate mother) or to transfer a human embryo into 
her”. Under this provision, no “agreement” in a technical sense is required; the 
mere willingness of the surrogate to relinquish the child to a third party is
sufficient.
Neither the surrogate, nor the ordering parents can be punished. According
§1(3)(2), “…the surrogate mother and likewise the person who wishes to take
long-term care of the child will not be punished”. If a woman is being inseminated
with the sperm of the ordering father with no medical assistance, through sexual 
intercourse or “home insemination”, this kind of operation will be subject to no
sanction. 
iii) The Procurement Adoption Act457: according to §13(a), the surrogate mother
is a woman who by agreement has consented (1) to an artificial or natural
insemination, or (2) to having somebody else’s embryo implanted, and, after 
giving birth to it,  to  hand the child over in view of  an adoption or other  
permanent accommodation. Once more, this kind of activity is not in itself
prohibited. According to §13(b), the procurement of a surrogate mother means 
the bringing together of the party who is willing to adopt a child born by a
surrogate or is in some other way ready to take permanently care of it (ordering 
parents) with a woman who is willing to serve as a surrogate mother. Such 
procurement is formally prohibited (§13(c), and even, following §14(b), 
punishable (imprisonment up to one year or a fine). Any publicity is prohibited
(§13(d)). With an imprisonment up to 2 years or a fine can be punished who has 
a pecuniary benefit or the promise of such a benefit out of the procurement of a
surrogate mother. If the offender turns it into a business activity for financial
profit or proceeds on commercial basis, the punishment amounts even to an 
imprisonment of 3 years or to a fine. §14(b)(3) confirms that the surrogate and
the ordering parents cannot be sanctioned.  
456 Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen (Embryonenschutzgesetz – EschG)), Federal Law Gazette, Part I, n°69, 
19.12.1990, p. 2746 
457 Gesetz über die Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern 
- Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz – AdVermiG, 2001 (BGBl. 2002, I, p. 354), last modified in 2008 (BGBl, I, p.
2403) 
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2. There is no type of surrogacy (commercial, altruistic, traditional and gestational)
legally authorised in Germany; no distinction, nor any reference of “reasonable costs” is
made. 
3. Given the legal frame of surrogacy, in particular §134 and 138(1), BGB, surrogacy 
agreements are not enforceable by the courts, and cannot in any way, be pre-approved
by a court in order to be considered as enforceable. This has been confirmed by the 
jurisprudence458: the sole fact that a woman has been a part to a surrogacy agreement 
is not a reason to take back the child to whom she gave birth (this kind of measure can
only be pronounced in exceptional circumstances, when the child suffers from a bodily or
mental damage459), despite the biological relation between the ordering father and the
child, and the financial motivation of the surrogate.
4. Laws determining parentage
Under German law, there is a legal presumption, according to which the mother is the 
woman bearing the child (§1591, BGB). No indication can rebut this presumption, as 
ovum donation and surrogacy are illegal. The mother’s identity has to be mentioned in
the act of birth. There is no formal possibility of giving birth anonymously. The child has 
only one legal mother. In case of surrogacy, the surrogate would be considered as the 
legal mother.
Under German law, the father is: the husband of a woman while bearing the child
(§1592(1) BGB); a man who has recognised his paternity (§1592(2) BGB)460; or a man
whose paternity has been stated by court (§1592(3) BGB). No specific provisions have
been made for the case of surrogacy. If the surrogate was married while the child was 
born, her husband will be considered as the legal father of the child.
The names entered on the child’s birth certificate are exclusively those of his parents 
also in case of surrogacy.  
The ordering parents can adopt the child born through surrogacy under the following 
conditions: the consent of the surrogate, since the consent of the biological parents in 
general is mandatory, which cannot be given before the child is 8 weeks old (§1747
BGB). This consent might become unnecessary (§1748 BGB) if the parent has neglected
his / her duty to the child permanently or has shown by his / her attitude that he / she 
doesn’t care about the child, and if the child would suffer a disadvantage not being
adopted. Also, the consent might be replaced if the child suffers from a serious (although
not continuous neglect), or if the parent, suffering from a particularly great emotional
disease, or a particularly serious mental or psychological disability, is permanently 
unable to assume the care and the education of the child.
According to §1741(1) BGB461, while deciding upon the adoption, the judge has to take 
into account the well-being (Kindeswohl) of the child, and only if it is to be expected that 
a parent – child relationship will result between the adopting party and the child.
Nevertheless, whoever participates in an unlawful and unethical arrangement or
transportation of a child with regard to an adoption, or delegates such an undertaking to
a third party against payment, shall only be able to adopt the child, if this is necessary to
the welfare of the child. In this context, a surrogacy agreement would not necessarily
exclude adoption, and the judge would decide case by case. In any event, the mother is
458 KG Berlin, 19.3.1985, 1 W 5729/84, JZ 1985, 1053 
459 §1666, 1666a BGB 
460 A paternity recognition can be made before the child is born (§1594(4) BGB) 
461 « Wer an einer gesetzes- oder sittenwidrigen Vermittlung oder Verbringung eines Kindes zum Zwecke der 
Annahme mitgewirkt oder einen Dritten hiermit beauftragt oder hierfür belohnt hat, soll ein Kind nur dann 
annehmen, wenn dies zum Wohl des Kindes erforderlich ist » 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
allowed to hand over the child to the ordering parents only under the condition that an
order has been given by a court.
The child might be adopted by the couple (if the couple is married) or by one parent 
(§1741(2) BGB). The guardianship court (Vormundschaftsgericht) decides on the 
adoption of the child.  
5. Donation of gametes
Germany is one of the very few countries, if not the only one, in which there has never 
been a rule concerning anonymity of the sperm donor. The anonymity is guaranteed in
most Länder. But on 06.02.2013, a regional appeals court in Hamm added legal weight 
to the claim that sperm donation shouldn’t be anonymous with its verdict that the 
children of anonymous sperm donors have the right to know the names of their fathers.
The ruling came in a case involving a 22-year-old plaintiff, Sarah P., who was conceived
with sperm donated at a clinic in Essen. Sperm donation is the only kind of donation 
authorised (in other countries in which access in favour of children to the identity of the 
gamete or embryo donor is guaranteed, often an anonymity principle has been enacted 
and eliminated).
The right of children to the knowledge of their origins has been confirmed by the German
Federal Constitutional Court in 1989462, considered as derivative from another right, a 
constitutional one, concerning the right to one’s own personality development. This right 
concerns the donation - conceived child in relation to the donor, as an anonymity
principle between the donor and the donation receivers has never been contested. There 
is no official register set, which would insure the realisation of such right. The parents 
are not obliged to tell their children that they have been conceived through sperm
donation. 
6. Attribution of German citizenship to the child
A child is considered to be a German citizen if at least one of his parents is German463, 
thus requiring his / her filiation to be determined. According to §19(1) of the 
Introductory Law of the Civil Code, in respect to the filiation of a child at first the law of 
the state in which the child has its habitual residence is applicable. However, the 
filiation, in relation to each parent, can be decided according to the law of the state to 
which this parent belongs464. In the context of surrogacy, the establishment of a filiation
is complicated, given that, under German law, the mother is the woman bearing the 
child (§1591 BGB), and, if she is married, her husband is considered as the legal father
(§1592(1) BGB), and not the ordering father.  
These kinds of presumptions often do not exist in countries where German citizens 
choose to make a surrogacy agreement, like India or Ukraine, where the ordering
parents are considered as legal parents, and where children born within their territory 
are not always automatically given the local nationality. This conflict of law can cause 
painful situations, where these children have neither a filiation in relation to the ordering
parents, nor any citizenship, even if the ordering parents (who are, sometimes, also the 
biological parents) are German. Nevertheless, this state of the law has been confirmed
462 BVerfG, 31.1.1989, FamRZ, 1989, 255. This decision doesn’t deal with ART, but is considered relevant in
this field as well 
463 §4(1) Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz –StAG : « Durch die Geburt erwirbt ein Kind die deutsche 
Staatsangehörigkeit, wenn ein Elternteil die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt » 
464 §19(1) Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB: « Die Abstammung eines Kindes 
unterliegt dem Recht des Staates, in dem das Kind seinen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt hat. Sie kann im Verhältnis 
zu jedem Elternteil auch nach dem Recht des Staates bestimmt werden, dem dieser Elternteil angehört » 
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by the Federal State Department, warning that entrance to Germany of these children,
who don’t have German passports, is impossible465. 
B CASE LAW
1. The decisions presented in this report do not include any decision issued by the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) or the federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof) regarding surrogacy; thus explaining the lack of convergence in 
German case law. 
A distinction can be made between the first period – the 80’s- where surrogacy 
agreements have been concluded within the German territory, and a second period- later 
on, German citizens concluding such agreements abroad. In most cases, German law
has been considered applicable, as nationality and filiation being at steak. Also, after a
long period of time, where the conclusion of foreign surrogacy agreements by German
citizens seems to have been tolerated (we can even find a request for a fiscal deduction
of expenses engaged in the context of a foreign surrogacy agreement, to be considered
as extra ordinary, request which has been refused466), in recent years courts have been 
more reluctant. 
2. In recent years, the question which has raised the most in judicial proceedings has 
concerned travel documents for the children467; this question implicates law of 
nationality and filiation, in order to determine the legal parentage of the child, and, to
establish his / her citizenship (German nationality law being ius sanguinis).
Nevertheless, certain cases deal with adoption requests468. Other cases examine the 
recognition in Germany of foreign documents or judgments related to surrogacy:
paternity recognition made in Russia469, adoption judgment in the US470, and birth 
certificates471. We can even find a request for a fiscal deduction of expenses engaged
(see question n°1, part B)472. 
3. The ordering parents, as well as the surrogate, cannot be criminally convicted, as 
their immunity is set by law473 (see question n°1, part A). Therefore, no case deals with 
criminal proceedings.
Surrogacy cases are predominantly dealt with by administrative (Verwaltungsgericht) 
and civil (Landesgericht, Oberlandesgericht) courts, whose jurisprudence seems 
convergent. There is no clear separation of competence between civil and administrative 
courts. 
4. Generally, the “best interest of the child” consideration is used by German judges
against surrogacy. In certain cases, the well-being (Kindeswohl) of the child was
considered to be hurt by the mere fact of him being treated as a subject of an 
465http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/FAQ/GeburtAusland/06­
Leihmutterschaft.html?nn=383016) 
466 FG Düsseldorf, 9.5.2003 - 18 K 7931/00 E 
467 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09; VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09; VG Berlin, 15.4.2011­
VG 23 L 79.11; VG Berlin, 5.9.2012 – VG 23 L 283.12 ; OLG Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12 
468 AG Gütersloh, 17.12.1985 – 5 XVI 7/85; AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 (confirmed in LG Dortmund,
8.7.2011, Az. 9 T 210/11) 
469 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
470 LG Düsseldorf, 15.3.2012 – 25 T 758/10 
471 OLG Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12 
472 FG Düsseldorf, 9.5.2003 - 18 K 7931/00 E 
473§1(3)(2) of the Embryo Protection Law 1990, confirmed by 14b(3) of the Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
agreement, a merchandise474, or by his / her impossibility to ever discover the identity of 
his biological mother, if the surrogacy agreement includes an ovum donation475. 
On the other hand, this consideration was also used in order to facilitate the child’s
situation: firstly, it has been judged that adoption was not contrary to the child’s best 
interest because of the sole fact of the existence of a surrogacy agreement; the court 
was not in charge of pronouncing his vision of bonos mores, but only of the question
which was submitted, the one which concerns the child’s best interest476. 
Secondly, this consideration was used in a case concerning an adoption request in favour
of the partner (an American citizen) of the biological father of a child (a German citizen), 
the men having concluded a civil partnership in Germany477. The couple had concluded a 
surrogacy agreement in the US, which involved an ovum donation from a third party,
and the German citizen’s sperm. The American birth certificate mentions the surrogate
as the mother, and the German citizen as the father. The men (ordering parents) 
returned to Germany in order to settle down, and asked for an adoption judgment in 
favour of the American citizen, partner of the biological father, with the surrogate’s 
consent (which was made before a notary in California). This adoption request was 
refused in first instance by the Amtsgericht, but was admitted by the Landesgericht, on
the basis of the “best interest of the child” consideration. The court has decided that 
German law was applicable, as the civil partnership was concluded in Germany: following
§19(1)(1) EGBGB, the child’s filiation is to be determined according to the law of the
state where he / she resides habitually. In German filiation law, the legal mother was the 
surrogate (§1591 BGB), and, as she wasn’t married when she gave birth, and as no 
paternity recognition has been made, no paternal filiation could be established (the fact
that the birth certificate mentioned the biological father was irrelevant). The court has 
therefore declared, that the paternal filiation would be determined following rules
respecting the most the child’s best interest. Several “child’s best interest theories” could 
be possible. The one which respects the child’s need to determine his paternity as soon
as possible, even up to his birth; the one which respects the child’s need to access, as 
soon as possible, the knowledge of his genetic origins. Following both theories, the
Californian law was applicable, recognising the German citizen (the biological father) as 
the father. Nevertheless, the judges decided that in this precise case, §1741(1), al. 2 
BGB would be the most respectful of the child’s need to have a stable relationship with
the people who take care of him, thus an adoption. Also, according to §9(7) of the
Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz, under the condition of the child’s best interest (which, in
this case, is respected, given the harmonious environment in which the child was 
growing up), the biological child of one of the civil partners could be adopted by the
other partner, thus considering both civil partners as legal parents. The judges
considered that, in this particular case, the subjective relationship between the parties
and the child, and the fact that he would have to face objective difficulties in the future, 
were sufficient to justify a legal solution, namely an adoption. The child’s need for a
double filiation would be fulfilled; he would be allowed to inherit and to get other 
financial rights.
5. The “best interest of the child” consideration has never been used to allow the 
administration of travel documents to children born through foreign surrogacy 
agreements, this question had to be examined according to nationality and filiation legal
provisions. The decisions taken by the administrative court of Berlin478, which dealt with
the child’s right to enter German territory without a visa, don’t mention this criteria, and
refuse these requests. 
474 OLG Hamm, 2.12.1985, 11 W 18/85; AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 
475 AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 
476 AG Gütersloh, 17.12.1985 – 5 XVI 7/85 
477 LG Düsseldorf, 15.3.2012 – 25 T 758/10 
478 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 ; VG Berlin, 15.4.2011- VG 23 L 79.11 ; VG Berlin, 5.9.2012 – VG 
23 L 283.12 
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However, this criteria has been mentioned while considering the request to admit a
paternity recognition of a child, which was made in Russia, in order to determine the 
child’s filiation. The judges decided that the interest of the child was that his parents’
identity would be established as soon as possible in order to get the German citizenship,
and the travel documents479. 
6. The protection of “family life” (as between the child and the intended parents) has 
never provided an alternative consideration for the courts, nor a challenge for the “best
interest of the child” principle.
7. In Germany, neither ovum donation, nor surrogacy, are authorised. There is no 
difference in the judges’ way of reasoning if the intended mother is the biological mother
or not, the origin of the egg being irrelevant. We can see that the reasoning of the 
administrative court of Berlin (Verwaltungsgericht) is the same in three of its 
decisions480, although only the later concerns a case where the intended parents are also
the biological parents. In another case481, the judges have mentioned that ovum 
donation is illegal in Germany (§1(1)(2), Embryo Protection Law), but even if the egg 
were the one of the intended mother it would not have changed the result.  
8. The intended parents can adopt a child after he / she has been delivered and handed 
over to them by the surrogate; this has been confirmed implicitly through legal
provisions (see question n°12, Part A), and explicitly by courts: firstly, despite the 
refusal of an adoption request, the judges declared that adoption was not contrary to the 
child’s best interest because of the sole fact of the existence of a surrogacy agreement; 
the court was not in charge of pronouncing his vision of bonos mores, but only the 
question which was submitted, the one which concerned the child’s best interest482. 
Secondly, the administrative court of Berlin, while dealing with requests for travel 
documents for children born abroad through surrogacy agreement, proposed twice483 to 
the intended parents, in order to establish a filiation for the child with them, to undergo 
a genetic test, and then to ask for an adoption. This kind of proposition was also made
by the Regional Appeal Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Stuttgart in 2012484. However,
adoption has been authorised in favour of the civil partner of the biological father of a 
child born through surrogacy in the US485 (see question n° 4, Part B). 
Nevertheless, in a decision from 2011, the administrative court of Hamm486 rejected an 
adoption request of a child born through surrogacy in the US. The judges justified their
decision by declaring that even if §1741(1) BGB might have allowed the adoption in the 
interest of the child (although surrogacy agreements are contrary to §134 and 138(1) 
BGB, as well as to §1(1)(7) of the Embryo Protection Law, and to §1(1)(2) when ovum 
donation is included, as in the present case), the child is growing up under optimal
conditions with the care of the intended parents, this situation should continue in the
future, and authorising adoption cannot make his situation better. The judges mentioned
that the intended parents, along with the surrogate, have planned to continue their 
cooperation in making an adoption request, and, in full conscience and knowledge, took
the decision to undergo such a risk of legal uncertainty for the child, whose only paternal 
479 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
480 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09; VG Berlin, 15.4.2011- VG 23 L 79.11; VG Berlin, 5.9.2012 – VG 
23 L 283.12 
481 Amtsgericht (AG), Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08. This case dealt with a surrogacy agreemnt in the US,
including an anonymous egg donation 
482 AG Gütersloh, 17.12.1985 – 5 XVI 7/85 
483 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 ; VG Berlin, 5.9.2012 – VG 23 L 283.12 
484 OLG Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12 
485 LG Düsseldorf, 15.3.2012 – 25 T 758/10 
486 AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 (confirmed LG Dortmund, 8.7.2011, Az. 9 T 210/11. This case
concerned a surrogacy agreement in the US, with an anonymous ovum donation and the intended father’s
sperm, followed by a birth certificate on which the intended parents were mentioned. After going back to 
Germany, the intended father underwent a genetic test, which confirmed his paternity. He then began an 
adoption procedure with his spouse, with the consent of the surrogate 
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filiation could be determined. Adoption is therefore seen as a try to regulate an illegal 
situation under the Embryo Protection Law. This situation hurts the child’s interest, being
unable to know the identity of his biological mother, and being conscientious of the fact 
that he was considered as the object of a commercial agreement. For the 
abovementioned reasons, the court has decided to refuse this request for adoption, and
proposed to take some testimonial dispositions to guarantee the inheritance rights of the 
child.
9. German courts have admitted a paternity recognition act, made by the intended 
father, and issued in Russia, and considered it not contrary to public policy (ordre
public)487. The judges declared that the document at steak was not a foreign
judgment488, and even if it were, there would be no contradiction with public policy 
(ordre public), for two reasons: first, because of the right to know one’s own origins,
considered as derivative from another right, a constitutional one, concerning the right to 
one’s own personality development (§2 and 1 of the German Constitution); this kind of 
right cannot be void by any party to a surrogacy agreement (intended father, surrogate, 
etc.). Second, even if this surrogacy agreement would have taken place within the 
German territory, there would be no infringement to public policy, as §1594 BGB sets 
conditions to paternity recognition, which do not include any genetic tie between the 
recognizing father and the child, this provision being possible to use also in a surrogacy
context. Accordingly, any foreign decision, which achieved the same result, cannot be 
considered as contrary to public policy.
On the contrary, German courts do not recognise foreign birth certificates related to
surrogacy agreements. A request to recognise a birth certificate issued in California has
been refused489, on the ground of §36(1) PStG (Personal Status Law), according to which 
only the transcription of German citizens born abroad is possible. This provision requires
German citizenship. §19 EGBGB provides that German law is applicable for questions of 
nationality. In the present case, the children were not German citizens, as their legal 
mother is the one who was bearing them (§1591 BGB), and their legal father the 
husband of the surrogate.  
In other cases dealing with surrogacy, foreign birth certificates, even if at least one of
the biological and intended parents is mentioned, were not considered as sufficient to
establish a filiation. In cases of surrogacy agreements concluded in India490 or in the
US491, neither the intended mother, nor the intended father ‘despite his genetic relation
to the child), were able to establish their filiation, even though they were mentioned as 
legal parents on the foreign birth certificates.
It seems much easier to establish the paternity of the intended father (several court
decisions suggested it, and also, establishing the paternity of the sperm donor has never 
been excluded in German Law), than the maternal filiation of the intended mother, which 
can only be made through adoption (given §1591 BGB).  
As far as we know, there is no case law published concerning a surrogacy agreement
where there was no genetic relation between the intended father and the child.  
10. Birth certificates issued abroad, in the context of surrogacy agreement, were not
recognised (see question n° 9, Part B). In different cases dealing with surrogacy 
concluded abroad, the mere existence of foreign birth certificates was not even taken 
into consideration in order to establish filiation. Also, §16(a)(4) of the Law of
487 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
488 In the sense of §16(a) FGG, and in particular §107 FamFG 
489 OLG Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12. This case dealt with a surrogacy agreement made in the US,
where the intended parents had both a genetic relation to the twins. 
490 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 
491 AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 
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Jurisdiction492 excludes the recognition in domestic law of any foreign decision if it is in
contradiction with the law, and in particular with fundamental rights. 
The administrative court of Berlin493 gave as reason for not recognising the paternity of 
the intended father, despite the fact that he was mentioned as such in the Indian birth 
certificate, the contradiction of the regulations published by the Indian Council for 
Medical Research to public policy (ordre public), in the sense of §6 EGBGB, because
§1591 BGB (the mother is the woman bearing the child) is part of it.  
Nevertheless, the notion of « ordre public » was used to facilitate the situation of a child 
conceived through surrogacy, and recognised by the intended father, this act of 
recognition, made in Russia, being considered as non contradictory with the “ordre 
public”, and thus, recognised494 (see question n° 9, Part B). 
11. German judges, while dealing with surrogacy agreements concluded abroad, have to 
decide about giving travel documents to the children, under the condition of being 
German citizens. In fact, German Law being ius sanguinis, a child whom at least one of 
his / her parents is a German citizen, can get the German citizenship495. According to 
§19(1) of the Introductory Law of the Civil Code, in respect to the filiation of a child, at
first the law of the state in which the child has its habitual residence is applicable.
However, the filiation, in relation to each parent, can be decided according to the law of
the state to which each parent belongs496. In the context of surrogacy, the establishment 
of a filiation is complicated, given that, under German law, the mother is the woman 
bearing the child (§1591 BGB), and, if she is married, her husband is considered as the
legal father (§1592(1) BGB), and not the ordering father.  
German courts have been forced to consider foreign law in cases where the habitual
residence of the child, unable to get back to Germany because deprived of travel 
documents, was abroad. In a case of surrogacy which took place in India497, the court 
disregarded the claim of the intended father to the recognition of his paternity, founded 
on the genetic relation between him and the child, considering that the question of the 
nationality has to be determined following Indian law, where the child resides. Under 
Indian Law, no specific provision has been set in the field of surrogacy, and in general,
the mother is the woman bearing the child, even if she doesn’t have any genetic relation
to the child; the father is this woman’s husband498, so if the surrogate was married when 
she gave birth to a child, her husband is the legal father. However, the judges insist on 
explaining that even under German law, the intended father is not the child’s legal 
father, as he wasn’t married to the surrogate when she gave birth to him499, nor has he 
recognised his paternity500, nor has his paternity been judicially established501. 
In the case dealing with the admission of a paternity recognition made in Russia (see
question n° 9, Part B), the judges referred to the fact that even though German law was 
492 According to §16(a)(4) Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit – FGG : « Die 
Anerkennung einer ausländischen Entscheidung ist ausgeschlossen…..wenn die Anerkennung der Entscheidung 
zu einem Ergebnis führt, das mit wesentlichen Grundsätzen des deutschen Rechts offensichtlich unvereinbar 
ist, insbesondere wenn die Anerkennung mit den Grundrechten unvereinbar ist » 
493 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 
494 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
495 §4(1) Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz –StAG (Law of nationality) 
496 §19(1) Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch – EGBGB: « Die Abstammung eines Kindes 
unterliegt dem Recht des Staates, in dem das Kind seinen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt hat. Sie kann im Verhältnis 
zu jedem Elternteil auch nach dem Recht des Staates bestimmt werden, dem dieser Elternteil angehört » 
497 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 
498 §112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
499 §1592 al.1 BGB 
500 §1592 al.2 BGB 
501 §1592 al.3 BGB 
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applicable, even under Russian law of filiation, the admission of this kind of act would 
not be considered as contrary to the « ordre public »502. 
The German legislator has never defined the application domain of the Embryo 
Protection Law, nor the Adoptionsvermittlungsgesetz. Therefore, German criminal law is
only applicable in regard to offences committed within the national territory.  
12. Even in cases where surrogacy agreements were considered as void, because of 
their contradiction with the notion of bonos mores (based on §134 and §138(1) BGB)503, 
and as being degradation to the child’s status504, the judges use the same neutral terms, 
namely « Leihmutterschaft », and sometime « Ersatzmutterschaft » (substitution 
motherhood)505. On rare occasions, more negative qualifications are used, the surrogate 
is named « Mietmutter »506 (rent mother), and the intended parents « Bestelleltern »507 
(commanding parents). Generally, the judges prefer to name the intended parents 
according the place they have in the procedure (adoptive parents, biological father, 
spouse of the pretender, etc.), or name them by abbreviations (Mrs. X, for example).  
13. No court decision regarding surrogacy has ever mentioned any need for a legal 
reform. 
14. In Germany, a written law country, judges refer to legal provisions, which, in the
field of surrogacy, may concern contract law (§134 and 138(1) BGB), filiation law 
(§19(1), Introductory Law of the Civil Code – EGBGB); §1591-1592 et §1741(1), BGB),
and nationality law (§4(1) StAG). They are not guided by any jurisprudential 
construction.  
15. German courts have never approved any payments in the context of surrogacy, as
surrogacy in itself is not authorised. The judges do mention the existence of this kind of
payment, in order to condemn them morally508, but the sole fact of paying has never 
been the main issue, rather nationality and filiation law.
16. Despite the legal frame of surrogacy, German judges have much discretion as
adoption rules are flexible, in particular §1741(1) BGB, which can serve as a legal 
foundation for decisions of adoption, under the condition of respect of the child’s best 
interest, even in cases of surrogacy. Once the paternal filiation established, the intended 
mother could ask for an adoption, as has been confirmed by several courts.  
List of cases: 
- Kammergericht (KG) 19.3.1985, 1 W 5729/84 
- Oberlandesgericht (OLG), Hamm, 2.12.1985, 11 W 18/85 (FamRZ 1986, 159 ; JZ
1986, 441 ; NJW 986, 781) 
- Amtsgericht (AG), Gütersloh, 17.12.1985 – 5 XVI 7/85 
- Finanzgericht (FG), Düsseldorf du 9.5.2003 (18 K 7931/00 E) 
- Amtsgericht (AG), Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09
502 AG Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
503 OLG Hamm, 2.12.1985, 11 W 18/85; LG Freiburg, NJW 1987, 1486, 1488 
504 OLG Hamm, 2.12.1985, 11 W 18/85 ; AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 
505 AG, Nürnberg, 14.12.2009 - UR III 264/09 
506 OLG Hamm, 2.12.1985, 11 W 18/85 
507 VG Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09 
508 KG 19.3.1985, 1 W 5729/84; AG Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 
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- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 26.11.2009 - VG 11 L 396.09  
-Amtsgericht (AG), Hamm, 22.2.2011, Az. XVI 192/08 (confirmed - Landesgericht (LG), 
Dortmund, 8.7.2011, Az. 9 T 210/11) 
- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 15.4.2011- VG 23 L 79.11 
- Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Stuttgart, 7.2.2012 – Az 8 W 46/12 
- Landesgericht (LG), Düsseldorf, 15.3.2012 – 25 T 758/10 
- Verwaltungsgericht (VG) Berlin, 5.9.2012 – VG 23 L 283.12 
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6.5. GREECE 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this report is the investigation, illustration and critical analysis of the 
main legal issues that arise from the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece. In
2002 the Greek legislature introduced the Law 3089/2002 on medically assisted human
reproduction, which – among the government of other issues of reproductive medicine – 
included specific rules concerning the permissibility of the practice of surrogacy, the legal 
status and the enforceability of surrogacy agreements, and the transfer of parentage.
This Law was the cause for a radical reform of the Greek Civil Code, and especially of 
Family Law. Three years later, Law 3305/2005 stipulated the concept and meaning of 
the “reasonable expenses” paid to a surrogate, and criminalised any act that violated the 
letter of the law. Drawing on the relevant legal sources and the literature available to
date, this report presents the Greek regime of surrogacy, which can be used as a solid
base for the legal reform of other jurisdictions in the EU with regards to the issue of 
surrogate motherhood. 
INTRODUCTION 
While the majority of jurisdictions have accepted and recognized reproductive
technologies (RTs) as a way to “cure” infertility, implementing legislative regimes
accordingly, surrogacy in most jurisdictions remains on the margins of the protective
scope of the law. As a result, all the parties of a surrogacy agreement – the intended 
parents, the surrogate mother, and the child born through this method – are in a legal 
limbo. In other jurisdictions, the practice of surrogacy is prohibited, or it is allowed but 
constrained by various conditions. At a European level, the regulatory frameworks
among the Member States are diverse, and as a rule ‘surrogacy contracts are not
enforceable’ by law.509 
In fact, Greece is one of the very few countries, and evidently the only country within
the European Union (EU),510 which has introduced a complete and comprehensive 
regulatory framework with regards to surrogacy. The Greek legislation came into force in
2002 by Law 3089/2002 for the regulation of the medically assisted human
reproduction; it was amended in 2005 by Law 3305/2005, and has been described as
one of the most progressive regimes in the modern legal world.511 The Law includes 
provisions for a variety of issues, such as human cloning, artificial insemination, 
cryopreservation of embryos, gamete donation, as well as specific provisions for the 
permissibility of surrogacy. In addition, Law 3305/2005 makes a declaration for civil and
criminal sanctions, thus discouraging any effort to violate the law.
The Greek law for medically assisted human reproduction sets the limits of the ethical
practice in biomedicine and RTs. First and foremost, it aims to protect the rights and 
interests of any resulting child,512 and secondly the individuals’ right to personal freedom 
and autonomy, and their right to procreate.513 Consequently, Laws 3089/2002 and 
509 Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, 
Portuguese Economic Journal (2009) 8, page 207 
510 ESHRE, 2010. Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted Reproduction in the EU: Regulation and 
Technologies (SANCO/2008/C6/051). Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/health/blood_
tissues_organs/docs/study_eshre_en.pdf . 
511 See Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E., ‘Artificial insemination and family law. The Greek legislation: statutes
3089/2002 and 3305/2005’, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2005), p. 6 (in Greek); Panagos, K.,
‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to criminal law’, Sakkoulas
Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), page 9 (in Greek); Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and 
back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, Portuguese Economic Journal (2009) 8, page 207. 
512 Article 1 paragraph 2 Law 3305/2005: ‘When applying the techniques for the medically assisted human 
reproduction, the best interests of the child to be born should be taken into consideration’. 
513 Article 1 paragraph 1 Law 3305/2005: ‘The technologies of assisted reproduction are applied in such a way 
that ensures the respect for the individual’s personal freedom and personal development, and for [the 
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3305/2005 are in harmony with the national legislation in general, as well as the moral 
principles, rights and obligations incorporated into the Greek Constitution, while at the 
same time they are consistent with the European and international laws and inter-
countries’ agreements on Human Rights and on the protection of and respect for the
children’s welfare.514 
The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with an insight into the Greek 
regulatory framework on surrogate motherhood. I will first refer to the background of 
the regulation of surrogacy and then move to an extensive analysis of the provisions of
the law. Reference will be made to important legal cases which have raised legal issues
and social concerns relating to surrogacy that have been discussed by the Greek courts, 
as well as to sociological studies that have been performed throughout the years in
Greece with regards to surrogacy. 
However, only three sociological studies were accessed with regards to surrogacy in
Greece, and two of them were conducted at a time before the passing of the Law 
3089/2002.515 The third is a small-scale study on students of the Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki in Greece, and cannot possibly provide a solid base for any kind of 
generalisations or extract data that will lead to any valid and accurate remarks.516 As a
result we can only guess that the recent law on surrogacy is indeed successful in Greece. 
It should, however, be noted that it is not only the sociological research and the 
considerable lack of data towards the effects of the law on surrogacy on the social realm
that should concern us. The relevant academic literature can also be described as scant 
and inadequate. It is only recently that surrogacy has been inserted into the Greek
literature, and some of this work will be referenced in this report. Despite this
burgeoning commentary, it is important to note that the Greek legislation on surrogacy
has not gathered the attention of international commentators. Given that Greece is the
only country in the EU that has adopted a legislation which expressly facilitates
surrogacy and regulates its conditions, it is both surprising and concerning that the 
Greek legal regime has not garnered more attention in academic, policy and legal
debates across the globe. 
There is, therefore, an absolute need for future researchers to dedicate their work on the 
issue of surrogacy, the conditions of the legislation, and its effects on the Greek legal 
and social world. Moreover, during the research for the formation of this report,
difficulties were encountered in gaining access to relevant information; the legal cases
individual’s] right to procreate, in accordance with the medical and biological facts, and the principles of 
bioethics’. 
514 More specifically, the Greek laws on assisted reproduction are in line with the provisions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the Directive of the EU Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
(2004/23/EC), and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights CETS No.:160, which are
inserted into the national legislation, as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. See also
Mitrosyli, M., ‘Medically assisted reproduction. "Application of medically assisted reproduction" act 3305/2005,
Greece): Presentation and comments’, Archives of Hellenic Medicine, (2007), 24(6): 612-622 (Article written in
Greek. Abstract in English available at http://www.mednet.gr/archives/2007-6/612abs.html). 
515 Chliaoutakis, J.E., Koukouli, S., Papadaki, M., ‘Using attitudinal indicators to explain the public’s intention to
have recourse to gamete donation and surrogacy’, Human Reproduction, 17 (11), 2002: 2995-3002;
Chliaoutakis, J.E., ‘A relationship between traditionally motivated patterns and gamete donation and surrogacy 
in urban areas of Greece’, Human Reproduction, 17 (8), 2002:2187-2191. These studies were published in
August and November 2002 respectively, and, hence, before the issuance of Law 3089/2002 (it came into
force on 19 December, 2002). 
516 Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to criminal law’, 
Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), pages 113-128. The students showed knowledge of the
issue of surrogacy and stated that they are likely to view surrogacy as a legitimate and positive way of 
reproduction when there is a physical inability for it. However, they did express their preference towards the 
method of adoption rather than that of surrogacy. What certainly became apparent was the fact that the young 
people educated at an academic level are socially conscious and that the matter of surrogacy slowly but 
steadily gains recognition in the public discourse. 
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could not always be found on publically accessible sources.517 The Greek authorities 
should, therefore, work towards making this information readily available to everyone,
so as to avoid future legal disputes created by incomplete knowledge of the 
requirements and provisions of the law coming before the Greek judges. 
General presentation of the Greek legislation 
The Greek law on surrogacy includes rules that facilitate the practice of surrogate
motherhood, define the ethically acceptable character of surrogacy in the Greek reality, 
present the terms and conditions for the judicial license for the artificial insemination of 
the surrogate mother, and provide legal force to preconception surrogacy agreements, 
which in the end lead to the automatic attribution of legal parenthood to the intended 
parents immediately after the birth of the child.
As becomes apparent, the Greek legislature made a bold and unprecedented move – if 
compared to the legal situation of other EU Member States – and introduced an 
innovative and certainly controversial regime to the otherwise conservative society of 
Greece, which is still significantly under the influence of the Orthodox Church (Ecclesia)
and the doctrine of ‘tradition’. The Greek society is generally described as having strong 
regard for the traditional norms of family, morality and religion, and for the value of
strong inter-familial bonds. According to the norm, the ‘traditional family’ essentially
consists of two heterosexual parents in a married union and one or more children
genetically related to their parents and brought to life through natural conception and 
birth.518 
The legislature, however, decided that it was time to change the norm of ‘the family’ and 
follow the example of other jurisdictions, by introducing regulations concerning advances
in biomedicine, similar to those of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act)
in the United Kingdom (UK), which has become a law of the country since 1990 and was 
amended in 2008. 
On November 22, 2000 the Minister of Justice, at the time Mihail Stathopoulos, a leading
academic of Law at Athens Law School, and a man with a progressive mind, appointed a 
Committee to evaluate the effects of the RTs and genetics to family law.519 The result of 
this project was the formation and the passing of the Law 3089/2002 on December 19, 
2002. 
The above mentioned Law brought about major changes in the legal reality, and more 
specifically in Family Law and the Greek Civil Code (GCC), and was instigated by the
case of the Multi-member Court of First Instance of Heracleion no. 31/1999, whereby the
court approved the application of the intended parents to adopt twins that were born by 
a surrogate. The honorable judges of the court highlighted the legal vacuum that existed 
concerning the attainment of legal parenthood through the practice of surrogacy and
recommended a law reform. Moreover, they found that the stimulation of the adoption
process was inappropriate for the particular case, as well as unacceptable as a means to 
517 Indeed the court decisions were not able to be accessed by someone without a subscription on the Greek
legal research engines (for example the research tool “NOMOS”). The information is only available to Greek
lawyers and legal interns who are registered in the Bar Association as practitioners of the legal profession. 
518 For further information about the authoritative power of the Greek Orthodox Church over the devoted 
followers of the movement and its influence on their perceptions of family, tradition and the new reproductive
technologies read Paxson, H., ‘Reproduction as spiritual kin work: Orthodoxy, IVF, and the moral economy of 
motherhood in Greece’, Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry (2006) 30: 481-505. For an opinion on the influence
of the Catholic doctrine on women’s rights in Italy and the law of reproductive medicine see Fenton, R.A., 
‘Catholic doctrine versus women’s rights: The new Italian law on assisted reproduction’, Medical Law Review, 
14, Spring 2006: 73–107. 
519 See also Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in
Greece’, Portuguese Economic Journal (2009) 8: 205-220. In this paper, the writer argues that Law 3089/2002 
was a product of legal paternalism and an effect of legal formalism. 
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create family relationships, even artificial ones, since there is a biological connection 
between the parents and the child.  
In this case the genetic material of both of the parents was collected, and an embryo
was created and inserted into the uterus of the surrogate mother in vitro. Consequently,
the children were genetically related only to the intended parents, but gestated by the
surrogate, because the intended mother was unable for medical reasons to become 
impregnated and give birth to a child. This was a landmark case for the Greek courts and 
the first application for the licensing of parental rights to a woman who was the genetic 
mother of the twins, since her genetic material was used for their creation in vitro, but 
not the gestational mother of the twins by gestation and birth. Under the then applicable 
law, parental rights could only be acknowledged to the birth mother, and no exception to 
this rule was provided. 
As a result, the case no. 31/1999 was a milestone for the challenge of the legal norm of
the biological attainment of motherhood, as described by the previous Civil Code and 
article 1463. This rule had its origins in Roman law (“mater semper certa est”, meaning
“the mother is always certain’’), and dictated that motherhood is attained by the event 
of birth. The rule is still valid in many contemporary regimes, including that of the UK,520 
although, due to the wide use and availability of RTs today, it does not entirely respond 
to the modern social, medical, and legal reality. For the case in question the application
of the above-mentioned rule to the intended mother would be contrary to the law, as the
legal requirement of birth was not satisfied by her. 
The judges of the First Instance Court of Heracleion realised that even if they resorted to
alternative legal methods that offered them flexibility against the letter of the law –
namely the reliance on the constitutional principles, or the general ethical principles of
Civil law (such as that of “good faith”, and of “moral goodness”) which give rise to an 
interpretation according to the social perceptions of the time – such methods would
prove insufficient. 
Additionally, they recognized the impracticalities and difficulties of the law as it stood.
The legal father of the child and husband of the surrogate mother would have to contest
his parental rights, which would allow the intended and genetic father to willingly
acknowledge the child as his own. Finally, the wife of the latter would apply for adoption. 
However, the attainment of parentage by the intended parents would not be possible 
without the consent of the surrogate mother; thus, there was the imminent danger that
the intended parents would never accomplish to gain the right to raise their child.  
For this reason, the judges of the Court urged the authorities to introduce legislation that 
would provide a satisfactory level of protection to all the parties involved in surrogacy
agreements. Three years after this court decision was published, and with the 
recommendations and draft legislation of the Committee assigned by minister
Stathopoulos,521 the Parliament issued the Law no. 3089/2002 for “The medically
assisted human reproduction”, and reformed the articles 1455-1460 of the Greek Civil 
520 Section 33 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: ‘The woman, who is carrying or has carried
a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be 
treated as the mother of the child’. 
521 The negative form of the constitutional right to self-determination and personal development encompasses 
the right not to procreate, where the right to an abortion can be accommodated. For further details on the 
matter read Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E., ‘Assisted reproduction and Civil Law: Draft Legislation for the “Law on 
Medically Assisted Human Reproduction”’, as appeared in Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E. (edt.), ‘Assisted 
reproduction and genetic technologies: ethico-legal approach’, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki
(2003), p. 88 onwards (in Greek). 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
Code. This reform has been considered as the most important and radical one in the 
Greek legal history ‘after the reform in 1983, enforcing the equality of the sexes’.522 
The issuance of a law that facilitates surrogacy agreements was justified by the
constitutional recognition of the right to procreate, which was portrayed as an essential 
component of the right of personal development, including the right to autonomy and 
self-determination. More specifically, the right to procreate is guaranteed by article 5
paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution, which can be further referred to in order to
indicate the right to have a child (positive form), even through the use of RTs523. The 
state sought to empower the respect for the individual’s desire to achieve self-fulfillment
through parenthood, even in its modern form of “social parenting”, where the parent-
child relationship is based on emotions of love instead of biological ties, and embraced a
regulatory approach to the issues of the assisted reproduction. 
Law 3089/2002 came into force to regulate the circumstances, whereby a person or
couple places great importance on having a child that is (at least partially) genetically
related to the intended mother/parents524 and, due to his/her inability to procreate by 
natural means, he/she will have to resort to the help of RTs. Additionally, the law 
recognizes the case of full “social parenthood”, where the child has no genetic 
relationship with his/her parents, and where the family relationships are based merely
on intent.525 The statute of 2002 enforced the reform of Article 1458 of the Greek Civil 
Code and regulated surrogacy. 
Three years after this reform, Law 3305/2005 was introduced to amend the provisions of
the Law 3089/2002. The character of the new law was purely complementary to that of 
2002; it clarified some issues concerning the maximum age limit of the women seeking
medically assisted reproduction (the age of fifty),526 introduced criminal and civil 
sanctions in cases of the violation of the law, and established the National Authority of
Medically Assisted Reproduction (NAMAR) to control and regulate ethical and legal issues
arising from the advances in the field of biomedicine.527 Unfortunately, NAMAR has not
yet come into operation. 
Analysis of the specific conditions of the Greek law on surrogate motherhood 
The issue of surrogate motherhood in Greece is regulated by the combination of the 
articles 1458 and 1464 of the Civil Code, article 8 of Law 3089/2002 (domicile in
Greece), and article 13 of the Law 3305/2005. It is described as a method of assisted
reproduction of complementary nature that is provided in order to tackle the inability to
procreate with natural means. The intended parents must be able to prove to the court,
which will license the fertilization of the surrogate mother and approve the surrogacy 
522 Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, 
Portuguese Economic Journal (2009) 8, page 206. 
523 It has been contended, though, that the right to procreate can alternatively be founded on the right to
personal freedom (article 5 paragraph 2 of the Constitution), on the principle of the protection of the 
individual’s private life (article 9 paragraph 1 of the Constitution), on the principle for the protection of the 
family life (article 21 paragraph 1), as well as the principle for the protection of health (right to medical 
treatment) regarding the use of ARTs (article 5 paragraph 5, and article 21 paragraph 3 of the Constitution).
For a more extensive analysis see Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and 
the extension to criminal law’, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), pages 71-83 (in Greek). 
524 See also Olga van den Akker, ‘The importance of a genetic link in mothers commissioning a surrogate baby 
in the UK’, Human Reproduction, 15 (8), 2000: 1849-1855. 
525 Indeed the law refers only to the requirement that the ova will not belong to the surrogate. Hence, it offers 
the right for surrogacy to a single woman, who will have to use the sperm from a donor and possibly the ova 
from a donor as well, if she is unable to provide one (derived from article 1458 GCC). 
526 The previous law (3089/2002) referred vaguely to the “age of biological ability to reproduce” and created 
great ambiguities concerning the upper limit of age until which the use of ARTs was ethically and legally
permissible. 
527 See also Leon, G., Papetta, A., Spiliopoulou, C., ‘Overview of the Greek legislation regarding assisted
reproduction and comparison with the EU legal framework’, Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) 23, 820– 
823. 
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agreement, that there is a reason of medical necessity that forces them to proceed to  
the particular method. Therefore, the choice of surrogacy for social reasons is not 
acceptable by law. 
More specifically, the Law of 2002 states that surrogacy is defined as 
[t]he transfer of fertilized eggs, which do not belong to the surrogate mother 
herself, into the body of another woman, so as to gestate them. This is allowed 
when there is a written agreement, without any financial benefit, between the
parties involved, meaning the person(s) wishing to have a child and the surrogate 
mother, and her husband, if she has one. The court authorization is issued before 
the transfer and following an application of the woman who wants to have a child,
provided that evidence is adduced proving that the intentional mother is unable
(for medical reasons) to bear a child, and that the woman offering to become the
surrogate is, with regards to her (physical and mental) health status, suitable for 
it.528 
As we can see, the legislature allowed only the case of gestational surrogacy, where the
surrogate mother has no genetic relation to the child, since the egg does not come from
her.529 In other words, the law gives permission only to the “letting of the womb” on  
behalf of the surrogate mother, and prohibits cases of traditional surrogacy. Moreover,
surrogacy is provided only for altruistic reasons, where no financial benefit will be
derived from the agreement. The procedure for the attainment of pre-conception judicial 
approval has to be followed, and there is also a clause concerning the health of the
surrogate mother.530 
Due to the fact that surrogacy in Greece is limited strictly to cases where the egg does
not belong to the surrogate – hence it will either come from the intended mother, if she
is able to produce one, or from a third donor – it is necessary for the woman who wishes 
to have a child through surrogacy to resort to medical treatment and request an IVF
procedure. Consequently, the general conditions for the permissibility for the use of the 
methods of medically assisted reproduction will also apply.  
According to article 1455 paragraph 1 GCC, the person(s) seeking treatment through the 
use of RTs should be recognized as infertile. Alternatively, there should be another valid
reason which prevents the individual(s) from having a child through natural conception,
as for example the avoidance of the transmission of a serious hereditary medical 
condition (for example sickle cell anaemia) to the child. Furthermore, the individual that
needs assistance to procreate should be of an age when the attainment of a pregnancy
is still possible. Law 3305/2005 states that the upper age limit for the use of RTs is the 
fiftieth year of age for the woman who seeks treatment.531 
As can be derived from article 1456 paragraph 1 of the GCC, medical assistance in 
human reproduction can be requested by married or unmarried heterosexual couples, or 
528 Article 1458 of the GCC. 
529 Also incorporated into article 3 paragraph 9 of Law 3305/2005. 
530 Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, 
Portuguese Economic Journal (2009) 8, page 216. For an opinion on the permissibility of surrogacy of 
commercial nature read further the article under the title ‘Just the Oven: Law and Economics Approach to 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts', same author, in Katharina Boele-Woelki (edt.), ‘Perspectives for the 
unification or harmonisation of family law in Europe, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003. 
531 From the combination of the articles 1455 of the GCC and 4 paragraph 1 of Law 3305/2005. The rationale of 
this provision is the avoidance of the phenomenon of the provision of fertility treatment to post-menopausal 
women, which was deemed not to serve the interests of the child, as he/she would grow up without a mother.
What strikes the reader of the Greek law is that an age limit is not provided for the surrogate mother. The 
courts seem, however, to have adopted a flexible approach to this issue, and have approved the request of an 
older woman, aged 52, to bear the child of her daughter and her husband (One Member Court of First Instance 
of Korinthos no. 224/2006). For the matter of the post-menopausal pregnancies see Dew, J. et al., ‘The
Influence of Advanced Age on the Outcome of Assisted Reproduction’, J Ass Reprod Genet, 4, 1998: 210. 
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heterosexual couples living in a civil partnership, as well as unmarried women who do
not have a partner. Consequently, RTs are not available to same-sex couples, or single 
men in Greece. 
Furthermore, the law sets out the requirement for a valid written consent on behalf of all 
the parties involved in the fertility treatment (articles 1456 GCC and 5 of Law
3305/2005). A further analysis on the issue of consent will be provided in due course.  
We will now proceed to an evaluation of the specific conditions that are incorporated in
the Greek regulatory framework regarding surrogate motherhood. 
 The pre-conception judicial approval 
The requirements of the judicial approval: 
The law states that a woman who desires to have a child, but who is unable to carry a
pregnancy to term, is entitled to apply to the court and request the granting of 
permission to use a surrogate mother. This will then enable her to gain parental rights
immediately after the birth of the child. It is necessary for the intended mother to seek 
the permission of the court prior to the transfer of the fertilized egg into the surrogate’s
uterus.  
However, there is a legal precedent that includes the granting of parental rights
retrospectively to a woman that made the relevant application to the court after the
surrogate was fertilized with an embryo created from the genetic material of the
intended couple. The One Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki (case no.
27035/2003) accepted that in the particular case there were exceptional reasons that 
compelled the parties involved in the surrogacy agreement and the medical professional
who performed the IVF on the surrogate to act fast, and proceed without the permission
of the court.
As this case was indeed the first one that came before the court almost immediately
after the issuance of the Law 3089/2002 that allowed surrogacy, it was dealt with some 
flexibility and the judges showed a great deal of legal discretion and empathy. The
reason why the intended mother failed to apply to the court for the approval of the 
surrogacy contract at the time dictated by law was that both the intended and the 
surrogate mother were close to the maximum age limit as presented by the legal 
framework. This was accepted as a valid reason for not seeking the judicial approval at
an earlier stage, and the judicial acknowledgement of parental rights in retrospect to the
intended mother were granted. This exception is now recognized by all national courts
dealing with matters of surrogacy. 
-Issues of procedural law 
The court responsible for the review of such cases is the One Member Court of First 
Instance (article 470 of the Code of Civil Procedure) of the residency of either the
intended mother or the surrogate mother (article 499 paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, as added by article 6 of law 3089/2002). It is a civil court and it follows the 
procedure of the voluntary jurisdiction. The judge possesses the discretional power to 
order the case to be discussed behind closed doors, if deemed that its publicity could be 
detrimental for the social morality, or that there are compelling reasons for the 
protection of the private or familial life of the parties (article 799 paragraph 2 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure).  
The judge’s power can be described as very restricted: he/she can only review the 
validity of the agreement and determine whether the legal conditions have been met,
without investigating the reasons for choosing this method and the moral character of
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the agreement. Consequently, the court approval can be depicted as more of a 
procedural requirement, a ‘formal bureaucratic procedure’532 rather than a judicial review
of the cases relating to surrogacy. 
The judge is bound to abide by the law and has little discretional power. He/she will not
perform a deep investigation into the true reasons for choosing this method other than
requesting proof of the biological inability of the intended mother to procreate; he/she
will not even look for the existence of a true altruistic motive on behalf of the surrogate 
mother, or for any evidence of a close relationship between the contracting parties.  
As might be expected, there are cases which raise a variety of concerns and doubts
regarding the true nature of altruism; the financial and social imbalances between the 
contracting parties; the possible exploitation of the surrogate mothers; the existence of
a true consent to the surrogacy agreement; as well as the possibility of payments “under 
the table” that mistakenly escape the attention of the judge, who is more preoccupied 
with the bureaucratic/ procedural side of the matter. 
The research conducted for this report on the Greek case law showed that in reality 
many of the cases of surrogate motherhood were a result of an agreement between
Greek women, who were the intended mothers, and surrogate mothers of foreign origins
(although domiciled in Greece as the law requests), who, in some cases belonged to the
domestic staff (mostly cleaners or nurses) of the intended parents or a member of their
family. The surrogate mothers in these cases were mostly of low social standing
(considerably lower than that of the intending parents), of low wage, and came from 
countries which were in chronic financial decline (see Tables 1 and 2 below). 
To exemplify this, the researcher for this report collected as many applications to the
One Member Court of Thessaloniki as she was able to gain access to (17 in total) and
investigated how many of the surrogates were of foreign, as opposed to Greek origin.
These cases refer to the period of 2007-2010. As will be noted from Table 2, in the most
recent year that data was collected for, eight out of nine approved surrogacy 
arrangements involved non-Greek surrogate mothers. 
Table 1
Court One Member Court of Thessaloniki
Examined Period 2007 – 2010
Total Number of Cases
Greek Surrogates 
Foreign Surrogates 
No mention of the surrogate’s citizenship 
status 
Other (surrogate’s name indicates foreign
origin but no specific information about 
her citizenship) 
11 (1 from Philippines, 1 from 
Georgia, 2 from Russia, 3 from 
Poland, 4 from Bulgaria)
532 Hatzis, A., ‘The Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in Greece’ (working paper, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689774 . 
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Table 2
One Member Court of Thessaloniki  
Total Number of Cases : 17
2007 2008 2009 2010 
No. 39636/2007 
No mention of 
citizenship status 
No. 1522/2008 
Greek Surrogate 
No. 13707/2009 
No mention of 
citizenship status 
No. 395/2009 
No. 838/2010 
Russian Surrogate 
No. 2721/2010 
Polish Surrogate
No. 3967/2010 
Bulgarian Surrogate
Philippine Surrogate No. 4981/2010 
Bulgarian Surrogate
No. 10350/2010 
No. 16574/2009  Polish Surrogate
Bulgarian Surrogate No. 10351/2010 
No. 40820/2007 
No mention of 
citizenship status 
No. 33558/2008 
Bulgarian Surrogate
No. 25790/2009 
surrogate’s name 
indicates foreign 
Russian Surrogate 
No. 14681/2010 
Georgian Surrogate 
No. 14682/2010 
origin but no specific Greek Surrogate 
information about No. 14946/2010 
her citizenship Polish Surrogate
The judge has merely both the right and the obligation (articles 744 and 759 paragraph 
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure) to investigate the marital status of the two women-
contractors, and ensure the protection of the legal rights of their husbands/partners,
who might be considered as fathers of the child (according to the rules of articles 1465­
1471 of the GCC) possibly without their previous consent533. This would be contrary to
the negative expression of the constitutional right for procreation (right not to
procreate), and their right to self-determination. 
- Who can submit an application for surrogate motherhood to the court? 
The process of the judicial approval is, as mentioned above, set in motion by the 
intended mother. Article 1458 GCC refers to two women, one wishing to have a child and 
another offering her gestational services. The (male) partner of the intended woman, if
she has one, is not entitled to start the process of the judicial review of the surrogacy
agreement, and can attain fatherhood only indirectly based on the fact that his
wife/partner is the legal mother of the child; provided that he has consented to the 
surrogacy contract beforehand (article 5 of Law 3305/2005). 
Furthermore, based on the letter of the law, a single man’s application to the court 
requesting the authorization of a surrogacy agreement will not be accepted. However, 
recent case law defined this provision as unconstitutional and contrary to the spirit and 
the general principles of the law. The judges argued that this rule created inequalities 
between the sexes that cannot be tolerated by the modern legal theory and judicial
533 See also Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to 
criminal law’, Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), page 57 (in Greek). 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
practice, and considered it discriminatory against men, who do not have a female
partner and who are unable for medical reasons to have a child. The most significant 
examples of such content in Greece were the cases of the One Member Court of First
Instance of Athens no. 2827/2008 and of the One Member Court of First Instance of 
Thessaloniki no.13707/2009.534 
The above mentioned cases raised controversy in the Greek legal and social reality and 
caught the attention of the national media. Some commentators appeared to have a
negative view towards the approval of the single man’s application for surrogacy by the 
court. Influenced by traditional ideas of family formation, they argued that the child’s
upbringing should include stimuli from both sexes; hence, it was not in the best interests
of the child to be raised by only a father.
However, the need for the protection of the right to procreate, guaranteed by article 5
paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution, in conjunction with the respect for the principle of 
gender equality, declared by article 4 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, prevailed, and the 
permission for the fertilisation of the surrogate mother with the sperm of the single man 
was granted. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a contrasting future court decision cannot be excluded, 
since the Greek judge, as compared to the judicial practice in common law countries 
(e.g. UK), is not obliged to follow the judgement of another court on a case with similar
content and legal facts. In another case the judge may consider the request of a single
man for surrogacy as not serving the best interests of the child, which must be taken 
into consideration.535 Each case is in fact judged on its own merits. However, the court’s
reasoning should be very careful to make mention of the specific and exceptional
circumstances that justify the refusal of the constitutional right to procreate to a single
man. 
Furthermore, the provision of the law for the availability of surrogacy to a woman
without a husband, or a heterosexual partner, has been criticised as discriminatory
against couples of the same sex. Surrogacy is indeed not allowed to take place in cases
where the intended couple consists of two men, one of whom is able to provide sperm
with the aim of inseminating the surrogate mother. The same applies for lesbian women. 
If one of them is infertile, she does not have the right to apply to the court requesting 
the fertilization of her female partner with donated sperm, and gain parental rights to
the resulting child.536 
-The content of the application to the court for surrogate motherhood:
 The prerequisite of medical necessity
With regards to the Greek law on surrogacy, a woman is entitled to resort to surrogacy if
and only if she is unable to conceive a child, or bring a pregnancy to term. This 
requirement is also expressed by article 1455 paragraph 1 GCC as a general proviso for
the use of the various ARTs. The rationale for this repetition is that surrogacy is
534 For further comments read Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E., ‘Medically Assisted Reproduction: The Right of an 
Unmarried and Single Man to Have a Child through Surrogacy’, Medical Law and Bioethics, 9, January-March 
2010, Sakkoulas Publications, pages 2-3 (in Greek). 
535 Article 1 paragraph 2 Law 3305/2005: ‘When applying the techniques for the medically assisted human 
reproduction, the best interests of the child to be born should be taken into consideration’. 
536 This differentiation among same-sex and heterosexual couples is based on the more general reluctance 
towards the legal recognition of homosexual relationships. Especially in Greece, homosexuality is still an issue 
of great controversy (see for example Pavlou, M., ‘Homophobia in Greece. Love for equality’, Institute for 
Rights, Equality and Diversity, Report, (2009), available at www.i‐red.eu).
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recognized as an extreme method of fertility treatment, and thus, emphasizes its 
prohibition for cosmetic or social reasons, or even reasons of limited free time due to 
professional or any other kind of commitment of the intended mother. These reasons
have been expressly condemned as legally and morally intolerable.537 
Moreover, special mention for the prerequisite of a medical need has to me made, since
surrogacy is not available generally to women who are just unable to reproduce by 
natural means, but more specifically to women who are unable to gestate a child. The 
woman who applies to the court for surrogacy has to possess sufficient medical proof (an 
affidavit by an obstetrician-gynecologist) of her inability to either achieve a pregnancy or
bring it to term. 
It should be mentioned that the indications for the permissibility of surrogacy consist of 
the following conditions:538 
1.	 congenital absence of uterus (Mayer-Rokitansky syndrome);539 
2.	 congenital anomalies of the uterus; 
3.	 multiple uterus fibromyomas;
4.	 certain medical diseases rendering pregnancy dangerous for a woman’s life, such
as congenital heart diseases; 
5.	 cases of multiple pregnancy losses;
6.	 selected cases of multiple failures in previous IVF attempts.540 
Moreover, it is now accepted541 that the method of surrogacy can be used in cases where
there is an imminent danger for the transmission of a serious hereditary disease, for 
example if the intended mother suffers from HIV/AIDS,542 Hepatitis B and C or syphilis.
The woman must attach to her application medical tests to prove this (article 13 para. 3 
and article 4 paras. 2 and 3 of Law 3305/2005).  
It should be noted that the law does not differentiate between the primary or secondary 
type of the inability to produce a child with regards to the intended mother. She may 
have been able to reproduce in the past, and even have given birth to one or more 
children. What is important is that at the time of the submission and discussion of her
application to the court requesting permission for surrogacy, she is biologically unable to
have a child.
	 The surrogate mother’s “suitability” for fertilization
Article 1458 GCC declares a further limitation that relates to the suitability of the woman 
chosen to act as a surrogate mother. The judge will request to see medical evidence
which specifically indicate the surrogate’s good physical health; the doctor’s affidavit
should state that the surrogate mother is strong and healthy enough to deal with the 
inherent difficulties and risks of pregnancy and childbirth. The surrogate mother, in
particular, will undergo multiple medical tests that ascertain her fertility, and her general
537 See Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood: The Greek legislation, the constitutionality of the law [on 

surrogacy] when compared with and contrasted to the constitutional right to procreate and the socio-political 

issues raising’, in the Magazine of the Young Group of the Maragkopoulou Institution for Human Rights, Issue 

2, November 2008, pages 13-37 (in Greek).
 
538 As stated by the Fertility Centre IAKENTRO, based in Thessaloniki and specialised in the fertilisation of 

surrogate mothers (http://www.iakentro.com/en/assisted/gestational-surrogacy).
 
539 Read the case of the One Member Court of First Instance of Korinthos 224/2006.
 
540 Read the case of the One Member Court of First Instance of Athens no.1320/2004.
 
541 Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to criminal law’, 

Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), page 9 (in Greek); Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard 

paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, Portuguese Economic Journal (2009)
 
8, page 47.
 
542 Read also Merry, A., Smith, A., ‘Errors, Medicine and the Law’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 

(2001), page 192 onwards; Rojansky, N., Schenker, J., ‘Ethical aspects of assisted reproduction in AIDS 

patients’, J Ass Reprod Genet, 8 (1995), page 537 onwards.
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health, as well as tests that prove her not to be suffering from any sexually transmitted 
diseases that can be transferred to the child, such as HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis and syphilis
(art. 4 paras. 2 and 3 of Law 3305/2005).  
Although no upper age limit is mentioned for the surrogate, the judge should take into
consideration the fact that pregnancy after a certain age is extremely risky for the life
and health of both the pregnant woman and the child. An indicative upper age limit is
the age of 52, as approved by the judge of the Court of First Instance of Korinthos no. 
224/2006, whereby the surrogate was the mother of the intended mother and was still 
physically able and healthy enough to gestate a child on her behalf. The surrogate was
found to be of good health that would enable her to accomplish a pregnancy and bring it
to term. 
In addition to the above mentioned medical tests, the law requires (article 13 para. 2 of
Law 3305/2005) the performance of a psychological assessment to prove the surrogate’s
good mental state and her emotional stability. In the event that an affidavit that declares 
the good psychological state of the surrogate is not submitted to the court by the time of
the hearing of the case, the discussion is rescheduled for a future date.543 
	 The egg does not belong to the surrogate mother: egg donation and the
anonymity of the donor 
Great emphasis should be given to the provision of the law (art. 1458 GCC) which
prohibits the surrogate mother from having a genetic link to the child. As derives from 
the letter of the law, ‘the ova to be fertilized should either belong to the woman 
interested in becoming the legal mother of the child or a third woman’544 who will donate
her genetic material according to the legal requirements for egg donation. This is based
on the rule that for a woman to be forced to relinquish a child, with whom she has not
only a gestational but also a biological bond, is excessively limiting, and, therefore,
socially, morally and legally intolerable. If this would be permissible by law, it would
have been contrary to the general principle of fairness and social ethos (art. 179 GCC), 
and would render the agreement invalid on the basis that it was immoral. Therefore, the 
surrogacy contract would not have any force, and the mother of the child would be the 
one who gave birth to him/her (art. 1463 GCC). 
However, it is not required by law for the application to the court to mention whether the 
ova belongs to the intended mother or a third donor, as long as it is made clear that it 
does not come from the surrogate mother. 
Hence, article 1458 GCC redirects us to the regulatory framework of gamete donation in
cases where the egg used is from a third party donor. As article 1460 GCC states, the
identity of the donor will remain undisclosed, thus guaranteeing the anonymity and the 
respect for privacy of the donor. Only information that relates to the medical history of
the donor will be made public, and the child is the only person entitled to access the 
confidential medical files of the donor.545 
	 The fully medicalised fertilization procedure 
The practice of surrogacy in Greece can be portrayed as a “fully medicalised” act. 
According to art. 16 of Law 3305/2005, only qualified medical facilities may engage 
fertility treatment procedures such as IVF. As a result, surrogate procedures must be 
543 See for example the case of the One Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki no.838/2010, and 

(same court) no. 2721/2010.
 
544 Garoufalia, M., ‘MedicallyAssisted Human Reproduction: The Legal Framework in Greece’, International 

Legal Practitioner, 28 (52), 2003: 52-55 and 60, page 53.
 
545 Leon, G., Papetta, A., Spiliopoulou, C., ‘Overview of the Greek legislation regarding assisted reproduction
 
and comparison with the EU legal framework’, Reproductive BioMedicine Online (2011) 23, page 821.
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carried out by a medical practitioner, specialized in IVF, either in a hospital (public or
private) or a private fertility centre licensed to perform IVF and other fertility treatments.
 Domicile of both women in Greece 
Both the women who participate in the surrogacy agreement are legally required to be
domiciled in Greece (art. 8 of Law 3089/2002). A similar condition appears in the 
legislation of other countries and is justified by the state’s intention to prohibit possible 
“reproductive tourism” and cross-border surrogacy arrangements, which bring about 
various problems relating to the laws on citizenship, and to delays in issuing the
necessary travel documents for the return of the child in its country. There is, then, the 
imminent danger that the child will in the end be rendered stateless and parentless.546 
This is what the Greek legislature tried to avoid by inserting the particular rule.
The judges are further limited to their interpretation of “domicile”. The two women 
should have lived in Greece for a sufficient period of time in the past and prove their 
intention to stay there for a long time in the future.547 Nevertheless, it can be contended
that the latter requirement is not deemed very significant during the process of the
judicial authorization of the surrogacy agreement. From the research conducted for this 
report on the recent case law, no judge requested proof of the surrogate’s intention to 
stay and live in Greece for a long period of time.  
Additionally, according to articles 49 and 50 of the TEU (freedom of establishment), the
law on surrogacy is not violated when the intended mother is a citizen of one of the EU
Member States and domiciles in Greece. 
Furthermore, no cross-border surrogacy arrangements have been reported in Greece or
in the Greek courts. However, even if the rule of article 8 of Law 3089/2002 is violated,
the establishment of familial relationships will not be influenced since the regulations of
private international law may be applicable. The only legal case in Greece for the 
decision of which private international laws were called to be applied was that of the One
Member Court of First Instance of Chania no. 122/2008, which referred to a child to be 
born through surrogacy from Greek biological parents who lived in the country and an 
Albanian surrogate mother. 
The judge of the case took into account the Albanian law on international adoptions,
which required the registration of the child in the list of the Albanian Adoption
Committee for a period of 6 months, during which time the child would have to reside in
Albania. The Albanian law also dictated that all efforts would have been made for the
adoption of the child in Albania first, before the authorization of the adoption of the child
by the foreign couple. The best interests of the child were considered primary and the 
rules of the Albanian law inapplicable and as contrary to the Greek legislation on assisted 
reproduction. 
In the end, however, the decision for the authorisation of the particular surrogacy
agreement and the fertilisation of the Albanian surrogate never took place. The 
surrogate’s husband had not given his consent for the fertilization of his wife and the 
trial was rescheduled for another date so that the surrogate’s husband could provide his 
consent. 
546 Read further Trimmings, K., Beaumont, P., ‘International Surrogacy Arrangements: An Urgent Need for Law 

Reform at the International Level’, Journal of Private International Law, 7 (3), 2011: 627; Blyth, E., Farrand,
 
A., ‘Reproductive Tourism- a price worth paying for reproductive autonomy?’, Crit Soc Pol, 1 (2005), page 91 

onwards.
 
547 Panagos, K., ‘Surrogate motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to criminal law’, 

Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), page 9 (in Greek); Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard 

paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate motherhood in Greece’, Portuguese Economic Journal (2009)
 
8, page 50.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
	 The surrogacy contract, the transfer of the legal parentage and the issue 
of consent
The rule that greatly differentiates the Greek regulatory framework on surrogacy to the 
majority of jurisdictions around the world is the enforceability of the surrogacy contract. 
The agreement takes a written form (art. 1458 GCC) and is signed by the intended
mother, and her husband or her (male) civil partner if she has one, and the surrogate 
mother, as well as her husband or partner if she has one. The contract does not need to
follow any formality, although in common practice it is often requested for the document 
to be a notarised document, which provides a more complete legal protection to the 
contracting parties. 
If the male partners of the contracting mothers are not married to their female partners, 
they must turn to a notary and give their consent in writing. This is required because 
their signature on the notarial document of the surrogacy contract will not only function
as the provision of their consent to the fertilization for surrogacy purposes, but also as a 
proof of a voluntary recognition of their paternal obligations towards the child (art. 1475 
para. 2 GCC). If the woman proceeds to the fertilization without her husband’s consent,
then he is entitled to legal compensation due to the violation of his personal rights. 
Moreover, he also maintains a legal right to request a divorce to the disadvantage of his 
wife (art. 1439 GCC).548 
-The legal type of the surrogacy agreement
The legal character of a surrogacy arrangement in Greece is described as a contract for
the provision of services and operates as a mandate to the surrogate to conform to her 
commitments. Any clause that imposes extreme safety measures to be taken by the 
surrogate during her pregnancy is invalid, because they violate her right to self-
determination and her private freedom. The legal basis for this rule is the general legal 
principle of fairness guaranteed by article 179 of the GCC. Also invalid as immoral and
illegal is any clause that prohibits the surrogate’s right to a lawful abortion.549 Such a 
clause would be unacceptable due to the fact that it infringes the surrogate’s right to her 
bodily integrity. Whether the illegality of these clauses will influence the illegality of the 
surrogacy contract as a whole will be deemed on the basis of the article 181 of the
GCC.550 
The document of the agreement will be submitted to the court for review. During the 
discussion of the case the judge will ask the contracting parties once again to verify their
consent to the surrogate motherhood arrangement. This is the ultimate point, the “point
of no return”, after which, and if the court gives its permission, the fertilization of the
surrogate mother can be performed. The surrogate mother loses her right to change her 
mind551 and she is from then on forced to comply with the terms of the agreement and 
give the child to up the intended mother and her husband/partner, if she has one, or to 
the single man,552 who has been granted the judicial permission, immediately after the
birth. 
548 This may constitute an irretrievable breakdown of marriage on the fault of the wife.
 
549 The requirements to a lawful abortion are set out in article 304 of the Criminal Code.
 
550 Article 181 GCC: ‘The invalidity of a part of an agreement brings about the invalidity of the agreement as a 

whole, if it is indicated that the parties would never have agreed to it if they knew about the invalid part’. 

Consequently, if the invalid clause is one of the most important clauses of the agreement, without the
 
existence of which no agreement would have been made in the first place, then the contract as a whole is also 

invalid.
 
551 No room for the event of a “change of heart” is given by in the Greek legislation. The surrogate’s consent 

can be recalled only before the transfer of the embryo into her uterus. The same applies for the intended 

mother as well. If she refuses to take the child after he/she is born, she is obligated to take care of the child 

and be responsible for his/her upbringing, as set out in the articles 1510 and onwards of the GCC.
 
552 According to the decision of the court of Athens no. 2827/2008.
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The surrogacy contract can operate as a safety net even after the birth of the child. In 
the event that the surrogate mother fails to relinquish the child, the intended and now 
legal mother of the child can apply to the court and force her to adhere to the terms of
the agreement (article 946 Code of Civil Procedure). The legal mother is also entitled to 
compensation due to breach of contract. 
-The transfer of parental rights
The time of birth is defined as the cut-off point for the acquisition of legal parenthood. If
the intended woman has succeeded in her application to the court for the approval of the 
surrogacy agreement, then immediately after the birth the surrogacy contract is
enforced and she is considered as the legal mother of the child. The surrogate has no
parental rights to the child. All this information must have been made very clear to the
surrogate before she signs the agreement and her consent to her fertilization must be 
free from coercion (art. 5 of Law 3305/2005). 
The judicial approval of the surrogacy arrangement creates a presumption of
motherhood on behalf of the intended mother after the birth of the child (art. 1464
para.1 GCC). The presumption of motherhood can, however, be rebutted in court if the 
surrogate presents sufficient proof that the child is genetically related to her and her 
partner/husband. The deadline for the rebuttal of the maternal rights expires six months 
after the birth of the child (art. 1464 par. 2 GCC). 
This provision has been harshly criticised as against the best interests of the child and 
contrary to the national laws (art. 1 para. 2 of Law 3305/2005), the Constitution (art. 21
para. 1), and the European Convention for the Protection of the Children’s Rights. This is
due to the fact that by the time of the court hearing the child would have already lived
with the intended parents for at least one or two years and then he/she may be forced to 
leave them and be returned to the former surrogate mother. For this reason, it has been 
argued that a DNA test should take place after the birth of the child to verify the child’s
genetic origins from either of the contracting parties.553 
In the total absence of the court’s permission, the general rule with regards to the 
establishment of motherhood in retrospect applies, which states that the mother of the 
child is the one who gives birth to him/her (art. 1463 GCC). After this point, the 
intended mother can only apply for the adoption of the child. However, this will only be 
made real if the former surrogate mother and now legal mother of the child consents to
it.
With regards to the paternity rights, the law provides that the father of the child will be 
the husband of the legal mother of the child and he has no right to apply to the court 
and refuse his status as the legal father of the child, if he consented to the surrogate’s 
fertilisation. This presumption is justified by the “best interests of the child” principle and 
it is not acceptable in Greece for the child not to have a legal father when the legal
mother is married.554 Article 21 paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution creates an 
obligation on the state authorities to take reasonable measures to protect the rights of 
children, and ensure that the child will be raised under the best possible conditions, and
this is thought to be impossible in the existence of a single parent.555 However, as 
553 Panagos, K., ‘Parentheti mitrotita. Elliniko nomiko kathestos kai egklimatologikes proektaseis’ (Surrogate 
motherhood. The Greek regulatory framework and the extension to criminal law’), Sakkoulas Publications,
Athens-Thessaloniki (2011), page65 (in Greek). 
554 See also the Introductory Report of the draft legislation of Law 3305/2005, as well as the cases of the One
Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki no. 40820/2007; (same court) no. 838/2010; (same court) no.
10350/2010; (same court) no. 14946/2010; Multi Member Court of First Instance of Chania 122/2008, among 
others. 
555 The courts seem to have also accepted as valid criteria for the evaluation of the welfare of the child born 
through surrogacy the social and financial status of the intended parents, as well as their strong desire to have 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
mentioned above, the courts have authorized parenthood rights to single women (which
is also acceptable by art. 1458 GCC) and single men (One Member Court of First 
Instance of Athens no. 2827/2008; One Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki
no. 13707/2009). 
	 The lack of financial benefit and the content of the concept of 
“reasonable expenses” 
Article 1458 GCC refers to the lack of financial benefit from the surrogacy agreement.
The law declares that any payments made or promised to be made to the surrogate as a
compensation for the offering of her gestational services as illegal, and, therefore, allows
only ‘altruistic’ surrogacy arrangements. It is indeed unacceptable according to the 
morals of the Greek legal theory for familial relationships to be formed on a commercial 
basis. 
The legislature tried to avoid being criticised for introducing legislation that allegedly
facilitates the practice of “baby-selling” and the commodification of both the surrogate 
and the children.556 Nevertheless, it has been contended that commercial surrogacy 
would not lead to such problems if satisfactory and suitable regulations were in place. In
fact ‘an economic analysis of law’557 in the case of surrogacy would be beneficial for the
‘infertile married couples [trying] to maximize their utility by exploring all options in an
effort to have a baby’.558 This was, however, considered contrary to the spirit of the law 
and the right to procreate. 
Article 13 para. 4 of Law 3305/2005 inserts an exception to the general prohibition of
financial benefits and allows payment for “reasonable expenses”. According to the letter 
of the law, the only reason for payment within a surrogacy agreement is the coverage of 
the expenses relating to the accomplishment of pregnancy through the use of RTs, 
namely the costs of IVF, for the pregnancy, and the childbirth, namely the costs of 
pregnancy clothing, drugs and any other medical treatment of the pregnant woman, the 
costs of the hospital for the birth of the child and for the treatment of the woman who 
has given birth and for the treatment of the newborn baby, as well as any wage losses of 
the surrogate due to her inability to work during the pregnancy and childbirth. 
Then amount of money to be paid is to be overseen by the National Authority of the  
Medically Assisted Reproduction. However, this authority has not yet operated in Greece,
and the danger of payments “under the table” to the surrogate exists. Reports of
commercial surrogacies have been made,559 but no case of commercial surrogacy has
yet been examined by the Greek courts. 
	 Registration of the child born through surrogacy in the National Registry
Office 
and raise a child. See for example the case of the One Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki no. 

14946/2010.
 
556 Read further Anton van Niekerk and Liezl van Zyl, ‘The ethics of surrogacy: women’s reproductive labour’, 

Journal of medical ethics, 1995, vol.21, pp.345-349; Elisabeth S. Anderson, ‘Is women’s labor a commodity?’,
 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 19, no. 1, 1990, pp. 71-92; Arneson, ‘Commodification and commercial
 
surrogacy’, Philosophy and public affairs, 1992; 21, 2: 132-164; M. M. Tieu, ‘Altruistic surrogacy: the
 
necessary objectification of surrogate mothers’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2009; 35: 171-175.
 
557 Term used by Hatzis, A.N., ‘From soft to hard paternalism and back: the regulation of surrogate 

motherhood in Greece’, Portuguese Economic Journal, 8, 2009, page 207.
 
558 Ibid., page 208. See also by the same author ‘Just the Oven: Law and Economics Approach to Gestational
 
Surrogacy Contracts', same author, in Katharina Boele-Woelki (edt.), ‘Perspectives for the unification or 

harmonisation of family law in Europe, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003.
 
559 News reports: ‘Egg Trafficking’, Eleytherotpia Online Newspaper (last updated: 14 November 2010):
 
http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=223596; ‘Criminal group of persons from Romania selling eggs’, Ta 

Nea Online Newspaper (last updated: 21 September 2010): http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4595175.
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The registration of every child in Greece in the National Registry is governed by Law
344/1976. The legal parent(s) of the child must enter the name of the child into the 
Registry of Births within the days after the birth of the child. The case of surrogacy is no 
exception to the rule. The name of the legal mother of the child should be stated on the
document. There is no provision in the law that requires the name of the surrogate
mother to be included in the document for the registration of the child as a Greek
citizen. In order for the intended mother to be considered as the legal mother of the
child by the National Registry Office, the court approval should be submitted to the 
Office at the time of the child’s registration (art. 7 of Law 3089/2002). The judgment of 
the court that authorized the application for surrogacy should be definitive, meaning that 
the deadline for all remedies has already expired. As opposed to that, for the “renting of 
the womb” (the fertilization of the surrogate mother) to be allowed, it suffices for the
court decision to be final, namely an appeal is still possible to be made (art. 763 para. 1 
of Code of Civil Procedure).560 
 Civil and Criminal sanctions 
If the doctor and the two women proceed to the fertilization of the surrogate without the 
court’s approval, the mother of the child is the surrogate, according to the general rule 
of the article 1463 GCC. The non-existence of the court’s permission creates a criminal
liability against all the parties involved in the illegal action, according to article 26
paragraph 8 of Law 3305/2005. The penalty includes the possibility for the personal 
imprisonment of all the actors to the crime for two years at least, as well as the payment 
of damages of at least 1,500 Euros. The same sanction applies against the person who 
operates as a mediator who is getting paid for bringing intended parents in touch with 
candidate surrogates, or against advertisers of surrogacy services. However, no case has 
been reported where the judges have actually imposed the above mentioned legal
sanctions. The significance of the “best interests of the child” principle for judicial 
deliberations makes it very unlikely for any surrogacy contract not to be approved even 
in retrospect, or for any actions to be considered as willingly circumventing the law.
560 Koutsouradis, A., ‘issues of surrogate motherhood, especially after the introduction of the Law 3305/2005’,
Legal Library Publications, 2006, page 353, footnote no. 74. 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
6.6. ITALY 
A. Legislation  
1) In Italy all forms of surrogacy are forbidden, whether it be traditional or gestational,
commercial or altruistic. The Italian parliament provided very strict guidelines in matters
of assisted reproduction. Act n. 40 of 19/2/2004, entitled Rules about medically 
assisted reproduction, introduces a prohibition on employing gametes from donors, and 
specifically decrees: “Anyone who, in any form, realizes, organizes or commercializes 
gametes or embryos or surrogate motherhood is sentenced to 3 months to 2 years’
imprisonment and to pay a 600,000 to 1,000,000 euro fine” (art. 12, par. 6).
According to the main interpretation561, this article incriminates not only intermediary
agencies and clinics practising surrogacy, but also the intended parents and the 
surrogate mother too. This interpretation is found out ab contrariis from paragraph 8: 
“The men and the women subject to the reproduction techniques forbidden by par. 1
[assisted reproduction with gametes from donors], 2 [application of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ART) post mortem, or to underage, single, or homosexual
couples], 4 [application of ART without the patient’s consent] and 5 [application of ART
in unauthorized clinics] cannot be condemned”. This list does not include paragraph 6, so 
the doctrine supports the theory of punishability of the patients subject to the application 
of surrogacy technology. Furthermore, paragraph 9 of the same article provides an
accessory penalty for doctors: “the forced interruption of professional practise by 1-3 
years”. 
Before the Parliamentary Act of 2004, there was no legislation explicitly condemning or
banning surrogacy. Most jurists agree that the current doctrine on surrogacy should
accept the rules of the Doctors’ Deontological Code, in force since 1995, forbidding the 
practise of surrogate motherhood “to protect the interest of the soon-to-be-born
baby”562. Before 2004, there were also some legal rules punishing surrogacy agreements 
with regard to their most important effect: the “transfer” of the child. Art. 71 par. 1, act
n. 184 of 4/5/1983 on adoption punishes “illegal foster care”563 (i.e. foster care in
violation of legislative rules on adoption) by1-3 years imprisonment; Art. 567 of Italian
Penal Code condemns those who falsify a child’s original birth certificate to 5-15 years
imprisonment. This rule protects the individual’s right to obtain legal status in
accordance with its own biological identity. According to the main, traditional
understanding of art. 567, status filiationis needs to reflect the genetic reality564. 
It is worth noting that this guarantee and the punishment of art. 567 can be connected
only with traditional surrogacy. With regard to gestational surrogacy, some jurists before 
2004 found legal grounds to reject such arrangements, without any legislator’s specific
condemnation. These jurists focused on the link between art. 5 and art. 269, par. 3, of 
the Italian Civil Code. The first forbids using one’s own body as the object of a 
transaction, if it is potentially dangerous for one’s own well-being, or if it is against the 
law, the public order, or good customs. The second article includes a sort of “principle of
presumption” of motherhood: it assumes that the mother is the woman bearing the 
child. This is a traditional rule, mentioned both in the first Italian Civil Code of 1865 (art. 
561 See R. Villani, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 2008, pp.
 
1828-1834; M. Sesta, Procreazione medicalmente assistita e status del figlio, in Rivista dell’Associazione 

italiana degli avvocati per la famiglia e per i minori, 2, 2006, pp.77-92.
 
562 Art. 42, Codice deontologico della Federazione degli ordini dei medici. See R. Villani, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n.
 
40, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 2008, pp. 1828-1834; M. Sesta, La maternità 

surrogata tra deontologia, regole etiche e diritto giurisprudenziale, in Il Corriere giuridico, 4, 2002, pp. 488­
495.
 
563 See D. Terracina, art. 71, l. 4 maggio 1983, n. 184, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 

2008, pp. 1721-1724.
 
564 See L. de Rosa, Dei delitti contro lo stato di famiglia, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di
 
famiglia, 2008, pp. 2264-2269.
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
190) and in the first formulation of the Civil Code of 1942 (art. 270). The present family
law was reformed in 1975, but the rules about motherhood were not changed.  
Therefore, according to the conservative understanding, surrogacy agreements had to be 
avoided. On the one hand these agreements seem to be dangerous for the surrogate
mother and the child’s well-being, and on other hand they appear to be against the law
because they confer motherhood to the intended mother rather than the woman who
bears the child565. 
Act n. 40 on medically assisted reproduction closed a 20-year-old legislative iter 
legislativo (the process to get a parliament’s act passed), characterized by a deep
difference of opinion in Parliament, mirroring the different tendencies in society. There 
were a lot of legislative proposals from all the parties, but the final, approved text is a 
very “restrictive”566 act, justified by the clear aim to limit access to ART 567. The most
liberal expectations were let down and some eminent jurists denounced the purely
“ideological foundation”568 of the Act. The legislator, with a catholic model of the family
in mind, made a conservative choice in order to protect “the stability of traditional values
and relationship structures”569. The liveliest debate focused on some particular points of 
the Act. The aim to protect the conceived child as a subject of rights (art. 1), contrasting 
with the principle of connection between legal capacity and birth (art. 1 Italian Civil 
Code), creates a problem of balance and protection of the mother’s right to be healthy.
The ban of donor insemination (art. 4 par. 3, 12 par. 1) in order to guarantee the 
sameness of social and genetic parenthood was condemned by some of the  public, as  
the presence of different parents (genetic, social, surrogate) is not dangerous for the 
child’s wellbeing570. At the same time the introduction of subjective and objective limits
on access to ART (art. 1, art 4) appears too difficult, strict, as the Italian Bill of rights
does not protect natural reproduction571. 
In this theoretical framework, little space is devoted to surrogacy. Indeed, neither the
Italian jurists nor the legislature have dealt with this matter to any great degree. We can 
trace the ratio of the current ban to the following traditional assumption that the division
between biological and social parents is dangerous for the child’s well-being, and to the 
new demand of “right to truth” about one’s genetic origins572. In particular, with
reference to gestational surrogacy, the legal reason of the ban seems to be the same as
before 2004, and directly flows from the system: the link between and art. 5 and art. 
269 par. 3 of the Italian Civil Code.  
565 See M. Sesta, La maternità surrogata tra deontologia, regole etiche e diritto giurisprudenziale, in Il Corriere 
giuridico, 4, 2002, pp. 488-495. 
566 “Restrictive” is the word used to indicate the act n.40/2004 by a lot of jurists, with different opinion. For 
example, according to M. Sesta, Dalla libertà ai divieti: quale futuro per la legge sulla procreazione 
medicalmente assistita, in Il corriere giuridico, 11, 2004, pp. 1405-1409, this “restrictive” law generally is
good; G. Ferrando, La nuova legge in material di procreazione medicalmente assistita: perplessità e critiche, in
Il Corriere giuridico, 6, 2004, pp. 810-816, and P. Rescigno, Una legge annunciata sulla procreazione assistita, 
in Il Corriere giuridico, 8, 2002, pp. 981-983, look at the act with diffidence.
567 See M. Sesta, Dalla libertà ai divieti: quale futuro per la legge sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, in 
Il corriere giuridico, 11, 2004, pp. 1405-1409. 
568 A. Dogliotti, M. Figone, Procreazione assistita Fonti, orientamenti, linee di tendenza - Commento alla legge 
19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, 2004, p. 123; see P. Rescigno, Una legge annunciata sulla procreazione assistita, in Il 
Corriere giuridico, 8, 2002, pp. 981-983; M. Dell’Utri, La fecondazione eterologa nel sistema dei diritti
fondamentali, in Giurisprudenza di merito, 1, 2011, pp. 381-404.
569 M. Dell’Utri, La fecondazione eterologa nel sistema dei diritti fondamentali, in Giurisprudenza di merito, 1,
2011, p. 392. See G. Ferrando, La nuova legge in material di procreazione medicalmente assistita: perplessità 
e critiche, in Il Corriere giuridico, 6, 2004, p. 815. 
570 See M. Dell’Utri, La fecondazione eterologa nel sistema dei diritti fondamentali, in Giurisprudenza di merito, 
1, 2011, p. 398. 
571 See A. Dogliotti, M. Figone, Procreazione assistita Fonti, orientamenti, linee di tendenza - Commento alla 
legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, 2004, p. 123. 
572 See M. Sesta, Dalla libertà ai divieti: quale futuro per la legge sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, in 
Il corriere giuridico, 11, 2004, pp. 1405-1409. 
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Two unsuccessful legislative proposals 573, alternatives to the traditional model, provide
interesting points of view about the analysis of the surrogacy phenomenon. They put 
great stress on the need for protection of the woman’s right to health, condemned the
representation of the woman as an “embryos container”, promoted a cultural alternative 
to the idea of “a child at any cost”. Following this perspective, which focused on a novel
view of the female body and its freedom from traditional values, they did not promote 
legalizing surrogacy agreements because they were against any intrusion of the 
legislator in such intimate decisions.  
After the promulgation of the act, a popular movement asked for and obtained a 
referendum on whether to abrogate the most conservative aspects of the decree. Among
the issues up for debate was a proposal which would grant homosexual couples access to 
assisted reproduction. The result was disappointing. The new instances did not pass 
because the referendum questions did not get to the quorum stipulated by Italian law.
Nevertheless, a very important issue is still open to different interpretations. The Act 
40/2004 does not provide a solution about the status filiationis of the child born to a  
surrogate arrangement in violation of the law: who is his/her legal mother?574 
2) The Italian Act 40/2004, forbidding the surrogacy totally, also provides very strict
“subjective requisites” for access to the assisted reproduction technology: only adult and
heterosexual couples , married or live-in partners, both potentially fertile-aged, both
living, are eligible (art. 5).
3) Neither commercial nor altruistic surrogacy is permitted in Italy. Before 2004, when
the law did not forbid the practice explicitly, the courts did not adopt or develop the idea 
of “reasonable cost”. 
4) As surrogacy is legally banned, the surrogacy agreement is not enforceable by the 
Italian courts. However the last sentences (after 2004) deal with one of the most 
relevant consequences of such arrangements: the legal parentage of the child born in
another country with Italian intended parents.
5) In Italy provisions such as “birth orders” have never existed.
6) There are no specific legislative rules aimed at protecting parties involved in
surrogacy. 
7) A principle of presumption of motherhood has been drafted by the Italian Civil Code
(art. 269, par. 3): the mother is the woman bearing the child. The same idea inspires
the Act n. 40/2004 and there are no legislative provisions which rebut such a principle. 
Last year, the Italian courts tried to introduce different indications in the set of rules,
such as the legal recognition of “social parenthood” in order to protect the child’s
interest575. In cases of surrogacy, arranged in violation of legal prohibition, the 
legislature doesn’t provide any criterion to assign legal motherhood, causing an involved
conflict of interpretations. 
8) Generally, the presumed legal father is the surrogate mother’s husband, when the
child is conceived during the marriage (art. 231 Italian Civil Code). Out of the marriage 
the father can recognise the child with a personal declaration, or such a declaration can 
be demanded of the child.  
573 See relazione Valpiana and relazione Cossutta, 26 marzo 2002;
 
574 See R. Villani, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 2008, p.
 
1833; G. Ferrando, La nuova legge in material di procreazione medicalmente assistita: perplessità e critiche, in
 
Il Corriere giuridico, 6, 2004, p. 816.
 
575 See b) Case law
 
296
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
   
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
      
   
                                                            
   
A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
In the contest of surrogacy, the establishment of legal fatherhood has no specific rule.
According to most interpretations, if the intended father is also the genetic father, he 
could obtain legal fatherhood through a simple act of recognition576. 
9) Generally, the legal parents are named on the birth certificate. The Italian set of rules
deals neither with cases of surrogacy, nor with the regulation of birth certificates. 
10) No legislative provision employs adoption as an instrument to allow the intended 
parents to become legal parents — though nothing forbids this. The intended parents 
can adopt the child after he/she has been delivered and handed over to them by the 
surrogate mother. Also, there has been a judicial decision (see below: Civil Court of 
Monza, 1989) which indicated such a solution. The intended parents need to follow the
ordinary – very strict – procedure of adoption and they don’t need to have a genetic 
relationship with the child. In Italy only married couples can adopt a child (art. 6 act 
184/1983). Nevertheless, there are a few special cases where a single person is allowed
to adopt: a spouse separated or widowed during the adoption proceedings (art. 25 par. 
4, par. 5); a spouse who is not separated who wants to adopt his/her spouse's child (art. 
44 par. 1b); a single person linked to the child by a relationship (art. 44 par. 1a).
11) Italian citizenship is based on the principle of ius sanguinis: the child of Italian
parents is an Italian citizen. Foreigners can obtain Italian citizenship through two types
of concession: marriage and residence.  
12) According to Italian law, surrogacy agreements are illegal and invalid.
13) In spite of the absolute prohibition of surrogacy, with a simple internet search it is
possible to find a lot of agencies promoting so-called “procreative tourism”, indicating
different arrangements and prices. 
b) Case Law 
Today, the Italian legislature on the one hand forbids any form of surrogacy, and on
the other hand leaves a legal vacuum around the legal consequences, within the 
domestic set of rules, of surrogacy arrangements made by Italian citizens abroad. 
1) So far the regime of surrogacy restrictions, providing an absolute ban with penal 
consequences, has not been applied; no criminal case has emerged; no intended parents 
or surrogate mothers have ever been criminally convicted. The questions which have 
arisen in judicial proceedings have dealt only with the recognition in Italy of some
documents relating to surrogacy, issued in foreign countries (such as birth certificates or 
birth orders); they are questions of “private international law”.  
The following is a draft of most important decisions about surrogacy issued in Italy.
***** 
It’s interesting to consider the case law before the promulgation of the current legal 
regime, when surrogacy was not regulated. From the few decisions about surrogacy 
before 2004, two opposing tendencies emerged: one against surrogacy agreements and 
one in favour of them. All the following rulings are domestic case-law:
	 The first judicial decision about surrogacy – and the first legal definition of a
surrogacy agreement, too – in Italy was by the Civil Court of first instance of 
Monza in 27/10/1989. The judge declared invalid the surrogacy agreement 
576 See R. Villani, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40, in A. Zaccaria, Commentario breve al diritto di famiglia, 2008, p.
1834. 
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between a woman, the genetic and surrogate mother, and a couple of intended 
parents. According to the court, a commercial agreement to rent one’s own body, 
in order to bear a child for other parents taking part in the agreement, violates
art. 5 of the Italian civil code, because it contrasts with the law, public order and
“good customs”. In this case, the arrangements took place in Italy and the child
was also born in Italy. The intended parents asked the court to 1) compel the 
surrogate mother to respect the agreement, to deliver the child and to renounce 
all legal rights in relation to him; 2) recognise the legal parenthood to the social
couple. The judge defeated the petition and defended the principle of 
presumption of legal motherhood: the mother is the woman bearing the child
(art. 269, par. 3, Italian civil code). The decision decreed that 1) the legal 
parental relation is only between a child and his “blood’s parents”; 2) the best
interest of the child is to grow up with its legal parents; 3) an individual “right of 
reproduction” does not exist; 4) because of these reasons, the legal mother is the 
surrogate one, the genetic/intended father could obtain the legal fatherhood 
through a recognition577, the “social mother” has the residual possibility of
adopting the child, in compliance with Italian rules. It is also worth noting that
the surrogate mother’s refusal to consent to the adoption does not influence the 
real possibility to give the child up for adoption. Indeed, this possibility depends 
only on a special declaration of the Court, according to the Italian Act about
adoption (ar. 7 and art. 8). 
	 The second approach taken by Italian jurisprudence regarding surrogacy, before 
Act n. 40, was represented by the decision of the Civil Court of first instance
of Rome in 17/02/2000, which reverses the reading of the Monza ruling. An
Italian couple entered into a surrogacy agreement with a woman and in a
contract for a FIVET (Fertilizzazione In Vitro con Embryo Transfer- IVF with
embryo transfer) professional service with an Italian doctor. As a consequence of 
ratification of the Doctors’ Deontological Code forbidding surrogacy, the doctor
refused his service. 
The committing Italian couple asked the judge to authorize the doctor (who 
refused) to implant an embryo in the uterus of surrogate mother, according to an
“altruistic” agreement drawn up by the couple and the gestational mother. The
judge authorized the doctor to do so, focusing on: 1) the importance of the
solidarity features in the agreement; 2) the need for the protection of the
individual right of reproduction; 3) the new “anthropological and cultural 
dimension of parenthood”, developed thanks to innovative arrangements; 4) the
fact that parental status is linked to one’s own “will” to be a mother or father.
The doctor could not be forced to cooperate because the Court passed only a 
declaratory judgment – not a conviction. Nevertheless this decision was shocking
in Italy: it broke with the traditional understanding of family law578. It was so
radical that the legislature of 2004 did not follow the recommended protocol.  
After 2004, only two relevant cases arose in the courts, both dealing with the recognition
of documents issued by foreign authorities. Indeed, Act 40/2004 forbade surrogacy in
Italy, causing an increase in “procreative tourism”. 
	 The decision taken by the Civil Court of second instance of Bari579, in
13/2/2009, is very interesting. A couple (an English husband and an Italian 
wife), who were resident in Bari, drew up two surrogate agreements in Great 
577 See point 8 of “Legislation”.
 
578 See G. Ciani, C. App. Roma 17/2/2000. Nota, in «Foro Italiano», I, 2000, pp. 1697-1702
 
579 It’s a Court of second degree as the case has dealt with the registration of a foreign judicial decision (see 

art. 67, act. N. 218/1995)
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Britain with the same Englishwoman (the genetic and surrogate mother), who
bore two children: one in 1998 and one in 2001. She gave up her parental rights 
and, pursuant to two different parental orders, British authorities recognised the 
commissioning couple as legal parents. As Italian children’s birth certificates 
indicate only the genetic parents, the “social mother” asked the judges to order
the Bari mayor to change these documents, effectively enforcing in Italy the
parental orders issued by British judges. The Civil Court of Bari approved the
instance. The decision is based on some principles that are very progressive in 
the Italian legal context: 1) surrogate motherhood, as it is permitted in some
Member countries, does not contrast with international public order; 2) the best
interest of the child is a primary consideration for every judicial decision
(according to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of New York, 20
November 1989) and 3) in the case of Bari, the best interest of child is the 
recognition of the “social mother” as the legal mother; finally, 5) favor filiationis
can be a higher priority than favor veritatis. 
[There was no referral to the Cassation Court] 
	 The latest case arose in the Civil Court of first instance of Napoli in
1/7/2011. A single man benefited from a surrogacy arrangement in Colorado 
and became the father (both the genetic, and legal father according to Colorado
rulings) of two children580. 
He asked the Neapolitan judge to recognize his parental status. In this case, the 
Court also approved the instance, decreeing that “the forbidding of surrogacy is
not found in the need to guarantee the constitutional principles about child 
protection, but this forbidding is based on a legislator’s choice”. So, a child’s birth
certificate which is issued abroad does not contrast with the Italian public order,
as it is possible to “harmonize the domestic ban of using surrogacy arrangements
in Italy with the recognition of the parental relation between the social father and 
the child born due to surrogacy in the U.S.A”. [There was no appeal.]
It’s also worth noting one last case which is presently in front of the European 
Court of Human Rights : the Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy case, introduced on 
27 April 2012. A surrogacy contract was agreed between an Italian couple and a
Russian company, « Rosjurconsulting ». A child was born from a Russian woman.
The birth certificate states that the child is the son of the Italian couple of intent.
Upon their return to Italy, the parents asked to have the birth certificate 
transcribed, but the Italian administration (Ufficiale di Stato civile) refused to do 
so under the premise that the birth certificate did not state the name of the real
parents. 
It dealt with a very special case of surrogacy, because neither the intended father
nor the intended mother were the genetic parents of the child born through the 
Russian woman. Biological tests were indeed carried out.  
This couple avoided not only the ban on reproduction with gametes from donors,
but the rules about the adoption too. The Court for minors had to declare a state 
of abandon (and adoptability) regarding the child, because the biological parents
were unknown and the intended parents could not be considered parents – 
according to Italian law – without any genetic or legal ties to the minor. The Court 
refused to foster the child to the intended parents. The judgment denying the 
foster is related to the discretion of the judges, as it is generally employed in the 
580 It was not possible to know who was mentioned as the mother in the birth certificate and if the father lived 
with a partner. 
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Italian Court of minors. The Court of Appeal confirmed the first judgment581. The
child was entrusted to the social services and placed in foster care. The couple 
has no contact with him. 
It will be interesting to know the ruling of the Civil Court called to decide about
the transcription of the child’s birth certificate. But neither the civil sentence nor 
the Penal Court’s sentence (about the violation of the art. 567 of Italian Penal 
Code) has yet been published.
2) The best interest of the child is a principle recalled by judges with different opinions,
in different ways. The Court of Monza (1989), using a too restrictive interpretation of art. 
30 of the Italian Bill of Rights, refers to the right to grow up with one’s genetic parents.
This argument does not appear very important when it comes to making a decision, as
the judges focus on the invalidity of the agreement according to rules pertaining to
contracts in civil code.  
The Court of Bari (2009) found its decision on the best interest of the child as a primary
consideration and used such a notion to allow the enforcing of the British parental order
in Italy. The interpretation of the judges of Bari underlay the need for analysis, in each
single case, of the material, deep, real issues of the child, supporting the innovative
conception of the prominence, in some case, of the favor filiationis over the favor 
veritatis. The proceedings, rather than affirm the truth at any cost, have to guarantee 
above all the well-being of the child. So, in the case of Bari, the children require: 1) to
have a definite status filiationis and not two different statuses, one in Britain, one in
Italy; 2) to continue to live with their social mother even if the genetic reality indicates
another woman. 
Favor filiationis is a notion generally used in decisions about divorce. It was considered
the main principle to be followed when the divorcing couple has children and it was
necessary to solve capital and practical issues related to them.  
There is no real difference between the notions “best interest of the child” and favor
filiationis. The Italian judges used both expressions with the same meaning. 
Nevertheless, the second one could be thought more precise and immediately related to
the condition of the child within the family: the child considered as a member of a
parental group, the child to be protected as a daughter or a son. There is a new, heavy,
question for Italian jurists: following the introduction of special technology such as ART
and surrogacy, what is the best interest of the sons and the daughters born due to these
arrangements? Is it more important to protect the right to the genetic truth or the right
to grow up with the intended parents? The last two Italian decisions (Bari and Napoli)
gave a clear answer to this issue.   
3) The protection of the “family life” emerged in the decision of Bari (2009). In this case, 
the children had lived with the intended mother since their birth, and the family was
founded on social ties only. According to the judges’ interpretation, the interest of the 
children to live “at home”, within the only family they knew, is the first interest to
protect. In this case, the principle of respect of family life mirrored the notion of favor 
filiationis. 
4) In the cases analysed, if the intended mother is also the genetic mother, it does not 
make a difference to the judicial reasoning. Italian judges have never focused on these 
two different situations because of the presence of art. 269 par. 3 (“the mother is the 
woman who bears the child”), so the most important point in the judicial reasoning has 
always been the difference between “social” and “bearing” mother. 
581 These cases were not publicised and they are not described in the most famous generalist legal reviews. 
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5) In Italy, the intended parents can adopt a child after he/she has been delivered and 
handed over to them by the surrogate mother in order to obtain legal parenthood582. In
particular, the judge of Monza (1989) proposed that the intended mother adopt the child 
as solution to the case.
6) The cases of Bari (2009) and Napoli (2011) deal with the recognition of documents 
relating to the surrogacy arrangement and issued in another country. In the first case, 
the document is a judicial one: a parental order attributing legal motherhood to the 
Italian intended mother. In the case of Napoli, the document is a birth certificate. In
both situations the intended parents had petitioned the relevant administrative office for 
the registration of each document. As a consequence of the refusal, both the intended
mother of Bari and the intended father of Napoli have commenced judicial proceedings. 
The judges accepted to recognise both types of document at all. So, we could say that 
paternal genetic connection is no more a favoured condition than intended motherhood. 
7) The administrative office in charge refused to recognise the foreign documents for 
reasons of “public order”, following a strict interpretation of art. 16 act 218/1995: 
“Foreign law is not enforceable if its effects contrast with the public order”, it identified
the public order with the domestic law. In Italy surrogacy is banned, so such foreign 
documents are not legal.
In a broader interpretation of the rulings of Bari and Napoli, the “public order” has to 
mean a notion of international order, that is the need to guarantee that human rights 
and dignity are universally recognised. According to such reasoning, neither the British
parental orders nor American birth certificate damage the public order, even if in Italy
surrogacy is illegal583. 
8) It seems the Italian judges use a consistent language. 
9) In the context of surrogacy cases, the Courts appeared more able to accept the issues
coming from public opinion rather than legislative or administrative institutions. In the 
context of surrogacy cases, Italian judges don’t have more discretion or more freedom to 
decide; they are ordinary judges in ordinary courts; they have the power to apply the
law following a complex procedure of interpretation. On the one hand they suggest the 
need for legal reform, on the other hand they take on a substitute creative role, and 
through more liberal decisions they can bring new principles into the Italian set of rules.
Unfortunately the Cassation Court has not even decided about surrogacy cases; we have 
to wait for a statement of the Unified Sections of Cassation in order to discern the main
determining tendency of Italian jurisprudence. The power of such a decision could really
influence the legislature’s next choices. 
582 See point 10 of “Legislation”
 
583 See M. Castellaneta, Dietro l’interesse del minore si nasconde il rischio di un turismo procreativo, in
 
Famiglia e minori, 5, 2005, pp. 66-69; L. Mazzanti, G. Pavan,
 
http://www.studiocataldi.it/news_giuridiche_asp/news_giuridica_11416.asp
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6.7. THE NETHERLANDS 
A Legislation
1. The legal framework of gestational surrogacy
There is no specific legislation setting out guidelines for questions raised by surrogacy in
the Netherlands. Non-commercial gestational surrogacy was first regulated at the 
initiative of the Dutch Health Minister. The Act adopted on 1 April 1998 relative to the
institutions that practice in vitro fertilization (IVF)584 sets out that gestational or high-
technology surrogacy should respect the directives adopted by the Dutch Society for 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology585. This regulation also states that surrogacy by IVF can only
take place if the surrogate mother has already given birth to at least one child and
information on the (psycho-social and legal) consequences of resorting to surrogacy 
have been clearly communicated to the interested parties. However, in the absence of
legislation specifically addressing surrogacy, the civil aspects of surrogacy are not
regulated. As a consequence, no legal provision regulates the transfer of parenthood 
between the surrogate mother and the intended parents586. 
At the criminal level, certain provisions criminalize the commission of certain acts
committed as part of a commercial surrogacy. The Dutch legislator's objective to fight
against commercial surrogacy has thus resulted in the introduction in 1993 of article 
151(b) in the Dutch Criminal Code587. 
At present, the Dutch legislator is among others facing two questions: should Dutch
family law be adapted to oversee the civil aspects of a surrogacy procedure performed
on the national territory and facilitate the transfer of parenthood between the surrogate 
mother and the intended parents? Should he further tweak Dutch private international
law rules to facilitate the recognition of the parent-child relationship established abroad 
as a result of a surrogacy?588 
584 Act on In Vitro Fertilization of 1 April 1998, Staatscourant 1998/95, pp. 14-18 (« Planningsbesluit In Vitro 
Fertilisatie »). 
585 « Hoogtechnologisch draagmoederschap », Richtlijn Nederlandse Vereniging voor Obstetrie en 
Gynaecologie, n° 18 January 1999, www.nvog.nl. See the explicit reference made to the directives adopted by 
the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology in its annex, point 2.4 : “Application of in-vitro fertilisation in 
combination with surrogacy takes place in accordance with the rules laid down in the protocol that should be in
accordance with the directive “High-tecynology surrogacy” (“Hoogtechnologische draagmoederschap”) of the
Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology of 1999, and occurs solely if the mother already has one or more 
children”. 
586 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 
Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 
international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
Legislation, 2011, p. 206, citing the Minister for Health : « Transfer from one set of parents to another set of 
parents must take place by means of voluntary divestment of parental responsibility of one set of parents, 
after which the intended parents can be vested with parental responsibilities and will eventually have to adopt 
the child » (Dutch Second Chamber 1996-1997, 25 000-XVI, n° 62, p. 13). 
587 Act of 16 September 1993, Staatsblad 486 and M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double
dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, 
Proceedings of the 8th Congres of international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July
2010, Paris, Society of Comparative Legislation, 2011, p. 205. In reality, there is no provision of the Dutch 
Criminal Code explicitly punishing the resort to commercial surrogacy. The Criminal Code punishes only certain 
acts committed in the framework of a contract of surrogacy performed in exchange of a fee. Voy. K. BOELE­
WOELKI, I. CURRY-SUMNER, W. SCHRAMA and M.J. VONK, Draagmoederschap en illegale opneming van kinderen
(Surrogacy and illegal placement of children), Utrecht, Utrecht Centre for European research into Family Law,
2011, p. 36 (www.rijksoverheid.nl). 
588 M.J. VONK and K. BOELE-WOELKI, « Surrogacy and Same-Sex Couples in the Netherlands », in Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. National, Cross-border and European Perspectives (ed. K.
Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs), 2nd ed., Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 138. 
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2. Types of surrogacy
There are only provisions to oversee non-commercial gestational surrogacy in the 
Netherlands. There are no provisions on traditional or low-technology surrogacy – i.e.
surrogacy that doesn’t require IVF – although it isn’t forbidden.
3. Access to surrogacy: profile of applicant parents and medical indications  
The Act of 1 April 1998 relating to institutions engaged in in vitro fertilization provides
that recourse to gestational surrogacy must comply with the guidelines established by 
the Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, including the requirement that the intended 
parents (married or not, in a partnership or not) are able to provide all of the genetic 
material necessary to the conception of the child. As a result, only heterosexual couples
have access to gestational surrogacy, since same-sex couples and single persons are not
able to provide all of the genetic material necessary to the conception of a child. In 
practice, surrogacy centres reserve access to surrogacy to married heterosexual couples
who come together with their surrogate mother589. Nothing prevents same-sex couples
or a single man to resort to traditional or low-technology surrogacy, which would in this 
instance be performed outside of any legal framework. As long as surrogacy is not for
profit, the interested parties do not violate Dutch law. Under these assumptions, the 
surrogate mother is the child’s genetic and biological mother.  
The Act of 1 April 1998 relating to institutions engaged in in vitro fertilization further
requires a medical certificate establishing that surrogacy is the only option for the
intended mother to have a child to which it would be genetically related, because a 
pregnancy would be impossible (due to the congenital absence of a uterus or due to a
hysterectomy performed following a malignant infection) or dangerous for her. The
guidelines of the Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology specify in which medical context 
the intended mother can turn to surrogacy, whilst excluding the possibility of using 
surrogacy for simple reasons of personal convenience. 
4. Repression of commercial surrogacy 
To combat commercial surrogacy, the Dutch Parliament introduced article 151(b) in the 
Dutch Criminal Code in 1993.  
Under article 151(b) of the Criminal Code, it is an offence to cause or promote, as part of 
his/her professional activity, the contact, direct or not, between, on the one hand, a 
surrogate mother, or a woman who wants to become one, and, on the other hand, 
another person. The perpetrator of such an offence shall be liable to a prison sentence of 
maximum one year or a fourth category fine, i.e. a fine of 6,701 to 16,750 €.  
Article 151(c) can be applied to surrogacy, even though it doesn’t mention it, and 
punishes anyone who causes or promotes, as part of his/her professional activity, the 
fact that a mother agrees, directly or not, to give her child to another person so that the 
latter takes care of it durably. The perpetrator of such an offence shall be liable to a 
prison sentence of maximum six months or a third category fine, i.e. a fine of 3,351 to
6,700 €. 
589 M.J. VONK and K. BOELE-WOELKI, « Surrogacy and Same-Sex Couples in the Netherlands », in Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. National, Cross-border and European Perspectives (ed. K.
Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs), 2nd ed., Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 126.
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5. Financial aspects of altruistic surrogacy 
Altruistic surrogacy implies that the parents must take care of the expenses related to
IVF, to the pregnancy and to the delivery, if those are not covered by insurance, as well 
as the expenses relating to the adoption procedure, to the insurance, and to the legal 
charges590. 
6. Absence of forced execution of surrogacy agreements 
Any surrogacy agreement providing that the surrogate mother has the obligation to hand
over the child to the intended parents is null as it contravenes to public order and good 
morals and can therefore not be enforced. However, the centres supervising surrogacy 
by IVF ask the parties to sign a contract whereby they agree to a series of clauses, 
including potential rights to claim damages, which in the doctrine are controversial as to
their validity and the possibility of their execution. The legality of the contract is
controversial; however it helps the judge in charge of the adoption procedure to
understand what the intentions of the parties were at the time of signature of the 
contract591. 
7. Absence of a pre-birth judgement system 
There is no pre-birth judgment system in the Netherlands. The intended parents’ 
parenthood is established after the birth of the child through a judicial adoption 
procedure. 
8. Standards of protection of the surrogate	 mother and the intended 
parents 
The guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology pose a series of
conditions with among others the objective of protecting the parties involved in a
surrogacy agreement. 
- Age of the surrogate mother: according to the guidelines of the Dutch Society for 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the surrogate mother should be no older than 44 (aligned
to the age limit for an IVF with egg donation)592;
- Condition linked to the fact that the surrogate mother should have already 
given birth to a healthy child: the Act of 1 April 1998 relative to the institutions that 
practice in vitro fertilization requires that the surrogate mother has already given birth to 
a healthy child, whilst the guidelines set by the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology also provide that the surrogate mother should consider that her family is
complete; 
- Verification of the free and informed consent given by the surrogate mother:
according to the guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, all 
parties involved – that is the intended parents, the surrogate mother as well as her 
partner, if appropriate – must be informed orally and in writing of all the potential
consequences of this undertaking, be it on the medical, psychological or judicial fronts,
which should allow to verify the free and informed consent of the surrogate mother; 
590 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, « Non-commercial surrogacy : an account 

of patient management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004 », Human Reproduction,
 
2010, vol. 25, n° 2, p. 448.
 
591 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 208.
 
592 Beyond this age limit, there is uncertainty on the obstetric risks to the surrogate mother.
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- Medical and psychological examination of the surrogate mother: according to 
the guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the parties involved
should benefit from psychological support during and after the procedure. Moreover, on
a medical level, the guidelines stipulate that the number of embryos implanted into the 
surrogate mother should be limited to two in order to avoid the risks of multiple 
pregnancies;  
- Age of the intended parents: according to the guidelines of the Dutch Society for 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology, the intended mother should be no older than 40593; 
- Measures to make sure that it is impossible for the intended parents to
withdraw their consent: there seems to be no specific provision to make sure that the 
parents do not withdraw their consent. However, the procedure to be followed by the 
intended parents and the conditions imposed on them seem to be so strict that it seems
very unlikely that intended parents would withdraw their consent; 
- Conditions linked to the place of residence, home and/or nationality of the 
intended parents and/or of the surrogate mother: the guidelines of the Dutch
Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology don’t formulate any requirements in terms of 
place of residence, home or nationality. However, certain surrogacy centres lay down 
additional requirements to those stipulated in the guidelines, and require for example 
that the parties hold Dutch nationality and residence in the Netherlands594; 
- Counselling requirement: the guidelines of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology dedicate a paragraph to the requirement of counselling. It provides that all
parties, that is both the intended parents and the surrogate mother and her partner, 
should be informed in writing and orally of all aspects, risks and disadvantages of the
treatment, be on the medical, psychological or legal levels. The counselling is carried out
by a psycho-medical team who tries to bring out an informed consent, which will be
recorded in an agreement bringing together all parties involved, but also separately
consulting with, on the one hand, the intended parents, and on the other hand, the 
surrogate mother and her partner. The agreement among others stipulates the number 
of IVF attempts accepted by the surrogate mother as well as the moment and manner in 
which the child will be handed over to the intended parents. 
9. Rules determining parenthood  
In the absence of regulation governing the civil aspects of surrogacy, common law rules 
apply. Maternal filiation is therefore established for the surrogate mother, as she is the
woman who gave birth to the child, no matter whether she is genetically related to the 
child or not (art. 1:198 DCC) while the paternal filiation is established with respect to her 
husband if she is married (art. 1:199(a) DCC). If the surrogate mother is not married,
the father of intent can recognize the child with the consent of the surrogate mother and 
provided that there is a close personal relationship between the child and the father of 
intent (art. 1:204(1)(e) DCC). 
To establish parenthood of the child, the intended parents must turn to the adoption
procedure after the “surrogate parents” have been deprived of parental authority over
the child. In practice, the intended parents must report the situation to their 
municipality, which then refers the case to the Child Protection Council (authority from
whom permission to adopt must be requested) so that a social investigation can be 
performed. If the Council validates the parents’ request, the latter can initiate an
593 This age limit is based on the expected results of the ovarian stimulation and the small chance of success of 

a pregnancy through IVF for women aged over 40, due to the aging of their ovula.
 
594 French Senate, Comparative legislation study n° 182 relative to surrogacy, January 2008, available on the
 
following webpage: www.senat.fr, p. 25.
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adoption procedure under the condition that they have been living together for 3 years
and that they have been raising and taking care of the child for at least one year, period
during which they exercise joint guardianship (gezamenlijke voogdij) with respect to the
child (art. 1:228 DCC). No genetic link is required between the child and the parents who 
want to adopt it. Moreover, a single person can also adopt a child. 
In concrete terms, in situations involving surrogacy, the Child Protection Council refers
to the competent courts to seek the forfeiture of parental authority of legal parents 
(‘surrogate parents’) and the designation of the parents of intent as tutors. The request
for revocation of the parental authority of the ‘surrogate parents’ can only be introduced 
by the Child Protection Council and not by the parents of intent (art. 1:267 DCC). Most 
courts revoque the parental authority of 'surrogate parents' because of their inability to
care for the child as they did not intend to have it for themselves595. After caring for the 
child for a year, the parents of intent can then introduce an adoption procedure596. 
According to a study, this period is inappropriate as it subjects parents of intent and
surrogate mother alike to uncertainty for a year. This study therefore recommends the 
abolishment of this period to allow the parents of intent to adopt the child at birth597. 
10. Determination of the surname of the child
Since the Act of 10 April 1997, which amended the rules in the Netherlands relating to 
the assignment of the name, parents can choose to give their child its mother’s name or 
that of its father. Failing a choice, the child born during marriage receives the name of
the father. If the child is born out of wedlock, it keeps the name of its mother, unless the 
father recognises the paternity of the child and gives it his name (art. 1:5, al. 2 DCC)598. 
These rules also apply if the child has been born out of surrogacy. Some jurisprudence 
decisions listed below are used to illustrate the allocation of the name in case of
surrogacy. Thus, during a procedure of adoption started in the Netherlands as a result of
the forfeiture of parental authority of the surrogate mother and the designation of the
parents of intent as tutors, the parents of intent, who were unmarried, chose to assign 
the name of the father of intent to the child599. When surrogacy is carried out abroad and 
the child's surname is specified on a foreign birth certificate, it is recognized by the
Dutch authorities provided that the name has been established in accordance with the 
child’s national law, which is designated by the rules on conflict of law on names (art. 1 
Wet conflictenrecht namen or Private International Law (Names) Act)600. In one case, the
surrogacy was conducted in India and the child received the surname of the father of 
intent, in accordance with the choice made by the legal parents of the child: the father of
intent and the surrogate mother601. 
595 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 212.
 
596 M. ANDRE, A. MILON, H. DE RICHEMONT, Contribution à la réflexion sur la maternité pour autrui, Information 

Report n° 421, 25 June 2008, French Senate, p. 27, available online: www.senat.fr/rap/r07-421/r07-4211.pdf.
 
597 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, « Non-commercial surrogacy : an account 

of patient management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004 », Human Reproduction,
 
2010, vol. 25, n° 2, p. 448.
 
598 Law of 10 April 1997 amending articles 5 and 9 of Book 1 of the Civil Code and in respect of any other 

articles of this Code, Staatsblad 161.
 
599 Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039.
 
600 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844 : the surname of the child, as it was stated on 

the British birth certificate, was recognised by the Dutch authorities in enforcement of the rules on conflict of 

law on names (art. 1 Wet conflictenrecht namen). In this case, the surname of the parents of intent was
 
awarded to the child, in accordance with article 1:5, al. 3 and al. 8 of the Dutch Civil Code.
 
601 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627.
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11. Gamete donation
Since 2002, the donation of gametes is not anonymous anymore in the Netherlands. The 
law of 25 April 2002 on the gamete donor’s information abandons the double system of 
gamete donation that allowed donors to remain anonymous602. This Act applies to 
donations made after 1 June 2004603. It provides that within sixty weeks of the last
insemination, the following information must be sent to the 'Landelijke Stichting
Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting’ (National Foundation for information on
donors for artificial insemination): 
— Medical information on the donor, such as any relevant disease and the detailed
typology of the blood group; 
— Information that is non-constituent of the identity of the donor, such as physical 
characteristics, personality, social and family data; 
— The identity of the donor, such as his date of birth, his address, etc.
When a child reaches the age of 16, a child conceived through medically assisted 
reproduction with sperm donation has the possibility of obtaining the identity of the 
third-party donor, with the consent of the latter. However, if the donor refuses to reveal
his identity, only decisive reasons can justify the maintenance of anonymity because the 
interest of the child is considered as a priority.
12. Granting of Dutch citizenship to the child 
In the Netherlands, the nationality law is based on the principle of ius sanguinis and is
codified in the Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap (RWN)604. 
A child can be given full Dutch citizenship in different circumstances: 
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality as a 
consequence of the father’s/mother’s nationality and regardless of the child’s
place of birth (art. 3§1 RWN);  
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality due to the birth
of the child in the Netherlands: a child found on Dutch territory whose parents 
are unknown is granted Dutch citizenship if, within five years following its
discovery, the child is deemed to have no other nationality (art. 3§2 RWN); a 
child born in the Netherlands of at least one parent of foreign nationality residing
on Dutch territory is awarded the Dutch nationality if at least one of his 
grandparents was also born in the Netherlands to a Dutch parent residing on 
Dutch territory (art. 3§3 RWN); 
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality to a child whose 
parent has been legally given parentage over the child (art. 4§1 RWN) 
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality to a foreign child 
recognized by a Dutch citizen before the age of 7 (art. 4§2 RWN); 
602 Law of 25 April 2002 on the gamete donor’s information (Wet Donorgegevens Kunstmatige Bevruchting),
 
Staatsblad 240, 28 mai 2002.
 
603 French Senate, study of comparative legislation no. 182 concerning surrogacy, January 2008, available at:
 
www.senat.fr.
 
604 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap 19 December 1984, Staatsblad 628.
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- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality to a foreign child 
recognized by a Dutch citizen who demonstrates that he is his biological father 
within one year following the child’s recognition (art. 4§4 RWN);
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality to a foreign child 
adopted in the Netherlands if the child is a minor on the date of the pronunciation
of the adoption and if at least one of the adoptive parents is Dutch. The Dutch 
citizenship is awarded to the child within a period of three months following the
judicial decision declaring the adoption or, if an appeal is lodged, within a period
of three months following the judgment of the appeal court (art. 5 RWN); 
- Attribution by rights ("van rechtswege") of the Dutch nationality to a foreign child 
adopted abroad under certain conditions, including the fact that one of his 
adoptive parents have Dutch nationality (art. 5a RWN: adoption falling within the 
scope of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on the protection of children and
cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption; and 5b RWN: adoption governed 
by the law applicable to the recognition of adoptions in the Netherlands: Wet
conflictenrecht adoptie).
13. Model of surrogacy agreement
While any agreement relating to surrogacy is null and void due to its affront of morality
and public decency, some institutions ask the parties to sign an agreement in which
interested parties agreed on different points to, inter alia, preclude issues that may arise
during the pregnancy and to agree on the responsibilities of all the parties after the 
birth605. 
In collaboration with the Dutch Centre for Non-commercial IVF Surrogacy, which 
functioned from 1997 to 2004, lawyers thus met with the intended parents and the 
surrogate mother to discuss various points concerning the child (for example, what to do
in the case of multiple pregnancies or miscarriage) and the surrogate mother (for 
example, in case of complications during pregnancy or childbirth, on the behaviour of the
surrogate mother if she smokes, drinks or works, as well as the support provided by the 
parents of intent to the surrogate mother). The list of issues to be addressed also 
concerns legal questions (interview with a lawyer, adoption proceedings, drafting of a
will), financial aspects (insurance, support for the charges paid by the parents of intent), 
different terms (what should be revealed to the parents, children, friends and
colleagues; whether surrogacy should be disclosed or not) as well as on what to do in 
the event of conflict606. 
14. Organization governing the use of surrogacy
A surrogacy centre was created in Zaandam following the 1994 legislative changes 
punishing only commercial surrogacy: the Dutch Centre for Non-commercial IVF
Surrogacy. From 1997 to 2004, all parents of intent wishing to use surrogacy had to
verify their eligibility to the surrogacy with the Centre from a medical, psychological and
legal point of view. After this first stage, candidates for surrogacy were sent to one of 
the three clinics practicing IVF in the Netherlands (the Reiner de Graaf Hospital in
Voorburg, the Academic Medical Center University Hospital in Amsterdam, or the 
University Hospital in Groningen)607. In 2004, the Dutch Centre for Non-commercial IVF
605 French Senate, study of comparative legislation no. 182 concerning surrogacy, January 2008, available at:
 
www.senat.fr, p. 25
 
606 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, "Non-commercial surrogacy: year of patient 

account management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004", Human Reproduction,
 
2010, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 445
 
607 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, "Non-commercial surrogacy: year of patient 

account management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004", Human Reproduction,
 
2010, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 444.
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Surrogacy was forced to close because none of the IVF clinics in the Netherlands wished
to participate in a surrogacy program. In 2006, the surrogacy program was however
revived by the Free University Medical Centre in Amsterdam, which is therefore at
present the second centre for surrogacy by IVF in the Netherlands (Dutch Centre for IVF 
Surrogacy)608. This Center reserves access to surrogacy only to married heterosexual
couples who arrive with their own surrogate mother609. 
B Case law
1. The legal proceedings relating to surrogacy cases concern both internal situations610 
and international situations involving a surrogacy carried out in a Member State 
(Belgium611 or the United Kingdom612) or in a non-Member State (Russia613, the United 
States614, Ukraine615, India616), or a surrogacy carried out in the Netherlands but 
followed by an anonymous childbirth (“accouchement sous X”) in France617. 
The Dutch jurisprudence on cases of surrogacy can be consulted at the address
www.rechtspraak.nl. Most of the decisions cited in this study are available on this 
website. 
(a) Internal cases of surrogacy
In some of the internal cases of surrogacy, the father of intent files a paternity claim in
which he seeks to establish parentage through proof of a close personal relationship with 
the child.
- Rechtbank Almelo, 24 October 2000, FJR, 2001 (3) 91, cited by M.J. Vonk618: 
acknowledgment of paternity of a child born to a surrogate mother by a married
father of intent. The tribunal granted demand as soon as it appeared that there 
was a close personal relationship between the father of intent and the child
established by the fact that the child was living in the home of the parents of
intent since birth. 
- Rechtbank Assen, 15 June 2006, LJN AY7247 cited by M.J. Vonk619: filing of a 
prenatal recognition of paternity of a child carried by a surrogate mother (sister
608 Ibid., p. 449.
 
609 M.J. VONK and K. BOELE-WOELKI, « Surrogacy and Same-Sex Couples in the Netherlands », in Legal
 
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. National, Cross-border and European Perspectives (ed. K.
 
Boele-Woelki and A. Fuchs), 2nd ed., Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, Intersentia, 2012, p. 126.
 
610 See e.g. Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 21 June 2010, LJN: BN1309; Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 18 August
 
2011, LJN: BR 5334 and Centrale Raad van Beroep, 7 December 2011, LJN: BU7192.
 
611 Rechtbank Groningen, 20 July 2004, Rechtbank Utrecht, 26 October 2005, Rechtbank Utrecht, October 24,
 
2007, Rechtbank Utrecht, 7 May 2008, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 25 November 2008, Rechtbank Utrecht, 10 

June 2009, Gerechtshof Amsterdam, February 2, 2010 (case gave) and Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October 2008,
 
LJN: BG8903.
 
612 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844.
 
613 Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039.
 
614 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, 

European private international law on legal parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the 

principle of mutual recognition in legal parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at:
 
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540).
 
615 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 9 November 2010, LJN: BP 

616 Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10 January 2011, LJN: BP0426;
 
Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN : BU 3627. Rechtbank Haarlem, 28 November 2012, LJN:
 
BY4231.
 
617 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197.
 
618 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 210.
 
619 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 
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of the mother of intent) by a married father of intent (biological father). The 
tribunal refused to grant his application on the ground that there can be no close 
personal relationship between a man and an unborn child. 
In other situations, the Dutch courts were seized of cases designed to challenge 
paternity of the husband of the surrogate mother to establish filiation from the father of 
intent.
- Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 21 June 2010, LJN: BN1309: surrogacy was carried
out in the Netherlands between parents of intent of Dutch nationality and a 
surrogate mother of Dutch nationality who is related to the parents of intent
(sister of the mother of intent). The surrogate mother was inseminated with
sperm from the father of intent. She is therefore the genetic mother of the child 
(traditional or low-technology surrogacy). The filiation of the child is established
with the surrogate mother and her husband. The case initiated on behalf of the 
child (by a guardian or bijzonder curator) aims to challenge the paternal filiation
of the husband of the surrogate mother and to establish the paternity of the 
child's father of intent. In accordance with the rule of conflict of laws on filiation
(art. 2, al. 1 and art. 1 WCA), the action in contestation of paternity is governed 
by Dutch law as soon as it comes to the common nationality of the legal parents 
(i.e. the surrogate mother and her husband). Dutch law is also applicable to the 
issue of the establishment of paternal filiation of the biological father whenever it 
comes to the law of the common nationality of the mother and biological father
having validly challenged the legal father’s filiation (art. 6 WCA). As a
consequence, the Court refers to article 1:207, al. 1 of the Dutch Civil Code 
according to which the father of a child is the one that has "created it". Having
established that a "sperm donor" cannot be described as "progenitor" within the 
remit of the Dutch law, the tribunal refers to the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights relating to article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and notes that the European Court
ignores the distinction made by the Dutch legislator between a "progenitor father" 
and a "sperm donor father”. What matters is the combination of blood ties and 
the concrete circumstances of a family life. Therefore, the Court accepts the 
relationship of filiation of the biological father on the grounds that, under the
circumstances of the case, the latter maintains a "family life" with the child. This 
is the reason why he is entitled to the protection afforded by article 8 of the
ECHR. The tribunal grants the request and establishes the filiation of the 
biological father to the child.
As explained above in the section on the Dutch legislation, to establish their parentage 
with respect to the child, the parents of intent will have to wait until the legal parents or 
'surrogate parents' to be deprived of parental authority over the child, and until they are
themselves appointed as guardians. Providing they have lived together for at least three 
years, the parents of intent will be able to introduce a procedure for adoption after
having raised and cared for the child for a year. The Child Protection Council (Raad voor
Kinderbescherming) will initiate the case for the revocation of the legal parents’ parental
authority. 
- Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 18 August 2011, LJN: 5334 BR: surrogacy was
carried out in the Netherlands between a surrogate mother and a married same-
sex couple. A friend of one of the fathers of intent gave the egg that was fertilized
by the sperm of the other father of intent to then be implanted in a surrogate 
mother (gestational surrogacy with egg donation). The action is brought by the 
Raad voor de Kinderbescherming (Child Protection Council) in order to withdraw
international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
Legislation, 2011, p. 210. 
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parental authority from the surrogate mother and her husband (legal parents) 
and to place the children under the joint custody of the parents of intent
(homosexual couple). The Court granted the application and nominated the 
parents of intent guardians with regard to different elements: the interest of the 
children, the absence of financial stakes, the excellent relationship between the 
parents of intent and the “surrogate parents”, the emotional bonding between the 
parents of intent and the children, the biological link between the children and 
one of the two fathers of intent, the parents of intent’s desire for a child and the 
absence of pressure on the surrogate mother. 
Lastly, one of the decisions was made on social matters: the mother of intent was 
seeking maternity leave allowances. 
- Centrale Raad van Beroep, 7 December 2011, LJN: BU7192: surrogacy was 
carried out in the Netherlands between parents of intent of Dutch nationality and 
a surrogate mother of Dutch nationality who is related to the parents of intent
(sister-in-law of the mother of intent). The action brought by the mother of intent 
is to be awarded compensation during maternity leave ("zwangerschaps- en 
bevallingsuitkering"). The Court refused to grant her application on the ground
that the right to these allowances is only open to the legal mother, or to woman
who has given birth. The legislation on work and health (Wet arbeid en zorg -
Wazo) does not have formal legal effect on surrogate motherhood. 
b) International cases of surrogacy
The Dutch courts face a number of situations where surrogacy is conducted abroad,
whether in a European Union Member State, such as Belgium or the United Kingdom, or 
in a non-Member State, such as Russia, the Ukraine, the United States or India. If Dutch 
nationals go abroad despite the existence of a framework regulating surrogacy in the
Netherlands, it is probably because of the strict conditions laid down by the guidelines of
the Dutch Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology. It seems that few couples who 
started a surrogacy proceeding in the Netherlands were declared eligible in the end.
According to data on the 500 initial applications, only 13 couples have a child born as a 
result of surrogacy620. For all same-sex couples who are unable to provide all of the 
gametes or who know no surrogate mother, the realization of a surrogacy abroad is the 
only way to have a child genetically related to one of the parents of intent.
A decision in which surrogacy was carried out on the Dutch territory is classified among 
the decisions of international nature as childbirth took place anonymously in France 
(“accouchement sous X”), which led the Dutch courts to examine the recognition of
French birth certificate in the Dutch legal order.
620 See figures cited by S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, "Non-commercial 
surrogacy: year of patient account management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to
2004", Human Reproduction, 2010, vol. 25, no. 2, p.445-446. 300 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2806181/): mothers of intent out of 500 applications have
seen their application dismissed on the ground that they did not fulfil the basic conditions (those with no
surrogate mother, single mothers of intent, infertile couples who have already unsuccesfully tried IVF on 
several occasions). Out of the 202 remaining couples, only 105 were retained on the grounds that the other 97 
did not meet other conditions (mother of intend over 41 years-old, no medical contraindication of pregnancy 
for the mother of intent, medical contraindication for the surrogate mother, surrogate mother aged over 45,
etc.). Out of the 105 parents of intent, 58 withdrew their application or have not been accepted for medical
reasons. 47 couples attended the second meeting. Among the 47 couples, 10 withdrew their application or 
have seen their application dismissed. In the end, only 35 couples have started a surrogacy with IVF 
procedure. For various reasons, only 24 surrogates were inseminated, which resulted in 13 pregnancies. In
conclusion, of the 500 requests, only 13 couples managed to have a child through the surrogacy program. 
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France
- Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: surrogacy was 
realized between a Dutch surrogate mother and a homosexual couple whose 
spouses, Dutch nationals living in the Netherlands, had been married since 2001
(previously bound by a registered partnership (geregistreerd partnerschap), later
transformed into marriage). Surrogacy was done by artificial insemination of a 
surrogate mother, who is therefore the genetic mother of the child (traditional 
surrogacy). The birth of the child was anonymously in France. The French birth
certificate only mentions the name of the biological father as the father of the 
child. The Dutch civil registry officer refused to transcribe the birth certificate due 
to the absence of the name of the mother on it. The action is primarily filed with
the view of having the French birth certificate transcribed in the civil registry and 
set out in legal terms that the surrogate mother has given her consent to the 
recognition of paternity by the biological father. The second aim of the filing is to
establish the paternity of the biological father. The Court considers that the 
absence of the name of the mother in the birth certificate is contrary to Dutch 
public order, which is why it refuses to recognise the French birth certificate. The 
Court also refuses to declare that the surrogate mother has validly consented to 
the recognition of paternity by the biological father on the grounds that the 
surrogate mother had already declared this in the contract of surrogacy, while at 
that time she was not yet pregnant. With regards to the paternal filiation of the 
biological father, requested as an alternative, the tribunal refers to article 1:207, 
al. 1 of the Dutch Civil Code according to which the father of a child is the one
that has "created it". Having established that a "sperm donor" cannot be
described as "progenitor" within the remit of the Dutch law, the tribunal refers to
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to article 8 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
notes that the European Court ignores the distinction made by the Dutch
legislator between a "progenitor father" and a "sperm donor father”. What
matters is the combination of blood ties and the concrete circumstances of a 
family life. Therefore, the Court accepts the relationship of filiation of the 
biological father on the grounds that, under the circumstances of the case, the
latter maintains a "family life" with the child. This is the reason why he is entitled
to the protection afforded by article 8 of the ECHR. 
In the three following cases involving international cases of surrogacy (two conducted in 
Belgium and the third in Russia), Dutch courts have had to rule on questions of law: in
the first case, on the question of the maintenance of the child in the home of the Dutch
couple who want to adopt it; in the two latter cases, the delivery had taken place in the 
Netherlands and the Court was seized of the matter of forfeiture of parental authority of
the legal parents and the designation of the parents of intent as guardians. 
Belgium
- Rechtbank Groningen, 20 July 2004, Rechtbank Utrecht, 26 October 2005, 
Rechtbank Utrecht, 24 October 2007, Rechtbank Utrecht, 7 May 2008, 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 25 November 2008, Rechtbank Utrecht, 10 June 2009, 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam, February 2, 2010: case Donna: surrogacy was carried
out in Belgium between a Belgian surrogate mother and a Belgian couple of
intent. The surrogate mother was inseminated with sperm from the father of
intent (traditional surrogacy). As a result of the deterioration of the relationship
between the surrogate mother and the couple, the surrogate mother pretended 
that she had a miscarriage. After the birth, the surrogate mother entrusted baby
Donna to a Dutch couple, in return of payment. The Dutch couple informed the 
Dutch authorities that a newborn would soon arrive in their family and that they
would like to adopt it, without specifying that the child is coming from abroad.
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The case was referred to the Court of Utrecht, which has had to decide whether 
the child could stay with the Dutch couple despite the fact that they had not 
honoured the rules applicable to the adoption procedure when the child to be
adopted is foreign. Noting that there was a "family life" between the child and the 
couple insofar as Donna had been living in the home of the Dutch couple since 
her birth, the Court allowed the couple to keep Donna. Meanwhile, the Belgian
parents of intent had realised that the surrogate mother had lied to them and had 
given birth to 'their' child. More than two years after the birth of the child, a DNA
test showed that the Belgian father of intent was the biological father of the child.
Following this test, the Belgian father of intent started various procedures before 
the Dutch courts to get the child back and to be granted visitation rights. The 
courts however felt that it was not in Donna’s interest to leave the home in which
she had been growing up since birth, nor to grant her biological father a right of
access. The various protagonists of the Donna case were convicted in Belgium: 
12 October 2012, the Criminal Court of Oudenaarde sentenced the surrogate 
mother and her husband to a deferred imprisonment of one year and a fine of
1.650 EUR for inhumane and degrading treatment, it also sentenced the Dutch 
couple to a fine of 1.650 EUR while the Belgian couple of intent benefited from a 
suspended sentence. 
- Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October 2008 LJN: BG8903: surrogacy was carried out in 
Belgium with the gametes of intended parents implanted via IVF in the surrogate, 
who is the sister-in-law (brother’s wife) of the mother of intent (gestational 
surrogacy). Surrogacy has been carried out in Belgium and not in the Netherlands 
because of the age limit that the Dutch legislation subjects the mother of intent
to. The proceedings are instituted by the Raad voor de Kinderbescherming (Child
Protection Council) in order to remove parental authority of the surrogate mother 
and her husband (legal parents) and to place the child under the joint custody of 
the parents of intent so that they can adopt the children in one year’s time, in
accordance with Dutch law. The Court granted the application on the ground that 
it is in the interest of the children that the parents of intent be appointed as their 
guardians. 
Russia
- Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19
May 2009, LJN: BI5039: surrogacy was carried out in Russia with the gametes of 
the intended parents implanted via IVF into the surrogate, who is the mother of 
the mother of intent (gestational surrogacy). The proceedings are instituted by
the Raad voor de Kinderbescherming (Child Protection Council) in order to
remove parental authority of the surrogate mother and her husband (legal 
parents) and to place the child under the joint custody of the parents of intent.
The Court granted the application on the ground that it is in the interest of the
children that the parents of intent be appointed as their guardians. In accordance 
with Dutch law, the genetic parents filed an application to adopt the children one 
year after having been designated as guardians. The Court granted their request 
and orders the adoption of the children by the parents of intent, on the grounds 
that it is in the best interest of the children to have their filiation established with
their genetic parents. During the adoption procedure, the (unmarried) parents of
intent agreed to give the children the surname of their father of intent.
Finally, in other international cases of surrogacy, the Dutch courts must usually look into
the recognition of foreign birth certificates or into the issuance of travel documents to
children. In one case of surrogacy conducted in the United Kingdom however, the action
brought before the Dutch courts was to accede to the adoption of the child by the 
parents of intent. 
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United Kingdom
- Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844: surrogacy was 
carried out in the United Kingdom with the gametes of the intended parents 
implanted through IVF in the surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy). The 
father of intent is a Dutch-Austrian national and the intended mother is of
Austrian nationality. Although both are resident in the Netherlands, they decided
to carry out the surrogacy in the United Kingdom because they did not know
anyone in the Netherlands who would have agreed to be surrogate mother. They
therefore called upon an English organisation (Childlessness Overcome Through 
Surrogacy, COTS) that put them in contact with a surrogate mother. The child
was born in the United Kingdom and received British citizenship. The parents of 
intention file a procedure of adoption in the Netherlands. The Court states that
article 2 of the Wobka (Wet opneming Therefore buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter
adoptie), applicable to the adoption of foreign children, requires that prospective 
adoptive parents must obtain the approval of the Minister of Justice 
(beginseltoestemming) to be able to adopt a foreign child. In this case, such an
agreement was lacking. However, the Court held that by adopting the Wobka, the 
Ducth legislation did not intend to target children conceived with the genetic 
material of the adoptive parents. This is why candidates Dutch law shall apply to
an application for adoption sought as a result of an IVF surrogacy, and not the 
Wobka. As such, the Court grants adoption to the parents of intent after verifying 
that the surrogacy had been carried out in accordance with English law and met
the conditions laid down by Dutch law, namely that it was not a commercial
surrogacy and that the surrogacy complied with the guidelines laid down by the
Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology (medical indications, age of the surrogate
mother and the mother of intent, surrogate mother having already given birth to
a living child, counseling, etc.). The name of the child, such as shown on the 
British birth certificate (family name of the parents of intent) was recognized by
the Dutch authorities in accordance with the law applicable in respect of names 
(art. 1 Wet conflictenrecht namen conflict rule).
United States
- Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), 
unreleased621: surrogacy was carried out in California between a same-sex Dutch-
American couple residing in the United States and a US national. The Californian
birth certificates only mention the identity of the two fathers of intent as being 
the legal parents. Back in the Netherlands, the Dutch courts have refused to 
recognize the paternity of the two fathers on the grounds that the Californian
authorities had not established the maternity of the woman who gave birth to the 
children.
Ukraine
- Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 9 
November 2010, LJN: BP 3764: surrogacy was carried out in Ukraine with the 
gametes of the Dutch parents of intent implanted through IVF into the Ukrainian 
surrogate mother (gestational surrogacy). The action filed for interim proceedings 
concerns the issuance of travel documents to the children. This is rejected by the
Dutch Foreign Ministry on the grounds that the surrogacy done in Ukraine has of 
commercial nature, which is contrary to the Dutch public order. The Court in
interlocutory proceedings sentences the Dutch State to issue the travel 
621 Cited by J.S. KEES, European private international law on legal parenting?) Thoughts on a European
instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238,
available at: http: / / arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540 
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documents to the children after finding out that the parents of intent already
have a "family life" with the children under article 8 of the ECHR and that it is in
the interest of the parents and children that this "family life" is respected.
India
- Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10
January 2011, LJN: BP0426: surrogacy was done in India between an Indian 
surrogate and a Dutch same-sex couple, with an egg donation from an 
anonymous Indian woman. The ovum is fertilized by the sperm of one of the
fathers of intent and is then implemented into the Indian surrogate mother 
(gestational surrogacy). The birth certificate of the child mentions the name of 
the surrogate mother and the name of the biological father. The action filed for 
interim proceedings concerns the issuance of travel documents to the child. The 
Dutch Foreign Ministry refused on the ground that the child does not have the 
Dutch nationality, as no relationship of parentage exists between the biological 
father and him. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the fact that the
biological father’s name appears on the birth certificate does not mean that he 
should be regarded as the father of the child in Dutch law. The Court in 
interlocutory proceedings sentences the Dutch State to issue the travel 
documents to the child after establishing that the father of intent already has a
"family life" with the child and that as such, he is entitled to the respect of article 
8 of the ECHR. The Court also notes that it is likely that, as a result of this interim
judgment, the filiation of the child will be established with the father of intent,
which will allow the child to receive a Dutch passport. After balancing the various 
interests at stake, the Court finds that in the present case, the interests of the 
child and of the father of intent must take precedence over the interests of the 
Dutch state.
- Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: surrogacy was 
conducted in India between an Indian surrogate mother, a Dutch father of intent 
and an Irish mother of intent. The parents of intent are residing in the United 
Arab Emirates. Surrogacy was conducted with anonymous egg donation and 
sperm from the father of intent. The surrogate mother is not the genetic mother 
(gestational surrogacy). The Indian birth certificates mention the parents of intent
as the legal parents. Back in the Netherlands, the mother of intent seeks to 
transcribe the Indian birth certificates in the Dutch civil registry. The Registrar 
refuses the transcription on the grounds that the mother of intent cannot be 
mentioned in the birth certificate as being the legal mother since she did not give 
birth to the child. The action brought by the parents of intent aims at sentencing 
the Registrar to record the birth in the registers of civil status, to establish the 
Dutch nationality of the child and the legal parentage of the parents of intent. The 
Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction over the dispute on the grounds that the 
mother of intent and the child reside in the Netherlands, that the father of intent 
has the Dutch nationality, and that the child will receive Dutch citizenship due to 
the establishment of the paternal filiation by the Court (art. 3 Wetboek van 
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering). In accordance with the rule of conflict of laws on  
filiation, the Indian law shall apply to the determination of parentage of the 
surrogate mother to the child (art. 3 Wet conflictenrecht afstamming622 - WCA: 
the determination of the relationship between a woman and a child born out of 
wedlock is determined by this woman’s national law). According to Indian law,
when a child is born of a surrogacy with anonymous egg donation fertilized by the 
sperm of the father of intent, the surrogate mother and the father of intent are 
the legal parents of the child. As a result, the Indian birth certificate mentioning
the parents of intent as being both the genetic and the child's legal parents is 
622 Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act. 
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contrary to the Indian law and to reality and therefore contrary to public order as
far as, in Dutch law, the legal mother is the woman who gives birth to a child or
who adopted it (art. 1: 198 DCC). This legal provision must be regarded as a 
fundamental principle of the legal Dutch order. The mother of intent must use the
adoption procedure, as long as the Dutch legislation offers no alternative to 
establish a relationship between a mother of intent and a child born out of 
surrogacy. The Court therefore confirms the position of the Registrar and refuses 
to sentence him to transcribe the birth certificate in the Dutch civil registry.
To determine the paternal filiation from the father of intent, the Court applies the
Dutch law, designated by the rule of conflict of laws on filiation from the moment
the child's usual residence is located in the Netherlands and has spent most of his
life there (art. 6 WCA: determination of paternal filiation is governed by the law
of the residence of the child, in the absence of a common nationality between the 
father and the mother and failing for the father and the mother to have a 
common usual residence). In accordance with Dutch law, the paternal filiation is
established if the father is the progenitor of the child (art. 1: 207, 1st § DCC). In 
this case, when the child was conceived by IVF, the father of intent is the genetic 
father of the child and not its progenitor. Having established that a "sperm donor"
cannot be described as "progenitor" within the remit of the Dutch law, the 
tribunal refers to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to 
article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and notes that the European Court ignores the distinction made by the 
Dutch legislator between a "progenitor father" and a "sperm donor father”. What 
matters is the combination of blood ties and the concrete circumstances of a 
family life. The Court states that, under the concrete circumstances of the case, 
the biological father has a "family life" with the child and that as such, he is
entitled to the protection afforded by article 8 of the ECHR. As such, the Court
admits to establish the paternal filiation of the father of intent. In accordance with 
article 1: 5, § 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, the child bears the surname of the father
of intent, chosen by the surrogate mother and the father of intent who are the 
legal parents of the child.
With regard to parental authority and the temporary guardianship, the Dutch
Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction over the case according to article 8 of the 
Brussels II bis regulation, on the grounds that the child has its usual residence on 
Dutch territory. As the child usually resides in the Netherlands, Dutch law is
applicable in accordance with article 16 of the Hague Convention of 19 October
1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation 
in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. 
According to Dutch law, the surrogate mother has exclusive parental authority 
over the child. Insofar as the paternal filiation from the father of intent will be
established only after a period of three months following the decision by the 
Court, provided that an appeal is not lodged against this decision, he may not be 
vested with parental authority over the child. The case is postponed to a later 
date to allow the Court to rule on parental authority and the temporary 
guardianship. 
- Haarlem Rechtbank, 28 November 2012, LJN: BY4231: surrogacy has been
performed in India between an Indian surrogate mother and Dutch parents of
intent, who entered into a partnership registered in the Netherlands. Surrogacy 
was conducted using an anonymous egg donation. The ovum is fertilized by the
sperm of the father of intent and is then implemented in the Indian surrogate
mother (gestational surrogacy). The Indian birth certificate mentions the names 
of the surrogate mother and of the biological father as the child's legal parents. 
Shortly after birth, the father of intent of obtained a judgment from an Indian 
Court stating that he is the child's legal father. The father of intent then asked his 
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Consulate in Mumbai for a Dutch passport for the child. When the Consulate 
refused to issue a passport, he filed an interlocutory application. On 10 January 
2011, the Judge sentenced the Mumbai Consulate to issue a travel document to 
the child. Once the child arrived on Dutch territory, the biological father filed a 
declaration of paternity (November 2011). The juvenile court subsequently 
appointed the father of intent as guardian of the child. In May 2012, a Dutch 
passport was issued to the child. The proceedings introduced by the father of 
intent before the Court of first instance aim to establish that the Consulate 
wrongly refused to issue a Dutch passport to the child. The Court refuses to 
follow the father of intent and confirms the position of the Consulate as it
considers that the refusal to issue the passport was based on proper reasons 
since no parent-child relationship existed between the child and the father of
intent at the time of the passport application. The father of intent indeed declared
his paternity of the child upon the child’s arrival on the Dutch territory. In the 
Court's view, filiation with the father of intent was therefore established by this
recognition of paternity and not by the Indian birth certificate mentioning his 
name. Furthermore, referring to a report by the International Law Institute (IJI:
Internationaal Juridisch Instituut)623 according to which Indian law cannot
establish paternity by law, the Court refuses to acknowledge the relationship
established by the Indian Court. According to the same report, the mention of the 
name of the father of intent in the Indian birth certificate doesn’t establish with
certainty his filiation with respect to the child.
2. Analysis of the case law identified above demonstrates that the Dutch courts are 
faced with very diverse issues in surrogacy cases. 
In internal affairs, the Courts must often decide on the paternity claims by the father of
intent or on cases challenging the legal father’s paternity. Many cases concern the 
revocation of the parental authority of the legal parents followed by the designation of
the parents of intent as tutors. In this respect, certain decisions classified under the
heading of International Affairs (because the surrogacy was carried out abroad) actually
concern questions of internal law as the action does concern the recognition of a foreign
birth certificate but the revocation of the legal parents’ parental authority to entrust the 
guardianship of the children to the parents of intent624. 
In international surrogacy cases, the Dutch Courts had to decide on the issuance of
travel documents 625, the issuance of a Dutch passport626, the recognition of foreign birth 
certificates627 or even the adoption of a child born out of high-technology surrogacy628. 
The courts must also address other issues arising from the main action, such as that of 
the citizenship of the child629 or the allocation of a surname630. 
623 The decision of 28 novembre 2012 refers to a "report by the International Law Institute of the Hague from
 
27 March 2011", but does not provide a specific reference.
 
624 See for example: Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October, 2008 LJN: BG8903 (surrogate motherhood in Belgium),
 
Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039 

(surrogacy carried out in Russia).
 
625 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 9 November 2010, LJN: BP 

3764 and Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10 January 2011, LJN:
 
BP0426.
 
626 Rechtbank Haarlem, 28 November 2012, LJN: BY4231.
 
627 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627 and Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November
 
2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, European private international law on legal 

parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal 

parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540).
 
628 Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844.
 
629 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: in this case, the assignment of the Dutch 

citizenship to the child depended on the establishment of paternal filiation from the father of intent. However, 

it could only be established after a period of three months following the Court decision, and provided that the 
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Under no circumstances do the proceedings aim at request the enforcement of the 
contract, since the doctrine seems to consider that the clauses relating to the core 
obligations of the contract – i.e. the surrogate mother’s obligation to hand over the child 
to the parents of intent – are null and void. The question remains open for other clauses, 
such as those relating to the parents of intent’s coverage of costs related to the
pregnancy and childbirth. No proceedings have been filed to date relating to the 
implementation of such clauses. 
3. Most of the decisions on surrogacy have been made by Civil Courts ruling on the
merits or, for interim measures when the action is aimed at sentencing the Dutch state
to issue travel documents before ruling on the merits of the parent-child relationship.
Some cases however gave rise to criminal proceedings. In the case of Baby J., a Belgian
mother sold the child she was carrying to Dutch parents of intent for an amount of 7.500 
EUR (see Belgian report). The Dutch couple was prosecuted by the public prosecutor and
was sentenced by the Dutch courts to an 8 months prison sentence, 240-hours of
community service and a fine of 1000 EUR with a two-years suspended sentence for
forgery and illegal adoption (because they had not received written permission of the 
Minister of Justice prior to the arrival of the child in the Netherlands, which is contrary to
article 2 of the law on the adoption of children from abroad / Wet opneming buitenlandse
kinderen ter adoptie)631. 
Finally, a case was conducted on matters of social security: the mother of intent was
seeking pregnancy and childbirth allowances. However, the tribunal refused to grant her 
request, stating that the relevant legislation applied to the legal mother, being the
woman who gave birth to children632. 
4. Best interest of the child
The interest of the child is taken into account in cases concerning revocation of custody 
of the surrogate mother and her husband and the designation of the parents of intent as 
tutors. On several occasions, the Dutch courts thus felt that it was in the interest of the
children to be entrusted to the parents of intent’s joint guardianship to then be able to
be adopted by the latter633. In principle, this procedure for revocation of parental
authority is a measure for the protection of children when parents are no longer able to
care properly for their children, which is the reason why only the Child Protection Council 
may initiate the legal action, and not the parents of intent634. In the absence of a more
judgment was not appealed. In the decision, the Court establishes however that it is very likely that the child 
will receive Dutch citizenship, considering that the filiation from the Ducth father of intent was recognised. 
630 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: in this case, the surname of the father of intent
was awarded to the child, in accordance with article 1: 5, § 2 of the Dutch Civil Code, which states that the 
name should be chosen by the legal parents, in this case by the Indian surrogate mother and the Dutch father 
of intent. See also Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039: under the procedure for the adoption of 
children born of surrogacy, the parents of intent agreed to give the children the surname of the father of 
intent; and Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844: the name of the child, such as shown 
on the English birth certificate (family name of the parents of intent) was recognized by the Dutch authorities 
under the rules of conflict of laws on names (art. 1 Wet conflictenrecht namen). 
631 Rechtbank Zwolle, 14 July 2011, LJN: BR1608 (judgment condemning the woman) and LJN: BR1615 
(judgment condemning the man). 
632 Centrale Raad van Beroep, 7 December 2011, LJN: BU7192. 
633 Rechtbank Arnhem, 20 February 2008, LJN: BC8012 and Rechtbank Arnhem, 19 May 2009, LJN: BI5039:
“The Court grants the adoption in the apparent interest of the minors. It is in the interest of the minors that 
they are allowed a family relationship with their biological parents”; and Rechtbank Alkmaar, 29 October 2008:
“The Court considers that seeing the particular circumstances in which the [child] finds itself, and the 
associated inaptitude and/or incapacity of the surrogate parents, the appointment of the parents of intent as
guardians of the [child] will be the best guarantee of upholding the interests of [child]. The Court considers 
that the following provision is in the best interest of the child [child]”. See also Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 
18 August 2011, LJN: BR 5334. 
634 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 
Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 
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suitable procedure for these special situations, the procedure is also used in surrogacy 
cases. In these cases, the Courts deprive the surrogate parents of parental authority on
the ground that they are not able to care properly for the child, whom they did not
conceive for themselves. 
The Dutch courts also refer to the best interest of the child when they put forward the 
existence of a "family life" between parents of intent and the child (see below). These 
two concepts are then referred to concurrently by the courts to establish or recognize 
the parenthood of the parents of intent. 
5. Family life
The Dutch Courts refer to the concept of "family life" to establish635 or recognize636 the 
parentage of the father of intent, also the biological father, in respect of a child born out
of surrogacy, on the grounds that a biological father is entitled to the protection of the 
"family life" he has with his child under article 8 of the ECHR, no matter the 
circumstances of the pregnancy. In other words, the Dutch jurisprudence refers to article 
8 of the ECHR and the concept of "family life" to disregard the distinction made in Dutch
law between a "progenitor father" and a "sperm donor father", according to which the 
paternal filiation may only be established with the man who "created" the child (art.
1:207 DCC) and not with the man who only gave his semen. The Dutch courts have 
found that the European Court was unaware of this distinction. What matters is the 
combination of blood ties and concrete circumstances that there is a family life, which
the Courts check on basis of factual circumstances637. 
The Dutch courts also refer to the ECHR’s article 8 concept of "family life" to sentence
the Dutch state to issue travel documents to children born of a surrogacy in Ukraine638 
and India639 as soon as they discover that the parents of intent have already a family life
with the child.
Finally, in the case of Donna, the Dutch courts decided to let Donna stay in the home of
the parents of intent on the grounds that a "family life" – as defined in article 8 of the 
ECHR – existed between the parents and Donna, who had been living in the home of the 
Dutch couple since she was three days old640. 
6. Egg donation and genetic reality
The fact that the surrogacy was carried out through egg donation doesn’t seem to
change the reasoning of the Courts, either because the actions concern the
establishment of the mother of intent’s maternal filiation (the parents of intent are a 
international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
Legislation, 2011, p. 212. 
635 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, June 21, 2010, LJN: BN1309. 
636 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197 (surrogate motherhood in the Netherlands
with anonymous delivery in France) and Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627 (surrogate
motherhood in India). 
637 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: “Under this article [art. 8 ECHR], the
biological father who has a "family life" with his child has the right on the "right to protection of family life", 
irrespective of the way in which the pregnancy was incurred. The Court must thus determine whether in the 
present case there are sufficient concrete circumstances on the basis of which the existence of "family life" can 
be assumed. Considering that the minor was included in the family of the man and [Mr C] after his birth and 
that they have since then taken on the care and upbringing of the minor, the Court considers that it is 
established that there is a "family life" between the man and the minor. Considering that the man is the 
biological father and that there is "family life", the Court is of the opinion that the man in this case should be 
equated with the parent, so that the request of the “particular guardian” (“bijzondere curator”) can be 
received”. 
638 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 9 November 2010, LJN: BP 3764. 
639 Rechtbank Haarlem (Interlocutory proceedings - Voorzieningenrechter), 10 January 2011, LJN: BP0426. 
640 Rechtbank Utrecht, 26 October 2005, LJN: AU4934. 
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homosexual couple641), or because, in any event, the legal mother is the woman who 
gives birth regardless of whether she is the genetic mother of the child or not642. The
Dutch Courts never accept to recognize the parentage of the mother of intent (even if
she is the genetic mother), as they consider the rule recognising filiation to the woman
who gives birth as being of public order (see below). To establish filiation, the mother of 
intent must always introduce a procedure of adoption.
However, the fact that the mother of intent is also the genetic mother of the child seems 
to have been taken into account in a case where the parents of intent did not follow the
rules applicable to a procedure for adoption of a foreign child. The Court indeed held that
the Dutch law did not intend to apply the law on the adoption of a foreign child (Wet
opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie) when this child is conceived with the 
genetic material of the parents of intent. The Court therefore granted the adoption
despite the fact that the parents did not respect the procedure, namely that they had not
obtained the agreement of the Minister of Justice643.
7. As explained above, the mother of intent may adopt a child born out of surrogacy 
provided that the legal parents or "surrogate parents" have been deprived of their 
parental authority and the child has been placed under her supervision for at least a 
year. If she meets the other conditions set out by the law, the Court will confirm the 
adoption. 
8. The establishment of parentage in the Dutch legal order following a 
surrogacy conducted abroad 
When surrogacy presents a cross-border aspect, the Dutch courts apply their rules of 
private international law to decide of the parent-child relationship established abroad in
the Dutch legal order.
Two different scenarios should however be considered: on the one hand, where the
parents of intents’ parentage is established in accordance with the parentage law of the 
country where the child is born, either directly in the birth certificate or as a result of a 
judicial decision; on the other hand, where the parentage of the parents of intent is the
result of an adoption pronounced abroad. These two situations must be distinguished 
because the rules for determining the law applicable to the recognition of parentage will
be different. 
In the first case, Dutch private international law rules on filiation are applicable. These 
are codified in the Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act (Wet conflictenrecht afstamming).
Where specific private international law rules on surrogacy are missing, the general rules
are used. With regards to parentage, section 10 of the Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act 
establishes the rules with regards to the recognition of a legal act (e.g. the paternity
recognition made abroad for a child born to a surrogate mother) or of a legal fact (e.g. a 
legal fact established by a foreign birth certificate). The Dutch civil registry officer will 
thus have to check whether the parent-child relationship mentioned in a foreign filiation
act was validly established under foreign law and if the Dutch public order has not been
violated. According to article 10(2) of the Parentage (Conflict of Laws) Act, a foreign act 
establishing a recognition of paternity is contrary to Dutch public order if, in particular,
this recognition was made by a Dutchman who did not have the right to recognize the
641 See e.g., Rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch, 18 August 2011, LJN: BR5334: the fact that surrogacy has been
 
completed with an egg donation had no impact on the procedure that was designed to remove parental
 
authority from the legal parents and invest the parents of intent of a guardianship over the child; and 

Rechtbank Haarlem, 10 January 2011, LJN: BP0426: the action was aimed at the issuance of travel documents
 
to a child born of a surrogacy acrried out in India, in which the parents of intent are a homosexual couple, 

which explains the fact that the Court is not attached to the fact that there was an egg donation.
 
642 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627.
 
643 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN BB9844.
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child according to Dutch law (Art. 1: 204 (1) (e) ACS: conditions for the recognition of
paternity). If the parent-child relationship is the result of a Court order, the Dutch civil 
registry officer must ensure that the conditions laid down by article 9 of the Parentage 
(Conflict of Laws) Act, including the rule on the Dutch public order exception, have been
respected644. 
In the second case, three instruments are likely to apply: the Hague Convention of 29 
May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, the rules of Dutch private international law on recognition of adoptions (Wet
conflictenrecht adoptie) and the Dutch law regulating the adoption of foreign children
(Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie or Wobka)645. 
One of the decisions listed above is used to illustrate the first scenario. Seized of a 
request for transcript of Indian birth certificates establishing filiation of the parents of
intent, the Court examined its jurisdiction and sought the law applicable under the rules 
of Dutch private international law. It declared itself competent after finding that the
mother of intent and the child reside in the Netherlands, that the father of intent has the 
Dutch nationality and that the child will most likely receive Dutch citizenship if filiation
from the father of intent is established (art. 3 Wetboek van Burgelijke Rechtsvordering).
Next, it determines that the establishment of the maternal filiation is governed by Indian
law, as it is the law of the surrogate mother’s nationality (art. 3 Wet conflictenrecht 
afstamming, WCA) while the establishment of paternal filiation is governed by Dutch law, 
being the law of the State where the child is usually resident and where he has spent 
most of his life (art. 6 Wet conflictenrecht afstamming, WCA)646. 
The second scenario can be illustrated by the case of a surrogacy carried out in the 
United Kingdom. The action brought before the Dutch Courts by the parents of intent 
aimed to see pronounced the adoption of a child born out of IVF surrogacy in the United
Kingdom. In this case, the parents should ask for the consent of the Minister of Justice to
adopt the child, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Dutch law regulating the
adoption of foreign children (Wet opneming buitenlandse pleegkinderen ter adoptie or 
Wobka). However, the Court considered that the situation was outside of the scope of 
the Wobka as the child was conceived with the genetic material of the parents of
intent647. 
9. Public order exception
The Dutch courts consider that foreign laws that allow the establishment of maternal 
parentage towards the mother of intent who has not given birth to the child are contrary
to the Dutch public order. In the case of a surrogacy conducted in India, in which the 
name of the mother of intent was included in the Indian birth certificate, the Court thus 
stated that the rule according to which the mother of a child is the one that gave birth to 
this child (art. 1:198 CCD) should be considered as a legal and social principle that is
fundamental to Dutch society. As a result, the Court refused to transcribe the Indian
birth certificate in the register of births648. The Dutch Courts likewise refuse to recognise 
foreign (Californian) birth certificates that mention the identity of two fathers of intent
(homosexual couple) as being the parents of the child without mentioning the identity of
644 I. CURRY-SUMNER and M.J. VONK, “National and International Surrogacy: an Odyssey”, in The International 

Survey of Family Law, 2011, Edition (ed. B. ATKIN), Bristol, Family Law, 2011, pp. 272 – 277.
 
645 M. J. VONK, « Netherlands: Maternity for another : a double dutch approach », in Gestation pour autrui : 

Surrogate motherhood (dir. F. MONÉGER), coll. Colloques, vol. 14, Proceedings of the 8th Congres of 

international comparative law, held in Washington DC from 25 to 31 July 2010, Paris, Society of Comparative
 
Legislation, 2011, p. 215.
 
646 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU3627.
 
647 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 11 December 2007, LJN: BB9844.
 
648 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 362: “In the view of the Court, this rule reflects
 
principles of legal and social nature that are considered as fundamental in the Dutch society”.
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the surrogate mother, on the grounds that the rule mater semper certa is of public
order649. 
The Courts reason in the same way when it turns out that the birth certificate does not 
mention the name of the mother who gave birth. Thus, in case of a surrogacy that 
involved an anonymous birth in France (“accouchement sous X”), the Court held that the 
absence of the name of the mother in the birth certificate was contrary to the Dutch 
public order, which is the reason why it refused to sentence the civil status officer to 
transcribe the deed in the civil registry650. The Court decides on the basis of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which sets out that a child has the right to know
his parents and be cared for by them, whenever possible, and specifies that article 1:198
of the Dutch Civil Code whereby the mother is the woman who gives birth to a child is a
fundamental public order principle of family law.
10. Judges use the terms of “draagmoederschap” to talk about surrogacy and call the 
parents of intent “wensmoeder” (mother of intent) and “wensvader” (father of intent) 
while the surrogate mother and her husband are sometimes referred to as “carrying 
parents” (“draagouders”). 
11. Surrogacy cases provide an opportunity for judges to point out that, at present,
Dutch law does not allow parents of intent to establish a direct relationship with a child 
born of surrogacy and that they have no choice but to resort to adoption651. In none of 
the cases identified in this report do the Courts however suggest that Parliament should 
adopt a law governing the civil aspects of surrogacy. Some studies have on the other 
hand denounced the period of one year during which the parents of intent must wait
before they can introduce a procedure of adoption, as they view this time laps as a 
source of uncertainty and anxiety652. 
12. When ruling surrogacy cases, it seems that the Courts exclusively refer to similar
case law and do not draw on cases in other areas of the law, such as adoption or IVF
cases. 
13. The Dutch legislation represses the surrogacy business. As such, the Dutch
Prosecutors continue to sue the parents of intent when it turns out that they have 
"bought" the child. This was the case in the case of Baby J where the Dutch couple was
649 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 (328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, 
European private international law on legal parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition in legal parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at: http: / /
arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540) : "The judicial decision from the Superior Court of California of 15th April
2008 cannot be recognised since this is contrary to Dutch public policy, bearing in mind the aformentioned 
fudamental rule of family law (mater semper certa is) and the fact that the judicial decision was ordered 
without the legal mother first being determined"(translated by I. CURRY-SUMNER and M.J. VONK, “National and 
International Surrogacy: an Odyssey”, in The International Survey of Family Law, 2011, Edition (ed. B. ATKIN), 
Bristol, Family Law, 2011, p. 279). 
650 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 14 September 2009, LJN: BK1197: "Registration of the French birth certificate
conflicts with the Dutch public order". In a similar sense, see Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 23 November 2009 
(328511/FA RK 09-317), unreleased (cited by J.S. KEES, European private international law on legal 
parenting?) Thoughts on a European instrument implementing the principle of mutual recognition in legal 
parenting, 2010, no. 7.2.1.3.3, p. 238, available at: http: / / arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=19540) : the Dutch 
courts have refused to recognize California birth certificates on the grounds that it did not establish the 
maternity of women who have given birth to children. 
651 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: "If the Dutch legislation does not provide other 
opportunities in that regard, the woman can not be recognised as the legal mother of the minor and the 
woman should, in the opinion of the Court, adopt the minor, to be able to register as a legal mother in the civil 
status registries". 
652 S. DERMOUT, H. VAN DE WIEL, P. HEINTZ, K. JANSEN and W. ANKUM, "Non-commercial surrogacy: year of patient 
account management in the first Dutch Centre for IVF Surrogacy from 1997 to 2004", Human Reproduction,
2010, vol. 25, no. 2, p.448 
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sentenced for having purchased a child to a mother and her husband (the child's
biological parents) for an amount of 7.500 EUR653. 
In international cases, the Dutch courts don’t seem to worry about the financial aspects
of the agreement. In a case concerning a case of surrogacy in India, Dutch courts agreed
that it was not their responsibility to investigate the commercial nature of the 
agreement; since a child was born, the main objective was to take decisions in its 
interest654. In another case, the courts sentenced the Dutch state to issue the required 
travel documents despite the commercial nature of the agreement, considering the need 
to protect the privacy and family life of the people involved on the basis that they
already had a "family life" protected by article 8 of the ECHR (the Dutch State was 
refusing to issue travel documents on the basis that the surrogacy in Ukraine was of a 
commercial nature and was therefore contrary to Dutch public order)655.
14. The Dutch courts appear to have some flexibility in the handling of surrogacy cases, 
as the absence of specific legislation governing the civil aspects of surrogacy in domestic
law has led judges to “tinker” legal solutions from laws that were not quite suitable for
surrogacy. Thus, the procedure for revocation of parental authority is used to remove  
parental authority from the “surrogate parents” in order to be able to vest the parents of
intent with the guardianship of a child born out of surrogacy, which is a necessary step 
before starting an adoption procedure.  
On the other hand, the courts largely use of the concepts of "best interest of the child"
and "family life" to establish or recognize the relationship between the children and the 
parents of intent. The judges, however, may as well consider that it is not in the interest
of the child to see his filiation established towards parents that he is not genetically
related to. As long as no specific content is given to the concept of the best interest of
the child, judges that refer to it have a lot of power to decide with whom the parentage 
should be established.
At the international level, the lack of specific provision on surrogacy in private
international law also seems to allow the courts some room for the ruling on legal 
situations decided abroad. 
653 Rechtbank Zwolle, 14 July 2011, LJN: BR1608 (judgment condemning the woman) and LJN: BR1615 

(judgment condemning the man).
 
654 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 24 October 2011, LJN: BU 3627: “The court sees no reason to involve in its
 
judgment the question of whether this is commercial surrogacy. The fact is that the minor exists and that the 

Court considers that the best interest of the minor should inform the decision”.
 
655 Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, 9 November 2010, LJN: BP3764.
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6.8. ROMANIA
§1. Legal framework
1.1.Legislation in force 
	 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention for human rights)656, Rome, November 4th 
1950, ratified by Law no 30/1994 dated May 18th 1994 
	 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine)657, Oviedo, April 4th 1997, ratified by Law no 17/2001
dated January 22nd 1997 
	 Constitution of Romania  
	 New Civil Code, in force since October 1st 2011658 as further modified and 
completed659 
	 Law on patient rights no 46/2003 dated January 21st 2003 as further modified
and completed 
	 Law on child’s rights protection no 272/2004 dated June 21st 2006 as further
modified and completed
	 Law on adoption no 273/2004 dated June 21st 2006 as further modified and
completed
	 Law on health sector reform no 95/2006 dated April 14th2006 as further
modified and completed 
	 Rules of the Supervising Commission for transplants from living donors660 
1.2.Bills 
	 Bill for assisted reproduction with third-party donation (PL-x nr. 63/2012), 
adopted by the 1st Chamber of Romanian Parliament on April 4th 2012)
1.3.General overview  
Presently, the regime of surrogacy is not expressly regulated by the Romanian legislation
in force. Nevertheless, the surrogacy issue could be indirectly looked at via medically
assisted reproduction. This subject matter was initially regulated in 1998 (Law no 
2/1998661 on human organs and tissue transplantation), but at that time the human
genetic material or embryo transplantation662 were not included in such legislation. Law 
no 95/2006 broadened the field of application of the previously mentioned legislation,
without directly including medically assisted reproduction.  
656 Hereafter ECHR.
 
657 Hereafter CHRB . 

658 Hereafter C.civ.
 
659 Translated into French by Juriscope Institute, Poitiers, France.
 
660 Approved by the Ministry of Health Order No 1076/2006, issued on September 5th 2006.
 
661 Abrogated by Law no. 95/2006.
 
662 Law no 2/1998, Art.1 (3) provided the scope of this Law: replacement of compromised cells and tissues with 

healthy ones.
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On another note, the Law on patient rights no 46/2003 includes a chapter on sexual and
reproductive rights, without taking into account the specific legal issues concerning
assisted reproduction. Also, the Rules of the Supervising Commission for transplants
from living donors of September 5th 2006 included human sperm transplant, amongst 
others, in the scope of the above-mentioned Commission activity.  
In Romanian legislation there is no specific rule for establishing the filiation of children
born from a surrogate mother. The legislation on adoption663 neither takes into account
the medical techniques of human reproduction, nor the issue of surrogacy. The New Civil
Code briefly mentions the assisted reproduction with third-party donation in Part II 
(Family), Title III (Relatedness), Chapter II, Section II, art. 441-447– Filiation. This
issue is to be further regulated by a specific legislation664, but at present the production 
of such legislation has been postponed for an undefined period. 
A Bill on healthy reproduction and medically assisted reproduction was permanently 
rejected on June 9th 2006, after several articles were judged as unconstitutional665. 
Another Bill on medically assisted reproduction with third-party donation was recently 
adopted by one of the two Chambers of the Romanian Parliament.666 As the title of the 
Bill indicates, the scope of this law is more limited compared to the previous Bill.
The Bill (currently suspended) does not mention surrogacy at all, contrary to the 
previous Bill (declared partly unconstitutional and permanently rejected by Parliament).  
The New Criminal Code didn’t adopt the chapter « Crimes and public offenses in genetic
manipulation », provided by a previous Draft version of 2004.667 No other mention is
made concerning the crimes and the public offenses in the specific field of medically 
assisted reproduction. 
§2. Assisted reproduction with third-party donation  
The New Civil Code mentions assisted reproduction with third-party donation without
providing too many details on the meaning of these terms. At first sight, the meaning of 
the concept of “third-party donation” doesn’t seem to refer to the surrogate mother.
Moreover, the systemic interpretation of the New Civil Code and the whole legislative
evolution cannot offer a clear legal solution to the issue of surrogacy. 
Nevertheless, the obvious aim of the provisions concerning assisted reproduction is to 
give legal consequences of all in vitro fertilisation techniques, which technically not only
allow artificial insemination, but also the transfer of embryos. This would be a reason
that could justify a broad interpretation of the concept of “third-party donation” to
include surrogacy in the scope of the future legislation announced by Art. 447 C.civ.
2.1. Who are the “parents” (of intent)? 
Art. 441 (3) C.civ defines “the parents”, as a woman and a man (no mention is made of
their marital status) or a single woman. The parents of intent must be able to prove their
consent before the start of the medical procedure of reproduction. Their written consent 
must be authenticated by a solicitor. The legal consequence of this consent is that the 
father accepts the filiation with a child that is not genetically his (Cf. Art. 444 C.civ.). 
663 The adoption was initially regulated by the Family Code; the Family Code provisions concerning the adoption 

were abrogated by the G.O. 25/1997 and several modifications have been made since; the legislation in force
 
is Law no 273/2004.
 
664 Art. 447 New Civil Code; the provisions concerning the medically assisted reproduction were inspired by the 

Civil Code of Québec. 

665 Romanian Constitutional Court, Decision 418/2005 of July 18th 1997.
 
666 There is no estimated date for the end of the adoption and enforcement procedure.
 
667 Law no 301/2004, not in force.
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This act doesn’t replace the formal recognition after the child’s birth, in case the parents 
of intent are not married or do not live together.  
If the father of intent is not married with the mother of intent or does not live with her,
he is required to submit a double declaration of intent. If the parents of intent are
married or live together, there is a presumption of paternity; it can be reversed if the 
presumed father has not agreed to the insemination (see below). 
Art. 442 (2) specifies the situations in which the previously expressed consent has no
longer effect: in case of death, petition for divorce, and/or separation of fact after the 
beginning of the medical proceedings. The consent can be withdrawn at any moment,
even in front of the doctor called to provide the medical assistance for the reproduction. 
2.2. Who can be a “third-party donor”? 
Art. 14 of the Rules of the Supervising Commission for transplants from living donors
provides that the human sperm used in therapeutic purposes is not submitted to the 
Commission’s approval, but must conform to some principles, such as: the evaluation of
the donor’s state of health, the evaluation of risks, the stakeholder’s consent after
complete information, the confidentiality, the interdiction of trade of genetic material.
The Commission can keep a close watch on the respect of these principles by a random 
survey. 
2.3. Impossibility to assimilate the surrogate mother to a “third-party 
donor” 
Actually, the meaning of the concept of “third-party donor” used by the New Civil Code
seems to be limited to the donor of genetic material, which is not always the case of the
surrogate mother. Moreover, Art. 441-447 C.civ. expressly refer to a male “donor”.
Nevertheless, Art. 443 (1) provides that “nobody” can contest a child’s filiation for
reasons related to assisted reproduction. This article could be interpreted as the 
recognition of the possibility to have a genetic contribution from a feminine “third-party 
donor”. Yet, Art. 446 C.civ. provides that “the father” has the same rights on a child born 
as a result of medically assisted reproduction as on a naturally conceived child; there is
no similar rule with regard to “the mother”.668 
One of the Draft versions of the New Civil Code had literally forbidden the “surrogacy
agreement”669. This ban has been eliminated from the Code in force, which neither
forbids nor allows this kind of agreement. Still, the systemic interpretation of all
provisions related to assisted reproduction doesn’t offer consistent legal solutions for 
issues related to surrogacy. 
Although it is allowed in theory, this kind of agreement doesn’t produce legal effects as 
long as the surrogate mother cannot be forced to forego the legally presumed maternal 
bond. The legislation in force, if it were to be applied to the particular case of surrogacy,
would have a perverse result: the genetic parents would probably be assimilated to the
“third-party donors”, rather than the “parents of intent”670; and the “surrogate mother”
would be legally presumed to be the child’s mother. On the other hand, the possibility 
for the genetic father to claim the recognition of the paternal bond between him and the 
child doesn’t eliminate the problem of giving legal effects to the genetic maternal bond.
668 The intended parents are simply called « the parents »; a distinction is made between « the third-party 

donor » (genetic father) and « the father » (the father of intent).
 
669 Art. 461 of the Project for a new Civil Code (Draft version of 11.03.2009).
 
670 We do not take into account here the case in which the surrogacy would be linked to an egg donation (of a 

third-party donor): this type of donation is less frequent and not specifically regulated. In theory, egg donation 

should be subjected to the same regime as sperm donation.
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Once again it clearly appears that, without being formally forbidden, surrogacy is not 
encouraged by Romanian legislation. Another possible solution for the intended (genetic)
parents would be to adopt their own child from his legal parent(s). Nevertheless, the
adoption procedure is very long and difficult, and there is always a risk that the Court 
could reject the adoption request. Moreover, the genetic bond between the child and the
adopting persons must not be revealed, taking into account that one cannot adopt his 
own genetic child. There is no written rule forbidding the adoption of one’s own genetic
child, it would however be absurd to allow the natural parents to adopt their own
children. Unless adoption specifically serves the purpose of bypassing a rule that forbids
the establishment of “genetic” parentage.  
Since the 2000s, the adoption procedure in Romania has become very cumbersome due 
to public scandals of organ trafficking through international adoptions in the 1990s, 
when the law on adoptions was very liberal. Adoption remains a valid option to consider:
the father of intent admits paternity of the child and, with the consent of the surrogate 
mother (legally presumed to be the child’s mother), the mother of intent can adopt the
child of her partner (not immediately but under more flexible conditions than a normal
adoption).  It is possible, however, that the mother of intent would want to see her 
genetic link with the child directly recognised.
2.4. Filiation  
Art. 441 C.civ. provides that the identity of the third-party donor should be anonymous 
and that there should be no relationship of parentage between the child and the donor.  
2.4.1. Establishing the paternal bond
Art. 414 (1) C.civ adopts the presumption of paternity for the husband of the child’s
mother if the child is conceived or born during their marriage. A genetic father who is
not married with the mother can either recognise the paternity bond (if the mother is not
married), or contest the legal paternity presumption if the mother is married to another 
man (Art. 434 C.civ.). A new legal presumption of paternity is established by the New 
Civil Code for the man who usually lived together with the mother during the period of
the conception (Art. 426). He must formally recognise paternity of the child; if he
refuses, the mother can file a claim to establish his paternity – which is where the 
presumption of paternity rule intervenes.
Regarding the specific issue of the assisted reproduction with third-party donation, Art. 
446 C.civ. provides that “the father” has the same rights on a child born as a result of
medically assisted reproduction as on a naturally conceived child.
2.4.2. Establishing the maternal bond
Romanian legislation provides that the maternal bond is established by the fact of giving
birth to a child - Art. 408 (1). This fact is proved through the medical certificate provided 
by the medical unity where the child was born. In theory, the presumption of maternity 
is absolute and cannot be contested.  
If the child is not born in a medical establishment and the birth is not declared in due 
time, Art. 415 (1) C.civ provides that the genetic mother can declare the maternal bond 
to the authorities. In practice, the birth certificate for the child is not delivered in the first
year after the birth, unless the mother provides a medical certificate. After one year, the 
maternal bond can be evidenced by any means (testifying witnesses in front of the
Court, DNA tests, etc), according to Art. 422 C.civ. Nevertheless, the parties involved in
a surrogacy agreement have no interest in avoiding the medical unity for the child’s 
birth; moreover, the child would have no legal status unless he has a birth certificate. 
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Art. 416 (1) C.civ provides that the genetic mother can recognise the maternal bond in
an authentic declaration or, post mortem, in a testament. In practice, this declaration of 
maternity is used only if the child already has a birth certificate and has been lost or
abandoned by the parents. The parentage recognition by the mother (stipulated in art. 
416 C.civ) cannot result in the creation or modification of a birth certificate. The aim of
the article is for the mother mentioned in the birth certificate to be able to confirm the
identity of the minor who has been lost and found by the authorities. Such a procedure
could therefore only serve to establish the parentage of the mother of intent, who didn’t
give birth to the child but would be the genetic mother of the child carried by another 
woman.
2.4.3. Contestation of parentage
Art. 443 (1) mentions that nobody can contest a child filiation bonds for reasons related
to assisted reproduction, except in the situation provided by Art. 443 (2) C.civ. – the
absence of valid consent from the father (of intent).
Regarding the common parentage regime, a remarkable difference is made by the new 
Art. 430 C. Civ which recognises the right of a child, his mother and his genetic father to 
question the legally presumed paternity of the child. Under the former Family Code671,
the legally presumed father was the only person entitled to contest his own paternity of 
the child born or conceived during his marriage with the child’s mother. 
2.4.4. International aspects  
According to Romanian legislation (Law 21/1991), a child can obtain the Romanian
nationality at birth if one of his parents is Romanian, or if the child was born on 
Romanian territory from unknown parents. As a consequence, the child’s nationality 
depends on the meaning of the word “parents”. Art. 2.572 C. Civ mentions that the civil 
status and the individual rights are regulated by the national law of each individual.
Parentage is thus established according to the child’s national law. Adoption must obey
to the national legislation of both the adopting person and the adopted child (Art.2.607 
C. Civ.).
Art. 2564 C. Civ provides that the foreign law cannot be applied if it contradicts the 
public order of Romanian private international law or if the applicability of the foreign law
results from the intention to bypass Romanian law. Moreover, Romanian private 
international law expressly includes the fundamental principles of human rights, 
Romanian and European law. 
2.5. Confidentiality 
Art. 445 C.civ. provides that information on assisted reproduction is confidential towards 
third parties. The Court can potentially authorise to communicate it to the medical 
personnel or to other authorities in-charge, if it can prevent the child or his descendants
to be faced with serious health-related problem.  
§ 3. Case-law 
Taking into account that medically assisted reproduction generally remains a very 
sensitive issue, Romanian judges usually impose a strict privacy policy in this kind of
case. Many decisions are not published, except those of the Supreme Court. No decisions
on surrogacy can be found on the websites of the Bucharest Courts; the case cited below
was extracted from a specialised trimestral magazine. The Case No 7874/302/2009 
671 At present included in the New Civil Code. 
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submitted to the Sector 5 Bucharest Court672 is a perfect example of two different 
solutions to the same legal problem, made possible by the complete lack of legislation on
surrogacy issues. 
3.1. Parties’ claims  
In contradiction with the Custody Authority (defendant), the genetic mother claimed
that the surrogate mother (defendant) is not the genetic mother of the child, so that the
Court should recognise the effects of: 
- the maternal bond between the child and his real genetic mother (the claimant); 
- the lack of paternal bond between the surrogate mother’s husband and the child;  
- the paternal bond between the genetic mother’s husband and the child. 
Consequently, the Court was asked to authorise the corrections in the child’s birth
certificate, so as to allow the child to have the name of his genetic parents. 
Also in contradiction with the Custody Authority, the genetic father brought to justice 
both the surrogate mother and her husband by a separate application later merged with
the first one. He asked the judge to recognise his paternal bond with the child and to
authorise the modifications in the child’s birth certificate. With regard to the same
application, the legally presumed father (the surrogate mother’s husband, also 
defendant) formulated a counterclaim of paternity contest. 
3.1.1. State of facts 
In this decision – the only case to be found on surrogacy in the Romanian courts – all
parties were Romanian. 
- The claimants asserted to be the genetic parents of the child and asked the Court 
to confirm the parentage link between them and the child born of the surrogate
mother. 
- The medical report issued by the Department for Assisted Reproduction of a 
Hospital from Bucharest confirmed that the child was born as a result of in vitro 
fertilisation. The genetic mother had already had two spontaneous miscarriages
and six failed attempts of insemination with the sperm of her husband. The 
medical report shows her physical incapacity to be inseminated and to give birth 
to a child. After the failure of the insemination with three in vitro embryos, the
other 9 embryos obtained were frozen. 
- After having given her written consent, the surrogate mother, a married woman, 
was inseminated with 3 of the 9 embryos obtained following the in vitro
fertilisation of the two claimant’s genetic material. A girl was born.  
- The defendant (the surrogate mother) had previously signed a standard 
“Declaration” provided by the Hospital, in which she was giving up any rights on 
the child to be born. She also declared that she had received a sum of money and
an additional sum was to be paid after the child’s birth. It is indeed worth 
specifying that some private clinics accept to inseminate surrogate mothers. This
672 Unpublished; extract from Veronica DOBOZI, Curierul Judicar 10/2011. These Court decisions were anterior 
to the New Civil Code enforcement, which now includes the former Family Code as amended and completed.
The legal situation of the parties would have been mostly the same under the New Civil Code regime, as long 
as surrogacy issues are not at all regulated. Except the case of the reproduction with a third-party donor 
(which doesn’t include surrogacy), filiation rules essentially didn’t change under the New Civil Code. 
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remains however a solution of last resort, when the mother of intent has already 
been unsuccessfully inseminated several times and/or has had several 
miscarriages – as is the case of the mother of intent in the present case. The 
practice of declarations is common in hospitals; it seems to be their way of 
waiving any responsibility and reassuring the parents of intent who paid for the 
procedures. 
- The DNA test confirmed the genetic bond between the claimants and the child. 
- After the birth, the child had been taken in charge and stayed with his genetic 
parents. 
- The surrogate mother and her husband had no claims with regard to the child, 
neither before, nor during the trial. 
3.1.2 Legal arguments 
- Regarding the maternal bond: the claimants first invoked the Family Code673 in 
order to contest the parentage that doesn’t correspond to the reality. They also 
cited a Constitutional Court decision674 observing that some of the Family Code
provisions seriously affect the possibility to give legal effects to the genetic reality.
Cumulating the above-mentioned arguments with Art. 8 of the ECHR, the 
claimants sustained that the maternity presumption could be overthrown if the 
genetic reality is different.675 
- It should be noted that decision 349/2001 of the Constitutional Court referred to 
the genetic father’s impossibility to contest the presumed parentage links 
(between the child and his mother’s husband); this affected the possibility of 
giving legal effect to the genetic reality and was therefore judged to be
unconstitutional. This decision was relevant at the time because the New Civil 
Code was not yet in effect (the New Civil Code allows the genetic father the 
possibility of having his paternity established). We shouldn’t forget however that
at the time, the Constitutional Court’s decision 349/2001 did not target assisted 
procreation and only concerned paternity.  
- Regarding the paternal bond: the same arguments prevail (the Family Code
should be interpreted according to the ECHR, in order to give legal effects to the
social and genetic reality, even against legal presumptions). 
3.2. The First Court’s decision: strict application of the national 
legislation to give limited legal effects to the reality 
By the decision no 1405/2010676 the Court: 
- Rejected the application of the genetic mother.  
- Rejected the application of the genetic father. 
- Accepted the counterclaim of the presumed father (the only legal application
expressly regulated by the Romanian legislation in force at that moment) who 
contested the paternal bond between himself and the child.  
673 At present, the Family Code was modified, completed and included in the New Civil Code.
 
674 Constitutional Court, Decision 349/2001.
 
675 The genetic reality is a fact and it can be proven by any means of evidence.
 
676 Unpublished.
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The paternal link between the legally presumed father (surrogate mother’s husband) and
the child was annihilated and the paternal bond between the genetic father and the child
was recognised. The Court authorised the modifications on the child’s birth certificate in
order to allow her to have the genetic father’s name. 
- Regarding the maternal bond, the Court mentioned that in the absence of
derogatory legislation, the medical reproduction techniques couldn’t generate a
different parentage regime. As long as Romanian legislation doesn’t make a 
difference between “genetic mother” and “surrogate mother who gives birth to the 
child”, the judge has no power to do it. 
- Regarding the discrimination between man and woman (both genetic parents) the 
Court mentioned a fundamental difference: maternity is closely related to the 
capacity of giving birth, while paternity can potentially be limited exclusively to the
participation with genetic material.  
- Regarding the surrogacy convention: the above-mentioned “Declaration” was
annulled. Not only did this declaration contravene to the public order, but it also 
represented an onerous title whose object (the surrogate mother’s body) is not in
the civil circuit and cannot be rented. 
- Regarding the paternal bond: the Court mentioned that the genetic father cannot
claim the recognition of parentage between himself and his genetic child if the 
latter already has a legally presumed father.677 The only one who could claim the 
cancellation of the paternal bond between himself and the child was the legally 
presumed father. Under the legislation in force at that moment, as long as the 
legally presumed father (surrogate mother’s husband) didn’t contest his paternity, 
the genetic father had no means to give legal effect to the genetic reality. Only
after the legal presumption of paternity was overthrown (by the DNA test result),
the genetic father had the possibility to prove his paternity and recognise the 
child.
3.3. The Bucharest Court of Appeal’s decision: application of the national 
and international law in order to give the maximum of legal effects to the 
reality 
By the decision 1309 A/2010678, the Appeal Court admitted the appeal and partially
modified the First Court’s decision, by also recognising the legal effects of the maternal 
bond between the claimant (genetic mother) and the child. The genetic filiations’ legal
effects become thereby complete. 
Regarding the compatibility of Romanian legislation with Art. 8 ECHR:
- Family life: The Court of Appeal decided that the bond between the child and the
legally presumed parents didn’t fit within Art. 8 ECHR’s meaning of “family”, as the 
child did not live with these people, nor had a close relationship with them.
- All the evidence showed that the claimants had always considered themselves the 
child’s parents and acted accordingly; thus, the relationship between the claimants 
and their genetic child correspond to the meaning of “family” as provided by Art.
8 ECHR.
677 The situation changed, the New Civil Code gives the genetic father the possibility to claim the recognition of
the real parental bond even if the child has a legally presumed father. The solution would nowadays 
substantially be the same, except that the genetic father would now be able to file a case to have his rights 
recognised. 
678 Final decision (no other appeal was made), unpublished. 
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- Child’s private life: The protection conferred by Art. 8 ECHR is not absolute;
nevertheless, the superior interest of the child must overrule the strict application 
of the national law, in order to guarantee the child’s right to an identity and his 
other personal rights provided by Art. 8 ECHR. By ignoring the genetic and social 
reality for a formalist application of national legislation, the First Court violated
Art. 8 ECHR.
- With regards to the scope of this decision, we would like to remind the reader that 
it was not pronounced by the Supreme Court and that the practice varies
significantly across Romanian courts of law. This decision wasn’t much talked 
about, even though the debate on surrogate motherhood remains topical; the 
debate focuses mainly on arguments of social and religious and not so much on 
the legal aspects of surrogacy, which are too technical for the majority of people.  
- Furthermore, surrogate motherhood is not a topic of public interest but rather an 
“exotic” or “niche” issue. The nature of the topic is such that it only concerns a 
tiny part of the population and its complexity goes far beyond the comprehension
of the general Romanian public.
- The fact that these cases always involve minors commands tremendous discretion, 
especially in light of the conservative position of the public in terms of surrogacy. 
- Because of the complete legislative void, the Courts can choose between adhering 
strictly to the law (inadequate with the modern living conditions and medical 
techniques) or to interpret the law more liberally (in particular by applying the
principle of the ECHR case-law). 
- The two decisions (of the First Court and of the Court of Appeal) mentioned above 
are fully legitimate considering that there is no European consensus on surrogacy.
- For that reason, the solution of adoption should not be side-lined, even though it
doesn’t coincide with the biological reality.  
- Both procedures (recognition of genetic parentage and adoption) are equally 
heavy and unpredictable. 
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6.9. RUSSIA 
Legal Sources 
Russian legal regulation of assisted reproduction in general and surrogate motherhood 
specifically, although being permissive on the whole, is fragmentary and not always
consistent. The most recent changes in Russian law in this regard were made in 2011 by
the Federal Law on the Fundamentals on Protection of Citizens’ Health. However this Law 
did not fill all gaps that existed in the legal regulation of assisted reproduction. 
Particularly in the part which regulates surrogate motherhood, the Law is contradictory
and not always clear. This will be explained in due course when related issues are
discussed. 
Currently, the main legal sources that govern surrogate motherhood in Russia are the 
following:
1)	 the Family Code 1995 (as amended), enacted from the 1st of March 1996
(hereafter – FC); 
2)	 the Federal Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of Citizens’ Health in Russian 
Federation 2011 (hereafter – the Law on Citizens’ Health 2011), section that 
concerns application of assisted reproduction (including surrogate motherhood) 
enacted from the 1st of January 2012 (this Law replaced the Fundamentals of 
Legislation of RF on Protection of Citizens’ Health 1993 – hereafter the Law on
Citizens’ Health 1993); 
3)	 the Federal Law on the Acts of Registration of Civil Status 1997 (as amended), 
enacted from the day of its official publication; 
4)	 Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Health Order No. 67 of 26.02.2003 “On
Application of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) at Therapy of Female
and Male Infertility” (hereinafter – the Ministry of Health Order on ART 2003) 
together with Regulation on application of assisted reproduction methods
(replaced RF Ministry of Health Order No. 301 of 28.12.1993 “On application of 
the method of artificial insemination of women with the donor’s sperm by medical
indications and of the method of extra-corporeal fertilization and transfer of an
embryo to the uterus to treat female infertility” – hereafter RF Ministry of Health 
Order 1993). 
Definitions and Key Concepts 
The first mentioning of surrogate motherhood in Russian law relates to 1995, when the
Family Code was adopted, and since enactment of the Code, i.e. from the 1st of March 
1996, surrogate motherhood became legally available.679 
The Law on Citizens’ Health 2011 defines assisted reproduction technology as the
methods of infertility treatment when some or all stages of conception and early
development of an embryo are performed outside mother’s body (including the use of 
donor’s and (or) frozen gametes, tissues of reproductive organs, and embryos, as well as
679 V.S. Korsak, E.V. Isaakova, O.A. Vorobjeva, M.B. Tsirul’nikov, O.N. Arzhanova ‘The First Experience in
Russia of Conducting of a Programme of Surrogate Motherhood’ (in Russian) (1996) Problems of Reproduction,
2, at 46. In 2009, the number of ART centers carrying out surrogate motherhood programs constituted 44 
(compared to 38 centers in 2008), where 524 cycles with participation of surrogate mothers (1,3%) ended in 
embryo transfer (430 cycles in 2008). Pregnancy occurred in 216 cases (41,2%) and child birth – in 147 cases
(79,9%). See: Korsak, V.S. ‘ART in Russia in 2009. The 15th Report of National Register of ART’ (in Russian) – 
<http://www.rahr.ru/d_registr_otchet/vrt2009.pdf>, visited 19.01.2013; Korsak, V.S. (2010) ‘ART in Russia.
Report for 2008’ (in Russian) 6 Problems of Reproduction 15, 15-16. 
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surrogate motherhood) (s. 55 (1)). This means that use of surrogate motherhood is
possible, at least under the law, only by medical indications, as a method of infertility
treatment. 
The same Law defines surrogate motherhood as gestation and birth of a child (including 
premature birth) under a contract made between a surrogate mother (woman who 
gestates a fetus after transfer of a donor’s embryo) and prospective parents whose 
gametes were used for fertilization or a single woman for whom gestation and birth of a 
child is impossible by medical reasons (s. 55 (9)). To avoid any confusion, the Law 
specifies in the next sub-section that “a surrogate mother shall not be an oocytes donor” 
(s. 55 (10)).
From this it particularly follows that Russian Law allows only full, or gestational,
surrogacy because it is clearly stated that surrogate mother shall not be genetically
related to the fetus she gestates.
Before the Law on Citizens’ Health 2011 was enacted, technically there had been no 
clear prohibition of “partial”, or “traditional” surrogacy. However, under the previous
legal regime, traditional surrogacy has not anyway been permitted. Instead, what is
called “traditional surrogacy” was, in fact, considered an artificial insemination with a 
donor’s sperm, i.e. the “traditional” surrogate mother is a biological or genetic mother of
a child she gives birth to. Therefore, she is not a “surrogate” but a true mother in a 
biological sense. Under Russian law, if a woman does not want to bring up and take care 
of her child, she may give her consent to her child to be placed for adoption. The
adoption procedure is very special and very strict; it is not applicable in cases of
surrogate motherhood, and violation of the adoption procedure is a serious offense.  
Regulation of surrogate motherhood in Russia is based on a very important and key idea 
that a surrogate mother has the right to keep the child if she wants.680 This is considered 
to be one of the main safeguards against the exploitation of a woman involved in
surrogacy arrangements. It is fixed in FC, in s. 51 (para 4, part 2), which states that: 
Persons who are married to each other and who gave their consent in a
written form to implantation of an embryo in another woman for the
purpose of its bearing may be entered as the child’s parents only with
the consent of the woman who gave birth to the child (surrogate
mother). 
This provision is based on the concept that the woman who gave birth to a child is 
considered at law as the mother of this child. In this regard, drafters of the Russian 
Family Code were guided by the recommendations made by a group of European exerts
in biomedical science in 1989.681 
Recently, the constitutionality of FC provision that permits the registration of the 
intended couple as the child’s parents only with the consent of the surrogate mother who 
gestated and gave birth to the child was questioned in a case considered by RF 
Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court Ruling of 15.05.2012 No. 880-O). In this case
the surrogate mother refused to give her consent to the prospective parents’ registration 
as the legal parents and registered the child herself in a civil status state registry as her
own child (accordingly she was registered as the legal mother). The Constitutional Court
680 In this regard, Russian legal rules on surrogacy are very different from those in Ukraine, where a surrogate 
mother cannot keep the child, making Ukraine particularly appealing for foreigners looking for surrogate 
mother. 
681 Council of Europe. Report on human artificial procreation. Principles set out in the report of the Ad hoc 
Committee of Experts in the Biomedical Science (CAHBI, 1989). Principle 14. See:
<www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/texts_and_documents/default_en.asp>. See: Commentary to the Family
Code of the Russian Federation / (ed.) I.M. Kuznetsova. Moscow, 2000. P. 183-186 (in Russian).
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confirmed the constitutionality of this provision of FC and rejected the application of the 
intended/prospective parents. 
Requirements that a potential surrogate mother shall meet 
The Law on Citizens Health 2011 sets out the requirements that a woman who is going
to serve as a surrogate mother should meet. Before, they were stipulated at a lower
level of regulation (governmental/ministerial) – in the Ministry of Health Order 2003.
Thus, under the Law 2011 (s. 55 (10)), a woman who gave her written informed consent 
to medical intervention may serve as a surrogate mother provided she:  
 is between 20 and 35 years old;  
 has at least one healthy child; and 
 received a medical statement that she is healthy (in ‘satisfactory state of health’). 
The Law does not require a surrogate mother to be married or, on the opposite, to be a 
single woman. However, if she is married, her husband’s consent to her serving as a 
surrogate mother is required (s. 55 (10)). It should be noted in this regard that by
“marriage” the Law means a marriage officially registered in the order stipulated by 
Russian legislation, i.e. in the state bodies for registration of civil status.
Access to assisted reproduction technologies (ART) 
Under Russian law, a man and a woman, married as well as not married,682 have the 
right to have access to assisted reproduction technologies, provided they gave their 
mutual informed consent to medical interference; a single woman also has the right to 
have access to assisted reproduction technologies if she gave her informed consent to 
medical interference (the Law on Citizens Health 2011, s. 55 (3)). 
Two comments are necessary in this regards. 
1. The previous Law on Citizens’ Health 1993 spoke only about the right of “every 
adult woman of reproductive age” to benefit from assisted reproduction technologies (s. 
35). This Law did not specify whether a woman should be married or not. However,
Family Code 1995, when regulating the order of registration of intended parents as legal 
parents of a child born for them by a surrogate mother, speaks only about a married 
couple in s. 51 (para 4, part 2) cited above. As the result of this contradiction, many 
applications to register the birth of a child born by a surrogate mother presented by 
cohabitating couples or singe women were rejected by the civil status state registries
with the reference to this provision of FC. This, in turn, resulted in suits filed to the 
courts where the intended parents or intended single mothers claimed their right to be 
registered as legal parents or legal mothers respectively. It is known that in many cases
such claims were satisfied, and the registries were ordered to register birth of the
children.683 
The Law on Citizens Health 2011, having stated, firstly, that a man and a woman who 
are not married (to each other) may benefit from assisted reproduction and, secondly, 
that a contract on surrogacy contract may be made between a surrogate mother and 
intended parents (without any reference to their marriage status), clearly indicates that
surrogate motherhood is open not only for the spouses but for cohabitating couples as
well.
682 The wording of this provision is not clear enough, but most probably the Law means here a couple that can 

be married or not married (meaning married or not married to each other). I will proceed from this in my 

further reasoning.
 
683 See, for instance: RF Supreme Court Ruling on the case No. 78-Ф08-1314 of 8 September 2008.
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2. Whether a single man may have access to surrogate motherhood under Russian
law is an issue that also raises questions. Literal interpretation of the above-mentioned 
provisions of the Law on Citizens Health 2011 that concern access to assisted
reproduction and define the main terms of a contract on surrogate motherhood suggests 
a negative answer to this question because neither sub-paragraph 3 nor sub-paragraph
9 of s. 55 name a single man. Therefore, in accordance with this provision a contract on 
surrogate motherhood shall not be made between a single man and a surrogate mother. 
At the same time, we can hardly assume that the Law on Citizens’ Health 2011 meant to 
close access to fertility treatment for single men. To claim this would mean to go into 
contradiction with the principles of Russian Constitution 1993 on equality of rights and 
freedoms of men and women and equal opportunities for their realization (Art. 19), on
the right of everyone to health care and medical help (Art. 41) and with the 
constitutional provision on state support of the family, maternity, paternity and 
childhood (Art. 7), not to mention contradiction with the social reality of male infertility.
It is enough just to say that methods of medical treatment of male infertility had been
already widely applied in medical practice for several decades, and as long as in 1993, 
the previous Ministry of Health Order on ART stipulated the male fertility as one of the 
grounds for IVF treatment.684 Infertility treatment has been conventionally associated
with medical treatment of women, and in practice, these were and still are usually
couples, which would come to medical clinics, even if male, and not female, infertility
was a medical problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that the previous Law on Citizens’ 
Health 1993 spoke only about the right of “every adult woman of reproductive age” to
benefit from assisted reproduction technologies, without any mentioning of an adult man 
(s. 35). This did not raise particular problems before, because same-sex cohabitation
was not a topical issue in Russia until recently. Nowadays, the situation is changing, and 
the sexual equality angle of access to assisted reproduction technologies may certainly
turn out to be on the agenda one day.685 
Contract on Surrogate Motherhood v. Donors’ Gametes 
The Law on Citizens’ Health 2011 is confusing on another important issue, i.e. whether it 
is possible to use the genetic material of a donor(s) for IVF with surrogate mother 
participation. To recall, the Law defines surrogate motherhood as gestation and birth of a 
child under a contract made between a surrogate mother (woman who gestates a fetus 
after transfer of a donated embryo) and prospective parents whose gametes were used
for fertilization or a single woman for whom gestation and birth of a child is impossible
by medical reasons (s. 55 (9)). 
According to a literal interpretation of this provision, it is clear that the use of a donor’s 
genetic material is available for a single women only but not for couples, whether 
married or not. Therefore, under this provision prospective parents shall be genetic 
parents of a child that a surrogate mother will gestate for them and give birth to. It is 
hard to say now what the idea was behind such wording, as there are still no comments 
or official explanations of this provision. Before the Law on Citizens’ Health 2011 was 
adopted, there was neither prohibition nor differentiation between these situations in the 
law, which meant that an infertile couple could use both donated oocytes and sperm in a 
surrogate motherhood program, if there were medical indications. As far as the author of 
this report is aware, currently the situation in medical practice is the same as before,
684 Order No. 301 of 28 December 1993 “On application of the method of artificial insemination of women with 
the donor’s sperm by medical indications and of the method of extra-corporeal fertilization and transfer of an 
embryo to the uterus to treat female infertility”
685 Before the Law on Citizens Health 2011 with its more restrictive provisions on surrogate motherhood was
adopted, there were cases, where single “intended fathers” had won the court proceedings and had been 
registered as the legal fathers of the children born for them by surrogate mothers (with the use of donor’s 
oocytes) See, for instance: <www.surrogacy.ru/surrogacy_news8.php>; 
<www.jurconsult.ru/news/news40.php>, and <www.jurconsult.ru/news/news39.php> (in Russian). 
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and if there are medical indications, donor gametes are used in surrogate motherhood 
programs with regard to infertile couples.  
Finalizing parents-child relations
To finalize parental rights with regard to a child born by a surrogate mother no court 
judgment is required (provided there is no dispute over the child’s origin). The child’s
parents are registered as his or her legal parents at the registration of the child’s birth at
the civil status registry. 
If a surrogate mother gave her written consent to the registration of the intended
parent(s) as the legal parents in the birth registry book and on the child’s birth
certificate, the child birth registration procedure is the same as the registration of a birth
of a child conceived in a natural way, with one exception. The Federal Law on the Acts of
Registration of Civil Status 1997 (s. 16 (5)) requires that, apart from other documents 
that should be usually presented to the birth registration body (for instance, parents
ID/passports and a medical statement on child’s birth), the intended parent(s) also 
present an “official note” (medical statement) that was issued by a medical clinic and
that confirmed that the surrogate mother gave her consent to the registration of the
intended parent(s) as the legal parents. Given the registration of the intended parent(s)
as the legal parents of a child born by a surrogate mother, a surrogate mother is
considered by law as a strange person to this child and does not have any legal right to
claim to maintain contact with him or her. 
If a surrogate mother used her right to keep the child and did not give her consent the 
registration of the intended parent(s) as the child’s legal parents, she can be registered 
as the child’s mother in the birth registry book and on the child’s birth certificate upon
presenting to a civil status registration body her passport and a “statement” from the
medical clinic certifying that she delivered the child. If she is married, her husband is 
registered as the child’s father (to recall, under the law his consent to his wife serving as 
a surrogate mother is required).  
To finalize parental rights before a child is born is not allowed by Russian law; the child’s
birth certificate can be issued only after the child’s birth. After a child’s birth has been 
officially registered, parent-child relations are considered to be finalized. The child’s
status in the family is absolutely the same as the status of a child conceived in a natural 
way.
Contesting paternity or maternity 
Although Russian law permits contesting paternity or maternity in general, it does not
allow to contest paternity or maternity if it is based on assisted reproduction technology 
grounds. In this regard, Russian law is straightforward. Particularly on surrogate 
motherhood, FC (s. 52 (3 (2)) says:
“a married  couple who has agreed to implantation of an embryo to another  
woman, as well as a surrogate mother… when contesting paternity or 
maternity, cannot refer to these circumstances after registration of the child’s
parents in a birth registration book.” 
By “these circumstances”, FC means that the child was conceived through IVF with 
surrogate mother involvement. 
If donated genetic material has been used in the course of infertility treatment, it has no
legal consequences with regard to parentage for the donors. The Ministry of Health 
Regulation 2003 (para 6) stipulates that the donors “provide their gametes… to other
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persons to overcome infertility and do not undertake parental obligations towards a 
future child”. 
Citizenship (nationality) of a child 
The basic principle of Russian law concerning child’s nationality/citizenship is that a child 
shall not be left stateless (the Federal Law on Citizenship of RF 2002, s. 12). With regard
to the children born on the territory of Russia, whose parents are foreign citizens, this 
Law stipulates that these children acquire Russian citizenship by birth only if their
parents (foreign citizens) are permanently residing in the Russian Federation, and the 
country of the parents’ citizenship will not provide children born in Russia with the 
parents’ citizenship. Therefore, a child born on the Russian Federation territory acquires
the citizenship of its parent(s) under the parent(s)’ personal law. Only in cases whereby
the state of which the parent(s) are citizens does not provide citizenship to the child,
may the child acquire Russian citizenship. 
Cross-border Surrogate Motherhood Issues 
There is not that much information about cross-border surrogacy arrangements available 
in legal scholarship and in the mass media; there are no reported cases either. It is
known, however, that international programs in surrogate motherhood have started to 
develop in the country.686 
As cross-border surrogacy develops in Russia, additional problems connected, for 
instance, with taking a child born by a surrogate mother abroad or settling disputes 
between the parties of cross-border surrogacy arrangements will arise.
As far as taking a child abroad, getting entry visa for a child and further legalization of
the child in a home country of the child’s parents may be a problem. Particularly, to
finalize parent-child relations in some countries a court judgment is required. In
contrast, in Russia these issues, as has been noted, are administratively regulated (by 
registration of a child’s birth in a state body for registration of civil status), and no court
is involved.
As to the private international law context, Russian law does not contain any specific
rules that directly regulate cross-border surrogate motherhood issues. General conflict of
laws rules are included in Part III of the Russian Civil Code. However, those rules that 
address family law issues and, particularly, parenthood issues, are contained in the 
Family Code. Thus, FC refers to nationality/citizenship as a connecting factor with regard 
to legal parenthood. It is stated in FC that establishment and contest of legal parenthood 
is determined under the law of the state whose citizenship a child has by birth (s. 162
(1)). Parental rights, however, in accordance with FC, shall be determined under the law
of the state where parents and children have common place of residence. The law of the 
country of the child’s nationality/citizenship in such a case is used as a connecting factor
only if there is no common place of residence. With regard to child maintenance issues 
and other parent-child relations, the law also allows, upon a petitioner’s request, 
application of the law of the country where a child permanently resides (s. 163). 
686 See, for instance: http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=36172 visited 14.01.2013. 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
6.10. SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African regulatory framework on surrogate motherhood: A 
comparative study between the Greek and the South African law on surrogacy 
ABSTRACT
This report examines the legal regime of South Africa with regards to the issue of 
surrogate motherhood. The analysis will involve the presentation of the national law on 
surrogacy with reference to statutory sources, regulations, guidelines, and case law that 
govern the issues of the practice, as well as to the contemporary literature and media
reports. I will use this research as a compactor to the Greek regime on surrogacy, which 
is the only example of a comprehensive legal regime for surrogacy amongst the EU
Member States. 
As will be mentioned in the course of this report, surrogacy has been performed in South
Africa before its formal recognition and regulation in 2010 by the Children’s Act687 (which
took effect from 1 April 2010). The practice was perfectly legal since 2006, but in 2010
the Parliament adopted new rules that on the one hand facilitated surrogacy, and on the
other hand set limits and restrictions on the practice of surrogacy. A landmark decision
of the Court of Pretoria in 2011 came to complement the law, and announced guidelines
addressed to the South African judges for the treatment of surrogate motherhood cases 
that would reach the courts in the future.
South Africa is evidently one of the few countries in the global legal reality that has a 
specific law on surrogacy, as does Greece. A number of the provisions inserted in the 
legislation of both countries are indeed similar, if not identical, as for example the
process of the pre-conception judicial approval; the automatic attribution of legal 
parenthood to the intended parent(s); the non-commercial nature of the practice; as 
well as the enforceability of surrogate motherhood contracts. This research, however,
also gives emphasis to any variations between the regulatory frameworks of the two 
countries.  
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN (SA) LAW 
ON SURROGACY
In this section I briefly present the SA law with regards to surrogacy. A more detailed
analysis of the relevant legal requirements that lead to the permissibility of the practice 
of surrogacy in SA will be offered in the following parts of this research, while comparing 
these provisions with those incorporated into the Greek law on surrogacy.688 
The issue of surrogate motherhood finds a statutory recognition in South Africa (SA)
‘following the promulgation of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act on 1 April 2010’.689 Cases 
687 South African Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005, as amended in 2010, Chapter 19, titled “Surrogate
motherhood”. 
688 Law 3089/2002 and 3305/2005. 
689 Slabbert, M.N., ‘Legal issues relating to the use of surrogate mothers in the practice of assisted conception’,
South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, Vol 5, No 1 (2012), available at
http://www.sajbl.org.za/index.php/sajbl/article/view/190/200. Also, Carnelley, M., Soni, S., ‘A tale of two 
mummies. Providing a womb in South Africa: Surrogacy, the agreement and the legal rights of the parents 
within the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. A brief comparative study with the United Kingdom’, 11 Speculum Juris
(2008): 36-52; Baby2Mom, ‘Every Thing You Need to Know About Surrogacy in South Africa’,
http://www.proudparenting.com/node/15956; and Lewis, S.V., ‘The Constitutional and Contractual
Implications of the Application of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005’, Thesis submitted in the
Department of Private Law, University of the Western Cape, May 2011; Prinslean Mahery, Paula Proudlock,
Lucy Jamieson for the SA Children’s Institute, ‘ A guide to the Children’s Act for health professionals, Fourth
edition (1 June 2010); Desia Colgan for Unicef and the Department of Social Development (South Africa), ‘The
Children’s Act Explained. Booklet 1: Children and parents- rights and responsibilities’ (2009). 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
of surrogacy have, however, been documented in the SA social reality since 2006690 after 
the National Health Act of 2003691 introduced regulations for fertility treatment involving 
reproductive technologies. The practice has been taking place on the basis of the SA
Constitution, which protects the right of self-determination and the right to ‘make 
decisions concerning reproduction’,692 and the general national rules concerning contract
law.
A few years afterwards, the Parliament promulgated Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 
no.38 of 2005 (amended in 2010), which refers specifically to surrogate motherhood. 
Chapter 19 constitutes a regulatory framework that allows the practice of surrogacy
within strict and very distinct limits. The provisions of the Act apply to everyone, and 
there are no restrictions relating to the person’s marital or relationship status,693 his/ her
race, his/her gender, his/ her sexual preferences in place, which is also in accordance 
with the right to equality as it is expressed in the SA Bill of Rights.694 
Furthermore, surrogacy is depicted as an alternative and acceptable type of family
formation695 in cases where a person desires to have a child but is unable to have one,
either due to his/her biological inability,696 or his/her sexual orientation towards persons
of the same sex.697 The only prerequisite is that the practice is performed on a non­
commercial basis.698 Both traditional699 and gestational700 surrogacy are recognised by 
the law. 
690 The SA Parliament passed the Children’s Bill in August 2006, which, among other issues, dealt with the 
issue of surrogate motherhood: Kashiefa Ajam , ‘Wombs for rent: State to act’ (August 26, 2006), available at
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/wombs-for-rent-state-to-act-1.291108#.UNSRAW_eQd4 ). See also: 
News article by Andrew Vorzimer, ‘South Africa Adopts Tougher International Surrogacy Rules’, The Spin
Doctor (October 13, 2011), available at http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2011/10/13/south-africa-adopts­
tougher-international-surrogacy-rules/; News article by Claudine Renaud, ‘SA tightens surrogacy guidelines’
(October 13, 2011), available at http://www.iol.co.za/lifestyle/family/parenting/sa-tightens-surrogacy­
guidelines-1.1156632#.UMojDm_eT_2. 
691 The National Health Act was amended in 2012 (2 March, 2012). 
692 S. 12 (2) (a), (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 108 of 1996. 
693 A single person can employ a surrogate and have a child of his/her own according to the SA law (s.292 (1)
(c)). Read further Van der Linde v Van der Linde 1996 (3) SA 509 (O). The judge stated that mothering is also
a part of a man’s being, thus accepting single-parent family formations. 
694 Section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 108 of 1996. See also Satchwell v 
President of the Republic of SA 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) para. 15: “Permanent same-sex life partners are entitled to
found their relationships in a manner that accord with their sexual orientation: such relationships should not be 
subject to unfair discrimination”. Also: National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC), para.82. Other cases follow the principle of equality for the treatment of the same-
sex couples, such as Ex parte Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another (232/2003) [2004]
ZASCA 132; [2005] 1All SA 273 (SCA), (3 November, 2004), whereby the judge declared the right of 
individuals who are homosexuals ‘to adopt children, and in the case of lesbians to bear them’ (para.13 (g); Du 
Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 
695 South Africa recognises the right to have a child (s. 12 (2) (a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, No. 108 of 1996, Bill of Rights), even when this can only be attained through the use of artificial
means. 
696 S. 295 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005.
697 S. 295 (a) of Ch. 19, Children’s Act 2005 (amended in 2010). The Court of Pretoria confirmed that the 
biological inability to procreate due to the sexual preference of a person towards people of the same sex is in
harmony with the provision for the “permanent and irreversible” character of the condition that prevents a 
person from having a child and is a valid reason for turning to surrogacy. See Ex parte Applications for the 
confirmation of three surrogate motherhood agreements (2011/153, 2011/154, 2011/679, 2011/1314,
2011/1315, 2011/1316) [2011] ZAGPJHC 9; 2011 (6) SA 22 (GSJ) (1 March 2011), whereby two out of the
three couples who made an application to the court for surrogacy were of the same sex and were treated on 
the exact same way as the heterosexual couple; WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6)
SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011); article by the Leonard Link, ‘South African Court Approves Surrogacy
Contract for Gay Male Couple’, http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2011/10/south-african­
court-approves-surrogacy-contract-for-gay-male-couple.html ; and news report by Andrew Vorzimer, ‘South 
African Court Approves Same-Sex Surrogacy Contract’, The Spin Doctor (28 September, 2011), available at
http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2011/09/28/south-african-court-approves-samesex-surrogacy-contract/ . 
698 S. 301 (1) of Ch. 19, Children’s Act 2005 (amended in 2010): payments in respect of surrogacy are
prohibited. Subsection 2 of s. 301, however, allows for the payment of reasonable expenses, which are directly
related to the surrogate’s artificial insemination, her medical care during the pregnancy and childbirth, her 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
The SA law also provides for surrogate motherhood contracts. The legal procedure for 
surrogacy primarily involves the drawing up of a contract between the intending
parent(s), the surrogate and her husband/partner in a civil union (if she has one), and
their agreement on certain matters, such as the consensual and altruistic character of
the practice, the payment of “reasonable expenses” to the surrogate mother, and, 
among others, the attribution of legal parenthood to the intending parent(s) after the 
birth of the child.
Nevertheless, in order for the agreement to take force and for the person(s) who want to
be legally acknowledged as the child’s parent(s), an additional procedure must be 
followed. One of the most significant features of the SA law on surrogacy is the 
requirement of a confirmation of the surrogacy agreement by the court701 at a time prior
to the implantation of the genetic material of at least one of the intended parents, and in
the case where there is only one parent, his/her genetic material, to the surrogate 
mother’s uterus.702 
The court will only deem the agreement legal and give its permission for the surrogate’s
fertilisation if and only if there is sufficient evidence to prove the inability of the 
intending parent(s) to have a child through natural conception and pregnancy; the 
suitability of both the surrogate and the person(s) that want to raise the child703; the 
lack of commercial motive and of payments either to the surrogate mother or the agency
that possibly brought the contracting parties into contact in the first place; as well as the 
domicile of all the persons involved in the surrogacy arrangement in the SA territory.704 
More specifically, the surrogate mother must not provide her gestational service with a 
purpose to earn money for it, but instead her motives must be purely altruistic; namely
she must enter into a surrogacy agreement merely to help other people who want to
have a child but who are unable to do so. Moreover, she must be healthy and 
emotionally stable705; and she must have had at least one successful pregnancy and 
viable childbirth and have a living child of her own.706 As we can see, the law inserts a 
variety of rigorous criteria that will help the judge in deciding whether she is suitable for
the provision of her gestational services and whether she will adhere to the rules of the 
surrogacy arrangement even before she acts as a surrogate.707 This set of requirements
provides a high level of protection to the intended parents, while ensuring respect for the 
interests of the child, who will not be rendered parentless. The latter is guaranteed by a 
clothing, her insurance, her loss of earnings due to her inability to present herself to work during the 
pregnancy and right after the childbirth, as well as the expenses for legalities. For an estimation of the average 
cost of a surrogacy arrangement see http://baby2mom.co.za/Page/11609/Every-Thing-You-Need-to-Know-
About-Surrogacy-in-South-Africa-#%2FPage%2F11613%2FSurrogacy-Costs . The total sum of these costs can 
exceed R80,000 (approximately 6,000GBP). 
699 Stemming from s. 294 in conjunction with s. 298 (1) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in
2010. 
700 S. 294 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
701 S. 295 and 296 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. The fertilisation of the surrogate
mother can only take place after the granting of permission by the court and in any case not after the lapse of
eighteen (18) months after the court’s confirmation. After this time the consent given by the contracting 
parties is no longer considered valid. 
702 S. 292 (1) (c) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
703 S. 295 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
704 S. 292 (1) (c), (d) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
705 This will be determined by her medical and psychological assessment by certified medical practitioners
(para. 67, WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011)). 
706 S. 295 (c) (vi) and (vii) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
707 See also the article by Baby2Mom, ‘Everything you need to know about surrogacy in South Africa’ (2 June, 
2011), available at http://www.proudparenting.com/node/15956. Certain surrogacy agencies, which work for 
no fee and bring the intended parents in contact with the surrogate mother, may introduce additional criteria
for the suitability of the woman who will act as a surrogate. For example, the Surrogacy Advisory Group, which 
operates in SA states that in order for the woman to be chosen to act as a surrogate, on top of the 
requirements set out by the law, she may also not have had more than 2 caesarean sections, her Body Mass 
Index (BMI) must be below 35, and she must be between the ages of 21 and 42
(http://www.surrogacy.co.za/faqs/).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
number of conditions that must be filled by the intended parents as well, as for example,
their seriousness and suitability to raise the child, which will be signalled by evidence of
both their biological and psychological health, and their financial aptitude to care and 
provide for all the needs of the child.708 
It seems fair to say that surrogacy is regarded by the SA legislature and judiciary as 
extremely complex, and as raising issues that have profound ramifications for the 
ethical, legal and social reality. Moreover, the SA society seems to place great
importance on the institution of family, the protection of the best interests of the child,
and the respect for one’s right to have and parent a child of one’s own. As such, 
surrogacy cases are seen as requiring the delicate handling that only a judge of the
highest legal knowledge and expertise can provide; hence, the court responsible for the
investigation of cases of surrogacy is the SA High Court.709 
If the Deputy Judge of the High Court grants his/her permission to the contracting 
parties, this gives them the right to proceed with the fertility treatment procedure 
involving the surrogate mother. Any such procure must comply with the conditions set
out by the National Health Act.710 
In cases where a successful pregnancy and childbirth is achieved, the intended parent(s) 
will be considered as the legal parent(s) of the child. A right for a “change of heart” is 
recognised only for the surrogate mother who has a genetic link to the child (i.e. 
traditional surrogacy, where she has ‘donated’ her ova for fertilisation for the purpose of 
surrogacy), and only for the period prior to the lapse of sixty days following the birth of 
the child.711 In all other cases, the surrogate mother and her husband/civil partner, if
she has one, as well as her and her husband’s/partner’s relatives, have no right to 
parent, to care for, or to contact the child, unless so indicated in the surrogate 
motherhood agreement.712 
Although the Act seems to provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of 
surrogate motherhood practices in SA, some cases that have recently reached the 
national courts have illustrated that more clarification on the requirements for the 
permissibility of surrogacy is needed. More specifically, two cases have gathered the 
interest of the media, legal professionals and the public: the ex parte applications for the 
confirmation of three surrogacy agreements in 2011,713 which declared the right of 
same-sex couples to attain parenthood through the use of surrogacy, and the case of 
WH and others,714 also decided in 2011, which elaborated on the requirements of the law 
by providing thorough guidance in respect of the terms and conditions that will lead the 
judge to validate a surrogacy agreement. The above mentioned cases have set an 
important legal precedent for all the cases of surrogate motherhood that will come 
before the courts in the future. More extensive reference will be made to these cases in
the course of my analysis. 
708 S. 295 (b) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010, and para. 77.3 in WH and Others 
(29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011). This requirement is in line
with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of children (s. 28 of the SA Constitution), as well as the spirit of the
Children’s Act in general. Also, according to paras. 69 and 77.8 in WH and Others, any criminal convictions of 
sexual or violent nature against the commissioning parent (s) should be disclosed to the court, as they will be 
taken into serious consideration for the confirmation of the surrogacy agreement in question. 
709 S. 292 (1) (e), ch.19 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. 
710 National Health Act no. 61 of 2003, as amended in 2012. 
711 S.298 (1), ch.19 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010. In this case the surrogate will
have to compensate the commissioning parent(s) for the expenses they incurred due to the surrogacy contract 
(s. 301, ch.19 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010).
 
712 S. 297(1) (d), ch.19 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005, as amended in 2010.
 
713 Ex parte Applications for the confirmation of three surrogate motherhood agreements (2011/153,
 
2011/154, 2011/679, 2011/1314, 2011/1315, 2011/1316) [2011] ZAGPJHC 9; 2011 (6) SA 22 (GSJ) (1 March 

2011).
 
714 WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011).
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION- Which cases and/or events have instigated the
enactment of Chapter 19 of the Children’s Act 2005?
Surrogacy has featured in the SA social reality many years before its official recognition
and regulation by the Children’s Act. The first case that was reported and placed in the
centre of the public discourse is that of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen back in 1987.715 
Due to her inability to conceive and bear a child, Karen had asked her 48-year old 
mother to act as her surrogate and bring her child into the world. The birth of the triplets 
made international headlines, because the practice was outside the protective scope of
the law of the time. The laws in existence716 provided an insufficient basis; the persons 
involved in the surrogacy arrangement, as well as the child were in a legal limbo, as 
there was no law that expressly and specifically dealt with the issue of surrogacy. The
regulation in force would provide a mere indirect protection and could not lead to an 
automatic transfer or attribution of legal parenthood to the intended parent(s). As the 
law stood, the child would belong to the surrogate,717 who could only act as a surrogate 
if she was married718 and the intended parent(s) would have to go through the scrutiny
and the time-consuming process of adoption. By analogy with adoption law, payments 
would be illegal and constitute a criminal offence719 and in accordance with the law of 
contracts, surrogacy contracts would be unenforceable as contra bonos mores. 
In an attempt to tackle the problems raised by the lack of express provision of a legal 
framework for surrogacy, the South African Law Commission (SALC) began a 
consultation procedure in 1989, which had as a result the issuance of a Report on 
Surrogate Motherhood in 1993.720 The Report and draft legislation were brought before 
the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee (AHPC), which has been discussing the matter until
February 1999.721 In what followed the Report of the AHPC, the Discussion Paper 103 in 
Review of the Child Care Act in 2001722 highlighted the legal uncertainty surrounding the 
issue of legal parenthood with regards to the new reproductive technologies, and 
surrogacy in particular. This in turn led to the realisation of the need for a reform of the
SA Law of Children.  
In 2005, the legislature passed the Children’s Act no. 38, where it was declared that 
surrogacy was to be seen as an alternative form of fertility treatment. After the legal 
reform of 2005, surrogacy was being performed on a regular basis and with the 
involvement of surrogacy agencies which tried to ensure good practice.723 However, 
some commentators continued to stress the importance of more stringent controls on 
the practice of surrogacy. 
715 Lewis, S.V., ‘The Constitutional and Contractual Implications of the Application of Chapter 19 of the 

Children’s Act 38 of 2005’, Thesis submitted in the Department of Private Law, University of the Western Cape, 

May 2011, p. 17; Article by Kashiefa Ajam , ‘Wombs for rent: State to act’ (August 26, 2006), available at
 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/wombs-for-rent-state-to-act-1.291108#.UNSRAW_eQd4. 

716 Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 (amended by Act No. 106 of 1984, further amended by Act No. 51 of 1989 

and repealed by Act No. 61 of 2003) and section 5 of the Children's Status Act 82 of 1987, led to the
 
conclusion that the artificial insemination did not include the status of a child born of a surrogacy agreement. 

Nevertheless, the Act did refer to the situation where a child was carried by a woman with whom he/she had a 

genetic link. After his/her birth, the child would be legally recognised as the surrogate’s child, and the 

intending mother could only attain motherhood through adoption.
 
717 S. 5(1) (a) of the Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987.
 
718 S. 8.1 of the Regulations of Artificial Insemination 1986.
 
719 S. 24 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, as amended by s.8 of the Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991.
 
720 Working Paper of the South African Law Commission no.38: Surrogate Motherhood. For more information 

read Clark, B., ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Comment of the South African Law Commission’s Report on Surrogate 

Motherhood (Project 65)’, South African Law Journal, 110: 769-777, 1993.
 
721 Read further the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee Discussion on Surrogate Motherhood at
 
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/19990210-draft-report-discussion. 

722 Available at http://www.westerncape.gov.za/Text/2004/2/child_care_act_review.pdf .
 
723 For example the agency Baby2Mom (http://baby2mom.co.za/). See also the article by Baby2Mom, 

‘Everything you need to know about surrogacy in South Africa’ (2 June, 2011), available at 

http://www.proudparenting.com/node/15956. 
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More recently, in the wake of Madonna’s adoptions in Malawi,724 the SA authorities 
embraced and implemented tougher rules relating to the process of international 
adoptions, which were inserted in the Children’s Act of 2005 (as amended in 2010). This 
has galvanised a vivid debate concerning the matter of surrogate motherhood and the 
need for tighter regulation was recognised. Given high levels of poverty in SA, there was 
also concern that a commercial surrogacy industry would develop.725 
In line with the various concerns that illegal payments were taking place and that there 
was no consistency in the treatment of the issues relevant to surrogate motherhood by
the SA courts, Judges Ronel Tolmay and Jody Kollapen decided that it was time for the 
introduction of appropriate guidance. On 27 September 2011, the court of Pretoria 
granted permission for surrogacy to a male same-sex couple (who were Dutch and 
Danish citizens, but who were domiciled in SA and intended to reside there 
permanently), and laid down rules that govern the matters of same-sex726 and single727 
parenthood, and describe the meaning and the criteria for the suitability of the 
parents.728 
Additionally, the judges dealt with the definition of the ‘best interests of the child’. The 
law states that the interests of the child are of paramount importance729 when
considering the issues relating to a surrogate agreement. The Judges of the WH and
Others case took this rule one step further and referred to more specific provisions of the 
law on surrogate motherhood that are thought to guard the interests of the child. To 
exemplify this, they emphasised the requirement of s. 297 (b) and (c) of the Children’s 
Act for the handing over of the child by the surrogate and her husband/partner, if she 
has one, to the intended parents at a time ‘as soon as reasonably possible’, so that the
child will not be subjected to the emotional disturbance of developing familial bonds with
the surrogate and then being taken from her and given to the intended parent(s).730 
Moreover, the best interests of the child are protected because the law does not allow for 
the surrogacy agreement to be terminated after the fertilisation of the surrogate mother
has taken place, as per s. 298 (1) of the Children’s Act. The only exception to this rule is
724 News article by Andrew Vorzimer, ‘South Africa Adopts Tougher International Surrogacy Rules’, The Spin
Doctor (October 13, 2011), available at http://www.eggdonor.com/blog/2011/10/13/south-africa-adopts­
tougher-international-surrogacy-rules/; News article by Claudine Renaud, ‘SA tightens surrogacy guidelines’ 
(October 13, 2011), available at http://www.iol.co.za/lifestyle/family/parenting/sa-tightens-surrogacy­
guidelines-1.1156632#.UMojDm_eT_2. Also, articles appeared on BioNews, written by Annabel Christie, ‘South 
Africa shows a way to ensure more predictability in surrogacy arrangements’ (9 January, 2012),
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_116639.asp ; by Antony Blackburn-Starza, ‘South African court sets out 
guidelines for surrogacy arrangements’ (14 November 2011), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_111585.asp. 
725 See article ‘SA to tighten rules for foreigners to do for families’ (13 October, 2011),
http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2011/10/sa-to-tighten-the-rules-for-foreigners-to-do-for-families/ . The judges 
in WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011) expressed 
their fear that the already existent social and financial inequalities in SA would increase if appropriate rules to 
control the lack of payments to the surrogate were not to be put in place. 
726 WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011), para.
54.1: the SA law does not allow discrimination on grounds of sexual preferences; para. 54.2: “Care should be 

taken that different tests are not applied to same sex couples that could be discriminatory”.
 
727 WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011), para. 55:
 
s. 292 (1) (c) provides that a single person may also be an intended parent, which also complies with s. 9 of 

the Constitution and the right to equality.
 
728 WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011), para. 70:
 
“Personal and cultural perceptions should not influence any decision of the court… A court should have regard 

to the personal and character details of a commissioning parent. Details of previous criminal convictions should
 
be disclosed to the court…We would guard against setting unreasonably high standards that are not justifiable 

for people who choose surrogacy as an option for having a child”, as this would come into contrast with the 

right to equality enshrined in the SA Constitution.
 
729 S. 295 (e): “Above all is the interests of the child”.
 
730 WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011), para. 56.
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in the case of a legal termination of pregnancy, according to the provisions of the Choice 
on Termination of the Pregnancy Act, no. 92 of 1996.731 
Nonetheless, the court also stated that the rights of the intended parent(s) should enjoy
equal protection to that of the rights of the child when the judge is considering the
authorisation of the surrogate agreement. The constitutional rights to privacy, self-
determination and non-discrimination of the intended parents should be respected at all
times.732 
Lastly, the Pretoria court emphasised the need for the courts to act as the ultimate 
controllers and investigators for the non-commercial nature of the surrogacy 
arrangement.733 The lack of payments to any person involved (the surrogate mother and
the intermediaries) should be proven by an affidavit734 that supports the application and 
will be submitted to the court for review. Evidently, the court’s confirmation of the 
agreement is a lot more than a simple administrative procedure. The judge has a central 
role when it comes to the authorisation of the surrogacy contract and ‘should act to 
advance the spirit and the objectives of the Act without creating or placing additional 
obstacles in the path of the litigants, and as an upper guardian of all minor children’.735 
PROVISIONS OF THE SA LAW THAT ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE GREEK LAW 
ON SURROGACY 
It can certainly be contended that the legal, judicial and the political systems of Greece
and SA are very different, but the research on both legislations proves that the laws 
introduced to regulate the issue of surrogacy present similarities in a variety of aspects. 
The Greek legislation was adopted by the Greek society earlier than that of SA736 and, 
although it is unlikely that the Greek legislative action and the specific content of the 
legislation itself have exerted influence on how the SA regime on surrogacy was 
formulated, it seems that the decisions of the legislatures of both countries were up to a 
certain degree in parallel. 
It is, therefore, interesting from an academic, legal, and socio-political point of view to
summarise and compare the provisions of both regimes. This is evidently the only 
attempt in the contemporary literature to present a comparative analysis of both these
regimes. The fact that there is a strong resemblance between the two legislations – 
despite the social and political differences of the two countries – could be strong 
evidence that a harmonisation of the legislations of different countries around the world
may indeed be possible. 
The comparison of the Greek and SA law on surrogacy will be made in the form of a list,
and a brief analysis of specific issues will be provided, if and where it is necessary for a
better understanding of the two legal regimes. 
731 S. 300 of the Children’s Act.
 
732 More specifically, it is unacceptable for the courts to violate the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and 

the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, Act no. 4 of 2000 (WH and Others,
 
para. 63). The judges should also remember that every case should be decided on its own merits (see Minister 

of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick and Others (CCT08/00) [2000] ZACC 6; 2000 (7) BCLR
 
713; 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) (31 May 2000)).
 
733 Paras 64-67.
 
734 The appropriate content of the affidavit is set out in para. 77, WH and Others. The existence of an affidavit 

was deemed critical by the judge in the matter of the Ex parte Applications for the confirmation of three 

surrogate motherhood agreements (2011/153, 2011/154, 2011/679, 2011/1314, 2011/1315, 2011/1316)
 
[2011] ZAGPJHC 9; 2011 (6) SA 22 (GSJ) (1 March 2011), para. 24. The judge postponed the decision for all
 
three applications sine die, due to the lack or insufficiency of the affidavits concerning the medical and
 
psychological health of the contracting parties.
 
735 WH and Others, para. 72.
 
736 The Greek law on surrogacy was passed in 2002 (amended in 2005), whereas the SA law in 2005 (amended
 
in 2010).
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
	 The legislations of both countries facilitate surrogacy and regulate its practice
under strict provisions. 
	 The facilitation of surrogacy is based on the recognition of a right to have a child
(art. 5 para. 1 of the Greek Constitution, and s.12 (2) (a) of the SA Constitution),
even in cases where this can only be accomplished by artificial means and the use 
of fertility treatment, including surrogacy.
	 Surrogacy contracts are valid and enforceable: art. 1458 Greek Civil Code (GCC) 
and s. 292 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. Both the Greek and SA 
legislation allow for the drafting of a surrogacy agreement between the
individuals involved in the practice of surrogacy (intended parent(s), surrogate 
mother and her husband/partner, if she has one). The agreement must be in 
writing, and must be made at a time before the fertilisation of the surrogate 
mother. Furthermore, in order for the terms of the agreement to be enforced
three other prerequisites must be filled: the provision of (informed) consent by all 
those involved in the arrangement, the evident (by the specific clauses of the 
contract) lack of financial gain, the court validation and authorisation.
	 Consent to the surrogacy agreement: art. 1456 GCC and art. 5 of Law 
3305/2005, and s. 293 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. The 
surrogate motherhood contract must be created by consensual individuals, who 
were not coerced to make the agreement, and understand and accept the legal 
consequences of their predicament (their rights and obligations related to the 
nature of this arrangement, such as the costs of the medical and legal 
procedures, the lack of payments, the right for a legal abortion, the obligation for
the handing over of the resulting child after his/her birth, the terms and 
conditions of the right to parent and contact the child etc.). The Greek law goes 
on to say that the parties must also assert that they have been informed about 
the risks of the fertility treatment, as well as the dangers associated with the
pregnancy and childbirth. The parties should also consider the psychological 
impact that the relinquishment of a child may have on the person’s life (art. 5 of
Law 3305/2005, and s. 11 (b) of the SA National Health Act 2006, as amended in 
2 March, 2012). 
	 The pre-conception confirmation of the surrogacy agreement by the court: art. 
1458 GCC and art. 6 of Law 3089/2002, and s. 295 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s 
Act no. 38 of 2005. The upper guardian of the rights of the contracting parties 
and of the interests of the child, as well as the upper authority to deem the 
agreement valid is the Court. The judges in both countries examine the contract 
and decide whether the provisions of the law have been followed, and more
specifically whether the parties have entered into the agreement in good faith and 
only for altruistic reasons, whether payments have been made to any existent 
intermediaries, whether there is a medical necessity on behalf of the individual
who wants the child to proceed to the practice of surrogacy in order to have
his/her desire for parenthood fulfilled, whether the intended parent(s) and the 
surrogate mother have been assessed as suitable to execute the terms of the 
contract, among other issues. The confirmation of the surrogacy arrangement 
must take place before the surrogate’s impregnation. Nevertheless, due to the 
significance of the child’s best interests, it is hard to imagine that the judge will 
not authorise the surrogacy arrangement in retrospect if the parties failed to ask 
for the court’s permission before the fertility treatment takes place.
	 The best interests of the child are crucial to the decision for the confirmation of 
the surrogacy agreement and the dealing with any issues arising from the 
arrangement: art. 1 para. 2 of Law 3305/2005, art. 21 para. 1 of the Greek
Constitution (protection of the family), s. 295 (e) and 296 (1) (a) Ch. 19 of the 
SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. 
	 The rule of medical necessity: art. 1458 and 1455 of GCC, and s.295 (a) Ch. 19 
of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. Surrogate motherhood is in both
countries only available to persons who are unable to have a child for medical
reasons. Furthermore, the SA law considers homosexuality as a biological inability
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to procreate, and, hence, same-sex couples may use a surrogate in order to have 
a child. A provision similar to this one is non-existent in the Greek law.
	 Single parenting is acceptable: art. 1458 GCC737, and s.292 (1) (c) Ch. 19 of the
SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. The marital and/or relationship status of the 
person who wants to have a child through surrogacy is irrelevant.
	 Domicile requirement: art. 8 of Law 3089/2002, and s. 292 (c) and (d) Ch. 19 of
the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. Both the intended parent(s) and the 
surrogate mother must be domiciled in the country. However, there is a provision
in SA law which states that the court is entitled to allow – on good cause shown –
for a woman to become a surrogate even if she is not domiciled in SA (s. 292 (2)
Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005). Such flexibility to the court’s 
powers is not recognised by the Greek Law. 
	 Altruistic nature of the surrogacy arrangement: art. 1458 GCC, and s. 295 (c) 
and (v) and s. 301 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. Any payments
in relation to surrogacy are prohibited in both countries, including payments
towards the donor, the clinic, any surrogacy agencies that brought the intended 
parent(s) into contact with the surrogate mother, or any third parties involved.
The woman who offers her gestational services must not aim to financially benefit
from the surrogacy arrangement. An exception to the rule of the lack of payment 
in both countries is the provision permitting ‘reasonable expenses’, namely any
costs in direct link to the impregnation of the surrogate, the pregnancy, and
childbirth costs (art. 13 para. 4 of Law 3305/2005, and s.301 (2) Children’s Act 
no. 38 of 2005). More specifically, the intended parent(s) should provide for the 
medical care of the surrogate, her clothing, her transportation to and from the 
medical clinic, the costs of the childbirth and after-birth treatment, the legal costs 
for the application for the confirmation of the surrogacy agreements by the court, 
the medical and psychological assessment of the surrogate mother, as well as the
loss of wages due to her inability to present herself to work during the last
months of pregnancy. The SA law goes a step further and accepts additional 
payments for the insurance coverage of the surrogate (death and disability
insurance).738 Also, the SA law requires for the legal cases of surrogacy to be
managed by lawyers specialised in the specific are of law739 and the costs for their 
services are covered by the intended parent(s) (s. 301 (3) Children’s Act no. 38 
of 2005). Both in SA and in Greece the court must be satisfied – based on
affidavits that must be submitted to the court – that no payments other than for 
reasonable expenses have been made to the surrogate or any agencies involved. 
	 Requirement for the psychological assessment of the surrogate: article 13 para. 2
of Law 3305/2005, and s. 7 (j) (ii) of the National Health Act of 2003 (as
amended in 2012) and WH and Others (29935/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 185; 2011
(6) SA 514 (GNP) (27 September 2011), para. 67. Before applying to the court
for its authorisation of the surrogacy agreement, the intended parent(s) should
make sure that the good emotional state of the surrogate and her intention to 
comply with the terms and conditions of the surrogacy arrangement and the law 
have been evaluated by an experienced psychologist and have been deemed 
satisfactory. 
737 Art. 1458 of the GCC recognises the right of a single woman to have a child through surrogacy. The right of 
a single man to use a surrogate for the attainment of parenthood to a child was recently acknowledged by the 
Greek court (One Member Court of First Instance of Athens no. 2827/2008 and One Member Court of First
Instance of Thessaloniki no.13707/2009). For a comment on the SA law of parenthood see also Louw, A.,’ The
Constitutionality of a Biological Father’s Recognition as a Parent’, Per/PeLJ 13 (3) 2010: 156-206. 
738 S. 301 (2) (c) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. Read Slabbert, M.N., ‘Legal issues relating to
the use of surrogate mothers in the practice of assisted conception’, South African Journal of Bioethics and
Law, Vol 5, No 1 (2012), available at http://www.sajbl.org.za/index.php/sajbl/article/view/190/200. Also, the 
article by Baby2Mom, ‘Every Thing You Need to Know about Surrogacy in South Africa’, 
http://www.proudparenting.com/node/15956. 
739 Article by Baby2Mom, ‘Every Thing You Need to Know about Surrogacy in South Africa’, 
http://www.proudparenting.com/node/15956. 
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	 No right to terminate the agreement after the impregnation of the surrogate
mother: art. 1456 para.2 GCC, s. 297 (1) (e) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 
38 of 2005. 
	 The fully medicalised fertilisation procedure: art. 16 of Law 3305/2005, and s. 9 
(1) National Health Act of 2003. The impregnation of the woman who acts as a
surrogate on behalf of the intended parent(s) is strictly performed in medical
institutions which are authorised to provide fertility treatments and by medical
practitioners-gynaecologists specialised in human reproduction and reproductive
technologies. 
	 Anonymity of the donor, if donated gametes are used: article 1460 GCC, s. 8 (2) 
(d) of National Health Act 2003 and WH and Others case, para. 68. In cases 
where the gametes of another person are used, the identity of the donor will 
remain undisclosed. Only access to the donor’s medical files is permitted by law. 
	 Surrogate mother’s right to terminate the pregnancy: art. 179 and 181 of the 
GCC (legal principal of fairness) and art. 304 of the Greek Criminal Code (right to
a legal abortion), and s.300 Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. 
	 Automatic attribution of legal parenthood to the intended parent(s): art. 1458 
and 1464 GCC, and s. 297 (1) (a) Ch. 19 of the SA Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005. 
The child that is born after the drafting and the confirmation by the court of a 
surrogacy arrangement is considered as the child of the intended parent(s) from
his/her birth. No adoption, or court proceedings (such as those of the parental 
order in the UK) is needed. The surrogate and her husband/wife/partner have 
absolutely no parental rights towards the child. Moreover, the SA law includes an
express provision for the lack of a right of the surrogate, and her 
husband/wife/partner, as well as their relatives, to contact the child born through 
surrogacy, unless there is a different agreement between the parties found in the
surrogacy agreement. Such a rule does not exist in the Greek Law. 
PROVISIONS OF THE SA LAW THAT ARE DIFFERENT TO THOSE OF THE GREEK 
LAW ON SURROGACY 
Even though the Greek and SA laws on surrogacy are, as noted in the previous section,
so much alike, they are also dissimilar in many critical points. The SA legislation is more
progressive than the Greek one in a variety of aspects, providing for same-sex
parenthood and death and disability insurance of the surrogate mother. However, in
other respects the SA regime is more conservative, such as when it comes to the finite 
duration of the validity of the surrogacy agreement, the requirement for the existence of 
a genetic link between the intended parent(s) and the child.  
More specifically:
	 The SA law refers to “commissioning” parent(s) (s.294 Ch. 19 of the SA 
Children’s Act no. 38 of 2005), and requires for the child to have a genetic
relationship with his/her parent(s), as opposed to the Greek law, which allows for 
a non-biological parenting. The Greek law recognises the case of full social
parenthood, whereby the parent-child relationship is based on emotions of love
instead of biological ties (as derived by art. 1458 GCC).  
	 The cases of both full (s. 294 of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005) and partial 
surrogacy is recognised in SA (stemming from s. 294 in conjunction with s. 298 
(1) of the Children’s Act no.38 of 2005). In Greece only the case of gestational 
surrogacy is allowed, since the law requires for the egg not to belong to the 
surrogate mother (art. 1458 GCC). Hence, the fertilised egg will either come from
the intending mother, if she is able to produce one, or a third donor. With the 
adoption of this rule the legislature tried to avoid the critiques against the 
enforcement of the law on surrogacy made by people who consider it unethical
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and harsh to force a woman to relinquish a child, with whom she has supposedly
formed an emotional bond during the period of pregnancy.
	 The SA law makes surrogacy available to same-sex parents (S. 295 (a) of Ch. 19, 
Children’s Act 2005)740. Such a choice is currently not available to Greek same-
sex couples. It is, however, possible that a judge may authorise surrogacy 
arrangements that will be presented before the court in the future, based on the 
general constitutional principle of equality and non-discrimination (art.4 of the 
Greek Constitution). 
	 According to the SA law, the application to the court for the authorisation of the 
surrogacy agreement may be made by either of the intending parents, whereas in
Greece this right is only appointed to the intending mother (art. 1458 GCC). By 
placing the intended mother at the centre of the legal framework, it could be
argued that the Greek law seeks to empower women’s rights and promote a more 
feministic approach to the law of reproduction. In contrast, the SA regime allows 
for a “cooling off” period for a surrogate mother who is also the genetic mother,
during which she can change her mind about giving the child to the intended 
parent(s) (see below). 
	 The Greek law sets an upper limit to the age of the intending mother, which is the
age of fifty (from the combination of the art. 1455 of the GCC and art. 4
paragraph 1 of Law 3305/2005), although no requirement is in existence with
regards to the age of the surrogate mother. Recent case law, however, indicates 
that the most significant criterion for a woman to be allowed to act as a surrogate
mother in Greece is not her biological age, but her general good health and her 
ability to endure the difficulties of pregnancy and childbirth.741 A similar rule is 
not to be found in the SA regime on surrogacy. The Greek law has evidently
sought to discourage post-menopausal women from continuing with their 
attempts to accomplish motherhood.  
	 The surrogate mother in SA must have already had a viable pregnancy and
delivery and a child of her own: s. 295 (c) (vi) and (vii) of the Children’s Act of
2005, respectively. The Greek law does not require the woman who acts as a 
surrogate to have had the experience of pregnancy, childbirth, and motherhood
before she agrees to enter into a surrogacy contract. This has been harshly
criticised by many Greek commentators, who argue that the surrogate must know
what it means for a woman to undergo the difficulties of a pregnancy and
delivery, the emotional bond that is created between her and the child, and the
pain of not being able to care for and raise the child afterwards. Concerns are
expressed about the validity of her consent, which, according to them, is only
partially informed and therefore void. 
	 The payment of a death and disability insurance to the surrogate mother is
included in the “reasonable expenses” of a surrogacy arrangement (s. 301 (2) (c) 
of the Children’s Act of 2005). No such rule is adopted by the Greek law. 
	 In SA the fertilisation of the surrogate mother may take place, if the judge deems 
it necessary, even when the husband/wife/partner of the woman who wants to 
act as a surrogate does not consent to it (s. 293 (3) of the Children’s Act of 
2005). The court will decide whether the person withholds his/her consent for no
apparent and justifiable reason, and if it finds it correct and fair to do so, it will
order the performance of the artificial insemination of the surrogate without 
worrying about the lack of the legal requirement of consent from all parties
involved. Such an action is prohibited by the Greek law, where the legal rule of
the indirect attainment of the legal parentage through the recognition of legal
parentage to the man’s wife/civil partner (art. 1456 GCC, art. 5 of Law 
3305/2005, arts. 1464 and 1475 GCC).  
740 See also footnote no. 11 above.
 
741 In 2006 a woman aged 52 was allowed to bear the child of her daughter and her husband (One Member
 
Court of First Instance of Korinthos no. 224/2006).
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	 The SA law states that the fertilisation of the surrogate must take place before 
the lapse of a period of time of 18 months after the court’s permission to proceed 
with the surrogacy (s. 296 (1) (b) of the Children’s Act of 2005). The reason for
this is the fear that the consent of the parties will not be valid after the time
specified by the law, which could render the agreement unethical and coerced. 
The Greek law pertaining to surrogacy includes no similar rule.
	 Lastly, but importantly, the SA law allows for a “cooling-off period” and the right 
of the surrogate mother to change her mind. In Greece this is only possible
before the attainment of pregnancy. After this point the surrogate mother must
adhere to the regulations of the surrogacy arrangement and relinquish her 
parental rights along with the child after his/her birth. In SA, however, s. 298 (1)
of the Children’s Act of 2005 dictates that the surrogate mother who is also
the genetic mother can terminate the agreement at any time, as long as this is
done before the lapse of a period of 60 days after the birth of the child. The 
process is simple: she just has to file a written notice to the court informing the 
judge about it. She may then be considered as the wholly (both genetic and 
legal) mother of the child and not be forced to hand it over to the intending 
parent(s). However, the law states that she may have to compensate the 
intending parent(s) for any payments made up to that point742 (i.e. payments for
reasonable expenses) as a form of a breach of contractual obligations. Such a
right for a change of heart is not available to the gestational surrogate mother
according to the SA law. Her position as an altruistically motivated service 
provider is not deemed strong enough for her to be given the right to seek the 
recognition of legal motherhood. Any attempt to keep the baby for herself would 
be against the law (s. 297 (1) (b) of the Children’s Act of 205), as it is also in
Greece.
	 The role of the court: In practical terms, the judges who decide for the cases of 
surrogacy in Greece are extremely limited. They have little or no discretional 
power, and the court procedure for the authorisation is more of a ‘formal
bureaucratic procedure’743 rather than the ultimate test for the attainment of legal
parenthood. The case is different in SA. The court is more than a rubber stamp
for the endorsement of the individual’s desire to have a child through surrogacy, 
if this cannot be accomplished otherwise. The judge is the protector of the law
and of the interests and rights of all the parties involved in the surrogacy
arrangement. He/she will investigate and confirm the lack of financial gain, the 
respect of all the legal prerequisites, and the suitability of the intending parent(s)
and the surrogate mother to comply with the terms and conditions of the 
contract. The judge will ask about the true reasons for choosing the method of
surrogacy in order to have a child, and search for a close relationship of mutual 
respect and appreciation among the parties. In theory, these are also the
responsibilities of the Greek judge, but as the research conducted for this study 
on the recent case-law showed, the courts in Greece rather check if the 
paperwork submitted to the court is sufficient to declare the specific agreement 
as valid and in accordance with the national laws and the Constitution.
	 No criminal sanctions are threatened against the violators of the SA law on
surrogacy, as it is done by article 26 paragraph 8 of Law 3305/2005 in Greece.
The penalties are in fact harsh: personal imprisonment of all the actors to the
crime for two years at least, and a payment of damages of at least 1,500 Euros.
742 S. 298 (3) of the Children’s Act 2005.
 
743 Hatzis, A., ‘The Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in Greece’ (working paper, 2010), available at
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689774. 
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6.11. SPAIN 
Equal rights versus bioethics: a moral conflict or a legal one? 
The current legal debate in Spain with regards to homosexual parentage 
through the case of surrogacy. 
1. Current legal framework 
The Spanish law 35/1988 of the 22nd of November on the techniques of assisted
reproduction (Ley sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida- LTRA, for its Spanish
acronym)744 has been considered one of the most liberal pieces of legislation, as it
allowed already by the time of its entry into force the access to assisted reproductive 
technology to single women (art. 6.1.). It was also a pioneering law on the matter, as it 
allowed the access of ART to widowed women, if the husband had consented to donate 
his sperm while alive745. 
In Spain, the prohibition of surrogacy was determined by the law of the 22nd of
November 1988 on the techniques of medically assisted reproduction (TRA, for its 
Spanish acronym), and confirmed by the law nº14 of the 26th of May 2006. 
This law stipulates that: “1. A contract convening the gestation, whether for profit or
gratuitous, of a woman who will renounce to maternal parentage in favour of a co­
contracting party or a third party, will be null and void. 2. The parentage of the children
born from surrogacy will be determined by childbirth. 3. The biological father retains the 
possibility to contest the paternity, in conformity to the rules of common law” (art. 
10)746 . 
This law forbids surrogacy explicitly and reinforces the presumption according to which 
the mother is the woman who gives birth. Moreover, sanctions are provided for in the 
form of fines. Surrogacy is sanctioned by a fine going from 10.000 to a million euros and 
can lead to the closing of the medical centre or the services of medically assisted 
reproduction that participated in it.
Recently, a debate emerged on the legal scene and the doctrine is shared between two 
positions that are relatively opposed to each other. Furthermore, some members of the 
National Commission on Medically Assisted Reproduction have expressed their 
disagreement with this prohibition and defend an opening-up of the legal framework to
surrogacy for women who would not be able to bear children for physiological reasons.
However, in the current context of crisis, of social demands and the ascension to power 
of a conservative party, this is not a legislative priority. Moreover, the right-wing 
government has concentrated its attention on the reform of the abortion law, 
questioning the legal concert resulting from more than 30 years of struggle for the 
equality of men and women.  
2. Historical context of the laws  
In the context of the LTRA of 1988, the Spanish legislator had decided to create a 
Special Commission Studying In Vitro Fecundation and Artificial Insemination (Palacios 
Commissions)747. As a part of the work of this commission, a group of experts was
744 Official Bulletin of the State of the 24/11/1988, num. 282. 
745 MARTÍNEZ-PEREDA RODRÍGUEZ and J. M. MASSIGOGE BENEGIU, La maternidad portadora, subrogada o de 
encargo en el Derecho español, Ed. Dykinson, 1994, pg. 71 
746 BUSTOS PUECHE, J-E., El derecho español ante las nuevas técnicas genéticas, Diario La Ley, Ed. LA LEY, 
tome 3, 1992.
747 Report of the Special Commission Studying In Vitro Fecundation and Artificial Insemination: [approved by 
Congress of Deputies in Plenary session on the 10th of April 1986]. Spain. General Courts. Congress. Special
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
convened (biologists, gynaecologists, legal experts, philosophers) in order to counsel the 
legislative body with regards to the genetic, biological and ethical problems of assisted
reproduction. The report issues by this Commission (approved in 1986) adopted a series
of criteria that were determinant in the regulation of surrogacy, contemplated by the 
Law of 1988. In view of writing the report, the Commission disposed of a broad 
documentation, but it also was inspired –as the similarities of the final conclusion reveal-
by the Warnock report, written in the United Kingdom in 1984. 
This report refuses surrogacy on the basis of “ethical reasons” in relation to maternity,
but also to the possibility of the manipulation of the feminine body, arguing that: “it is 
inadmissible in a fair and democratic society, as there is an increased risk of abuse and
commercialisation, two situations that are subjected to conviction”.
At the same time, the Palacios Commissions settled on the question of prioritisation of
the nature of maternity in cases of conflict: genetic, gestational, etc. concluding that it is 
necessary to reflect on the biological value of the two aspects of surrogacy: the genetic 
aspect of maternity and gestation. The third dimension emerging in the latter years of
the debate, the intention (intended parents), is absent in these report.  
With regards to these conflicts on the prioritisation of the prevalence of maternity, the 
Commission concluded the following: “the gestation component is more important than
the genetic one, as the gestating mother bears the child within her for nine months and
protects the child physiologically and psychologically, an element that will give priority to 
the child-bearing woman, and opposes surrogacy. In this sense, we recommend that the
biological preponderance of gestational maternity over the genetic one is admitted and 
that the legal mother is always the gestating mother, even if originally there was an 
intervention of donors”. It is, thus, on this basis that the current laws prohibit surrogacy
and define maternity in relation to childbirth.
The recommendations were the following: 
- Surrogacy must be prohibited in all circumstances.  
- the individuals participating of a contract of surrogacy must be subjected to a penal 
sanction, as well as the individuals, the agencies and the institutions favouring it as well
as the medical teams performing it.  
- the health centres or services in which these techniques take place will be subjected to 
a sanction748. 
From a penal point of view, Art. 221 of the Penal code (based on the version of 2003) 
establishes: 1. Those who, through economic compensation, deliver a child to another 
individual, without the existence of a relation of parentage, eluding the legal procedures 
of custody, hosting or adoption, with the objective of establishing an analogous relation
to that of parentage,  will be punished with imprisonment of a duration of from one to  
five years, and with a legal impediment to exercise parental authority, tutelage or
custody during a period going from four to 10 years749. 2. The same sanction will apply
to the person who receives the child as the intermediary, even if the case of the 
“delivery” of the child took place in a foreign country750 751 . 
Commission Studying In Vitro Fecundation and Artificial Insemination, Marcelo Palacios. Congress of Deputies, 

General Secretary 1987.
 
748 ROCA I TRÍAS, E., «Derechos de reproducción y eugenesia», Biotecnología y Derecho. Perspectivas
 
en Derecho comparado, Bilbao-Granada, 1998, p. 127.
 
749 It is impossible to know if the incrimination concerns both parents or only the mother, as there has not been
 
a penal case concerning surrogacy until today. 

750 PEREZ VAQUERO, C. “Las pensiones de la poligamia”, Revista Quadernos de Criminología, 2009, nº 7; pp.
 
38-39. http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3104389.
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Let us move forward in history, and acknowledge the progress in terms of new
techniques of reproduction that has been achieved during these last years. In particular
the increased potential of research and the need to answer the issue of the destination 
of supernumerary pre-embryos, pushing forwards the need for a reform or a profound 
revision of the law 35/1988, of the 22nd of November 1988. 
The Law 45/2003, of the 21st of November, modifying the Law 35/1988 only partially
responded to these questions. Indeed, the Law authorises the use, for the purposes of 
research, of the cryopreserved pre-embryos existing before its entry into force 
(November 2003), and under very restrictive conditions. Moreover, this law established
an important limitation: that of producing a maximum of three oocytes in every single
reproductive cycle, which complicated the ordinary tasks related to assisted reproduction 
techniques. It is on this issue that the National Commission on Medically Assisted 
Reproduction showed criticism with regards to the legislative reform, and recommended
a correction of the gaps resulting by the creation of a new law. 
In this sense, there was also a problem of legal complexity, as Spain had two laws in
force, the law 35/88 and the law 45/2003, which modified only two articles of the 
previous one, without addressing the rest of it752. 
The Law 2006 will nullify the previous two laws and will constitute the sole norm on the 
matter. 
The law nº14 of the 26th of May 2006 on the techniques of medically assisted 
reproduction (“técnicas de reproducción humana asistida”) comprises an article entitled 
“Surrogacy”, enouncing: 
“1. A contract convening the gestation, whether for profit or gratuitous, of a woman
who will renounce to maternal parentage in favour of a co-contracting party or a third 
party, will be null and void.
“2. The parentage of the children born from surrogacy will be determined by childbirth. 
“3. The biological father retains the possibility to contest the paternity, in conformity to 
the rules of common law.” 753 
Let us be reminded that the previous law, adopted in 1988, included exactly the same 
prohibition. Neither the explanatory statement on the basis of the law of 2006 nor the
one for the law of 1988, both very detailed, specify the reasons for this prohibition. 
3. A great change through the administrative channels  
Regardless of this prohibition, the Directive of the Directorate General for 
Registers and Notaries (DGRN, for its acronym in Spanish)754 on the “regime of
registration of parentage of children born out of surrogacy”, of the 5th of October 2010 
(Official Bulletin of the State of the 7th of July 2010), provides for the registration in the 
Civil Registry of children born from surrogacy in countries where the law provides for it
and with the condition that at least one of the parents is Spanish. In other words, it
751 The penal process develops within the principle of territoriality (regardless of art. 221 of the Penal Code).
 
This principle has to be articulated with the principle of minimal intervention of penal law and the principle of
 
proportionality. This is the reason why the article 221 of the PC has never been applied to cases of 

international surrogacy. No case has been documented. 

752 Law 14/2006, of the 26th of May, on the techniques of assisted human reproduction. 

Official Bulletin of the State, nº 126 of the 27th of May 2006, pages 19947 to 19956 (10 pgs.), BOE-A-2006­
9292. http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2006-9292.
 
753 BOE nº 126, 27.5.2006.
 
754 The DGRN is structurally attached to the sub-secretariat of the Justice Ministry. It is the equivalent of the 

Registry Office.
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
allows the access to the Spanish Civil Registry of “foreign” cases755. 
However, this directive was questioned by the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia
(Audiencia Provincial de Valencia), as it is shown by the sentence nº 8621/2011 of the
Court (Sentence of the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia, of the 23rd of November 
2011). This sentence builds on the Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010, and
follows the precedent stipulated by the sentence of the Court of First Instance (nº 15 of 
Valencia, of the 15th of September 2010)756 that settles in favour of the action
undertaken before it by the Public Prosecutor (Fiscal Ministry), ordering the annulment of
the registration in the Civil Registry of children born from surrogacy in foreign countries.  
3.1. Detailing the legal facts 
In Spain, it was not until the question of the recognition of the double masculine same-
sex parentage was raised, through the issue of surrogacy, that a case law began to 
emerge. 
Surprisingly, there is no case before 2006. Previously Spain had bypassed757 the 
question of surrogacy raised by publicised cases of celebrities becoming parents through
“magic” channels. It is, thus, possible to affirm that there was a great degree of social 
and legal hypocrisy until a gay couple requested the registration in the consular Civil 
Register Office of their son born through surrogacy at Los Angeles in 2008. This case, 
very publicised, generated several judicial and administrative sentences and opened a 
debate within the doctrine, as we will explore in the following lines. 
To return to the question of this supposed hypocrisy, let us explore the statistics of the 
Consulate of Los Angeles. If we observe the data of the Consulate, it is possible to note 
that the birth rate of the Spaniards residing within the territory of the Consulate of Los 
Angeles during the year 2008 was of 50,01 per thousand. This rate is five times higher 
that the rate of Spaniards residing in Spain (9,8 per thousand in 2008) or in other
consular territories. To explain this disproportionate birth rate, we can suggest that the 
Consulate allows for the registration of sons and daughters of non-residing heterosexual 
couples. We have also found cases in which mothers, considered by the Consulate as
having given birth at Los Angeles, entered the United States a few days after the birth of
their child. In the blog “sonnuestroshijos” (Spanish for “they are our children”) there are 
several anonymous testimonies of heterosexual couples that registered their child born
through surrogacy before the Consulate of Los Angeles, pretending to be the biological 
parents of the child. 
In the light of this evidence, Spanish heterosexual couples were able to successfully
obtain the transcription of foreign birth certificates in the Spanish Civil Registry, as if the 
children born from surrogacy were children born through natural means.  
755 From the 1st of July 1992, Spain is a part of the Convention of the ICCS nº24 la Convention CIEC nº24 on 
the recognition and updating of civil status booklets, signed at Madrid on the 5th of September 1990 providing 
that civil registrars drawing up a civil status record, update, when presented to them, the civil status booklets 
drawn up in another Contracting State. Pursuant to the possibility provided by article 11 of the Convention, the 
Spanish civil registrar will not proceed to update the documents if such updates are not provided for by the 
domestic law or if the content is contrary to the domestic public order.
756 LAMM, E., Gestación por sustitución Realidad y Derecho, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y 
Técnicas, Argentina, 2012. 
757 To the extent public authorities ignored the situation. No legal procedure was triggered. The most publicised 
cases concern a Marquise (Thyssen), a signer (Miguel Bosé). 
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
It is evident that the gay couples struggling to register their children in the Spanish Civil
Registry from abroad made visible an issue that was until then invisible (or taboo). The 
discretion of this practice, even in recent cases, is explained by the fact that the
heterosexual couples could misrepresent reality and pretend to be both legal and 
biological parents of the child.  
In California, the practice of surrogacy is well established. An authorisation system for
the couple and the surrogate is founded on social and medical criteria. Moreover in this 
state, the case law grants parentage to the genetic mother, regardless of the fact of 
childbearing. Furthermore, the parents undertake an action before a Court prior to the 
birth of the child. The choice of the surrogate is often made between relatives or friends, 
or to the benefit of homosexual couples that enjoy the same rights as heterosexual 
couples in terms of marriage and parentage. Some couples keep ties with the surrogate 
in a perspective of symbolic parenthood, by attributing the social role of aunt or friend of 
the couple. 
3.2. The facts: legal actions of a gay couple
The RDGRN758 (Resolution of the Directorate General for Registers and Notaries) of the 
18/2/2009 resolves the legal action undertaken by two married men, both Spanish
citizens residing in Spain, against a legal sentence of the officer in charge of the Spanish 
Consular Register Office in Los Angeles-California, who refused the registration after 
birth of their two children born through surrogacy in that American state. The parents of 
the minors appeared before the Spanish Consular Register Office in California with the 
objective of obtaining the documentation necessary to return to Spain with the newly
born children. 
Within the consular demarcation (zone 17: United States Los Angeles), there is a 
Registry Office before which it is possible to register the children born on Californian
territory from Spanish citizens in order to allow these children to be recognised by the
Civil Registry as Spanish. The officer in charge at the consulate verifies the provided
documentation, and orders the transcription of the births into the Civil Registry in  
conformity with the Spanish law (Article 23 of the law on the Civil Registry). Thereafter,
the Ministry of Justice approves these documents and sends them to the Central Registry 
(Article 12 of the law on the Civil Registry).
758 The DGRN is not a judicial entity but and administrative one depending on the Ministry of Justice. The 
decision of the DGRN can be contested and taken before the courts. But the DGRN is the supreme entity
governing registries and gives instructions (directives) to ensure the correct functioning of the registries 
(certificates, registrations). 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
In this case, the officer in charge of registration at the consulate refuses the registration, 
not because there was a failure to comply with the procedure concerning the law on the
Civil Registry, but because the children were born through surrogacy, which is prohibited
by article 10 of the law on the techniques of assisted human reproduction759. 
Let us note that the procedure followed by this couple doesn’t consist of asking before 
the Spanish courts the execution of the Californian decision establishing parentage. The 
couple requests the registration of the two children in the Consular Civil Registry
(Registro civil consular). In this particular case, the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Fiscal)
was notified of the action, but did not take a stand. This could be due to the fact that the 
latter considers that the question does not have an incidence on the Spanish public 
order, as the transcription into the Spanish Civil Registry is necessary for the Public
Prosecutor to be able to nullify this decision after the fact (thus, after the registration).
The Directorate General for Registers and Notaries (DGRN) orders for the children to be 
registered in the Civil Registry, arguing that the question of parentage in relation to the 
minors is not the object of the procedure but to attend to the issue of recognising the
validity of the proof of the certificates issued by the foreign registry office760 (Art. 81 of 
the Decree of the 14th of November 1958 concerning the Regulation of the law on the
Spanish Civil Registry761).
The DGRN will settle in favour of the couple and will order the registration of the birth of
the minors with parentage, identically to what appeared in the Californian civil registry:
the children born in California are the “natural” children of the Spanish gay couple. On
the Spanish family record booklet they are identified as having a direct relation of
parentage with the gay couple. 
The DGRN refuses, thus, the existence of fraud or “bad forum shopping” and argues that 
the registration was not contrary to the Spanish international public order. Moreover, the 
DGRN highlight that the principle of the best interests of the minor demands the children
to have the same parentage in Spain and in California and that their identity is only one
and not many. 
In other words, to the DGRN the minors should not change parents every time they
cross borders. However, on the 17th of September 2010, the Court of First instance nº15 
of Valencia nullified this decision following an action undertaken by the Public Prosecutor 
(Ministerio Fiscal) and declared that the documents where null and void. The couple 
decides, then, to launch an appeal before the Provincial Supreme Court. Moreover, the 
DGRN issues a “directive762 concerning the registration of paternity or maternity in the
case of international surrogacy. 
The directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October of 2010 on “the regime of registration of
parentage in relation to children born through surrogacy” attempts to establishing a legal 
security, proportionate to the Spanish legal regime on parentage for children born 
through techniques of assisted reproduction when the parentage has been validated by 
the authorities of the foreign country. But the directive has several operational limits,
especially in Spanish international private law, and turns the procedure into an
759 QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ, A., “Doble filiación paterna de gemelos nacidos en el extranjero mediante maternidad 

subrogada. En torno a la RDGRN de 18 de febrero de 2009”, WWW. INDRET.COM, 2009. QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ,
 
A., « La famille homosexuelle en Espagne », Homoparentalité? Approche comparative, Société de législation
 
comparée, Paris 2012, pp. 41-79.
 
760 CALVO CARAVACA A.-L. et CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ, J., « Gestación por sustitución y derecho internacional 

privado: consideraciones en torno a la resolución de la dirección general de los registros y del 

notariado de 18 de febrero de 2009 », Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, vol. 1, n° 2, October 2009, pp.
 
294-319.
 
761 Decree of the 14th of November 1958 concerning the Regulation of the law on the Spanish Civil Registry.
 
762 OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE STATE, n° 243, 7th of October 2010.
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A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU Member States 
extremely complicated one in bureaucratic terms763. 
4. Courts and case law 
4.1. 2009: Resolution of the DRGN of the 18/2/2009 (RJ/2009\1735)764
A resolution of the DGRN of the 18th of February 2009 (RDGRN), assessing the
action undertaken against the legal decision of the officer in charge of the
Consular Registry, and ordering the transcription into the Spanish Civil Registry 
of the contents of the foreign birth certificates of the twins born through
surrogacy in California. 
The RDGRN invokes the best interests of the minor, on the basis of the supranational 
norm of the article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 
in force in Spain from the 5th of January 1991. Moreover, the RDGRN adduces the need
to guarantee a single identity to the minors through national borders. 
After ordering the transcription of such documents, the DGRN does not solve neither the 
questions of substance in relation to the legality of the surrogacy contract (according to 
article 10 of the Law on Assisted Reproduction) nor the question of parentage of the
children (according to the law designed by article 9.4 of the Civil Code), nor the question
of the eventual recognition in Spain of the Californian legal sentence (according to
articles 951 and following of the Law of Civil Procedure765). 
Besides, the RDGRN considers that refusing the registration of the demanded parentage 
is a case of discrimination, because such a refusal would be motivated by the fact that
both partners are of the same sex.
4.2. Sentence of the Court of First Instance nº 15 of Valencia, of the 15th of
September 2010 
The legal position reflected by the referenced legal sentence is founded on the 
prevalence of the express prohibition of surrogacy in the Spanish norm, and the 
control that the Civil Registry must carry out in conformity to the art. 23 of law
on the Civil Registry, as it specifies that the registration will occur “…whenever
there is no doubt of the reality of the fact registered and its legality in 
conformity to the Spanish Law "766. The sentence highlights that, due to the 
fact that in Spain surrogacy is prohibited, the registration in the Civil Registry
cannot be allowed.  
For the judge of Valencia, the couple undertaking the action was aware of the prohibition
in the Spanish law, and was aware that the request could be refused. Thus, for the 
judge, the two adults made an informed choice. In this sense, according to the sentence 
–adopting fully the action undertaken by the Public Procurator (Ministerio Fiscal) against
the RDGRN– there is a prevalence of the Spanish norm (prohibition of surrogacy) in
763 See in detail these limits in CALVO CARAVACA A.-L. et CARRASCOSA GONZALEZ, J., « Notas críticas en 
torno a la instrucción de la dirección general de los registros y del notariado de 5 octubre 2010 sobre régimen 
registral de la filiación de los nacidos mediante gestación por sustitución », in Cuadernos de Derecho 
Transnacional, vol. 3, n° 1, March, pp. 247-262. 
764 n° 1032/2009 TSJ Madrid, the Resolution of the Directorate General of Registers and Notaries (DGRN) of 
the 18th of February 2009 (RJ 2009\1735), « L’Instrucció DGRN de 5 d’octubre 2010 sobre el règim registral de
la filiació dels nascuts mitjançant gestació per substitució » (OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE STATE, n° 243, 7th of 
October 2010). 
765 Law 1/200 of the 7th on Civil Procedure. 
766 According to this article: Childbirth should be declared before the registry of the competent consulate in 
relation to the place of birth. The registration is based on general rules. The foreign birth certificate can be 
subjected to a registration, if there is no doubt of the reality of the childbirth and of the legality of the 
certificate according to Spanish law (art. 16 and 23 of the Law of the Civil Registry). 
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Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs
relation to the recognition of foreign birth certificates, especially in cases of fraudulent
“forum shopping”. Let us note that the sentence does not mention the best interest of 
the child, a fundamental argument of the RDGRN.  
The sentence of the Court of First Instance nº 15 of Valencia notes that the resolution of 
the RDGRN opposes the prevalence of the Spanish norm (prohibition of surrogacy). 
According to the court of Valencia, it is a responsibility of the officer in charge of the Civil 
Registry to verify the “reality of the registered fact”, and a formal control of qualification
would not be enough, as it is also necessary to prove that both applicants are the “real” 
fathers of the children, something that is biologically impossible and, thus, would have
left without legal effect the registration.  
However, the sentence highlights that the “nullity of the registration is not in relation to
the fact that the applicants are two men, but to the fact that the infants born are the 
consequence of a contract of surrogacy”; “this observation would be applicable to their 
situations, concerning two women, a single woman, or a heterosexual couple”  
It is possible that on the cases concerning women or heterosexual couples, the problem 
of surrogacy will be harder to identify, but if the identification takes place, the 
consequence should be the same: to refuse the registration”.  
4.3. Directive of the 5th of October 2010, by the Directorate General of 
Registers and Notaries (BOE nº 243, of the 7th of October 2010). 
The content of the directive of the 5th of October 2010 of the DGRN is the
following: when it comes to the registration of minors born through surrogacy
in California, the question is not to determine parentage but to transpose into
the Spanish Civil Registry a parentage that has already been determined by a 
certificated issued by a foreign Civil Registry offering all the necessary
guarantees767 . 
The directive of the DGRN confirms what expressed the RDGRN of 2009 and pretends to 
grant with legal protection the Spanish children born abroad through surrogacy. Unlike
the RDGRN (2009), this directive specifies that only one birth certificate will not be 
sufficient768. 
Indeed, the document, in the framework of its second directive, the DGRN indicates 
that: “In no case will it be admitted as a document allowing for the registration of birth
and parentage of the new-born child, a foreign civil registry certificate or the simple
declaration accompanied by a medical birth certificate of the minor, in which the identity
of the gestating mother is not established”.
As a result, the Directorate General of Registers and Notaries abandons the position that
it had held in the Resolution of the 18th of February 2009, in which it had admitted the 
possibility of registering the parentage of children born through surrogacy on the basis of 
a simple certificate of registration of birth. On the contrary, while the DGRN admits the 
registration in the Consular Civil Registry of the children born through surrogacy, it will 
be necessary to present to the officer in charge of the Registry, a legal resolution 
(sentence), issued by the competent jurisdiction on the matter in the country of origin.  
767 QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ, A., “Maternité de substitution et droit international privé (commentaire à la
Instruction du 5 octobre 2010, de la Direction Générale des Registres et du Notariat, sur l’enregistrement de la
filiation des enfants nés par gestation pour autrui)”, Revue Critique droit international privé, 2011-1, pp.
183-188. 
768 CERDA SUBIRACHS, J., “La insostenible legalización de facto de la maternidad subrogada en España. A 
propósito de la Instrucción de 5 octubre de 2010 de la DGRN”, Abogados de Familia, Nº 60, Section Tribuna 
Abierta, Second trimester of 2011, Editorial LA LEY. LA LEY 4893/2011. 
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The introduction of this new requirement is argued in the following way:
“The requirement of a judicial resolution in the country of origin aims at controlling the
compliance with the conditions required by the contract within the legal framework of 
the country where it was formalised, as well as the protection of the best interests of the 
minor and the gestating mother. Especially, it allows to ascertain the full legal capacity
of the gestating mother, the legal validity of her consent, which must have been given
without being affected by an error on the consequences and the scope and without being
submitted to deception, violence or coercion (…). It  allows also to verify  that no  
simulation exists in the surrogacy contract, which would disguise the international traffic
of children”. 
As a result, the attribution of parentage of the newborn children born through surrogacy 
should be based on a previous judicial decision, which must be the subject of an
exequatur, in conformity with the procedure established in articles 954 and subsequent 
of the Law of Civil Procedure769 of 1881 (Law 1/1881) (after the reform introduced by 
Law 62/2003, of the 30th of December (Law 2013/2003) on fiscal, administrative and 
social measures). 
4.4. Resolutions of the DGRN ordering the registration in the Consular Civil 
Registry of the Spanish children born through surrogacy 
These resolutions are all based on the following arguments, drawing support
from the new requirements specified in the Directive of the 5th of October
2010. All the decisions relate to married gay couples, which is explained, as we 
noted before, by the invisibility of the practice of international surrogacy when
the intended parents are a heterosexual couple. The authorisation of the
marriage between two persons of the same sex and the practice of surrogacy
by gay couples conduced to this series of administrative decisions, ending
underground practices.  
Concerning children born from a Spanish homosexual couple in the United States 
through surrogacy, it is necessary to assess if the conditions of the Directive of the
DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 are complied with, that is: a) the presentation before 
an officer in charge of the Civil Registry of a judicial sentence issued by a competent 
court; b) the foreign resolution was issued according to a procedure comparable to that
of the Spanish law; c) the Californian legal entity founded its international judicial
decision on criteria equivalent to those of the Spanish legislation; d) the best interest of
the child is respected by the Californian judicial resolution; e) the rights of the gestating 
mother are guaranteed. If all the conditions are complied with, there is no basis to
refuse the recognition of the sentence of the Supreme Court of the State of California. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 6th of May 2011 
A resolution (4a) of the 6th of May 2011. In the case of the registration of the birth of 
two minors presented to that Direction Centre (the DGRN) in a procedure of appeal by
the applicants against the resolution of the officer in charge of the Consular Civil Registry 
of Los Angeles (United States). 
1. The DGNR granted the appeal and leaves the resolution of the officer in charge of the
Consular Civil Registry of Los Angeles without effect.  
2. Orders the indicated registration. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 9th of June 2011 
769 Law 1/2000, of the 7th of January on Civil Procedure. 
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A resolution (3a) of the 9th of June 2011. In the case of the registration of the birth of 
two minors presented to that Direction Centre in a procedure of appeal by the applicants 
against the resolution of the officer in charge of the Consular Civil Registry of Los
Angeles (United States). 
1. Granted the appeal and leaves the previously mentioned legal decision without effect.
2. Orders the indicated registration. 
DGRN, Resolution of the 23rd of September 2011
Registration of the birth of children born in India through surrogacy.  
The DGRN refuses the registration 
Motives: 
Children born in India through surrogacy. The conditions required by the Directive of the 
DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 are not complied with.  
The DGRN refuses the action and revokes the previously mentioned legal decision of the 
officer in charge of the Consular Civil Registry refusing the registration of the birth of
children born in India through surrogacy, as the conditions required by the Directive of
the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 are not complied with. Indeed, the sentence issued
in Mumbai does not guarantee the respect of the best interest of the child, it doesn’t
guarantee either the free consent of the gestating mother.
4.5. Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia, sentence nº. 8621/2011 (Sentence 
of the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia, of the 23rd of November 2011). 
Appeal of the sentence by the Court of First Instance of Valencia of 2010 
Questioning of the Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 
The Sentence of the Provincial Supreme Court of Valencia confirms the 
sentence of the Public Procurator (Ministerio Fiscal) against the RDGRN, it
proposes to nullify the practiced registration and agrees to its annulment.
The Sentence of the Supreme Court of Valencia defends that there are “important
obstacles to the registration to the Spanish Civil Registry of the pretended parentage, 
even without demanding […] that the foreign sentence coincides with the one that could 
have been adopted by applying the Spanish law. These obstacles concern the
infringement, through the Californian registration certificate, of the Spanish international
public order”.770 
In this case, the conditions specified by the directive with the objective to recognise the
paternity were not complied with. However, the question of a potential invalidation of the 
directive of the DGRN by the judges is raised.  
4.6. DGRN, resolution of the 22nd of December 2011: 
Concerns a request of registration: The request of registration includes all the 
stipulated documents mentioned by the Directive of the 5th of October of 2010, 
770 VELA SÁNCHEZ, A. J. (2012), “De nuevo sobre la regulación del convenio de gestación por sustitución o de
maternidad subrogada en España A propósito de la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Valencia de 23 de 
noviembre de 2011”, Diario La Ley. Section Doctrina, nº 7815, Year XXXIII, pp. 1-12. 
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in this sense the DGRN evaluates the action against the previously mentioned
judicial sentence that refused the inscription of two birth certificates.  
Let us note in detail some legal aspects on which the resolution is founded:
Resolution (4a) of the 22nd of December 2011. 
The case concerns the registration of birth of two minors presented before this Direction
Centre in a procedure of appeal by the applicants against the resolution of the officer 
responsible of the Central Civil Registry. 
Two minors were born in the United States through surrogacy. The intended parents 
were two Spanish men. The local birth certificate does not mention the gestating mother
but only the international parents. The parentage regime of newborn children was 
determined by a judicial sentence. 
All the required conditions specified by the Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October of 
2010 for the registration of children born through surrogacy were complied: a judicial
resolution comparable to the Spanish procedure, equivalent to the foreign jurisdictional 
entity based on equivalent criteria to those established by the Spanish legislation, the 
respect of the best interest of the minor and the rights of the gestating mother. 
The DGRN evaluates the action against the previously mentioned administrative decision
that refused the registration of two birth certificates issued by the foreign Civil Registry, 
after considering that the biological parentage of the minors was not established and 
invoked the prohibition of surrogacy in our legal order.
The DGRN grants the appeal on the basis of the following articles:  
The articles 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child agreed in New York on the 
20th of November 1989, 14 and 39 of the Spanish Constitution of the 27th of December 
1978 (Law 2500/1978), 10 of the law 14/2006, of the 26th of May (Law 5218/2006) 
2006 on the techniques of human assisted reproduction, 9.4, 12.4, 12.6 and 17.1 of the
Civil Code; 319, 323.3 and 767.1 of the Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure (Law 58/2000), 
954 and subsequent of the Law on Civil Procedure of 1881 (Law 1/1881), in force by the
exception clause of the previously cited Law 1/2000, 2 and 23 of the Law on the Civil 
Registry, 81, 82, 83, 85 and 86 of the Regulation of the Civil Registry and the 
Resolutions of this Direction Centre of the 23rd of April 1993 and the 18th of February 
2009 and the 3rd of May 2011; and the directive of this Directorate General of the 5th of 
October 2010. 
Considering that this case respects all the conditions stipulated by the Directive o the 5th 
of October 2010 of the DGRN, the DGRN censors the refusal of the registration of the 
two children to the Civil Registry. Thus, the registration is agreed.
4.7. Recent case law: social security, maternity leave cases 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Principado de Asturias, Sala de lo Social, 
Sentence of the 20th of September 2012, appeal 1604/2012 (Regional Superior
Tribunal equivalent to a Court of Appeal) 
Right to maternity leave and maternity indemnities for surrogacy.  
The right to maternity leave on the supposition of surrogacy confirmed.
Recognition of the right to a maternity leave and the subsequent indemnities. It is not 
the question to determine the parentage of the child born through surrogacy in 
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California, or to determine if a relation of parentage already determined by a foreign
registration certificate can be translated into the Spanish Civil Registry, as the maternity
of the woman is recognised by the Court of Los Angeles, and the birth and parentage of 
the new-born child have been registered at the Consular Civil Registry of Los Angeles.  
In this sense, there is recognition of the legal effects in the context of social benefits.
Similarly, the instruments recognised by foreign judicial or administrative resolutions are 
considered here as legally comparable to forms of adoption and pre-adoption care, which 
leads to conclude that the presuppositions of parentage are also protected by the norm. 
The Regional Superior Tribunal refuses the appeal introduced by the INSS (for the 
Spanish acronym of the National Institute of Social Security) against the sentence of the
Social Chamber nº2 of Oviedo, on fundamental rights, in consequence, confirms the 
right of the applicant to maternity leave as well as the indemnities resulting from it.
5. The debate within the doctrine. 
5.1. Criticism of the Directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010
According to some authors, the solution proposed by the Directive is not fair, as it 
fosters administratively a certain “reproductive tourism”771, aiming at evading the 
application of a legal precept (art. 10.1 of the Law 14/2006) establishing the nullity of 
surrogacy contracts, a norm that has to be considered a norm of public order.
On the other hand, it is also noted that the directive generates an economic
discrimination, as it allows only to Spanish citizens with the means to use this technique 
abroad772. 
Two types of problems can be pointed out : 
First, the directive contains very disputable clauses addressed at the officers responsible 
of the Consular Civil Registries, clauses concerning the regime of the parentage registry
of newborn children born through surrogacy. In summary, experts consider that these 
clauses are not very clear and are very difficult to apply. 
Second, a conflict of the hierarchy of laws arises. The sentence of the Court of First 
Instance nº 15 of Valencia, of the 15th of September 2010 refuses the solution given by 
the DGRN, on the basis of the nullity of surrogacy conventions in the Spanish legal
system (art. 10 of the law on the techniques of assisted human reproduction)773. 
According to this sentence, founded on articles 81 and 85 of the Regulation of the Civil 
Registry, and art. 23 of the Law of the Civil Registry, which have a major normative 
value, the registration requires that there “should be no doubt with regards to the reality
of the registered fact and its legality”. According to this point of view, the parentage of
children born from Spanish persons through surrogacy should be determined by 
childbirth. In this sense, the Spanish law explicitly prohibits that parentage in cases of
surrogacy is not attributed to the mother giving birth.  
5.2. DGRN: the legality of the directive and the conflict of laws
771 DE VERDA Y BEAMONTE, J.-R., “Inscripción de hijos nacidos mediante gestación por sustitución (a propósito 

de la Sentencia del Juzgado de Primera Instancia número 15 de Valencia, de 15 de septiembre de 2010)”,
 
Journal La Ley, Nº 7501, Section Tribuna, 3rd of November 2010, Year XXXI, Ref. D-334, Editorial LA LEY.
 
772 VELA SANCHEZ, op.cit. 

773 VELA SÁNCHEZ, A.-J., “Propuesta de regulación del convenio de gestación por sustitución o de maternidad 

subrogada en España. El recurso a las madres de alquiler (1): a propósito de la Instrucción de la DGRN de 5 de 

octubre de 2010”, Journal La Ley, Nº 7621, Section Doctrina, 3rd of May 2011, Year XXXII, Ref. D-190, Editorial
 
LA LEY.
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For some authors, this regulation is void as it infringes the principle of normative
hierarchy of the Spanish legal order. The Ministry of Justice, through the Directorate 
General of Registers and Notaries, would have made the mistake of thinking that
regulatory norms can be arbitrarily used against the Law in force, affecting critically the 
legal system constitutionally established and guaranteed, and in particular article 9.3 of
the supreme law establishing that the “Constitution guarantees […] the normative 
hierarchy”; as did are equally article 1.2 of the Civil Code: “the dispositions opposing the 
norms of superior level will not be valid”774. 
6. Premises for the regulation of surrogacy?  
The directive of the DGRN of the 5th of October 2010 can also be understood as a 
statement of general intent or the premises of a regulation of surrogacy in Spain. 
Indeed, the Motives of the Directive as well as the clauses could configure the basic
structure of a basic convention of surrogacy in the Spanish legal system. The following 
are the directive clauses of the 4th of October 2010: 1. the fertilization of the gestating
woman with the genetic material of at least one of the parents or the intended mothers;
2. the capacity of the parties to act voluntarily; 3. the irrevocability of the given consent;
4. the possibility that the child born through surrogacy knows his/her biological origin775. 
We would find therein the essential characteristics of the surrogacy convention: the 
supply of genetic material by at least one of the parents or the intended mothers, full 
capacity and free consent of the contracting parties, the irrevocability of the consent and 
a guarantee of the access to his/her biological origin of the child born through surrogacy.
We can also add a further characteristic that could be a part of the surrogacy 
convention, namely the registration on a notarial public document. 
Moreover, some legal experts (within which many members of the National Commission
on Medically Assisted Reproduction776) propose the legalisation of surrogacy for women 
who cannot bear or conceive children for physiological reason. In this sense, this 
commission does not consider the case of gay couples.  
7. Determination of parentage: the growing complexity of assisted reproduction 
technology. 
The determination of maternity in the context of ART is progressively complex, as three
women can participate: the one taking the decision regarding the birth, the one 
providing the ovule, and finally the surrogate. In other cases, the ovule will be provided
by the intended mother or the surrogate, engaging only two women, one of them having 
two functions in this case. 
Art. 10.2 of the Law on the techniques of assisted reproduction established that the 
parentage of children born through surrogacy will be determined by childbirth. This 
article is based on the principle of a biological, gestational truth sometimes different 
from the genetic truth, which dominates in terms of the determination of paternity. This 
solution is justified according to civil law experts arguing on the basis of the 
774 VELA SÁNCHEZ, Op.cit. LASARTE ÁLVAREZ, C. (2012), “La reproducción asistida y la prohibición legal de
maternidad subrogada admitida de hecho por vía reglamentaria”, Journal La Ley, nº 7777, pp. 1 and on. 
775 DE VERDA, Op.cit. 
776 The National Commission on Medically Assisted Reproduction (Comision Nacional de Reproduccion Humana 
Asistida) is a collegial, permanent advisory body with the objective of helping and orienting the use of
techniques of assisted procreation, of contributing to the updating and diffusion of scientific knowledge and 
techniques on the matter and of establishing the functional and structural criteria of the centres and services
concerned. It is composed by personalities named by the general administration of the State, the autonomous
communities, the different scientific associations and diverse entities of civil society concerned by the different 
scientific, legal and ethical aspects of assisted reproduction. 
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psychological and physiological mother-child relation developed during the period of
gestation, an important period in the process of formation and development of the child.
In the cases of bio-maternal, genetic and gestational duality, the first is sacrificed in
favour of the second in the Law on the techniques of assisted reproduction, despite the
fact that the genetic and volitional dimension is found in the gestational component. The
sociological reality, derived from volition, is overlooked and used by the Civil Code in the
recognition of children by the existence of a de facto parent-child relation777, to 
subsidiarily establish parentage or to condition the legitimation of certificates of 
parentage778. 
The value of the genetic aspect is considered as preponderant by the law in other cases, 
as the one concerning the accessibility to the biogenetic information of the person779. 
Art. 5.5 of the Law on the techniques of assisted reproduction establishes that the born
children have the right to obtain general information about the donors. It would be
possible even to reveal their identity for the following reasons: in case of danger for
health (life danger) or in case of problems relating to penal procedures780. 
The prevention or cure of illnesses justifies the access to this biogenetic information,
showing the importance of the biological component that is, however, ignored when
determining parentage, not without a certain incoherence in the order of principles. 
Insofar as the right to health of art. 42 of the Spanish Constitution, the right to life of
every person and the right to know of one’s identity justify this access, these rights 
should also justify genetic parentage781. 
7.1. Consent as the basis of determination of parentage.
If the LTRA of 1988 did not take into consideration the possibility of determining
parentage in favour of another woman other than the one giving birth, considering a 
double filiation only in cases of heterosexual couples782, nowadays, in Spain it is possible
777 In the Spanish law, the de facto existence of a parent-child relation constitutes a cause to attribute 
parentage even in the absence of biological relation. Perspectivas del derecho de familia en el siglo XXI: XIII 
Congreso Internacional de Derecho de Familia / coord. por Carlos Lasarte Alvarez, Araceli Donado Vara, María 
Fernanda Moretón Sanz, Fátima Yáñez Vivero, 2004, I 
778 DELGADO ECHEVARRIA J., “Los consentimientos relevantes en la fecundación asistida”, pág. 203.
779 The Spanish regulation on parentage is not only contemplated by the Civil Code, but also by other 
autonomous civil laws. Catalonia (art. 235 of the Law 25/2010, of the 29th of July, of the Second Book of the 
Civil Code of Catalonia, and arts. 87 to 114 Code of the Family of Catalonia) and Navarre (laws 68 to 72 of the
Compilation of Civil Law of the Jurisdiction of Navarre (Fuero Nuevo de Navarra) have their own regulation in
matters of determination of parentage. 
780 According to articles 5, 6, 7 of the LTRA (14/2006)
5. the donation will be anonymous and the confidentiality of the identity information of the donors will be
guaranteed by the banks of gametes, as well as, in the pertinent cases, by the donor and activity registries of 
the centres. The born children have the right to obtain general information on the donors, except their identity 
(this general information is not specified by the law). Only exceptionally, in extraordinary circumstances such
as cases of danger of life or health of the child born through medically assisted reproduction or when the 
application of laws on penal procedures requires it, will the identity of the donors be revealed, only when the 
revelation is inevitable to avoid danger or to obtain a legal objective. The revelation will be limited and will not 
imply the publicity of the identity of the donors.  
6. Donors will have to be older than 18 years old, be in good psychophysical health and full volition (…). 
7. The maximum number of children born through medically assisted reproduction, in Spain, from a shame 
donor, cannot be higher than six. With the purpose of ensuring the effective application of this limit, the donors 
will have to declare for each donation if they have engaged in previous donations before, as well as the 
conditions and indicate the moment and the centre where the donations took place.
It will be the responsibility of each centre or service using gametes from donors to verify the identity of the 
donors. 
781 Parentage in assisted procreation “La filiación a finales del siglo XX: problemática planteada por los avances 
científicos en materia de reproducción humana: ponencias y comunicaciones” Vitoria-Gasteiz, 28-IX to 2-X­
1987, 1988, pgs. 201-230.
782 Art. 6, aps, 3 and 3; 8, pars 1 and 2 of the LTRA 1988.
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to determine the parentage resulting from the access to ART by a homosexual couple of
two women783. 
In Spain, the law nº 14 of the 26th of May 2006 on the techniques of medically assisted
human reproduction defines the main rules in relation to medical assistance to 
reproduction. It repeals previous dispositions, resulting from the law nº 35 of the 22nd of
November 1988, which was reformed in 2003784. Two years after the law opening 
marriage to homosexual couples, co-maternity was recognised in parentage law. But 
discrimination still exists between homosexual and heterosexual couples in matters of
parenthood. Contrary to the case of heterosexual couples who can adopt children or 
engage in medically assisted reproduction without being married, homosexual couples 
have to mandatorily be subjected to the institution of marriage.
Facing this situation, the doctrine has noted discrimination towards de facto homosexual 
couples, who cannot adopt, contrary to the case of heterosexual couples785. Surprisingly, 
parentage laws impose strongly the institution of marriage on homosexual couples.
In Spain, in the case of a marriage between two women, in which one of them gives  
birth to a child resulting from ART, the parentage norms (that the new law on marriage 
did not modify) create problems of discrimination.
These were initially denounced and, as a result, partially corrected by two changes of the 
law, the law 2006 on the techniques of assisted reproduction (L.T.R.A.) and the law 
3/2007 on gender identity. In 2006, the law on the techniques of assisted reproduction, 
law 14/2006 on the “Técnicas de reproducción humana asistida”, will also ignore this
problem. It would be necessary to wait until 2007, in the frame of the law on gender
identity, (law 3/2007, of the 15th of March, regulating the registry modification of the 
mentions in relation to the sex of individuals), for a modification of article 7 of the law of 
14/2006 to take place, adding a third paragraph, recognising explicitly the possibility of
engaging in a procedure of recognition of parentage in favour of the non biological 
mother, so as for it to enter into force when the child is born. 
When it is the case of a heterosexual married couple, marriage works as a presumption 
of paternity. But when it is the case of two married women, following the reforms
introduced by the law 13/2005 incorporating the figure of homosexual marriage with the
same effects as those given to heterosexual marriage, marriage is not valid to establish
presumption of co-maternity. However, in virtue of the principles of the Spanish law
3/2005, the treatment should not be different. In fact, the law 2005 and the new law 
L.T.R.A. leave a legal gap. Moreover, articles 6.3 and 8.1 of the L.T.R.A. refer only to the 
husband or the partner as the person able or obliged to give his consent for the 
parentage in relation to the conceived child through these techniques can be determined 
at the moment of childbirth. In practice, this situation obliged the wife of the women
conceiving and giving birth to the child to undergo a request of adoption to be able to be 
recognised as the legal mother, a long and tedious procedure786. 
For the Spanish legislator, it was evident that it was necessary to create a new norm to 
harmonise the legislation with the goals aimed by the law on homosexual marriage.
783 See the Catalonian laws: Law 10/2008, of the 10th of July, of the fourth book of the Civil Code concerning 

successions, and law 25/2010, of the 29th of July, of the second book of the Civil Code, concerning the person 

and the family. Especially in the following articles: Art. 235-8 rules the “Assisted reproduction of the married
 
woman”, and art. 235-13 rules the “Assisted reproduction of the woman”.
 
784 QUIÑONES ESCAMEZ, A. “Conjugalité, Parenté et Parentalité”, Revue Internationale de droit comparé”, 

2012, pp. 57-91.
 
785 VALLES AMORES, M., « Modificación del Código civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio », 

Revista de derecho de familia, 28, 2005, pp. 57-64.
 
786 ROCA i ESCODA, M., et GALLUS, N., « Ouverture du mariage aux homosexuelles en Espagne et en 

Belgique: une mise en question du caractère hétérosexué du droit? », in C. Perrin, M. Roca i Escoda et L. 

Parini, « Genre et homophobie », Nouvelles questions féministes, vol. 31, nº 1, March 2012.
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There was “a problem of legal congruence and coherence between the laws”. The reform
of the L.T.R.A. in 2006 entering into force after the law 13/2005 enacted an equal 
treatment for homosexual and heterosexual couples to the legal effects of marriage. This 
situation was, thus, apprehended as generating “unfair solutions”, partly resolved by the 
reform of the L.T.R.A. in 2007 establishing that: 
“When the woman is married, and not legally or de facto separated, with another 
woman, the latter will be able to manifest before the officer in charge of the Civil 
Registry of the matrimonial home that she consents to a relation of parentage to her
favour, when the child of her spouse is born”.
However, this modification does not create symmetry between the treatment in relation
to heterosexual and lesbian couples. In the current states, it is only heterosexual men
who are the subject of automatic establishment of parentage through marriage with the 
mother of the child through the presumption of paternity. In Catalonia, as a result of 
legislative reforms of the Catalonian Civil Code787, the association of Lesbian and Gay 
Families (F.L.G. for its acronym in Spanish) had requested that the procedures of
parentage of heterosexual and homosexual couples be placed in complete symmetry. To
reach that objective, the FLG wanted that a presumption of maternity be applied beyond 
the use of A.R.T., that is, in cases where the conception is done through “artisanal”
ways788. This opening to the presumption of maternity was refused by the legislator, 
adducing the biological impossibility to have the same child: “This new legislation gives
space to the same-sex family, except for the differences imposed by nature”789. 
We can, thus conclude, that the recognition of same-sex parentage in Spain continues to 
be supported on a parentage system that reproduces the transposition of a biological
reality (that of the capacity to reproduce) into a legal artefact, even if the techniques of 
assisted reproduction deconstruct the logics of this fiction.
In the case of surrogacy taking place abroad, we observed that, while the practice is 
formally prohibited in Spain, recently, through the channels of the Civil Registry a gay
couple can equally validate a “natural” parentage, registering the child in the Spanish
Civil Registry as having two fathers, even if this legal instrument is not consolidated and 
has been questioned many times by judicial channels. We could raise a contradiction 
here: gay couples can validate a “natural” parentage by transcription of foreign birth
certificates while lesbian couples are faced to the impossibility of procreation as 
justification for the refusal of the presumption of maternity. There would be, thus,
discrimination between the couples of men (indivisibility of admitted parenthood) and 
couples of women (divisibility of parenthood).
Such an appreciation has to be, however, strongly nuanced: gay couples have to face
very difficult procedures, especially taking into account that surrogacy is prohibited.
Conversely lesbian couples can legally engage in assisted reproduction and the 
parentage relation is automatically established from childbirth, with the reserve of the 
insemination taking place in a health establishment and not in an artisanal manner.  
8. Statistical problems. 
In Spain, the absence of official annual registries is an obstacle to having reliable
information on the persons acceding to ART, and more concretely, to know of the 
percentage of homosexual couples engaging in the procedure. As highlighted by Farnós
Amorós, the Spanish government has systematically ignored the obligation of articles 21
787 Catalonia, as other autonomous communities, disposes of a proper civil law. However, it cannot legislate on 

marriage, as the institution is the sole competence of the Spanish State.
 
788 ROCA i ESCODA, M., « De la mobilisation du droit à la réalisation du droit - Les actions de l’association 

catalane Familles lesbiennes et gays », Politix, 2/2011, pp. 59-80.
 
789 Official Journal of the Parliament of Catalonia, n° 5686, 5th of August 2010, pp. 61162-61260.
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and 22 LTRHA, stipulating the regulation of registries of donors and the activities of the 
centres. It is important to highlight that the law on techniques of assisted reproduction 
of 1988 included an obligation to the government of creating a donor registry and a
modification in 2003 ordered the creation of a registry of activities. However, this
registry does not yet exist790. 
In relation to the children born from surrogacy who have been registered and for whom 
parentage is recognised, it is impossible to count them, as according to art. 7.2. of the
LTHRA (law 14/2006), “the registration in the Civil Registry will never reflect information
that could lead to inferences on the character of the conception”.  
According to some publications, it would seem that most heterosexual Spanish couples
wishing to engage in surrogacy sign agreements with foreign women, preferably Latin
American. The different procedures prior to pregnancy take place in the country of origin
of the gestating mother, within whose uterus is transferred an embryo resulting from the
gametes of the intended parents. The child is sometimes directly registered as being that 
of the couple (without the need to be subjected to the strict conditions of the Directive of
2010) making it greatly difficult for Spanish to apprehend the scope of the phenomenon. 
790 FARNOS AMOROS, E. “Acceso a la reproducción asistida por parejas del mismo sexo en España: Estado de 
la cuestión, propuestas y retos”, P. Grosman et al. Derecho de familia, Revista interdisciplinairia de Doctrina y 
jJurisprudencia, 49, May 2011, pg: 153-181. 
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